Chetcuti v The University of Sydney

The second access application

1. The second access application requested: Documents relied upon by Dr Michael Spence, the University's Vice Chancellor and Principal, and Mark Gillespie ('Gillespie') in their various communications with me over the rejection of my abstract, Notation - I am here referring to their respective claims that my abstract was rejected because the Conference had to be scaled down. The edited abstract of Gillespie, Documents recording Gillespie's disappointment at my abstract being rejected, Documents recording decisions relating to the acceptance and rejection of abstracts not included in the 'Redacted Document', Notation - The Notice of Decision states, 'Document 11 includes details of presenters whose applications were successful and who made presentations or participated in panel sessions at the Conference'. Many of those who made presentations or participated in panel sessions at the Conference - including Ken Davis and Robyn Plaister - are not listed in the 'Redacted Document'. Other presenters not mentioned in the 'Redacted Document' include, amongst others, Mark Latchford, Hendri Yulius, Shawna Tang, Thomas Baudinette, Rebecca Gray, Matthew Clarke, Kane Race, Heath Paynter, Honni van Rijswijk, Susan Potter, Gail Hewison and Peter de Waal. Documents relating to parts 5, 6, 7 and 8 as referred to on page 2 of the Notice of Decision, Notation - The Notice of Decision identified no documents that disclose, inter alia, who came up with the idea for these Sessions, what discussions took place, and who decided how the Panels were to be constituted. Documents relating to the selection, appointment and composition of the organizing committee, including the appointment of 78ers to the organizing committee, Documents disclosing the appointment of 78ers to Conference panels, Records of the meeting of 22 May 2018 referred to in the 'Redacted Document', including but not limited to the details of those who participated at this meeting, Other records of the organizing committee including its minutes, Documents listing the criteria forming the basis for the acceptance and rejection of abstracts, and Documents containing the contribution of any 78er with respect to the acceptance and rejection of abstracts whether such contribution was formally sought or freely offered.
2. The Respondent identified a number of documents that fell within the scope of the access applications and decided to provide access to some of the information and to refuse to provide access to some of the information because it found that there is an overriding public interest against its disclosure.
3. As a result of the discussions between the parties and the decisions under review, the matters have been significantly narrowed. The Applicant subsequently indicated the he was not pursuing Parts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the first application and Part 2 of the second application.
4. The documents which respond to the second access application as pressed by the Applicant are identified as: 1. Item 1 - the minutes of the Conference organising committee. These minutes partially respond to Parts 6 and 9 of the request. 2. Items 2, 3 and 4 - emails from Susan Parker to the Vice Chancellor. These documents were relevant to Part 1 of the request. 3. Item 6 - an email from Mark Gillespie to a third party. This document responds to Part 3 of the request.
5. In relation to the remaining parts of the second access application, the Respondent contends that the requested information is not held.
6. The Respondent contends that some of the withheld information is personal information of third parties who have not consented to the release. Some other information that has been withheld is said to be subject to legal privilege which has not been waived.

Issues to be determined

1. The Tribunal is to decide what the 'correct and preferable' decisions are having regard to the material before it, including any relevant factual material and any applicable written or unwritten law: section 63(1) Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 ("the ADR Act").

Applicable legislation

1. The Respondent has provided a copy of the withheld information to the Tribunal on a confidential basis. That material has not been disclosed to the Applicant or the public. Section 64(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 applies to that material. Section 64(d) provides: 64 Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning proceedings (1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason, it may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) make any one or more of the following orders - … (d) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the proceedings of evidence given before the Tribunal, or of the contents of a document lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings.
2. Further, section 107 (1) of the GIPA Act provides: 107 Procedure for dealing with public interest considerations (1) In determining an application for NCAT administrative review, NCAT is to ensure that it does not, in the reasons for its decision or otherwise, disclose any information for which there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
3. I determined to deal with the consideration of some issues by way of confidential session. The Applicant and the public were excluded from that aspect of the hearing. I have also made orders under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 for the non-publication and non-disclosure of the withheld information.
4. Pursuant to section 63(3) of the ADR Act the Tribunal may decide to: (a) affirm the reviewable decision, (b) vary the reviewable decision, (c) set aside the reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision it set aside, or (d) set aside the reviewable decision and remit the matter for consideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
5. Section 5 of the GIPA Act establishes a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
6. Section 9 of the GIPA Act provides that applicants for access to government information have a legally enforceable right to be provided with access to it, unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
7. Section 12 of the GIPA Act provides that there is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information that is not covered by overriding secrecy laws. The category of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure is not limited. Subsection 12(2) sets out several examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure.
8. Section 13 of the GIPA Act provides that there is an "overriding public interest against disclosure" of government information for the purposes of this Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure.
9. Section 14(1) of the GIPA Act provides that it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of any of the government information described in Schedule 1. The Respondent considers that there is a conclusive presumption against disclosure of some of the withheld information as it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege: clause 5 of Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act.
10. Clause 5 of Schedule 1 to the GIPA Act provides: 5 Legal professional privilege (1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege (legal professional privilege), unless the person in whose favour the privilege exists has waived the privilege. (2) If an access application is made to an agency in whose favour legal professional privilege exists in all or some of the government information to which access is sought, the agency is required to consider whether it would be appropriate for the agency to waive that privilege before the agency refuses to provide access to government information on the basis of this clause. (3) A decision that an agency makes under subclause (2) is not a reviewable decision under Part 5.
11. The public interest considerations listed in the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act are the only other considerations that may be taken into account under this Act as public interest considerations against disclosure for the purpose of determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information.
12. Section 97 of the GIPA Act places the onus of establishing the claim for legal professional privilege lies on the Respondent. The same onus applies in review proceedings in the Tribunal: section 105.
13. I recently discussed issues relating to legal professional privilege in Lipscombe v Blue Mountains City Council [2020] NSWCATAD 121.
14. The relevant test under the GIPA Act for the determining client legal privilege and waiver of that privilege is the statutory formulation under the Evidence Act 1995. This approach has been confirmed by the Tribunal in a number of cases. In CHU Underwriting Pty Ltd v Hunter Water Corporation [2018] NSWCATAD 273, Senior Member McAteer provided the following discussion: Principles of Legal Professional Privilege 23 The concept of LPP has been well established as a legal concept over many years. The case of Hutchinson v Walcha Shire Council [2015] NSWCATAD 132 like many cases establishes the requisite LPP requirements in the GIPA Act context. At [54] the Tribunal observed: 54. The general provisions relating to the existence of legal professional privilege are as follows. The material must be: In the context of a client and lawyer relationship, That there is a confidential nature to the communication or the document(s), The communication or the documents was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of either: (a) assisting the client in obtaining, or the lawyer to give or provide legal advice or services, (b) for use in either existing of proposed / contemplated proceedings / litigation. 55. These provisions have a current statutory authority within sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 24 ... 25 The question for the Tribunal is whether these documents were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to a client or the client being provided with professional legal services. 26 Sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 provide: 118 Legal advice Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer, or (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client, or (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person, for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client. 119 Litigation Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made, or (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared, for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party. 27 ... Reference was made to the provisions of s 177 of the Evidence Act 1995 which defines the terms 'confidential communication', 'confidential documents', 'client' and 'lawyer'. 28 The Respondent referred to the meaning of the words 'dominant purpose' ... In Battin v University of New England [2013] NSWADT 73 at [35] the ADT observed: A 'dominant purpose' is one that predominates over other purposes; it is the prevailing or paramount purpose: FCT v Pratt Holdings at 279-280 per Kenny J at [30], AWB v Cole [2006] FCA 1234 per Young J at [44]. When applying the dominant purpose test an appropriate starting point is to ask what was the intended use or uses of the document which accounted for it being brought into existence: Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357 per Finn J v; AWB v Cole [2006] FCA 1234 per Young J at [44].
15. Legal Professional Privilege is not established by the mere assertion that the privilege applies to a particular communication. Simply to label a document as being "prepared for legal advice" or as "privileged" or as being "without prejudice" is of itself insufficient to justify the privilege. It is necessary to consider objectively whether the reports were privileged. This takes account of the substance of the matter, having regard to the content, context and evidence as well as the form of the documents.
16. In order to prove that a document is privileged the Respondent must show the dominant purpose for which the document came into existence. The Respondent is required to consider whether it would be appropriate for the agency to waive that privilege before it refuses to provide access to the information on the basis of privileged. A decision regarding whether or not to waive privilege is not a reviewable decision.
17. Section 15 of the GIPA Act sets out the principles that apply when considering whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. Agencies must exercise their functions so as to promote the objects of the GIPA Act and must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner. The Tribunal is guided by those principles.
18. The Tribunal's jurisdiction derives from section 100 of the GIPA Act. Section 100(1) provides that a person who is aggrieved by a reviewable decision of an agency may apply to the Tribunal for administrative review of the decision. The administrative review application is brought under the ADR Act. The Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it.

"personal information" The term 'personal information' is defined in clause 4 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act to include information or an opinion about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.

1. Section 4(1) of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 ("the PPIP Act") defines 'personal information' in broadly the same terms as in clause 4 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act.
2. Section 18 of the PPIP Act provides: 18 Limits on disclosure of personal information (1) A public sector agency that holds personal information must not disclose the information to a person (other than the individual to whom the information relates) or other body, whether or not such other person or body is a public sector agency, unless (a) the disclosure is directly related to the purpose for which the information was collected, and the agency disclosing the information has no reason to believe that the individual concerned would object to the disclosure, or (b) the individual concerned is reasonably likely to have been aware or has been made aware in accordance with section 10, that information of that kind is usually disclosed to that other person or body, or (c) the agency believes on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of the individual concerned or another person
3. In the present matter the Respondent contends that it is possible that the identity of the author of an abstract could be identified by others. The question has arisen in regard to whether or not the identity of the author can reasonably be ascertained from the information and the extent of redactions that would be necessary to ensure that the identity could not be reasonably be ascertained.
4. In Office of Finance and Services v APV and APW [2014] NSWCATAP 88 the Appeal panel stated at paragraph [4]: 4. To be "personal information" the information or opinion must be about an individual "whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion." We have decided that this phrase does not mean that the individual's identity must be apparent or reasonably ascertainable solely from the information or opinion. Depending on the circumstances, other information may be consulted in order to ascertain the identity of the person concerned. In the circumstances of this case where APV's and APW's identity could be ascertained from the information or opinion in combination with information on a website controlled by the agency itself, the information was personal information.
5. At paragraphs [49] - [50] the Appeal panel stated 49. It is not in dispute that the personal information in this case was "about an individual". The issue is the meaning of the phrase "whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion." The Conservation Management Plan and the Schedule of Repair Works are the documents which the Office of Finance and Services submits do not contain personal information. That submission is made on the basis that the information includes APV's and APW's address and information about the interior of their home, but not their names. The Office of Finance and Services contended that because APV's and APW's identities must be reasonably ascertainable "from" the information, only that information can be examined. Other sources, such as the internet, cannot be interrogated to ascertain a person's identity. 50. The information in those documents became "personal Information" in the view of the Tribunal because an internet search using APV's and APW's address led to the web page for "NSW Tendering." That website contains APV's and APW's names as the successful tenderers for the property at that address. A member of the public could ascertain the identity of APV and APW from the Conservation Management Plan and the Schedule of Repair Works together with the information on the NSW Tendering website.
6. Identifying information may be redacted in order to remove the possibility that an individual may be identified by the information in issue. In Field v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2015] NSWCATAD 153, in reference to unidentified bystanders whose faces could be seen in video footage held by the agency, the Tribunal accepted that if the identification of a bystander was "possible" from the footage, their "identity may either be apparent or reasonably ascertainable" from the footage and whether or not the agency had been able to identify them is irrelevant to whether it contains their personal information. The Tribunal stated at paragraph [75]: 75. A person's identity may either be apparent or reasonably ascertainable from the information, in conjunction with other information that may be consulted: Office of Finance and Services v APV [2014] NSWCATAP 88 at [4]. ... It is also possible that some of the bystanders whose faces are visible could be identified, although that is not highly likely as the recording is taken from above and at some distance from the persons involved, so that their faces are not sharply discernible. The fact that the police have been able to identify only those persons shown to be working in the nearby shops supports that view. Nevertheless, it will be assumed for present purposes that one or more of the bystanders could be identified and that the footage therefore contains "personal information" consisting of images and information about their actions during the incident.
7. In Meldru v Wollondilly Shire Council [2017] NSWCATAD 292, a GIPA Act case, the Tribunal stated at paragraph [42]: 42. ... Although the Respondent's decision stated that "I am unable to identify the third parties for the purposes of third party consultation", so the individuals whose images were present in the 2016 video footage were not identifiable to the Respondent, this does not mean that individuals were not generally identifiable. Viewing the 2016 video footage confirmed that at least two members of the public could reasonably be expected to be identified by their facial features.
8. Senior Member Dinnen accepted that the footage contained the personal information of those individuals who could be identified and at paragraph [44] she ordered the Respondent to: provide the Applicant with a copy of the 2016 video footage, edited to de-identify those members of the public whose facial features are visible.

Adequacy of search

1. Section 53 of the GIPA Act provides that the obligation of an agency to provide access to government information in response to an access application is limited to information held by the agency when the application is received. An agency must undertake such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find any of the government information applied for that was held by the agency when the application was received. The agency's searches must be conducted using the most efficient means reasonably available to the agency.
2. The question of whether an agency has carried out all reasonable searches is not a reviewable decision under section 80 of the GIPA Act. However the Tribunal does have power to review a decision that information is not held by an agency. This may extend to an implicit decision of a government agency that it does not hold information beyond that which has been provided.
3. The Appeal Panel in Robinson v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAP 73 stated at paragraph [8] The question of whether all documents have been located becomes a reviewable decision in the following way. If the agency's answer is that it has no further documents in relation to the information sought, that is a decision 'that the information is not held by the agency' (s 58(b). A decision that government information is not held by an agency is a reviewable decision (s 80(e)). Such a decision may be said to be an implied decision in any decision responding to an access application. ...
4. The Tribunal has often applied the approach of the Queensland Information Commissioner in Shepherd and Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning (1994) 1 QAR 464. In that decision the Commissioner outlined a two-stage approach to the question of what constitutes an adequate search. The first is to consider whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the requested documents exist and are documents of the agency. If that question is answered in the affirmative, then to consider whether the search efforts made by the agency to locate such documents have been reasonable in all the circumstances.
5. Under this approach, in the context of the GIPA Act, the Tribunal must form a view as to whether there may be some further information that falls within the scope of the access application and, if so, whether the efforts that the agency concerned made to find the information were sufficient.
6. The Tribunal may review a decision that an agency does not hold information under section 80(e) of the GIPA Act. It has been generally accepted that this includes review of an implicit decision that an agency does not hold information. Thus, if the agency locates certain information, to which it refuses access and/or provides access, but does not mention any other information, the Tribunal has taken the view that it may review the implicit decision that the agency does not hold any other information.
7. In Webb v Port Stephens Council [2018] NSWCATAP 224, at paragraph [37], the Appeal Panel agreed that the correct approach is explained in Amos v Central Coast Council [2018] NSWCATAD 101 at paragraph [39]: The burden of establishing that the implicit decision that the Council does not hold information is justified lies on the Council: GIPA Act, s 105(1). The Council submitted that the onus is on the applicant to establish that the additional information exists. That proposition is not supported by the legislative scheme, nor by authority. In Cianfrano v Director General Department of Commerce (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 195 at [69], a case dealing with the Freedom of Information Act, Judge O'Connor remarked that an applicant "must put some credible material or submissions before the Tribunal which persuades the Tribunal that an arguable case of that kind exists [that is, that there is further material]." These remarks were applied in the context of the GIPA Act in Templeton v Office of Environment & Heritage [2016] NSWCATAD 312 at [22]. These decisions suggest that the applicant has what is sometimes referred to as a "practical onus" to establish the existence, or possible existence, of further information. However, these comments should not be taken to detract from the respondent's legal onus to justify its decision under s 105 of the GIPA Act.
8. Senior Member Higgins discussed the issue recently in Alam v Insurance and Care NSW [2020] NSWCATAD 148. She stated at paragraph [46]: The Tribunal has accepted that the applicant bears a 'practical onus' to establish that the requested information exists, or that there is a possibility that it exists and is held by the agency: Webb v Port Stephens Council [2018] NSWCATAP 224 at [39] and Amos v Central Coast Council [2018] NSWCATAD 101 at [39]. However, this does not detract from the respondent's legal onus to justify its decision as required under s 105 of the GIPA Act.
9. The Appeal Panel in Webb v Port Stephens Council noted at paragraph [36] that, where there is relevant and credible material presented to support the decision, in practical terms, a burden will fall on the applicant to try and overcome or undermine the case from the agency. It is not enough for an applicant to base the assertion on a deep-seated distrust of the agency: Cianfrano v Director General Department of Commerce (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 195 at paragraph [69].
10. In Amos v Central Coast Council [2019] NSWCATAD 226 the Tribunal stated at paragraphs [12] - [14]: 12. Where an applicant asserts that searches for information conducted in response to an application have not been reasonable, Camilleri v Commissioner of Police [2012] NSWADT 5 (Camilleri) and other previous decisions of the Tribunal and its predecessor provide that the Tribunal is to approach the question as follows: The tribunal is to first ask whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the requested information exists and is information of the agency. If the answer to question (1) is "yes", the Tribunal must then ask itself whether the efforts made by the agency to locate the information have been reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 13. The applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that there are reasonable grounds for believing that further information falling within the scope of the access request exists that has not been supplied: Stanley v Roads and Maritime Services (NSW) [2014] NSWCATAD 123 at [57] (Stanley). This requires the applicant to put some credible material or submission before the Tribunal that documents of the requested kind exist. The requirement will not be satisfied by an assertion of non-compliance based on a general distrust of the agency in question: Camilleri at [13]; Cianfrano v Department of Commerce (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 195; Hula v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2013] NSWADT 153 at [32]. 14. The Respondent then bears the onus of satisfying the Tribunal that the searches conducted by the Respondent were reasonable in the circumstances. In determining whether reasonable searches have been conducted, relevant considerations include "the clarity of the request, the way the agency's record keeping system is organised, and the ability to retrieve any documents that are the subject of the request, by reference to the identifiers supplied by the applicant or those that can be inferred reasonably by the agency from any other information supplied by the applicant": Miriani v Commissioner of New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 187 at [30].
11. What constitutes a reasonable search will vary with the circumstances, however, key factors include the clarity of the request, the way the agency's record keeping system is organised and the ability to retrieve any information that is the subject of the request: Miriani v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] NSWADT 187 at paragraph [30]; Mizzi v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2013] NSWADT 150 at paragraph [30]. That there may be some weaknesses in an agency's searches or failures in recordkeeping within the agency, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the search has not been reasonable: Camilleri v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2012] NSWADT 5 at paragraph [15]; Saggers v Environment Protection Authority [2013] NSWADT 109 at paragraph [49].

The material before the Tribunal

1. The Respondent relies on affidavit evidence of its manager of Archives and Records Management Services, Mr Timothy Robinson; an in-house solicitor in the Respondent's Office of General Counsel Mr Ashley Fry; and the solicitor with carriage of both matters, Ms Sarah Heesom.
2. Mr Robinson attended the hearing and was cross-examined. The Respondent has also provided both written and oral submissions.
3. Copies of the documents that are the subject of the applications have been provided to the Tribunal. The Respondent has provided an open bundle and a confidential bundle. Copies of the withheld information have been provided to the Tribunal on a confidential basis and have not been made available to the Applicant
4. The Applicant relies on his own evidence and written submissions.

Mr Timothy Robinson

1. Mr Robinson gave evidence of the usual approach taken by the Respondent in relation to searches undertaken in the determination of an access application. Members of his unit identified and emailed relevant personnel and requested that they provide information captured by the requests. He said that the most efficient approach was adopted and that in these matters an enormous amount of material was located from the searches that were undertaken.
2. The usual practice is to provide unredacted copies of located information to the decision maker. He was not the final decision maker but he was consulted in the process and he has seen all the documents that were withheld.
3. His evidence is that the searches that were undertaken would have located any information that falls within the scope of the Applicant's access applications. He stated that his unit did not address all of the documents that were located by the searches because of their limited resources. He did not dispute that some information, such as meeting minutes had not been located. His view is that if minutes had been created for those meetings then the searches undertaken would have located those minutes. He agreed that it is possible that further searches might locate other information however the most efficient approach has been adopted.
4. Mr Robinson denied that his unit had not conducted reasonable searches. His view is that the Respondent has undertaken reasonable searches for the information requested by the Applicant, and that there are no documents falling within the scope of the first application or the second application that have not previously been identified by the Respondent.
5. In regard to the decision to withhold the requested abstracts Mr Robinson's view is that the community of those who were involved in the Conference is small. Therefore, it would be possible to identify the authors of the abstracts. He did not dispute the possibility that redactions could be made to the abstracts to remove identifying information.

Discussion

1. The Respondent submits that the Tribunal should affirm the decisions because either there is a conclusive presumption against disclosure of information that would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege, or legal professional privilege; or because, on balance, the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of the information sought by the Applicant are outweighed by those against disclosure.

The public interest considerations in favour of disclosure

1. Section 12 of the GIPA Act provides that there is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information. The general public interest in favour of disclosure is a factor that must be taken into account. In the present matter I am satisfied that disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs and contribute to positive and informed debate on issues of public importance.
2. The Applicant wants to make sure that conferences, such as the Conference, are open to public scrutiny, and are not used by political operators to promote their narrow political agendas. The Applicant also wants to make sure that in conducting such conferences, the Respondent adopts policies and practices that promote and protect freedom of expression and intellectual inquiry.
3. These are considerations in favour of release of the withheld information.
4. The Applicant also identified a number of personal factors of the application. These include the fact that an invitation was extended to him to participate in the Conference; the Respondent set the topic of his proposed presentation; and that the Conference Organizing Committee subsequently decided to reject his abstract. He notes that the Respondent subsequently withdrew its invitation but failed to inform him that it had done so.
5. The Respondent accepts that it is accountable to the public for, among other things, the provision of services and facilities to the public and the expenditure of public monies. The Respondent recognises that the GIPA Act is one means of facilitating and furthering that accountability. The Respondent accepts that there is a public interest in disclosing information that facilitates public scrutiny of and promotes transparency in Respondent decision-making, including in respect of the organisation and management of public conferences.

The first application

1. As noted, the documents which respond to the first access application and remain for consideration are identified as Documents 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11. In relation to the abstracts (documents 6, 8, 9 and 10) the Respondent has relied on the considerations in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act. It submits that, on balance, there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of this information.
2. The Applicant accepts that the abstracts may contain personal information including personal identifiers. However, he argues that personal information, including personal identifiers that help identify an individual, may be redacted. Therefore, he submits that when redacted the abstracts cannot and should not be construed as personal information.
3. The Respondent must establish that the withheld information is 'personal information' and the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to either reveal an individual's personal information; or breach an information protection principle under the PPIP Act.
4. It is apparent from the face of each of documents 6, 8, 9 and 10 that the documents contain information about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information. They contain the names and other identifying information of people who submitted abstracts. The abstracts were either withdrawn or rejected by the Conference organising committee.
5. Mr Robinson stated that to the best of his knowledge, the information that has been withheld is not in the public domain and remains confidential. The Respondent submits that it could therefore be reasonably expected that disclosure of the information would reveal the personal information or breach the information protection principle in section 18 of the PPIP Act.

Document 6

1. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
2. I am satisfied that Document 6 contains personal information of the author and the author has not consented to the release of that information. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
3. However, I am satisfied that it is possible to redact parts of Document 6 to remove information that would allow the identity of the author to be apparent or reasonably ascertained. This can be achieved by redacting the names of the authors where they appear in the title; the words that appear in the second paragraph between the words "among" and "about"; and the words that appear in the third paragraph between the words "experience of" and "the workshop".
4. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
5. A redacted copy of Document 6 is to be released to the Applicant.

Document 8

1. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
2. I am not satisfied that Document 8 contains personal information of the author. However, an issue is raised with respect to the abstracts in this matter is whether an abstract contains "personal information" of an individual where the identity is not apparent from the information contained in the abstract but it is possible that the person's identity could be apparent to a person with specific knowledge that may not be known to the general population. The Respondent submits that intimate friends or family may be able to deduce who the author of this abstract was and that the abstract was rejected by the Conference organising committee. The identity of that author and the fact that the abstract was rejected is personal information of the author.
3. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
4. In my view, the information that is contained in Document 8 standing alone is not sufficient to allow the identity of the author to be known. I accept that it is possible that a class of individuals could be identified as possible authors of the abstract and that the author would fall within that class. It might be possible to guess the identity of the author. However, in my view this is not sufficient to establish that Document 8 contains the personal information of the author. The author's identity is not apparent nor can it reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion in Document 8.
5. I am not satisfied that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given weight.
6. A copy of Document 8 is to be released to the Applicant.

Document 9

1. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
2. I am satisfied that Document 9 contains personal information of the authors and the authors have not consented to the release of that information. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
3. However, I am satisfied that it is possible to redact parts of Document 9 to remove information that would allow the identity of the authors to be apparent or reasonably ascertained. This can be achieved by redacting the names of the authors and email address where they appear in the document; and the words that appear in final sentence of the first paragraph under the heading "Submission summary" after the words "unpublished work on".
4. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
5. A redacted copy of Document 9 is to be released to the Applicant.

Document 10

1. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
2. I am satisfied that Document 10 contains personal information of the author and the author has not consented to the release of that information. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
3. However, I am satisfied that it is possible to redact parts of Document 10 to remove information that would allow the identity of the author to be apparent or reasonably ascertained. This can be achieved by redacting the first paragraph of Document 10 and the final sentence of the third paragraph of Document 10.
4. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
5. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
6. A redacted copy of Document 10 is to be released to the Applicant.

Document 11

1. Document 11 is a partly redacted table which lists the details of submitted abstracts and records the organising committee's decision as to their inclusion or rejection and summary comments. The redacted version of Document 11 has been provided to the Applicant.
2. The Applicant has requested that the Tribunal examine the redactions to Document 11 to ensure that the Respondent acted in accordance with the GIPA Act.
3. I am satisfied that Document 11 contains identifying information about people who were suggested as potential participants in the Conference, or were otherwise discussed by the organising committee, but who ultimately had no involvement in the Conference; identifying information about people who may not be aware that they were named in connection with the Conference, and who may therefore not be aware of the existence of the information; and it contains the names of and other identifying information about members of the public who have corresponded with the Respondent.
4. I have examined the redactions to Document 11 and I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to provide the redacted version of Document 11 is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The second application

1. As noted, the documents which respond to the second access application as pressed by the Applicant are identified as Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.

Item 1

1. Item 1 comprise minutes of the Conference organising committee. These minutes partially respond to Parts 6 and 9 of the request. The Applicant has been given a copy of the minutes however some information has been redacted.
2. The Respondent contends that the minutes include the names of potential Conference participants who were either not contacted or ultimately removed from the list for other reasons. The Respondent submits that there is sensitivity relating to being associated with the Conference. Those individuals would not be aware that they were named in the minutes or that they were associated with the Conference.

The minutes of the 20 February 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 20 February 2018 meeting have been released with two redactions. These redactions relate to potential keynotes/participants.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. The Respondent submitted that the identified persons do not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 20 February 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 27 February 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 27 February 2018 meeting have been released with three redactions. These redactions relate to potential Conference participants.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about each of those individuals and that their identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified persons do not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 27 February 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 6 March 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 6 March 2018 meeting have been released with two redactions. These redactions relate to discussions that took place at the 20 February 2018 and 27 February 2018 meetings regarding potential keynotes/participants. These minutes repeat the information that was redacted from the minutes of those meetings.
2. For the same reason, I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
3. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 6 March 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 28 March 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 28 March 2018 meeting have been released with two redactions.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. These redactions relate to discussions that took place at the 20 February 2018 and 27 February 2018 meetings regarding potential keynotes/participants. These minutes repeat the information that was redacted from the minutes of those meetings.
4. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about each of those individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified persons do not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
5. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
6. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 28 March 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 17 April 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 17 April 2018 meeting have been released with four redactions.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about each of those individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified persons do not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 17 April 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 24 April 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 24 April 2018 meeting have been released with one redaction.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about an individual and that their identity is apparent from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified person does not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individual concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the name of the potential Conference participant from the minutes of the 24 April 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 2 May 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 2 May 2018 meeting have been released with one redaction.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about an individual and that their identity is apparent from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified person does not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individual concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the name of the potential Conference participant from the minutes of the 2 May 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 8 May 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 8 May 2018 meeting have been released with six redactions.
2. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
3. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about each of those individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. The Respondent submitted that the identified persons do not know that they were named in association with the Conference.
4. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
5. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 8 May 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The meeting of the 21 May 2018

1. No minutes of any 21 May 2018 have been located. The Applicant asserts that the meeting did take place and a decision was taken on that day. He submits that further searches should be undertaken. It is my view that the searches undertaken were reasonable and therefore I do not agree that the Respondent should be required to undertake further searches.

The minutes of the 22 May 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 22 May 2018 meeting attaches a proposed Conference schedule. The schedule has been released with three redactions.
2. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted schedule that the redactions contain information about individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. I accept that the identified persons do not know that they were named in the proposed Conference schedule.
3. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
4. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from schedule to the minutes of the 22 May 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 29 May 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 29 May 2018 meeting attaches an updated proposed Conference schedule. The schedule has been released with four redactions.
2. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted schedule that the redactions contain information about individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. I accept that the identified persons do not know that they were named in the proposed Conference schedule.
3. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
4. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from schedule to the minutes of the 29 May 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.

The minutes of the 12 June 2018 meeting

1. The minutes of the 12 June 2018 meeting attaches an updated proposed Conference schedule. The minutes have been released with two redactions. The schedule has been released with two redactions which are also redactions from the earlier versions of the proposed schedule.
2. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted schedule that the redactions contain information about individuals and that their identity is apparent from the information. I accept that the identified persons do not know that they were named in the proposed Conference schedule.
3. I am satisfied that the Respondent has correctly identified the redacted information as personal information of the individuals concerned. In my view, the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act should be given significant weight. On balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of this information.
4. The decision to redact the names of the potential Conference participants from the minutes of the 12 June 2018 meeting and the proposed Conference schedule attached to the minutes of the 12 June 2018 meeting is the correct and preferable decision and is affirmed.
5. I note that the redaction of the identifying information is consistent with the Applicant's submission that personal information could be redacted from the abstracts.

Items 2, 3 and 4

1. Items 2, 3 and 4 are emails from Susan Parker to the Vice Chancellor. These documents were relevant to Part 1 of the request. These documents have been withheld on the basis of legal privilege.
2. The Respondent contends that there is a conclusive presumption against disclosure of this information as it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of client legal privilege, or legal professional privilege. It contends that it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information unless the Respondent has waived the privilege. The Respondent has not waived the privilege.
3. The Applicant has concerns in relation to the Respondent's argument in relation to legal privilege. He submits that the Vice Chancellor appointed the decision makers and that it is likely that the Vice Chancellor made the decision that privilege would not be waived. He submitted that if the legal advice had been obtained for an improper purpose then legal privilege might not apply.
4. The privilege applies to confidential communications between government agencies and their salaried legal officers provided they have the necessary degree of independence. The Respondent relies on the evidence of Mr Ashley Fry in regard to the independence of the in-house lawyers in the Respondent's Office of General Counsel. Mr Fry is an in-house solicitor in the Respondent's Office of General Counsel and deposes to the circumstances surrounding the Respondent's claim for client legal privilege in relation to these documents. In his affidavit dated 19 November 2019 Mr. Fry explained the role of the Office of General Counsel as follows: 5 All solicitors within the OGC report to the General Counsel, who in turn reports to the Vice-Chancellor, who is the University's principal executive officer. The General Counsel's reporting line to the Vice-Chancellor is administrative in nature. The Vice-Chancellor does not in any way supervise the legal work performed by the OGC. 6 On the basis of my responsibilities and experience within the OGC, I am aware that: (a) Lawyers within the OGC are, first and foremost, officers of the court. They are expected to comply with the ethical and professional standards of conduct required of the legal profession including, relevantly, the obligation to provide independent, honest and professional legal advice to the University; (b) The OGC is not co-located with any other professional service provider or academic unit or faculty within the University. Access to the OGC requires a staff security card with appropriate coding or, in the case of the General Counsel's office, a key; (c) Legal records are kept in a secure environment in the OGC's office. Access to physical and electronic legal records is restricted to staff with the appropriate level of authority; (d) The OGC is the primary point of contact for the University's external regulators, and for the service of subpoenas; and ...
5. In regard to Items 2, 3 and 4 Mr. Fry stated: 9 The documents in question were prepared, or record communications made, for the dominant purpose of the OGC providing legal advice to the relevant staff members of the University, or for those staff members of the University to receive such legal advice. Specifically: (a) Item 2 is a chain of email correspondence between Ms Wilkinson and relevant staff members of the University, Mr Mark Gillespie, Ms Susan Parker and Mr Benjamin French, on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, Dr Michael Spence, about the preparation of a response to the Applicant's letter of complaint to the Vice-Chancellor, dated 4 June 2018. ... (b) Item 3 is a chain of email correspondence between Ms Wilkinson and relevant staff members of the University, Ms Susan Parker and Mr Benjamin French, on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, in which Ms Wilkson provides advice about the Applicant's claim of discrimination. … (c) Item 4 is a chain of email correspondence between Ms Wilkinson and relevant staff members of the University, Ms Susan Parker and Mr Benjamin French, on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor, in which Ms Wilkinson provides advice about a response to the Applicant's second letter to the Vice-Chancellor, dated 22 June 2018. ... 10 The University has considered whether it would be appropriate to waive privilege in these documents, and concluded that it would not. To the best of my knowledge, the University has not waived privilege in these documents.
6. I accept this evidence as it is unchallenged.
7. The privilege extends to advice that is of a non-legal character where that non-legal advice is connected to the giving of legal advice or for contemplated or pending litigation.
8. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
9. The legal advice was provided by Ms Megan Wilkinson, an independent in-house lawyer from the Respondent's Office of General Counsel who, at the relevant times, held a current NSW Legal Practising Certificate. On the basis of the evidence of Mr Fry, I am satisfied that the necessary degree of independence existed within the Respondent.
10. I am also satisfied that the documents were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing or receiving legal advice. I have no basis on which I could conclude that there was any improper purpose associated with the preparation of these documents.
11. I am satisfied that privilege applies to the withheld information. The privilege has not been waived. in these circumstances, it follows that the conclusive presumption against disclosure applies to Items 2, 3 and 4 in the second decision

Item 6

1. Item 6 is an email from Mark Gillespie to a third party. The redacted information is the identity of the recipient of the email. The document was partially redacted because of the Respondent's view that there is an overriding public interest consideration against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Table to section 14 of the GIPA Act.
2. It is apparent from the face of the unredacted document that the redactions contain information about an individual whose identity is apparent from the information. It is the personal information of that individual. It could therefore be reasonably expected that disclosure of the information would reveal the personal information or breach the information protection principle in section 18 of the PPIP Act. The Applicant has been provided with the body of the email. I do not consider that the public interest considerations in favour of release override the considerations against disclosure. In my view, the decision to withhold this information was the correct and preferable one.

Searches

1. The Applicant has raised issues in relation to the searches that the Respondent undertook to locate the information that he has sought. He identified information that he submits should be held by the Respondent. He maintains that further meeting minutes should exist and should be able to be located. He also noted that the Respondent failed to locate an email dated 19 June 2018 from Mr Steve Warren to Professor Annamarie Jagose that 'listed the names of 78ers for inclusion in a panel session'. He also points to the limited consultation taken in regard to members of the Conference organising committee as evidence that the searches were insufficient.
2. I agree with the Respondent that the email dated 19 June 2018 from Mr Steve Warren to Professor Annamarie Jagose does not fall within the scope of either the first or second access applications. The fact that the Respondent did not locate that email cannot be viewed as evidence that that the Respondent failed to conduct reasonable searches.
3. The Applicant also raised issues relating to the Respondent's failure to provide information in response to a number of his queries. He seeks an order that the Respondent undertake further searches with the aim of locating more information.
4. I agree with the Respondent that the GIPA Act provides a right to be provided with access to information and that it does not confer a right on applicants to know why documents do not exist.
5. The obligation on an agency is to undertake such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find the requested information. The agency's searches must be conducted using the most efficient means reasonably available to the agency. The agency may determine the resources that it can allocate to determining GIPA applications and the extent of the available resources is a relevant consideration in determining whether the searches that were in fact undertaken were reasonable.
6. The Respondent argues that it undertook the searches in the most efficient way that it could. It relies on Mr Robinson's evidence and says that the approach it adopted in regard to locating information relating to the Conference organising committee was to contact the committee Chair. Mr Robinson's evidence is that this is a standard approach in regard to dealing with committees. The Respondent submits that to adopt the approach that the Applicant urges would amount to an unreasonable divergence of its resources. In the circumstances it says that the searches that it undertook were reasonable.
7. I agree with the Respondent in that regard. It is readily apparent that the Applicant's requests were very detailed. The searches that were undertaken identified several thousand documents as falling within the scope of the requests. Enormous resources would be required to consider that information thoroughly.
8. I accept that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Respondent may hold other information that falls within the scope of the Applicant's requests. I agree that it is possible that wider searches might identify other information. However, it does not necessarily follow that the searches have not been reasonable.
9. I accept that the Respondent has limited resources to allocate to the task of responding to the Applicant's requests. Given the resources available to the Respondent for this task, I am satisfied that the searches conducted by the Respondent were reasonable in the circumstances. No further searches need be undertaken.

Whether information is held

1. In relation to the remaining parts of the second access application, the Respondent contends that the requested information is not held.
2. In my view, it is possible that other information is held but given my view regarding the reasonableness of the searches that have been undertaken, it is my view that no further action should be required in relation to this issue.

Conclusion

1. I have found that some of the withheld information can be released. In that regard, the decision under review is set aside and in its place the decision is made that the withheld documents are released in a redacted form as discussed in these reasons.
2. The decisions under review are otherwise affirmed.

Orders 1. A redacted copy of the document identified as Document 6 is to be released to the Applicant with redactions as discussed in these reasons. 2. A copy of the document identified as Document 8 is to be released to the Applicant. 3. A redacted copy of the document identified as Document 9 is to be released to the Applicant with redactions as discussed in these reasons. 4. A redacted copy of the document identified as Document 10 is to be released to the Applicant with redactions as discussed in these reasons. 5. The decisions under review are otherwise affirmed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 June 2020