Self-executing order contemplating default judgment
22 Rule 5.22 of the Rules provides:
A party is in default if the party fails to:
(a) do an act required to be done, or to do an act in the time required, by these Rules; or
(b) comply with an order of the Court; or
(c) attend a hearing in the proceeding; or
(d) prosecute or defend the proceeding with due diligence.
23 Rule 5.23(2) relevantly provides:
If a respondent is in default, an applicant may apply to the Court for:
(a) an order that a step in the proceeding be taken within a specified time; or
…
(c) if the proceeding was started by an originating application supported by a statement of claim or if the court has ordered that the proceeding continue on pleadings - an order giving judgment against the respondent for the relief claimed in the statement of claim to which the Court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled; or
(d) an order giving judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed, or any other order; or
(e) an order mentioned in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) to take effect if the respondent does not take a step ordered by the Court in the proceeding in the time specified in the order.
24 Grace Solar is in default. The company has failed to attend hearings in the proceeding on 23 November 2012, 1 March 2013 and today. This is a default under Rule 5.22(c). The company has failed to appoint a lawyer to represent it (or seek leave to proceed without one) during the seven months that have passed since Minter Ellison's retainer was terminated on 4 September 2013. On one view, this is a default under Rule 5.22(a); alternatively, if it were said that Grace Solar had not taken any step to "proceed" in the proceeding since that date, there would be a default within Rule 5.22(d) of the Rules. Further factors constituting a default under Rule 5.22(d) would include failing to respond to any of the correspondence sent to Grace Solar by the Court and by KerryJ's lawyers since 4 September 2012, as well as Grace Solar's failure to attend hearings.
25 The authorities have to date stated that the differences between Rule 5.23(2) of the Rules and its predecessor in O 35A r 3(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) are largely immaterial: see the discussion in Cafe2U Pty Limited v Bishambu Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 191 at [9]-[13] and the authorities there cited. The power conferred by Rule 5.23(2), like the previous conferral of power, is discretionary and is generally to be exercised cautiously: see, for example, Engineered Thermal Systems Pty Limited v Salmon, In the matter of Salmon & Speck Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1159 ("Engineered") at [36], citing Speedo Holdings BV v Evans (No 2) [2011] FCA 1227 ("Speedo") at [2]-[21].
26 Rule 5.23(2) does not require the applicant to prove by evidence the claim made against the respondent. As Flick J said in Speedo [at 23]:
… the requirement imposed is not that the applicant prove by way of evidence the claim sought to be advanced; the requirement is that the Court needs to be 'satisfied' on the face of the statement of claim that the applicant is entitled to the 'relief' claimed …
27 In order to be satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the relief claimed, the Court must be satisfied that each element of the cause of action is properly pleaded: see Speedo at [24]. Further, the Court may, and in a case seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief, may be obliged to, have regard to evidence, although the Court may not have regard to evidence that would alter the case as pleaded: see Speedo at [25]; and Engineered at [36]-[38].
28 In its Second Amended Originating Application and Second Amended Statement of Claim, KerryJ seeks (among other things) an injunction restraining Grace Solar from infringing Australian certified innovation patent no. 2009101302 and a corresponding declaration. Gordon J held, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) (2011) 195 FCR 1 at 21 [63], that where a default judgment is sought in respect of discretionary relief (including injunctions and declarations) the Court "is entitled, if not obliged, to receive" evidence relevant to the discretion, providing the evidence does not relate to additional facts that should have been pleaded in support of the claim.
29 The Second Amended Statement of Claim pleads clearly each element of KerryJ's infringement claim regarding certified innovation patent no. 2009101302. The affidavits of Thomas Gertsch affirmed on 14 October 2011, Grant Guzzi affirmed on 10 November 2011, Mario Guzzi affirmed on 10 November 2011, and Martin Earley affirmed on 24 November 2011 provide evidence in support of this claim. I accept that, as KerryJ submitted, this evidence is relevant to the Court's exercise of discretion under Rule 5.23(2) and whether or not KerryJ should have the declaratory and injunctive relief that it also seeks. Having regard to the pleading and this evidence, subject to [30] and [31] below, I would order that there be a default judgment entered against Grace Solar (in the event that Grace Solar fails to appoint a lawyer and file a notice of address for service, as discussed at [12]-[21] above).