Should the orders be varied and if so how?
50 Having considered all of the evidence adduced in relation to the interlocutory application, I am of the view that ASIC's contentions concerning the sufficiency of the information provided by EuropeFX in response to ASIC's requests has some merit. Perhaps more significantly, however, what the evidence clearly demonstrates is that the existing regime which has been in place since 4 March 2020 is plainly inadequate and likely to continue to give rise to disputes between ASIC and EuropeFX or its solicitors in relation to the adequacy of information provided in relation to future payments. In my view, that alone justifies some variation to the existing orders with a view to avoiding those ongoing disputes.
51 The question, then, is which of the proposed variations to the existing orders will better serve the overarching statutory purpose of orders made under s 1323 of the Corporations Act: the variation proposed by ASIC, which would provide or require EuropeFX to seek and obtain ASIC's agreement or approval before making any payments to trade creditors in excess of $50,000; or the variation proposed, without admission, by EuropeFX, which would require EuropeFX to give ASIC advance notice of payments it intends to make, along with sufficient information to enable ASIC to determine the bona fides of those payments.
52 In my view, in all the circumstances, the variation proposed by ASIC is the preferable and more appropriate variation to the existing orders. The evidence demonstrates that the existing regime is unworkable and that the variation proposed by ASIC is necessary and desirable for the purposes of protecting persons who may in due course be found to be entitled to compensation from EuropeFX. I doubt that the same could be said of the variation proposed by EuropeFX. In particular, I doubt that the variation proposed by EuropeFX will make the regime workable such that it will provide the necessary or desirable level of protection for prospective claimants.
53 The following considerations support that view.
54 First, EuropeFX has paid a very large amount of money, exceeding $14 million, to mostly overseas entities since the initial orders were made in mid-December 2019. It has, however, been slow to provide adequate or compelling documentary support for the bona fides of those payments. ASIC's concerns in relation to those past payments were reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to the size of the payments, the nature of the entities receiving them, and the paucity of the information concerning the services for which the payments were said to be made.
55 Second, there is reason to believe that EuropeFX will continue to make very large payments to mostly offshore entities in the future, including significant payments to the four companies who have been the main recipients of the payments to date: Antelope Systems, Baff, Global Win, and XYX Media Technologies. While EuropeFX has now provided the contracts that it has entered into with those companies pursuant to which the payments are said to be made, the terms of those contracts are, on their face and without further explanation, somewhat surprising. That is particularly the case with the terms which provide for the calculation of the payments that must be made for the relevant services. To give but one example, the fees payable to Global Win appear to be calculated on the basis of the entire fixed and variable operating costs of Global Win's office. Without further explanation, the size of the monthly fees payable to these various offshore entities seem excessive in all the circumstances. More will be said about the contractual variations later.
56 Third, the witness called by EuropeFX, Mr Sasso, was unable to provide cogent or reliable evidence concerning those very large past and anticipated future payments or EuropeFX's contractual relationships with the main recipients of those payments. Mr Sasso's evidence was unreliable because it soon became readily apparent that he had no first-hand knowledge about the payments or the relevant contractual relationships. His evidence was at best second-hand knowledge based on what had been told by an overseas-based financial adviser whom he had never met. Mr Sasso appeared to do little more than make payments that he was told to make. He conceded in cross-examination that he had no real way of verifying the accuracy of the information concerning the payments that had been given to him by that financial adviser.
57 Fourth, there would appear to be good reasons to doubt, or at least question, the bona fides of the future payments that EuropeFX is likely to make to Antelope Systems, Baff, Global Win, and XYX Media Technologies. The legitimate concerns in relation to those payments arise from the relatively recent variations to the contracts between EuropeFX and those companies. As has already been noted, the variations would appear to have had the effect that EuropeFX's liability to continue to make payments for services under the contracts was increased or extended into the future, despite the fact that on and from 31 January 2020 its business effectively ceased and it no longer has any customers. In the absence of some cogent explanation, it is difficult to see how it could have been in the best interests of EuropeFX to extend its contractual relationships in all the circumstances. Mr Sasso was unable to give any cogent explanation. That is because he effectively had little or no direct knowledge concerning EuropeFX's contractual relationships. The negotiations concerning the variations were all conducted by Mr Amar.
58 Fifth and significantly, the evidence concerning any potential prejudice to EuropeFX, should the variation proposed by ASIC be made, was heavily qualified and somewhat speculative. Mr Sasso's evidence concerning potential prejudice was as follows:
The orders that ASIC seeks have the potential to prejudice Europe FX. If Europe FX is required to seek permission from ASIC each time it needs to make a payment over $50,000 any delay by ASIC in approving a payment, could place Europe FX in breach of the terms of its contract with third parties and may expose Europe FX to legal action in relation to those contracts for delay or failure to pay pursuant to the terms of those third party contracts.
59 It can be seen that the potential prejudice postulated by Mr Sasso hinges on the suggestion that there may be some delay by ASIC in approving a payment or any payments made pursuant to the regime. There is, however, no reason to believe that in the circumstances, ASIC, as a model litigant, would, or would have any reason to, unreasonably delay approving a payment if adequate and sufficient information concerning the payment was provided. Even if there was some delay, it is also somewhat doubtful in the circumstances that any such delay would give rise to any real prejudice to EuropeFX, unless the delay was so extensive as to cause the relevant trade creditors to either commence court or arbitration proceedings against EuropeFX in relation to those payments. If that eventuated, it would be open to EuropeFX to have the matter relisted before the Court and to make an application in relation to the approval of those payments.
60 Even putting those matters to one side, I would in any event give little, if any, weight to Mr Sasso's evidence concerning the risk of prejudice. That is because it was readily apparent that Mr Sasso had little real involvement in, or knowledge of, EuropeFX's business, let alone its relationships with its trade creditors.
61 The relevant principles in relation to the making of orders under s 1323 of the Corporations Act were not in dispute between the parties. Orders under s 1323 are essentially intended to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of ASIC's investigations: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Carey (No 3) (2006) 232 ALR 577; FCA 433 at [25] (per French J).
62 As has already been indicated, it is common ground that the key criteria for the making of orders under s 1323 of the Corporations Act is whether the proposed orders are necessary or desirable for the purposes of protecting the interests of persons to whom the company may ultimately become liable. The making of appropriate orders under s 1323 involves an "element of risk assessment and risk management": Carey (No 3) at [26]. The same principles no doubt apply when consideration is given to the variation of orders under s 1323. My assessment of the relevant risks involved in all the circumstances of this case is that they are most appropriately managed by requiring EuropeFX to seek ASIC's consent or agreement in relation to future payments which exceed $50,000.