Voting position, benefits and recommendation of directors
55 The board of Allkem unanimously recommends that shareholders vote in favour of the Scheme in the absence of a superior proposal, and subject to Kroll continuing to conclude that it is in the best interests of the shareholders. Each director has indicated that they will vote in favour of the Scheme, but this has to be considered having regard to the fact that they will receive benefits if the transaction completes. I considered the various authorities as to director benefits and recommendations in Asaleo Care Limited, in the matter of Asaleo Care Limited [2021] FCA 406 at [70]-[71]; and in Essential Metals Limited, in the matter of Essential Metals Limited [2023] FCA 240 at [72]-[74]. I consider it is ordinarily appropriate for directors to make a recommendation, but there must be clear disclosure in the Scheme Booklet of their interests, and the nature and extent of the proposed disclosure of their interests must be carefully assessed. It is a fact-sensitive assessment: ThinkSmart Limited, in the matter of ThinkSmart Limited [2022] FCA 1314 at [52] (Jackson J).
56 In this case, the Scheme Booklet discloses that Allkem directors will receive certain benefits in connection with the Scheme. In particular, it states that each non-executive director will receive a special exertion fee to recognise the time and effort spent in connection with the evaluation, design and negotiation of the transaction. Certain of the non-executive directors are proposed to be appointed directors of Arcadium upon implementation of the transaction. Mr Pérez de Solay (Allkem chief executive officer) will receive certain benefits, including accelerated vesting of performance rights (consistent with the rights of other holders of performance rights), a redundancy payment under his employment arrangements, and a one-off 'Transaction Completion Bonus' of US$500,000. The number of shares held by the directors and the potential benefits they will receive are also disclosed in the Scheme Booklet.
57 The Scheme Booklet sets out that each of the Allkem directors considers that it is appropriate for them to make a recommendation in relation to the Scheme, as each of them believes that the benefits are not of such materiality to them that they impact their consideration of the Scheme or their ability to make a recommendation to Allkem shareholders.
58 Further, the voting intention statements given by the directors of Allkem are not class creating: Tawana Resources NL, in the matter of Tawana Resources NL (No 3) [2018] FCA 1952 at [23]-[32].
59 It is important, however, to address further the director entitlements in this case.
60 Allkem submitted that there was nothing in the transaction which may be viewed as a collateral benefit that might induce directors to vote their shares in favour of the Scheme.
61 In particular, Allkem explained that the performance rights granted to Mr Pérez de Solay and other shareholders were granted pursuant to the PROP, which was approved in November 2022, prior to entry into the Scheme and the Transaction Agreement. The performance rights held by Mr Pérez De Solay will be worth approximately $1,457,846.123. The accelerated vesting of those performance rights was determined by applying the same methodology which the Allkem board applied to all performance rights currently on issue. Accordingly, the performance rights would have been paid to Mr Pérez De Solay in the ordinary course, but will be accelerated and pro-rated because of the transaction.
62 An additional 109,955 performance rights were expected to be issued to Mr Pérez De Solay, subject to shareholder approval at Allkem's annual general meeting scheduled to be held on 8 November 2023 (the same day as the first court hearing). Of these performance rights, a maximum of 18,325 may vest on an accelerated basis in connection with the transaction, and they are worth approximately $111,885.
63 Mr Pérez De Solay is entitled to other benefits and payments, including a short-term incentive payment, based on his current base salary. His entitlement arose under an incentive program already in place prior to entry into the Transaction Agreement. Similarly, an entitlement to a one-off redundancy payment would have been paid to Mr Pérez De Solay in the ordinary course and irrespective of the completion of the Scheme and the Transaction Agreement.
64 Mr Pérez De Solay has received other financial benefits, including a Merger Completion Bonus of US$500,000 and one-off Retention Bonus of $187,500.
65 As to the payment of special exertion fees to the directors, such a course is permitted under the Allkem constitution, which was adopted in November 2022. Directors would therefore have been eligible to receive such fees prior to and before entry into the Transaction Agreement, and shareholder approval was not required and did not need to be sought for these payments.
66 According to Allkem, the quantum of the financial benefits to directors are not excessive, extravagant or out of the ordinary, having regard to the broader value of the transaction (A$15.7 billion).
67 All of these entitlements have been disclosed in the Scheme Booklet. Indeed, amendments to the Scheme Booklet have been made to highlight these entitlements (see in particular clause 4.8(a) as to Mr Pérez De Solay's entitlements, where the potential total value of the benefits, apart from salary and ongoing incentives during his 9-month notice period, is estimated to be US$2.84 million). I infer the amendments were incorporated after communications with ASIC.
68 The benefits are not overtly out of the ordinary having regard to the transaction as a whole. The directors stand to receive certain of the benefits regardless of the transaction, and some entitlements arose by way of rights under the constitution and PROP that arose prior in time to the Transaction Agreement. Mr Pérez De Solay will not receive the proposed additional performance rights without shareholder approval.
69 In all of the circumstances, having regard to the nature of the benefits and the prominent disclosure of such benefits in the Scheme Booklet, I accept that there is no reason to depart from the ordinary approach that the directors may make recommendations with respect to the Scheme.
70 It is also important to bear in mind that the recommendations of the directors are contingent upon Kroll continuing to conclude the Scheme is in the best interests of shareholders. The shareholders will receive Kroll's report. Kroll's report provides an important cross-check as to the commercial benefits and risks of the Scheme overall.