Determination of liquidator remuneration
23 Section 473(3) provides:
473 General provisions about liquidators
…
(3) A liquidator is entitled to receive such remuneration by way of percentage or otherwise as is determined:
(a) if there is a committee of inspection - by agreement between the liquidator and the committee of inspection; or
(b) if there is no committee of inspection or the liquidator and the committee of inspection fail to agree:
(i) by resolution of the creditors; or
(ii) if no such resolution is passed - by the Court.
…
24 There are two lines of authority regarding committees of inspection and meetings of creditors to determine remuneration of liquidators.
25 There is authority to the effect that it is in essence a prerequisite that a liquidator must seek to have either the committee of inspection (if there is one) or the creditors determine their remuneration before applying to the Court: Re Interchase Co Ltd (In Prov Liq) (1993) 44 FCR 501 per Drummond J (at 502-503, 506) and Re Ricki Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 2048 per Brereton J (at [2]).
26 Rule 9.4(2)(b) of the Corporation Rules also provides that an application for determination of a liquidator's remuneration under s 473(3)(b)(ii) in this Court must not be made until after the date of the meeting of creditors mentioned in s 473(4) of the Act. However, r 9.4(3)(c) of the Corporation Rules also provides for a mode of service of the notice of the remuneration application if there is no committee of inspection and no meeting of creditors has been convened and held.
27 In contrast, there is also authority confirming that a court may determine a liquidator's remuneration where no committee of inspection was held and where it was not practically possible to convene a meeting of creditors to determine the liquidator's remuneration: Re Earning Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] VSC 152 per Matthews JR (at [25]) and Barbo Group Pty Ltd v Investment and Construction Enterprise Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 71 per Gardiner AsJ (at [7]). See also Re Walker as liq of One.Tel Ltd (2005) 189 FLR 467 (at [11], [25]-[34]) and Re Perdives Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 230 (at 321).
28 In Park v Whyte (No 2) [2018] 2 Qd R 413, Jackson J observed (at [58]):
In the case of a winding up by the court, where there is no agreement between the liquidator and any committee of inspection or resolution of the creditors, a liquidator appointed by the court is entitled to receive remuneration as is "determined" by the court: s 473(3)(b)(ii) CA.
See also Re Melbourne Co-Operative Book Shop Ltd (in liq) [2015] VSC 69 per Sifris J (at [6]).
29 In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Starpicket Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 699, while a judge of this Court, Gordon J noted:
10 In this case, no committee of inspection was appointed by the creditors, nor was there any resolution of creditors fixing the Liquidator's remuneration. That fact notwithstanding, the Court has jurisdiction to fix remuneration of the Liquidator pursuant to s 473(3)(b)(ii) of the [Act]: see Barbo Group Pty Ltd v Investment and Construction Enterprise Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 71 at [7].
11 Rule 9.4 of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) (the Corporations Rules) stipulates that an application under s 473(3)(b)(ii) of the [Act] must be made by interlocutory process in accordance with Form 3 in the winding up proceeding: r 9.4(2)(a). Rule 9.4(3) requires the Liquidator to serve notice of its intention to apply for such an order in accordance with Form 16 at least 21 days before filing the interlocutory process.
12 The Liquidator accepts that no such notice or application, compliant with the requirements of r 9.4, has been filed in these proceedings. Nevertheless, both the Liquidator and the Commissioner submitted that it is permissible and appropriate for the Court to make an order fixing the Liquidator's remuneration (and disbursements) in connection with the liquidation of Starpicket. Neither Starpicket nor the Scotts opposed that submission.
13 The Court has a general power under r 1.32 of the Rules to make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice. Following the 31 October 2012 Orders, the parties with an interest in the question of the Liquidator's remuneration in connection with the liquidation of Starpicket were on notice that the Court would be making a determination with respect to that issue and were afforded the opportunity to be heard. The Liquidator filed affidavit material in support of his claims on 3 December 2012. The relevant parties had ample time and opportunity to respond. In these circumstances, it is fair and just to dispense with the requirement for the Liquidator to make a formal application for his remuneration under s 473(3)(b)(ii) of the [Act].
(Emphasis added.)
30 The rationale behind this approach is that while the persons who are financially interested in the outcome of the liquidation are entitled to be consulted whenever it is practically feasible to do so, the Court must have jurisdiction to determine a liquidator's remuneration where the explicit power to fix a liquidator's remuneration proves to be practically incapable of being exercised or where there is some other creditors' rejection, deadlock or paralysis that otherwise practically precludes resolution prior to court application. As Black J noted in Re Hunter Valley Dental Surgery Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1144 (at [21]):
…Section 473(3)(b)(ii) of the [Act] provides for the liquidator to receive remuneration determined, inter alia, by the Court, if, relevantly, the committee of inspection and the liquidator fail to agree by resolution of creditors the amount of that remuneration. In this case, no such agreement has been reached, although that failure reflects, not a lack of consensus so far as the majority creditor is concerned, but the practical difficulties in convening a meeting of creditors in circumstances that all parties' interests will be served by the termination of the winding up occurring promptly, so that further costs of the liquidator are avoided.
(Emphasis added.)
31 In the first line of cases no exception appears to be contemplated or at least referred to (although in Re Interchase, Drummond J did confine his observations to 'in the circumstances that exist here'). Whereas in the second line of authorities there are some exceptions acknowledged. There is clear authority, albeit under former legislation, that absent a committee of inspection approval, a creditors meeting must be called at least unless to do so, on clear evidence before the court, would not be practicable in the circumstances: see Re Molyneux Aluminium Pty Ltd [1970] VR 456 per Lush J (at 457) followed by White M in Re Sectam Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 476. I think this necessarily would be a rare case. See also Re Norfolk Island Airlines Pty Ltd (in liq) (1991) 5 ACSR 430 and Re Spedley Securities (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Kearney J, 25 November, 1991).
32 Although some of these authorities are not particularly recent, I consider that they are consistent with the current text and purpose of the legislation. It seems to me that in a rare case where the Court is persuaded that it is impracticable to convene a meeting of creditors, it may approve the remuneration claim. It has certainly done so in the recent and not so recent past. In such a rare case not only would the impracticability be a key factor, but what also may be relevant is the nature of the notice to the creditors and their response (if any), the opportunity afforded to object, and other measures taken to ensure clear and open communications with the creditors likely to be affected by the remuneration claim.
33 Further, the cases illustrate that the circumstances which may bring a liquidator to the Court to seek orders fixing their remuneration may vary widely. There may be 'no known current creditors': Re Earning (at [25]). It may be that all creditors of the company have been paid '100 cents in the dollar and in that sense are no longer creditors': Re Perdives. It may be, such as the application presently before this Court, that there exists genuine 'practical difficulties in convening a meeting of creditors': see Hunter Valley Dental Surgery (at [21]). It is because these variety of possible impediments to satisfying s 473(3)(a) and s 473(3)(b)(i) that the power is conferred on the Court by s 473(3)(b)(ii). While this is not to say that liquidators should be readily encouraged to apply to the Court to seek orders in respect of their remuneration and thereby circumvent the primary processes contemplated, it is a recognition that rare circumstances may arise where the impediments are such that it is in the interests of justice that the Court fixes a liquidator's remuneration.
34 Rule 1.8 of the Corporation Rules provides for a power for this Court to give directions in relation to the practice and procedure to be followed in a proceeding in certain circumstances, including if difficulty arises in relation to practice and procedure. I am satisfied this power extends to excuse any non-compliance with r 9.4(2)(b) if the Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances: see Hayes, in the matter of Henry Walker Eltin Group Limited (subject to deed of company arrangement) (No 2) [2014] FCA 30.
35 In the event that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the remuneration application under s 473(3)(b)(ii), s 473(10) then provides that in exercising its power under s 473(3), the Court must have regard to whether the remuneration is reasonable and then sets out a number of factors that the Court may take into account (as identified above).
36 Otherwise, the principles applicable to the Court's assessment of the approval of liquidators' remuneration are settled. For example, in Morgan, it was noted (at [17]-[22]):
17 It is well settled that the onus is on the liquidator to establish that the remuneration claimed is reasonable and that it is the function of the Court to determine the remuneration by considering the material provided and bringing an independent mind to bear on the relevant issues: Sanderson v Sakr (2017) 93 NSWLR 459 (at [54]), citing Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd v Conlan (1998) 20 WAR 96; Conlan (as liquidator of Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd) v Adams (2008) 65 ACSR 521 (at [28]-[29]).
18 Although Venetian Nominees and Conlan related to the legislation as it stood prior to the 2007 amendments, the principles referred to in those cases remain applicable. Further, it will be expected that the liquidator in supplying material to enable the Court to assess whether a remuneration claim was reasonable, would supply material by reference to the matters referred to in s 473(10) of the CA: Sakr per Bathurst CJ (at [54]).
19 In Venetian Nominees, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Kennedy, Ipp and Wallwork JJ) set out the general principles applicable to the Court's assessment of a liquidator's remuneration. Those principles were summarised in the later Court of Appeal (McLure JA, Buss JA, Newnes AJA) decision in Conlan (at [28]) and cited by Davies J in Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144 (at [60]) as follows:
(a) A summary procedure is involved, not unlike that applicable to the taxation of solicitors' costs, which is not necessarily subject to all the rules that would apply in an action.
(b) The initial task of the court is to consider whether the liquidator has made out a prima facie case on the evidence before the court that the remuneration claimed is fair and reasonable. The Court must make that assessment "bringing an independent mind to bear on the relevant issues" even though at that point there is no objector.
(c) There is no absolute rule regarding the amount of detail required to support a remuneration claim. But the evidence relied on should be sufficient to enable potential objectors to review the amounts claimed and ascertain whether there are matters to which objection should be taken. If there is inadequate evidence supporting the claim, no order should be made.
(d) If the liquidator establishes a prima facie case, the court should allow for an objection procedure to enable objections to be made.
(e) If there are objectors to the claim or any part, the court should then establish the validity of those objections.
20 The meaning of a 'prima facie' case on the evidence before the Court, in this context, was explained as follows by McLure JA in Conlan (at [31]):
The expression "prima facie" is used in Venetian Nominees to mean that the claimant's evidence is sufficient to enable the court to determine whether the claimed remuneration is fair and reasonable. So, for example, there must be evidence relating to the work done by particular persons, how long it took to do the work, their hourly rate and the reasonableness of the rate.
21 Thackray concerned an application by the receivers and managers of Great Southern Managers Australia Limited (receivers and managers appointed) (in liquidation), which was the responsible entity of 45 managed investment schemes at the time of their appointment, to establish their entitlement to be indemnified out of the scheme property of ten of those managed investment schemes, secured by equitable lien upon the lienable property, for their remuneration for work performed and expenses reasonably incurred in taking steps for the care, protection, preservation and realisation of the assets and property of those ten schemes.
22 In Thackray, Davies J (then in the Supreme Court of Victoria) noted that the receivers argued that the standard of proof on their application could not be higher (and, if anything, was lower) than the standard on insolvency practitioners for the purposes of s 473(3) of the CA, which is to establish that the remuneration claimed is fair and reasonable. However, her Honour went on to note (at [63]-[64]):
[63] … Nevertheless, the receivers accepted that the principles set out Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd v Conlan are persuasive and that they should put sufficient evidence before the court to enable the court to determine that the amounts claimed are fair and reasonable. That involved providing sufficient detail of the work that was done and the expenses claimed for the court to assess the reasonableness of the remuneration claimed for that work and the reasonableness of the expenses incurred by the receivers. The reasonableness of remuneration may be adduced by evidence for example of an appropriate benchmark, such as the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia rates, for comparative work by persons with the relevant status and qualifications for that kind of work and justification of the hours spent. That amount can then be adjusted up or down to reflect other factors including:
(a) complexity above the norm for the kind of work involved;
(b) novelty and difficulty of the issues faced;
(c) the ultimate outcome obtained by the claimant.
[64] The court is looking for evidence of overcharging. Excessive charging may be indicated if there is a lack of proportionality between the cost of the work done relative to the value of the services provided. But there is no universal approach applicable in all circumstances by which the "reasonableness" of remuneration claimed or expenses incurred should be measured. The size, importance and complexity of the tasks performed are all factors to be taken into account. What is needed is sufficient information for the court and any objector to have a clear view about what was done so that an assessment can be made about the reasonableness of the claim.
(Citations omitted.)
37 The principle question is whether the remuneration claimed is reasonable.