Rule 5.23(2)
3 Rule 5.23(2) relevantly provides:
If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:
…
If the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim, of if the Court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings - an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or
An order giving judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed; or any other order;
…
4 Kiefel J traced the history and operation of the former rule (Federal Court Rules 1979 O 35A r 3(2)(c)) in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665; [2006] FCA 1427 ("Dataline").
5 It may be accepted that the power conferred on the Court by the rule is just that. Whether it should be exercised in a particular case is a matter for the Court's discretion and the discretion should generally be exercised with caution. See Engineered Thermal Systems Pty Limited v Salmon, In the Matter of Salmon & Speck Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2012] FCA 1159 ("Engineered Thermal Systems") (Foster J) at [36]. But on the face of it there are significant differences between the present and the former rule. The former rule permitted the Court to give judgment against the respondent for the relief that:
the applicant appears entitled to on the statement of claim; and
the Court is satisfied it has power to grant.
[Emphasis added.]
6 The current rule is in more emphatic terms. The word "appears" has gone and the Court must not simply be satisfied that it has the power to grant the relief; it must be satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the relief.
7 It is not obvious why the terminology was changed. No reference is made to the rule in the Explanatory Statement. The description of Part 5, in which the rule appears, provides only limited assistance. It reads:
Part 5 deals with the Court's supervision of proceedings. It provides machinery for case management, for the operation of the Court's individual docket system and to assist the Court in achieving the objectives of the overarching purpose under Part VB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. While it largely adopts, simplifies and streamlines processes and procedures which operated under the former Rules and does not substantially alter existing practice, it does expand it and sets out some aspects in more detail. It also contains some new provisions.
[Emphasis in original.]
8 Uninstructed by authority I might have concluded that the change was substantive. But the weight of numbers is against me.
9 In Yeo v Damos Earthmoving Pty Ltd, in the matter of Beachwood Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1129 Gordon J considered that the earlier authorities under the former rule applied with equal force to the current rule.
10 In CNIP Pty Ltd v Chan & Naylor Norwest Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1170 ("CNIP") at [19] Perram J held that the requirements of the current rule, like its predecessor, will be met if, upon inspection of the applicants' pleading, the Court is satisfied that the applicant would be entitled to the relief sought (in that case permanent injunctions).
11 In Speedo Holdings B.V. v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 ("Speedo") Flick J provided a useful list of the old authorities. His Honour also cited Perram J in CNIP and held, in substance, that the differences between the former and the current rule were of no consequence. His Honour said at [23]:
Notwithstanding that difference in language, the requirement imposed is not that an applicant prove by way of evidence the claim sought to be advanced; the requirement is that the Court needs to be "satisfied" on the face of the statement of claim that the applicant is entitled to the "relief" claimed. (Citation omitted).
[Emphasis in original.]
12 In Engineered Thermal Systems Foster J (at [38]) agreed with Flick J.
13 Despite some misgivings, I am not convinced that these decisions are clearly wrong. I am therefore constrained to follow them.
14 Having said that, in the present case, without referring to any of the authorities, Cafe2U adduced evidence.
15 In Speedo Flick J explained (at [24]-[25]) that in order to be satisfied that an applicant is entitled to the relief claimed the Court only needs to be satisfied that each element of the relevant civil wrong involved is properly and discretely pleaded in the statement of claim. His Honour accepted, however, that the Court may permit recourse to further evidence provided it would not alter the case as pleaded. In this respect his Honour followed Kiefel J in Dataline. In that case, after reviewing the authorities concerning the former rule, her Honour said at 677 [45] that no evidence needs to be adduced, at [48] that the terms of the rule do not suggest recourse to affidavit evidence, and that the case law provides that judgment must be entered according to the pleading alone. Yet her Honour ultimately held at [50] that some affidavit material could be admitted in relation to the relief sought. In the appeal from her Honour's orders (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (2007) 161 FCR 513 ("ACCC v Dataline")) the Full Court said at 536 [90] that it was not necessary for it to consider whether additional evidence could be led going beyond the facts pleaded in the statement of claim. This begs the question, of course, about whether evidence can be called to support those facts.
16 In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] 195 FCR 1 at 21 [63], however, Gordon J went a little further. Her Honour held that where the relief is discretionary (including declarations, injunctions, pecuniary penalties), the Court is "entitled, if not obliged", to receive evidence relevant to the exercise of that discretion so long as that evidence does not include additional facts which should have been pleaded. I take the rider to refer to material facts.
17 Each of these cases was only brought under r 5.23(2)(c) or its predecessor, and none of them involved a claim for unliquidated damages. In CNIP Perram J made an order that damages be assessed but was apparently not asked to assess them. In the present case, not only am I asked to assess damages but I am also asked to grant several injunctions. A good deal of the evidence called by Cafe2U is relevant not only to the allegations of breach of the franchise agreement but also to the question of relief.
18 While it may not be necessary to do so, in Macquarie Bank Ltd v Seagle (2008) 79 IPR 72; [2008] FCA 1417 Jagot J received evidence to support the allegations in the statement of claim and made findings of fact based on that evidence. I have done the same. This course is largely unavoidable, not merely because of the way Cafe2U conducted its case, but because the particulars of allegations made in the statement of claim often incorporate the evidence by reference. It is also appropriate to consider the evidence because of the nature of the orders that are sought.
19 In addition to the evidence relating to service, in support of its application for default judgment Cafe2U relied on affidavits of:
Derek Black, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Cafe2U, who is responsible for all records and documentation relating to the operation of the business, sworn on behalf of the company on 3 September 2012;
George Angelis, National Operations Manager of Cafe2U, who is responsible for the day to day operations of the company's Australian business and the manager of its information technology systems (sworn on 3 September 2012); and
Barry Lazarus, solicitor for Cafe2U, affirmed on 14 December 2012 and 20 February 2013.
20 Cafe2U also tendered the transcript of the hearing of a claim for interim relief before Cowdroy J on 7 September 2012 in which Prince appeared by telephone conference.
21 The discussion of the facts that appears below is derived from this evidence. I am satisfied that, with the exception of inadmissible opinion evidence to which I have not had regard, the evidence does not go beyond the scope of what was pleaded. Before I go any further, however, I must deal with the question of service.