Camden Council v Rafailidis

The Evidence Filed in Support of the Charge 15The Council relies on: (a)two affidavits sworn by its solicitor, Mark Bonanno. On 12 November 2013, he deposed that the respondents and their solicitor, Michael Vassili, were present in Court at the time Biscoe J handed down his judgment on 18 September 2012. On 15 November 2013, he deposed that he personally served on Koula Rafailidis on that date the present NOM, statement of charge, and two affidavits in support. (b)two affidavits sworn by its Development Compliance Officer, Charlie Saab, on 7 November 2013, and on 17 March 2014. Mr Saab deposes to much of the above history, and to various inspections he conducted in October 2013, and on 13 March 2014, during which he took photographs depicting the continued presence of parts of the old house agreed to be demolished. He also deposes that, since 18 September 2012, Council had received no notices of intention to carry out building works at the site. (c)an affidavit by process serve Mark Slater, deposing to service on Efrem Rafailidis, on 29 November 2013, of the present NOM, statement of charge, and two affidavits in support.

The Documents Filed in Response to the Charge 16On 4 December 2013, Koula Rafailidis filed a "Notice of Special Appearance", challenging the Court's jurisdiction, supported by an affidavit/asseveration in support of that appearance and challenge. On 6 march 2014, she filed a further "asseveration of truth", together with a "Notice - Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court", and a NOM "requiring" the Court to "make null and void all orders, judgments" in this matter. A further "asseveration of truth" was filed on 11 March 2014. 17In her material, Koula Rafailidis has quoted some "maxims of law", and from the bible, historical legal documents, including Magna Carta, and texts such as Halsbury's Laws of England. She alleges that this Court is biased in favour of statutory authorities, including councils, and asserts that, as a statutory court, it lacks jurisdiction to deal with contempt. She also specifically alleges bias on the part of Lloyd AJ, because he made, in this matter, orders seen to be more severe than those he made in Wollondilly Shire Council v 820 Cawdor Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 71 (regarding Mr Richard Garton). 18She asserts, in summary: (a)that she has "no lawful binding contract" with the acquiring authority, this Court, Biscoe J, Craig J, and/or Lloyd AJ (b)that she "was deceived by all people involved with this matter" (c)that she "did not give expressed (sic) and unequivocal consent to [the] matter being heard summarily", and enjoys "an inalienable right to trial by jury", the denial of which constitutes treason (d)that "any orders/judgments" were not properly made and documented, and that at least one document (a letter) was not admitted into evidence because "there was no wet ink signature" to give it "lawful standing" and "bind" her to it (e)that this court lacks jurisdiction to proceed summarily, and that any determination it makes is the product of bias, deception, and/or fraud (f)that Craig J, in an unrelated class 3 matter, in which the present respondents were applicants, did not demonstrate that he was properly appointed and sworn as a Judge, and that Judges of this Court "allowed the proceedings to continue fraudulently" (g)that interference with property without consent is "terrorism". 19Despite being a named respondent to the charge, being served with most of Council's documents, and being present to respond to the charge on 6 December 2013, Efrem Rafailidis has not appeared today, and Koula Rafailidis declined to be regarded as his agent.

Discussion 20Questions of this Court's status, legitimacy, and power to deal with charges of contempt have been long settled. See, eg, Hawkesbury City Council v Foster (1997) 97 LGERA 12, per Sheller JA at 22. I reject Koula Rafailidis's submissions on this aspect of the matter. 21Likewise, the principles governing the exercise of its contempt powers are also well settled, and consistently applied by all its judges. Obedience to the law, and to valid orders of the Court, and the protection of the environment itself, of public safety, and of the statutory regime which regulates planning and development in this state are at the forefront of the Court's concerns. 22A contempt which is found proven is normally characterised as technical, wilful or contumacious, as a precursor to whether the principal focus of the court's reaction will be rectification and/or punishment. The fact that the relevant orders were made by consent, or pursuant to some undertaking, and the absence of any appeal against those which are not, are relevant considerations. General criminal sentencing principles are traditionally applied, to take account of illness, ambiguity, lack of mental capacity, and so on. Biscoe J, in Burwood Council v Ruan [2008] NSWLEC 167, summarised the characterisation as ([7]): There are three classes of contempt: technical, wilful and contumacious. Technical contempt is where disobedience of a court order (or undertaking to the court) is casual, accidental or unintentional. Wilful contempt is where the disobedience is more than that, but is not contumacious. Contumacious contempt is where there is a specific intention to disobey a court order or undertaking to the court, which evidences a conscious defiance of the court's authority. Although a contempt may be established, in the circumstances of the case the court may decide not to make any order. The element of intention is relevant to whether any order should be made and, if so, to punishment. ... 23No later cases have derogated from his Honour's analysis in any way. His Honour's analysis continued (at [8] - [14]), and it is appropriate to quote it here, as I respectfully adopt it, and will apply it to the present case: 8 The phrase "casual, accidental or unintentional" was used by the High Court in Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Proprietary Limited (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107 (in the joint judgment of Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ) and in Pelechowski v The Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435 at 484 [147] fn [156] (by Kirby J). The phrase was originally coined in the slightly different conjunctive form "casual or accidental and unintentional" in Fairclough & Sons v Manchester Ship Canal Co (1897) 41 Sol Jo 225 (CA), which was quoted in Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 541 by McHugh J. The meaning of the word "casual" is unclear. 9 The three classes of contempt were recognised in the High Court by Kirby J in Pelechowski at 484-485 [147], by the NSW Court of Appeal in Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam [No 2] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 at 314-315 by Kirby P (Hope A-JA agreeing), and in Greater Hume Shire Council v J & L Cauchi Civil Contracting Pty Ltd [2006] NSWLEC 738 at [30] by me. In Pelechowski at 484-485 [147] Kirby J noted that technical contempts are sometimes called "casual, accidental or unintentional" contempts and said: The underlying purpose of the law on this form of contempt is to vindicate the due administration of justice. Contempts of the kind illustrated in this case may be technical, wilful but without a specific intent to defy the authority of the Court and contumacious. In the last category a serious act of deliberate defiance of judicial authority is evidenced. Conceding that such categories of contempt may sometimes overlap, in a case of a technical contempt, where the contemnor has offered an apology which the Court accepts, it will sometimes be sufficient to make a finding of contempt coupled with an order for the payment of costs. Where a wilful contempt is shown, in the sense of deliberate conduct but without specific intent to defy judicial authority, a finding of contempt and an order for the payment of costs may not be sufficient. In such a case, a fine (and sometimes more) may be needed to vindicate the authority of the court. But in a case of contumacious defiance of a court's orders and authority, it will frequently be appropriate for a custodial sentence to be imposed as a response to an apparent challenge to the authority of the law. (footnotes omitted) 10 Earlier, in Maniam (above) at 314-315, Kirby P (Hope A-JA agreeing) made similar observations, noting that for technical contempts the court will usually accept an apology from the contemnor but may order the contemnor to pay costs. In Attorney-General (NSW) v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 362 at 367 the Court (Street CJ, Hope and Reynolds JJA) stated: ...[T]he development of a distinction between what Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd called conduct which is within the general concept of 'contempt of court' (often called technical contempt) and conduct included within that general concept, which a court regards as deserving of punishment in the particular circumstances of the case. This distinction was also referred to by Lord Reid:...there must be two questions; first, was there any contempt at all, and, secondly, was it sufficiently serious to require, or justify the court in making, an order against the respondent? ...It would be wrong to assume that it follows that there are two forms of contempt, one being technical contempt and the other being actual contempt. Technical contempt is contempt. For a variety of reasons, although contempt is established, the court may decide not to exercise its summary jurisdiction. These words simply mean that in the circumstances of the case, the court may decide to take no action in the matter. In a long history of reported judgments, courts have expressed the reasons why they have decided to take action, or not to take action. Sometimes these reasons have tended to obscure whether the question being dealt with is what constitutes contempt, or what the court should do in the particular case. As Lord Reid pointed out in Times Newspapers Ltd case, it is confusing to import into the question whether there is any contempt at all, or into the definition of contempt, matters which are related to the course which the courts will take, contempt having been established. In considering the reported decisions, it is important to appreciate this possible source of confusion. They continued at 370: If contempt has been established, the question arises whether the court should exercise its summary jurisdiction to punish. ...Once contempt is established, the court has to decide what action it should take, in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case. It should not punish simply because contempt has been established; and it must be careful to satisfy itself that the circumstances require that it exercise its jurisdiction. (footnotes omitted) 11 The relevance of intention to punishment was emphasised in Ainsworth v Hanrahan (1991) 25 NSWLR 155. The opponent was found to have committed a technical contempt, and to have acted without intention to interfere with the administration of justice. Kirby P (Samuels and Handley JJA agreeing) said at 168: "Intention is always relevant to punishment for contempt. Clearly, this is not a case where any punishment is called for". A declaration was made that a contempt had occurred but the claimant was deprived of any costs. Similarly, in M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 at 426-427 Lord Woolf approved the dictum of Lord Oliver in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 at 217-218: The intention with which the act was done will, of course, be of the highest relevance in the determination of the penalty (if any) to be imposed by the court, but the liability here is a strict one in the sense that all that requires to be proved is service of the order and the subsequent doing by the party bound of that which is prohibited. 12 In Mudginberri (above) the High Court (in the joint judgment of Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ) appeared to suggest that no punishment should be imposed (at least by way of fine) where the contempt is merely technical. They held: More recent decisions indicate that a fine may be imposed when the contempt consists of wilful disobedience to a court order in the sense that the disobedience is not casual, accidental or unintentional (at 106-107). In more recent times a strong stream of English and Australian authority has emerged to support the imposition of fines for disobedience to orders in circumstances where the disobedience is wilful (at 109). ...[T]he reasons supporting the recent decisions are compelling and they should be accepted by this Court. It follows that a deliberate commission or omission which is in breach of an injunctive order or an undertaking will constitute such wilful disobedience unless it be casual, accidental or unintentional (at 113). 13 McHugh J took the same view in Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 541: But this Court has now authoritatively determined that in some circumstances courts do have power to fine for civil contempt (Mudginberri...). That power exists where the breach has not been the result of casual, or accidental and unintentional disobedience (Fairclough v Manchester Ship Canal Co (1897) 41 Sol Jo 225). If, therefore, the breach has been wilful, it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order (Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban Council [1910] 2 Ch 190 at 194). Thus, if the act or omission that constitutes the breach was done wilfully, the contemnor is now liable to be fined even if the breach was not contumacious. (some footnotes omitted) 14 In Lade & Co. Pty Limited v Black [2006] 2 Qd R 531 at 548 [57], Keane J A held: Under the general law, apart from statute, it was established that contempt lies in disobedience of a court's order. References in the authorities to the requirement that conduct be contumacious were concerned with the power to fine a contemnor by way of punishment for a contempt; they were not concerned with establishing whether a contempt had occurred. (footnotes omitted)

Consideration 24It troubles me that this Court's decisions in respect of the development of the respondents' property have been favourable to their interests and desires, and yet they have shown total disregard for the orders they achieved. They were give twelve months to comply (by 4 July 2013), and did not. They still had not complied four months later, when this charge was laid. 25Had they done something about the old house following the laying of the charge of contempt, I would have been inclined to treat the disobedience to that time as "technical" contempt, but it has continued, and their contempt is, at least, "wilful". In fact, it is not that far short of "contumacious", when one takes into account the approach taken to the charge - one defendant did not appear, and the other refused to participate properly, in her own interests. 26After continued disruptions, I very reluctantly asked the sheriff's officers to remove Koula Rafailidis from the court room. She stayed in or near the precincts, and I arranged for those officers to deliver to her, at 1pm, copies of all Council's later materials (two affidavits plus written submissions), and to inform her, and later to remind her, that the hearing would continue at 2pm sharp. When she did not attend within a reasonable time after 2pm, I adjourned to prepare this judgment. 27I should add here that Council's solicitor took no unfair advantage of her absence, and made very fair and balanced submissions. Although strenuously challenging the relevance of all Koula Rafailidis's filed documents, Mr Campbell accepted that I would have regard to them. In reality, they shed no light on the position with regard to the continuing state of the subject building, and they advance no arguments as to why this Court should be lenient in dealing with Koula Rafailidis and her husband, in respect of their non-performance of the Court's orders. 28I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that both these defendants are guilty of contempt of court, and should be convicted. Theirs is a serious breach; they have made no attempts to purge their contempt; they have challenged the Court, but put nothing in mitigation; they did not plead to the charge, nor show any remorse or contrition. 29The circumstances call for general and specific deterrence.

Conclusion 30In the unexplained absence of Efrem Rafailidis, I will defer imposing any sentence on him. Council is directed to bring this judgment to his notice, and I grant Council liberty to approach the Registrar on further notice to Efrem Rafailidis, to fix a hearing date for him to be sentenced. 31In respect of Koula Rafailidis, I find her guilty of contempt as charged, and I convict her. I will impose a fine of $10,000, plus a monthly fine of $2,000, until the works are completed to Council's satisfaction, in order to give her one last chance to purge her contempt. 32Koula Rafailidis will also be ordered to pay Council's costs of these contempt proceedings, on and since 1 November 2013, on an indemnity basis, as agreed or assessed according to law. 33The exhibit will remain on the Court file.

Orders 34The formal orders of the Court are: (1)Efrem Rafailidis is found guilty of contempt, and convicted of that charge. (2)Koula Rafailidis is found guilty of contempt, and convicted of that charge. (3)Council is directed to bring this judgment to the personal notice of Efrem Rafailidis, and is granted liberty to approach the Registrar not earlier than 28 days from today and on seven days' notice to Efrem Rafailidis with a view to the fixing of a date for his sentencing hearing. (4)Koula Rafailidis is fined $10,000, payable to the Registrar pursuant to the Fines Act 1996, plus a monthly fine of $2,000 payable on the first calendar day of each month, on and from 1 June 2014, until the works the subject of the charge have been completed to Council's satisfaction. (5)Koula Rafailidis is ordered to pay Council's costs of these contempt proceedings, on and since 1 November 2013, on an indemnity basis, as agreed or assessed according to law. (6)The Council's exhibit will remain on the Court file.

Amendments 25 March 2014 - Paragraph [7] correction of legislation cited, paragraph [24] 'then' corrected to 'they' "... and yet they have shown ..." Amended paragraphs: [7] and [24] DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 25 March 2014