THE CURRENT APPLICATION
44 At the hearing on 16 March 2009, the first and fourth to seventh defendants submitted that the claim against them was, from the outset, weak and almost certain to fail. ASIC was said effectively to have abandoned its case against these same defendants and it was submitted in the alternative, that at least from 5 October 2007, it had become apparent to ASIC that it should have discontinued the proceeding given that APM had been wound up and that any alleged scheme was not operative.
45 The defendants justified this submission by a consideration of the merits of ASIC's case. They contended that the three elements necessary for a scheme to be considered a "managed investment scheme" were not present, referring to Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Pegasus Options Group Pty Ltd (2002) 41 ACSR 561 at par [28]. They submitted that there was no such scheme requiring registration under the Corporations Act. It was submitted that ASIC's outline of submissions accepted that in connection with the Calderone Financiers Agreements (dated 14 and 16 September 2005) neither the replacement securities nor the promised payments had been made and that the "scheme" "had not been fully implemented because the first step, release of the securities, had not occurred …" The defendants submitted that it then followed that as the first step of the alleged scheme had failed, it could not be maintained that a scheme was in operation.
46 More particularly, it was submitted that the financiers had already contributed funds to the Calderone Property Developers, so that the arrangements with APM to release original securities over the Calderone properties could not satisfy the requirement that money or money's worth be contributed to acquire rights to benefits in the scheme itself. Alternatively, the defendants submitted that if the release of securities could be characterised as a "contribution", then such a contribution was not pooled, nor was the release of securities "used in a common enterprise." The defendants stated that "the only thing that might amount to a common enterprise was the obtaining by APM of finance for development purposes. But this did not, and could not occur because the refinancing was prevented by the lodging of a vast array of caveats over the properties that were released."
47 The defendants further submitted that the definition of "managed investment scheme" in s 9 of the Corporations Act specifically excluded "the issue of debentures or convertible notes by a body corporate." Section 9 defines "debenture" to mean a chose in action which "includes an undertaking by the body to repay as a debt money deposited with or lent to the body". Relying on Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 45 ACSR 401 at par [11], the defendants submitted that a debenture or loan agreement is not an interest in a managed investment scheme. It was further stated that the definition of debenture does not include "an undertaking to pay money under a promissory note that has a face value of at least $50,000."
48 The point of these submissions was to assert that ASIC's allegation that promissory notes issued by the Australvic Group were held in "26 different names … and that the amount owing was of the order of $2.9M" was incorrect. According to the defendants' submissions, when joint holders of promissory notes to the value of less than $50,000 were excluded from the calculations as to whether the scheme must be registered under s 601ED(1)(a) of the Corporations Act (ie, whether there were more than 20 members participating in the Scheme), there were only 11 holders of instruments not excluded by virtue of the legislative provisions relating to the constitution of a managed investment scheme. The defendants' argument therefore assumed that even if the scheme was a managed investment scheme, given that the number of participants was less than 20, registration under the Corporations Act was not required. Accordingly, it was said that "ASIC's case was not just almost certain to fail: it would, as a matter of inevitability, have failed."
49 In addition, the defendants submitted that "ASIC may have been distracted by the argument in the winding up proceeding (VID 210 of 2007) from focusing on its material in the present proceeding." ASIC's concentration on the Australvic Group's transfer of funds; the insolvency of APM and the corporate defendants' books and records being in disarray was said to have no import as to whether a managed investment scheme was in existence. In this context it was argued that had ASIC's attention been properly focused, proceedings against the defendants would not have been pursued because it would have been obvious in the light of proper analysis, that no managed investment scheme existed. It was asserted that by the end of the hearing before Middleton J, any scheme possibly in operation had effectively ceased given the inactivity and winding up of various companies and that ASIC should have taken steps at that stage to discontinue the proceeding so as to avoid the defendants incurring considerable legal costs for which they were now liable.
50 The course of the procedural steps comprising the proceeding, coupled with the affidavit of Mr Warren Day on behalf of ASIC, was said to make it plain that ASIC's allegations against the defendants were futile at the very least from 5 October 2007 when APM was wound up. The combined force of these submissions was said to support the proposition in relation to the award of costs that "although the Court does not try a hypothetical case and venture into areas of disputed fact …, where a judge can be confident that one party would almost certainly have succeeded then that party should be awarded costs; Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [supra]." The judgment of Burchett J in One‑Tel Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 101 FCR 548 ("One‑Tel") was cited in support of this statement insofar as it was said his Honour drew a distinction between "cases in which one party, after litigating for some time, effectively surrenders to the other, and cases where some supervening event or settlement so removes or modifies the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one party has simply won, no issue remains between the parties except for costs."
51 In this context, the defendants claimed that not only would they have been successful at trial given that there could, on their submissions, be no purported scheme said to require registration, but also that ASIC had effectively surrendered its case, analogous to the decision in One‑Tel, thereby entitling the defendants to their costs.
52 The defendants developed these submissions in detail in their amended outline of contentions of fact and law and these were analysed further by Senior Counsel in oral submissions. The defendants acknowledged that it had taken some time to develop these submissions but they relied upon General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 for the proposition that the fact that it takes a long time to explain in an application for summary judgment why a plaintiff's case is so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed is no reason for a Court to refuse to find that the plaintiff's case cannot possibly succeed (at 130).
53 I have set out the defendants' submission in some detail in order to demonstrate that their fundamental submission that ASIC's case was almost certain to fail required a detailed consideration and analysis of the merits of ASIC's case and the defendants' defences at a number of different levels. Further, a number of the defendants' fundamental propositions were challenged and disputed by ASIC (to which I refer later in these reasons). For reasons to which I refer later, I am not satisfied that ASIC's case was almost certain to fail or that the defendants were almost certain to succeed. Whether this was so, could only be determined on a full trial of the merits of the case.
54 The defendants further claimed that the circumstances were such so as to warrant the award of costs on an indemnity basis. This assertion was based on the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction to make such an award where one party has engaged in conduct which causes loss of time to the court and to other parties; Colgate‑Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 and that the categories of special circumstances in which indemnity costs are awarded are not closed; Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397.
55 I turn to ASIC's submissions and its evidence as to how the agreement with the defendants to discontinue the proceeding arose.
56 From 9 April 2008 ASIC entered into without prejudice negotiations with the defendants, apart from APM, in an attempt to resolve the proceeding without the need for a lengthy trial. Mr Day said that there were a number of reasons for ASIC taking this approach:
(a) the liquidation of APM had resumed so that an officer of the Court, the liquidator, was now in a position to investigate further the affairs of APM and inter‑company transfers between the defendants;
(b) ASIC had received an interim report from APM's liquidator on 5 March 2008 which suggested that, although the liquidator's investigations were continuing, no significant additional assets were held outside APM and MK River;
(c) the report as to the affairs of the receiver of MK River dated 19 December 2007 suggested that that company was hopelessly insolvent and ASIC considered that there should be little resistance to the appointment of a liquidator which would complement the work of APM's liquidator in his investigations;
(d) the scheme which ASIC contended, and still contends, was a managed investment scheme, had effectively ceased operation and there was no ongoing risk to the public;
(e) in a judgment delivered on 29 November 2007 in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v HLP Financial Planning (Aust) Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 487, Finkelstein J had considered declarations of contravention against individuals in similar circumstances as this proceeding although he had suggested limitations not relevant for present purposes;
(f) ASIC considered that there was a low probability of it recovering its costs from the defendants;
(g) AF had been deregistered on 10 September 2007.
57 As a result of these matters ASIC formed the conclusion that there was insufficient need from a public interest perspective in pressing for final scheme‑related relief provided that the key incorporated defendants were to be wound up.
58 ASIC offered to settle the proceeding against Mr Kyriackou on the basis that the proceeding be dismissed against him with no order as to costs, that the corporate defendants be wound up and that ASIC's costs be costs in the winding up of those companies and that there otherwise be no order as to costs.
59 There was an issue about the winding up of MK River as the defendants, or at least, Mr Kyriackou, wanted the receiver of MK River, Mr Dunner, to be appointed as liquidator of MK River. As Mr Dunner was the receiver of MK River he needed the leave of the Court to be appointed liquidator: Corporations Act s 532(2). It was not until 22 July 2008 that the defendants, or at least Mr Kyriackou, acknowledged that Mr Dunner needed leave to be appointed liquidator. On 22 July 2008 it was agreed between the parties that MK River would be wound up and it was indicated through the defendants that Mr Dunner would apply to the Court for leave to be appointed as liquidator of MK River. No motion or application by Mr Dunner to this effect was ever filed and ultimately MK River was wound up and another liquidator appointed.
60 ASIC decided not to press for the winding up of the fourth and seventh defendants because it considered that they posed no risk to the public interest given the cessation of the scheme which had been the catalyst for the proceeding.
61 ASIC challenged the basic propositions underpinning the defendants' submissions. ASIC submitted that it had not abandoned its case; rather, ASIC and the defendants had reached an agreement that the proceeding be discontinued. I accept that submission. That was what I was told on 22 July 2008. On that date the only issue between the parties was the costs of the proceeding which they had agreed was to be the subject of an expeditious mediation.
62 ASIC relied in particular upon the following factors and circumstances in support of its submission that no order should be made as to the costs of the proceeding:
(a) on 22 November 2007 Middleton J had given an interlocutory judgment substantially in favour of ASIC;
(b) on 8 July 2008 Jessup J had refused the defendants' motion to strike out the proceeding, part of which motion was predicated on the submission that ASIC's statement of facts and contentions did not disclose an arguable case;
(c) it was not correct to say that the proceeding was evidently futile from and after 5 October 2007. It is apparent from Middleton J's reasons (pars [49]‑[50]) that the principal reason why he did not continue the interlocutory restraint on Mr Kyriackou was not the strength or lack of strength of ASIC's case against him but rather because the scheme, for which ASIC was contending, had ceased. The position of the incorporated defendants was still up in the air: see pars [43]‑[47] of Middleton J's reasons.
(d) ASIC's application in this proceeding was not confined to the winding up of the alleged managed investment scheme. The application relied also on s 459B (winding up and insolvency), s 461(1)(k) (winding up on the just and equitable ground), s 464 (winding up on account of an ASIC investigation) and s 472(2) (appointment of a provisional liquidator). There was also reliance on ss 473(1), 601EE, 1323 and 1324 of the Corporations Act.
63 ASIC also relied upon the following facts and circumstances which were relevant to the factual issues in dispute:
(a) Mr Kyriackou had, at various times, been a director of APM, AHL, ACCS, AF and MK River;
(b) AHL had been shown to be the recipient of substantial amounts of money from APM which according to the evidence had never been explained;
(c) a number of the corporate defendants had common directors and shareholders;
(d) the main reason the proceeding continued after the filing of the report from the liquidator of APM on 5 March 2008 was the refusal of the defendants to agree to an independent liquidator being appointed to MK River. The report as to affairs lodged with ASIC by the receiver of MK River, Mr Dunner on 19 December 2007 showed that that company was plainly insolvent. The receiver consented to MK River being wound up on the just and equitable ground but the defendants refused to accept the appointment of an independent liquidator and informed the Court on several occasions that an application for leave for the appointment of the receiver, Mr Dunner as liquidator was to be made, but it never was.
64 Further, ASIC did not accept that there were insufficient members of the alleged scheme to require registration. ASIC submitted that the calculation of the number of members of the scheme was not confined to recipients of promissory notes. As ASIC pointed out, membership of a scheme is defined by reference to "interests". "Interest in a managed investment scheme" is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act as meaning "a right to benefits produced by the scheme (whether that right is actual, prospective or contingent and whether it is unenforceable or not)". The defendants relied upon breach of the agreement of 14 September 2005 to demonstrate that no managed investment scheme liable to registration came into existence. However, that agreement proceeded on the basis that enforceable rights were created albeit rights which were not enforced because of breach of the agreement.
65 It was critical to the defendants' submissions that the further contribution of funds which was required to be made under the agreement of 14 September 2005 was not made and that the Calderone financiers who were obliged to release their original securities had failed to do so. It was then submitted that they had never contributed money or money's worth as required by the definition of "managed investment scheme" in s 9 of the Corporations Act. It was said that the definition of "managed investment scheme" required an actual contribution and not merely an agreement to contribute. I doubt that this submission and analysis is valid. Although the earlier securities were not released by the Calderone financiers there was an agreement that they be released. In any event this is not an issue which I should resolve without a full trial on the merits of the case. It should not be resolved on the present application.
66 ASIC submitted that the 14 September 2005 Deed of Agreement which provided that the consideration for additional finance was the release of securities earlier given to the Calderone financiers established that money's worth was thereby contributed and pooled by the Calderone financiers. In support of this proposition ASIC relied upon Mr Kyriackou's evidence in par [7] of his affidavit sworn on 11 June 2007 where he said:
"APM is the company created effectively to bail‑out landowners and builders under financial pressure by providing borrowing capacity to the existing owners of property by acting as a trustee and developing the acquired property to increase its value. Upon final development of the acquired property, APM disposes of the acquired property, and makes payment to the beneficiaries after the payment of its costs and remuneration."
It should be noted that the "beneficiaries" referred to by Mr Kyriackou are the owners of the properties, their financiers and any new financiers.
67 ASIC also challenged the defendants' submission that some of the holders of the promissory notes fell within the exclusion of debentures from the definition of "managed investment scheme" in s 9 of the Corporations Act. ASIC submitted that it was contentious whether the exception applied as the defendants would have it and referred to a number of authorities. ASIC submitted that even if the exception applied as the defendants submitted, the result was not that there were fewer than 20 members. ASIC submitted that there were at least 39 scheme members.
68 Having regard to the authorities to which I shall refer, it is not necessary, appropriate nor desirable to resolve all these contentious issues which can only be resolved at a full trial of the proceeding when the merits of ASIC's case and the defendants' case can be investigated in detail. These contentious issues are such that at this stage, on the material and submissions before me, I am unable to say that ASIC's case was almost certain to fail or that the defendants' case was almost certain to succeed. Nor am I able to form a clear view about the merits of ASIC's case without a full trial.
69 There was little dispute between the parties as to the relevant principles applicable in this area, namely where there has been discontinuance or an agreement to discontinue with the question of the costs of the proceeding being left for the Court. The significant difference between the parties was whether in the particular circumstances of this case an exception to the usual rule that there be no order as to costs had arisen.
70 The defendants submitted that the principles concerning costs where a party wishes to discontinue were summarised by Hill J in Australian Securities Commission v Aust‑Home Investments Limited (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201:
"(1) Where neither party desires to proceed with litigation the Court should be ready to facilitate the conclusion of the proceedings by making a cost order: Stratford and the SEQEB case.
(2) It will rarely, if ever, be appropriate, where there has been no trial on the merits, for a Court determining how the costs of the proceeding should be borne to endeavour to determine for itself the case on the merits or, as it might be put, to determine the outcome of a hypothetical trial: Stratford. This will particularly be the case where a trial on the merits would involve complex factual matters where credit could be an issue.
(3) In determining the question of costs it would be appropriate, however, for the Court to determine whether the applicant acted reasonably in commencing the proceedings and whether the respondent acted reasonably in defending them(SEQEB).
(4) In a particular case it might be appropriate for the Court in its discretion to consider the conduct of a respondent prior to the commencement of the proceedings where such conduct may have precipitated the litigation: cf Sunday Times Newspaper Co Ltd v McIntosh (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 371.
(5) Where the proceedings terminate after interlocutory relief has been granted, the Court may take into account the fact that interlocutory relief has been granted: cf Re Asiatic Electric Co Pty Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 603 at 606, a case which, however, depended upon the specific wording of the statute under consideration.
Where interlocutory relief has been granted, that fact carries no implication as to the ultimate merits of the case but does ordinarily suggest that the Court granting interlocutory relief has accepted or found that there is an arguable issue to be tried between the parties and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of that relief. …"
71 This approach was accepted and followed by McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622. At 624‑625 McHugh J said:
In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action.
…
Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. …
If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. This approach has been adopted in a large number of cases."
72 In Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 284, Finkelstein J adopted the propositions stated by Hill J in Australian Securities Commission v Aust‑Home Investments Limited (supra) and said at 287:
"For my own part I should wish to emphasise that in the absence of a hearing on the merits it is difficult to see how any order, other than an order that each party bear its own costs, can be made except in special circumstances. To do otherwise would require some prediction of the outcome of the case. It seems to me that the third proposition stated by Hill J was intended to cover the situation where the Court was in fact able to form a clear view about the merits of a case without a trial. So, if a claim is patently hopeless that would be a good reason to make an order for costs against the claimant. Likewise if a defence was bound to fail that would be good reason for awarding costs in favour of the claimant. But I venture to suggest that there will be very few cases where the issues will be sufficiently clear, in the absence of a hearing, for an order for costs to be made in favour of a party."
73 The defendants accepted that although the Court does not try a hypothetical case and venture into areas of disputed fact, where a judge can be confident that one party would almost certainly have succeeded then that party should be awarded costs, relying on Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214 at pars [50]‑[54]. The defendants, relying on this authority, submitted that it was almost certain as regards to the first and fourth to seventh defendants that they would have succeeded at trial. They made this submission on the basis that it could not be said that the alleged scheme was a managed investment scheme that was required to be registered. As I have already noted, I reject this submission.
74 I do not consider that ASIC has acted so unreasonably that the defendants should obtain their costs of the proceeding. Indeed, I consider that ASIC acted responsibly throughout the proceeding and, in particular, by reference to the matters referred to in pars [62] and [63] above. I do not consider, that the first and fourth to seventh defendants or any of them, in particular Mr Kyriackou, was almost certain to have succeeded if the proceeding had gone to a full trial. I do not consider that the further prosecution of the proceeding by ASIC became futile at any time prior to 22 July 2008 when there was an agreement that the proceeding be discontinued. Thereafter the proceeding continued having regard to the dispute between the parties as to the payment of the costs of the proceeding.
75 The circumstances of this case are such that this is not one of those rare cases, referred to in the decisions to which I have referred above, where the Court should determine how the costs should be borne without a trial of the contested issues between the parties. In my opinion, there are no special circumstances in this proceeding which warrant me in making any order other than that there be no order as to the costs of the proceeding, so that the parties each bear their own costs of and incidental to the proceeding. Certainly, I have not been able to form "a clear view about the merits of the case without a trial" (Gribbles at par [72] above).
76 In reaching these conclusions I have paid particular regard to the following factors:
(a) the interlocutory relief granted by Middleton J on 12 June 2007;
(b) the reasoning of Middleton J on 22 November 2007;
(c) the reasoning of Jessup J on 8 July 2008;
(d) the contested issues whether the scheme alleged by ASIC fell within the definition of a managed investment scheme required to be registered;
(e) my rejection of the submission of the defendants that "it was almost certain, at least as regards to the first and fourth to seventh defendants, that they would have succeeded at trial";
(f) my rejection of the defendants' submission that "ASIC has surrendered in its case against the First and Fourth to Seventh Defendants, against whom it could have proceeded … ASIC has effectively abandoned the case against those parties on 22 July 2008". What I was informed on 22 July 2008 was that the parties had agreed that the proceeding be discontinued and that there be a mediation as to the costs of the proceeding;
(g) my rejection of the defendants' submission that it was apparent that at least by the time of the winding up order on 5 October 2007 that ASIC's case realistically could not and should not have proceeded. In particular, there are a number of outstanding issues in relation to a number of the defendants and in my opinion, it was arguable that ASIC was entitled to declaratory relief in relation to what had occurred earlier, particularly against Mr Kyriackou.
77 The usual rule should apply, namely that as all parties acted reasonably up to the termination of the mediation of the costs issue that there be no order as to the costs of the proceeding.
78 It follows, therefore that the first and fourth to seventh defendants' motion filed on 12 September 2008 should be dismissed and that the first and fourth to seventh defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to that motion. Otherwise leave should be given to ASIC to discontinue the proceeding and there should be no other orders as to the costs of the proceeding.