Cairns v AHG Newcastle Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCATAP 103 | Case summary

What happened

Mr Cairns purchased a new Subaru WRX STI 6 from AHG Newcastle (Crossroads Subaru) in early November 2015 for $50,500 and took delivery on 3 November 2015. Within days he reported a suspicious gearbox noise and returned the vehicle for attention. By 14 December 2015 the vehicle had the gearbox removed and the clutch plate, clutch cover and flywheel replaced; the gearbox oil was drained and replaced in the course of that repair. Mr Cairns told AHG he would not have bought the vehicle had he known of the fault and notified AHG that he rejected the vehicle. AHG proceeded with repair and advised repair was the only available course.

From July 2016 through to May 2019 Mr Cairns continued to complain about difficulty selecting some gears, particularly in cooler conditions. He had the car regularly serviced by AHG; AHG conceded it did not use Subaru's recommended GL‑5 75W‑90 oil in those relevant services. Expert evidence adduced by Mr Cairns in 2019 established that after the transmission oil was drained and replaced with the manufacturer's approved oil, the vehicle operated in a sound and satisfactory manner.

Mr Cairns lodged a consumer claim in NCAT on 20 July 2019 seeking replacement or return of the vehicle and a refund, asserting rejection under s 259(3)(a) ACL because of a major failure of the guarantee of acceptable quality in s 54 ACL. On 27 November 2019 the Tribunal Member dismissed the application. The Tribunal Member treated the applicant's case as made up of two causes of action: (1) the original gearbox defect requiring repair in December 2015, and (2) the use of non‑approved oils in repairs and subsequent servicing. The Member held the first cause of action time‑barred under s 79L FTA and (on the Member's analysis) treated the second as a services guarantee breach under s 61 ACL but concluded no compensatory remedy was available or proved, and dismissed the claim.

Mr Cairns filed an internal appeal; the Appeal Panel extended the time for lodging the appeal (medical evidence explained delay) and then dismissed the appeal on 2 June 2020 for the reasons below.

Why the court decided this way

Two legal pivots drive the decision.

First, the jurisdictional bar in s 79L of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) prevents the Tribunal from hearing a consumer claim where the cause of action first accrued more than three years before the claim is lodged. The Panel focussed on identifying the 'cause of action giving rise to the claim' as the particular set of facts which support the right to an order by the Tribunal. That required enumerating the facts a consumer must prove to reject goods under the Australian Consumer Law: consumer status; supply by the supplier; failure of the s 54 guarantee of acceptable quality; that the failure was a major failure or could not be remedied; and notification of rejection within the relevant period (see the decision's summary of ss 259, 260, 263 and s 54 elements).

Applying that framework, the Panel held the only fact capable of establishing the vehicle was not of acceptable quality at time of supply was the gearbox noise/defect present at and shortly after delivery and addressed by the December 2015 repair. The later use of non‑approved oil in servicing did not change the vehicle's quality at the time of supply unless it revealed a hidden defect that existed at supply. Because the operative facts supporting rejection, the defect and the December 2015 notification, all occurred more than three years before the July 2019 Tribunal application, the cause of action accrued in late 2015 and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under s 79L.

Second, the Tribunal's separate finding that AHG used non‑approved oil when servicing was treated as a complaint about the supply of services under s 61 ACL. The Panel accepted the Tribunal Member's finding that such conduct could amount to a major failure in services, but observed that the remedies for a services major failure under s 267 are compensatory (damages) rather than providing the consumer with a refund of the purchase price. No evidence of compensable loss was made out; the expert evidence suggested the transmission was operating satisfactorily. The Panel also expressed some doubt (obiter) whether s 61 guarantees applied at all on these facts because s 61 requires that the consumer make known a particular purpose or result to the supplier.

Accordingly, the Panel concluded the Tribunal Member was correct to dismiss the application: the rejection/refund claim was time‑barred and the services claim did not afford the remedy sought.

Before and after state of the law

Before: The judgment applies existing statutory framework, s 54 ACL for acceptable quality; ss 259–263 ACL for rejection/refund; s 61 ACL for services guarantees; s 79L FTA for Tribunal jurisdiction time limits, and draws on earlier authority for timing of acceptable quality assessments (Full Federal Court decisions on analogous former Trade Practices Act provisions such as Medtel and Merck (cited)). It references NCAT internal appeal principles from prior Appeal Panel decisions (Prendergast and Cominos) to frame leave and questions of law.

After: The Panel clarifies and applies the principle that for s 79L FTA the 'cause of action giving rise to the claim' requires identifying the concrete facts that support a Tribunal order and, in the context of s 54 ACL, that acceptable quality is to be judged at the time of supply (with allowance for latent defects). That application means post‑supply servicing deficiencies (here, the use of non‑approved oil) will not typically restart or defer accrual of a rejection right under s 259 unless they reveal a hidden defect that existed at supply. The decision therefore reinforces a clear accrual point for consumer rejection claims: when the facts entitling rejection are present and notified, not when consequential or remedial events occur later.

Key passages with plain-English translation

"In the context of section 79L of the FTA, 'cause of action giving rise to the claim' refers to the set of facts which support a right to an order by the Tribunal."
- Plain English: To work out whether the Tribunal can hear a claim under the three‑year rule, you must list the concrete facts that give the consumer the right to the remedy they want.
"It is apparent from the terms of section 54 ... that the time at which the determination of whether or not goods are of acceptable quality is to be made is when the goods are supplied to the consumer..."
- Plain English: Whether goods were 'acceptable' is measured when the buyer got the goods, although later discovery of a hidden defect from back then can be relevant.
"The use of non‑approved oils in repairing and servicing the vehicle in the period after the motor vehicle had been supplied could not mean that the motor vehicle was not of acceptable quality, as it did not affect the quality of the vehicle at the time at which it was supplied to Mr Cairns..."
- Plain English: Problems caused by how the dealer fixed or serviced the car after sale do not make the car defective at the time of sale unless they show something was wrong when it was sold.
"Even assuming all the necessary facts in Mr Cairns' favour ... all of the facts supporting Mr Cairns' claim ... occurred more than three years before he lodged his claim ... the Tribunal was therefore prevented from hearing and determining that claim under section 79L of the FTA."
- Plain English: Because the events that would let him reject the car happened over three years before he sued, the Tribunal could not hear that part of his case.
"We doubt that the guarantees under section 61 of the ACL applied in the present circumstances."
- Plain English: The Panel signalled uncertainty whether the services guarantee (s 61) even fits these facts, but it did not have to finally decide that question.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

A consumer who discovers a defect at or shortly after delivery and notifies the supplier of rejection but waits more than three years to lodge an NCAT consumer claim will likely be time‑barred under s 79L, because the cause of action accrued when the facts establishing the right to reject existed (the defect and notification).
Claims that rely on poor repair or servicing conduct after supply (for example, use of incorrect parts or consumables) will not ordinarily change the accrual date for a rejection claim under s 54 unless the post‑supply conduct reveals a hidden defect that existed at supply.
Where a consumer's complaint about servicing might be characterised under s 61 ACL as a services guarantee breach, the likely remedies are compensatory (s 267) rather than substitutional remedies for goods (refund/replacement), so absent evidence of compensable loss, those remedies may not produce a refund of the purchase price.

How later courts have treated it

This decision is an Appeal Panel decision of NCAT. The Panel expressly relied on Full Federal Court authority (Medtel, Merck) to support the timing principle for acceptable quality, and on previous Appeal Panel decisions (Prendergast, Cominos) to frame internal appeal questions and leave considerations. The Panel's application is consistent with those authorities: it applies the timing rule to bar a late rejection claim, and treats post‑supply service complaints as functioning in the services guarantees/remedies space. As of this decision, it clarifies NCAT practice: careful identification of the facts needed to prove a rejection claim is essential to determining accrual and jurisdiction under s 79L. Practitioners citing this decision should expect courts and tribunals to focus on the accrual date tied to the factual matrix supporting the remedy sought.

Still-open questions

Hidden defects: the Panel accepted the general proposition that later‑discovered facts can disclose hidden defects existing at supply; however the decision did not elaborate diagnostic criteria for when post‑supply repair/service evidence will establish a latent pre‑supply defect. Future cases will need to develop how strong the causal or temporal link must be between post‑supply symptoms and an earlier latent defect for accrual to be deferred.
Interaction of goods and services guarantees: The Panel expressed doubt whether s 61 applied here but did not decide it. The boundaries between a goods guarantee under s 54 and a services guarantee under s 61 can be fact‑sensitive; further decisions may be required to delineate when a supplier's post‑supply servicing conduct gives rise to remedies for services as distinct from remedies for defective goods.
Remedies mix: The Panel treated the services remedy as compensatory (s 267). But there may be fact patterns where servicing conduct both (a) reveals a latent defect at supply and (b) independently causes loss. How remedies should be apportioned or characterised in such hybrid cases was not resolved.
Extension of time principles in NCAT appeals: The Panel extended time on the basis of a medical certificate and absence of prejudice. While this follows general principles, future disputes over late internal appeals will test how readily NCAT will grant extensions where prejudice is alleged or delay is longer.

This analysis is explanatory legal information only. It aims to explain what the Cairns v AHG Newcastle Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCATAP 103 decision says and how the Appeal Panel reasoned. It is not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft or strategy derived from it, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.

Judgment (14 paragraphs)

[1]

Introduction

This is an internal appeal under s 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ( NCAT Act) against a decision made in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal on 27 November 2019.
The appeal was brought by Mr Ben Cairns against AHG Newcastle Pty Ltd trading as Crossroads Subaru (AHG).
For the reasons set out below, we have decided to extend time to lodge the appeal until 21 February 2020 (the date the notice of appeal was lodged with the Tribunal) and to dismiss the appeal.

[2]

Background

The proceedings relate to a new Subaru WRX STI 6 motor vehicle purchased by Mr Cairns from AHG in November 2015 for $50,500 (vehicle). Mr Cairns sought a replacement of the vehicle on the ground that he had rejected it under section 259(3)(a) of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), due a major failure by AHG to comply with the statutory guarantee of acceptable quality under section 54 of the ACL. Alternatively Mr Cairns sought to return the vehicle and obtain a refund of the purchase price.

[3]

Tribunal proceedings and decision

The application to the Tribunal was lodged on 20 July 2019 and orders were made by the Tribunal on 27 November 2019.
The Tribunal relevantly found that: 1. Mr Cairns was a consumer; 2. Mr Cairns purchased the vehicle from AHG, taking delivery on 3 November 2015. 3. Mr Cairns returned the vehicle to AHG on 6 November 2015 and reported a suspicious noise. 4. In accordance with the advice of AHG, Mr Cairns returned the vehicle for service on 23 November 2015. 5. Mr Cairns was advised by AHG that the vehicle needed a major repair. He objected and advised the manufacturer, Subaru, that he would not have purchased the vehicle if he had known of the fault. AHG advised him that repair of the vehicle was the only available course. 6. Mr Cairns returned the vehicle to AHG on 14 December 2015. The gearbox was removed to enable the repair to be effected. The clutch plate, clutch cover and flywheel were replaced "to rectify noise from throw out bearing". In the course of the repair the oil was drained from the gearbox and replaced. 7. On 7 July 2016, Mr Cairns reported to AHG that in the cooler months it was difficult to select first, second and fifth gear. Mr Cairns returned the vehicle to AHG for testing on 2 August 2016. Testing by the regional service manager found "gearbox to be all within specifications no concern on gear selection". 8. In the period from November 2016 until May 2019 the vehicle was regularly serviced by AHG and the transmission oil was regularly replaced. In this period Mr Cairns consistently complained that it was difficult to select gears ( especially second gear) in colder conditions. 9. Subaru recommend the use of GL - 5 75W - 90 oil for the vehicle and do not recommend the use of any other oil. AHG conceded that it did not use 75W - 90 grade oil in the oil changes which were made in the relevant period. 10. The problems which Mr Cairns had with the vehicle since its repair in 2015 were caused by the use of non-approved oil in the vehicle. 11. The Tribunal Member accepted expert evidence tendered by Mr Cairns which established that in 2019 after the transmission oil was drained and replaced with the manufacturer's approved oil, the vehicle was consistently operating in a sound and satisfactory manner.
The Tribunal Member treated the claim by Mr Cairns as being based on two separate causes of action. The Tribunal Member considered the first cause of action to be a claim in respect of the defective clutch requiring repairs to the vehicle in December 2015, involving replacement of the clutch plate, clutch cover and flywheel. The Tribunal Member considered the second cause of action to be a claim in respect of the use of non-approved oils when AHG serviced the vehicle.
The Tribunal Member concluded that the first cause of action was time-barred by section 79L of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) (FTA). Section 79L relevantly provides that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a consumer claim if the cause of action giving rise to the claim first accrued more than three years before the date on which the claim is lodged.

[4]

Scope and nature of internal appeals

Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with permission (that is, the "leave") of the Appeal Panel: s 80(2) NCAT Act.
In Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 the Appeal Panel set out at [13] a non-exclusive list of questions of law: 1. Whether there has been a failure to provide proper reasons; 2. Whether the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked the wrong question; 3. Whether a wrong principle of law had been applied; 4. Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness; 5. Whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant (i.e., mandatory) considerations; 6. Whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration; 7. Whether there was no evidence to support a finding of fact; and 8. Whether the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it.
The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division are limited to those set out in cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 of the NCAT Act. In such cases, the Appeal Panel must be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that: 1. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or 2. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or 3. significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).
In Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5, the Appeal Panel stated at [13]: It may be difficult for self-represented appellants to clearly express their grounds of appeal. In such circumstances and having regard to the guiding principle, it is appropriate for the Appeal Panel to review an appellant's stated grounds of appeal, the material provided, and the decision of the Tribunal at first instance to examine whether it is possible to discern grounds that may either raise a question of law or a basis for leave to appeal. The Appeal Panel has taken such an approach in a number of cases, for instance, Khan v Kang [2014] NSWCATAP 48 and Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69. However, this must be balanced against the obligation to act fairly and impartially (Bauskis v Liew [2013] NSWCA 297 at [68] citing Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 367 at [309]-[316]). Relevantly, s 38(2) provides that that Tribunal "may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice.

[5]

Extension of time

The Notice of Appeal was lodged on 21 February 2020 which is not within the 28 day time period specified in cl 25(4) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014.
Mr Cairns provided a medical certificate which established that he had been suffering from a medical condition during the period in which an appeal was required to be filed. The delay was not extensive and there is no suggestion that AHG was prejudiced by the delay. In these circumstances we consider it appropriate to order an extension of time for Mr Cairns to lodge the Notice of Appeal until 21 February 2020.

[6]

Grounds of appeal

In his Notice of Appeal, Mr Cairns sought leave to appeal on the basis that the decision was not fair and equitable and was against the weight of evidence. The Notice of Appeal also asserted that significant new evidence was now available that was not reasonably available at the time of the hearing.
The grounds of appeal are somewhat discursive. However in essence they amount to a claim that the Tribunal should have found that there was a breach by AHG of the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality contained in section 54 of the ACL in relation to the vehicle, which would entitle Mr Cairns to return the vehicle and obtain a refund of the purchase price.
Although leave to appeal has been sought, we consider that the grounds of appeal in essence amount to a contention that the Tribunal Member made an error of law in the way in which Mr Cairns' claim was characterised and determined, including an error of law in relation to the determination of the issue of whether the claim to return the vehicle was time-barred. For this reason, we consider that leave to appeal is not required.

[7]

Submissions

In his oral submissions made to us at the hearing of the appeal on 29 April 2020, Mr Cairns emphasised that the only order he was seeking was a refund of the purchase price on the basis that he had notified AHG of his rejection of the motor vehicle due to a major failure to comply with the guarantee of acceptable quality. Mr Cairns made it clear that he had not, and was not seeking an order for compensation for loss or damage.
Mr W. Plancia, the Group Service Manager of AHG, made submissions on behalf of AHG. In the course of his submissions , we noted an undertaking by Mr Plancia on behalf of AHG to Mr Cairns that AHG agreed to extend the warranty on the gearbox of the motor vehicle for an additional period of three years from the date of expiry of the manufacturer's warranty in November 2018.

[8]

The cause of action giving rise to the claim

Part 6A of the FTA concerns the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in relation to consumer claims. Section 79E of the FTA defines a consumer claim to include a claim by a consumer for the return or replacement of specified goods. Section 79L provides, among other things, that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a consumer claim if the cause of action giving rise to the claim first accrued more than 3 years before the date on which the claim is lodged.
There is an imprecision in the meaning of the term " cause of action", which is sometimes used to mean the facts which support a right to judgment; sometimes to mean a right which has been infringed; and sometimes to mean the substance of an action as distinct from its form: Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd ( 1981) 147 CLR 589 at 610. In the context of section 79L of the FTA, "cause of action giving rise to the claim" refers to the set of facts which support a right to an order by the Tribunal.
In this case the claim by Mr Cairns was a claim against AHG as the supplier of the motor vehicle to reject the vehicle and obtain either a refund of the purchase price or a replacement vehicle, on the ground that AHG had failed to comply with the statutory guarantee under section 54 of the ACL that the vehicle be of acceptable quality.
In order to determine whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim, it is necessary to identify each fact which Mr Cairns had to prove to succeed in that claim, so that the time when the cause of action first accrued can be ascertained.
If a supplier supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer and fails to comply with a relevant guarantee under Subdivision A of Division 1 of Part 3 - 2 of the ACL ( including the guarantee of acceptable quality under section 54 of the ACL), then if the failure to comply with the guarantee cannot be remedied or is a major failure, section 259 (3)(a) of the ACL provides that, subject to section 262 of the ACL, the consumer may notify the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods and of the ground or grounds for the rejection. If, under section 259, the consumer notifies the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods then section 263 (4) of the ACL provides that the supplier must, in accordance with an election made by the consumer, either refund the purchase price and the value of any other consideration provided by the consumer or replace the rejected goods with goods of the same type and of similar value if such goods are reasonably available to the supplier.

[9]

Guarantee of acceptable quality under section 54 of the ACL

Subsection 54 (1) of the ACL provides that if a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer and the supply did not occur by way of sale by auction, there is a guarantee that the goods are of acceptable quality. Subsection 54 (2) provides: Goods are of acceptable quality if they are as: (a) fit for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied; and (b) acceptable in appearance and finish; and (c) free from defects; and (d) safe; and (e) durable; as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods), would regard as acceptable having regard to the matters in subsection (3)."
Subsection 54 (3) of the ACL provides: The matters for the purposes of subsection (2) are: (a) the nature of the goods; and (b) the price of the goods (if relevant); and (c) any statements made about the goods on any packaging or label on the goods; and (d) any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer of the goods; and (e) any other relevant circumstances relating to the supply of the goods.
It is apparent from the terms of section 54 ( including subsections (4),(5),(6) and (7) which we have not specifically set out) that the time at which the determination of whether or not goods are of acceptable quality is to be made is when the goods are supplied to the consumer, although information about the goods at that time not then known but discovered subsequently may be relevant. Facts learnt subsequently may establish a hidden defect existing at the time of supply.
This conclusion in supported by decisions of the Full Federal Court on the analogous provisions of former section 74D of the Trade Practices Act 1974( C'th) relating to the guarantee of merchantable quality: Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [ 2003] FCAFC 151;(2003) 130 FCR 182 ( in which it was common ground between the parties that the relevant time is the time when the goods are supplied to the consumer, see [38] and [57]); Merck Sharp & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] FCAFC 128; (2011) 196 FCR 145 at [180 ].
Mr Cairns had two complaints about the vehicle. The first was the gearbox noise which he notified AHG about in November 2015 and which was repaired in December 2015. Mr Cairns' second complaint related to use of non-approved oils in the vehicle at the time of the repairs in December 2015 and in subsequent servicing of the vehicle in the period up till May 2019.

[10]

The time limitation under s79L of the FTA

The gearbox noise led to Mr Cairns returning the vehicle to AHG in December 2015 for repairs. At that time Mr Cairns notified AHG that he rejected the vehicle but that rejection was not accepted by AHG, which proceeded to repair the vehicle.
The Tribunal did not make a finding as to whether the gearbox noise meant that the guarantee of acceptable quality under section 54 of the ACL had not been complied with, nor, if so, whether it was a major failure to comply with that guarantee. However, even assuming that it did amount to a major failure to comply with the guarantee of acceptable quality under section 54, Mr Cairns notified AHG that he rejected the vehicle on those grounds in December 2015, which was more than three years before he lodged his claim on the Tribunal.
Even assuming all the necessary facts in Mr Cairns' favour, all of the facts supporting Mr Cairns' claim to reject and return the vehicle on the basis of a breach of the guarantee of acceptable quality in section 54 of the ACL occurred more than three years before Mr Cairns lodged his claim in the Tribunal. Accordingly, the cause of action giving rise to Mr Cairns' claim to reject the motor vehicle arose more than three years before he lodged his claim. The Tribunal was therefore prevented from hearing and determining that claim under section 79L of the FTA. This is consistent with the Tribunal Member's conclusion on this issue.

[11]

Using non-approved oils in repairing and servicing the motor vehicle after delivery

The cause of action identified by the Tribunal Member relating to the alleged breach of a statutory guarantee or guarantees under section 61 of the ACL in connection with the servicing of the vehicle by AHG using non-approved oils could not succeed for the reasons identified by the Tribunal Member. The major failure to comply with section 61 of the ACL found by the Tribunal Member could only in the circumstances provide a remedy under section 267 of the ACL by way of compensation or damages. No such remedy was sought or established by Mr Cairns. We doubt that the guarantees under section 61 of the ACL applied in the present circumstances. Those guarantees only apply to the extent that the consumer makes known to the supplier a particular purpose for which the services are being acquired or a result which the consumer wishes to achieve. No findings were made to the effect that Mr Cairns communicated a particular purpose or result which he wished to achieve. However it is not necessary to determine this issue as this claim could not succeed in any event.

[12]

Conclusion

For the reasons we have set out we consider that the Tribunal Member was correct to dismiss Mr Cairns' application. The appeal is dismissed.

[13]

Orders 1. Order that the time for the appellant to lodge the appeal be extended until 21/2/2020. 2. Appeal dismissed

[14]

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 02 June 2020

Cairns v AHG Newcastle Pty Ltd

At a glance

Result

Key principles

Issues before the court

Plain English Summary

Cited legislation

Deep Dive

What happened

Why the court decided this way

Before and after state of the law

Key passages with plain-English translation

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

How later courts have treated it

Still-open questions

Catchwords

Judgment (14 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (2)

Cases Cited (8)

Cited By (2)

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