The contradictor's first proposition
38 The contradictor's first proposition was that for 30 years between 1970 and immediately prior to the commencement of the Criminal Code on 15 December 2001, the content of the market manipulation provisions was the same whether they were enforced civilly or criminally.
39 The relevant legislative history advanced by the contradictor commenced prior to the introduction of the 1970 market manipulation provisions. Section 369 of the Companies Act 1961 (NSW) (and like provisions in other States and Territories) had some similarity to the present s 1311(1) of the Corporations Act in that it provided that a person who did something forbidden, failed to do something required, or otherwise failed to comply with that statute "shall be guilty of an offence against this Act". Section 124 contained now familiar obligations imposed on company officers pertaining to honesty, due diligence and misuse of information, with corresponding civil liability and criminal sanctions for breach. At that time there were no specific market manipulation provisions. However, for the provisions that did exist, the elements of each statutory command were indistinguishable as between civil and criminal proceedings, with both containing state of mind components. That identity between civil and criminal proceedings may account for the contradictor being unable to find instances of civil enforcement when the regimes were the same. If so, that highlights the difficulty in having little or no difference of practical importance between civil and criminal proceedings. In such circumstances the distinction between the criminal and civil standard of proof may, as a practical matter, be illusory. The requirement to prove a criminal mental element is often a more substantial hurdle than differences in the burden of proof as between civil and criminal proceedings.
40 The lack of specific market manipulation provisions was addressed by the introduction of Part VIII of the Securities Industry Act 1970 (NSW), which dealt with trading in securities. Sections 70 to 72 contained earlier versions of the present market manipulation proscriptions. Section 74 provided that a person who contravened any of the provisions of that Part would be guilty of an offence against that Act and liable on conviction on indictment to a fine and/or imprisonment. Section 75 provided that a person who was convicted of an offence was liable to pay compensation to a person who had purchased or sold securities at a price affected by the act or transaction the subject of the offence for the damage suffered. In that way, civil enforcement was dependent upon prior criminal enforcement resulting in a conviction, at least when used as a sword rather than a shield. Section 70 in particular provided as follows
A person shall not create or cause to be created or do anything which is calculated to create, a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any securities on any stock market in the State, or a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market for, or the price of, any securities.
41 North v Marra Developments Limited (1981) 148 CLR 42 is an example of a case under a regime of civil consequences flowing from the commission of a criminal offence, but no separate civil penalty sanction. In that case, a contravention of s 70 (and also common law illegality) was successfully pleaded as a shield in defence of a claim for payment of a stockbroker's fees in circumstances in which the share purchases in question had taken place for the purpose of securing the success of a takeover by maintaining the market price of the company's shares. In the course of upholding that outcome, the High Court considered what was required to constitute a criminal offence breach of s 70, which had a bearing on the outcome of the civil proceedings.
42 Mason J in Marra Developments at 58-59 pointed out that the generality of the language in s 70 did not easily translate into a specific prohibition against injurious activity by way of giving the market or price of securities a false or misleading appearance, whilst at the same time allowing for legitimate commercial activity which would have the same effect. The way to achieve the necessary distinction between proscribed and legitimate activities was to confine the operation of the provision to buyers and sellers whose transactions were undertaken for the sole or primary purpose of setting or maintaining the market price. The requirement of such a purpose unavoidably entailed a proscribed mental element being found to exist. To that end, the word "calculated" in s 70 was interpreted to mean "designed" or "intended", being the language of a state of mind of fault or responsibility, rather than the neutral concepts of "adapted" or "suited".
43 The contradictor relied upon Marra Developments, and in particular on the interpretation given to the word "intended", to demonstrate, in support of his first proposition, that a progenitor provision to the present market manipulation provisions had the equivalent of a fault element in both a criminal and a civil context. The meaning was the same irrespective of the form in which proceedings were brought. However Marra Developments was not concerned with a legislative regime like the present, which, as discussed below, entails two quite separate civil and criminal streams. To the contrary, that case was concerned with the public interest doctrine that the law will not ordinarily countenance the enforcement of rights which rely upon an illegal act, producing a civil consequence flowing from criminal behaviour.
44 Marra Developments may still provide useful guidance in ascertaining what, if any, state of mind is required to be established either when none is specifically provided, or the ambit of the state of mind language that has been used requires determination. However, such reasoning cannot have much, if any, application if Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code does apply, because that code "assumes that it is apparent on the face of the offence, as interpreted in the light of the Criminal Code, precisely what are the physical elements of an offence and to precisely which of those physical elements a fault element, if any, attaches and what that fault element is": R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272; 230 FLR 276 at 301 [129].
45 A similar statutory approach was reflected in the successor Securities Industry Act 1976 (NSW), namely of providing for prohibitions, a general offence provision and a compensation remedy, albeit no longer with the need for a conviction first to be obtained before reliance could be placed on a criminal contravention, such that this statute did not require separate consideration.
46 The 1981 Securities Industry (New South Wales) Code, being the New South Wales version of this aspect of a quasi-national cooperative scheme, introduced new market manipulation proscription provisions containing specific elements of intention, coupled with a general offence provision and a corresponding compensation provision. Again there was no need for a conviction to be obtained for the compensation remedy to be available, but a contravention had to be established having the same elements as the criminal offence. A civil remedy of injunctions was also introduced. In parallel, the Companies (New South Wales) Code 1981, being another part of the same overall quasi-national cooperative scheme, contained familiar provisions for the duty and liability of company officers with common elements for civil and criminal liability. An injunction could be obtained where a person had engaged, was engaging, or was proposing to engage in conduct that constituted or would constitute an offence. It followed that the 1981 regime across two statutes continued to require a fault element to be established for civil contraventions and remedies as for criminal sanctions.
47 Almost a decade later, the first truly national legislative arrangement for companies law was legislated by way of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), which introduced the Corporations Law. Directors' duties were contained in ss 229 to 232, and market manipulation provisions for both securities and for the futures industry in ss 997 to 998 and 1259 to 1260, respectively. Section 997 in particular had an express additional element of intention. There was a civil compensation remedy, a general offence provision attaching to proscriptions within the statute, being an earlier version of s 1311 using the same section number, and the civil remedy of injunctions in s 1324.
48 The landscape further changed a few years later with the enactment of the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth), which in 1993 inserted a new Part 9.4B into the Corporations Law. This introduced, for the first time, a limited number of civil penalty provisions, including for directors' duties. The market manipulation provisions remained only criminal with no civil penalties, but were supplemented by the option of other ancillary civil remedies. Section 1317FA provided that a contravention of a civil penalty provision would also constitute a criminal offence if additional fault elements were established as follows:
Division 3 - Criminal proceedings
1317FA When contravention of civil penalty provision is an offence
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if the person contravenes a civil penalty provision:
(a) knowingly, intentionally or recklessly; and
(b) either:
(i) dishonestly and intending to gain, whether directly or indirectly, an advantage for that or any other person; or
(ii) intending to deceive or defraud someone.
(2) A person who contravenes a civil penalty provision is not guilty of an offence except as provided by subsection (1).
49 It may be seen that the legislative design of the initial Part 9.4B was that, apart from purely criminal offences such as the market manipulation provisions, there was a single norm created by the civil penalty provisions to which additional fault elements were attached making a breach also a criminal offence. Section 1317FA was the sole criminal offence provision relating to civil penalty contraventions.
50 The issue of how the state of mind component of a civil penalty provision under the Corporations Law should be construed was considered by Merkel J in Re Tasmanian Spastics Association; Australian Securities Commission v Nandan (1997) 23 ACSR 743. His Honour applied R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501, and thus criminal law reasoning, to the terms of the civil penalty provision in s 232(6) to the effect that the same concept applied to "improper use" of position to gain an advantage or cause detriment to a company of an objective rather than subjective test of impropriety. It was therefore found that there was no distinction as to the mental element as between civil and criminal proceedings for that particular provision. That approach may again be useful when there is a need to determine the content of a stated, or implied, state of mind element, but it does not assist in deciding whether such a process is required by reason of it not being expressly provided for, such as by the application of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code.
51 In Australian Securities Commission v Nomura International plc (1998) 89 FCR 301, Sackville J considered the then market manipulation provisions in ss 998 and 1260 of the Corporations Law in the context of declarations and injunctions being sought by the Australian Securities Commission (which later became ASIC). The conduct took place prior to the introduction of civil penalty provisions for market manipulation. Each of the substantive provisions contained mental components, referring respectively to "intended" and "calculated". His Honour concluded at 405-6 that the use of the word "intended" in s 998(1) did not require proof that the defendant knew that the false or misleading appearances were likely to be created by the conduct, however that did not mean that there was no mental element. It was necessary to show that the alleged wrongdoer intended to carry out the conduct relied on as creating the likelihood of a misleading or deceptive appearance. That reasoning was relied upon by the contradictor to contest the suggestion said to have been made on behalf of ASIC that there was no fault element in the provisions presently under consideration, as opposed to a question as to what the fault element was. However, beyond making that point, this again does not assist in determining whether or not Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code applies to civil proceedings relating to a contravention.
52 The above legislative history informed the reforms brought about by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) amendments to the Corporations Law, which relevantly commenced in March 2000. The contradictor argued that ss 180 to 184 carried through the idea of creating what he described as "express bifurcated norms", many of which would be civil obligations informed by their history of being derived from criminal offence provisions. In relation to general duties, civil norms and obligations were set out in ss 180 to 183, and separate criminal norms referable in content to each of the civil norms were set out in s 184, but with additional elements of recklessness or intentional dishonesty imposed for criminal liability.
53 The March 2000 amendments repealed s 1317FA and adopted a different mechanism for creating criminal offences for all of the proscriptions after the general duty proscriptions in ss 180 to 183 (civil penalty provisions) and s 184 (criminal offence). Instead of creating criminal offences by referring to all civil penalty provisions globally and in one place in the manner of s 1317FA, the creating of criminal offences took place either adjacent to the individual norm, or, by virtue of s 1311(1), by being based on such norms, rather than by any reference to civil penalty provisions or contraventions. Each offence designated adjacent to the norm or by virtue of s 1311(1) was listed in Schedule 3 where the applicable penalty was set out. The conduct constituting a civil contravention was separately stated adjacent to the norm, with the designation of an increased number of those contravention provisions as being a civil penalty provision by s 1317E(1). This was a step towards the current drafting mechanism of mostly having a wholly stand-alone statutory norm to which civil penalty or criminal consequences could separately attach. A norm of behaviour was stated, the impact of a contravention on the legality or validity of any underlying transaction was provided for, and separate provisions based on the norm constituted civil penalty provisions (by the operation of s 1317E(1)) or criminal offence provisions (by the operation of either the terms of each dispersed provision itself, or by the terms of s 1311(1)): see, e.g., ss 208 and 209. None of the civil penalty provisions listed in s 1317E(1) were also criminal offences and none of the criminal offence provisions listed in Schedule 3 were civil penalty provisions. Accordingly, there was no need for a provision such as s 1317FA.
54 The position after the March 2000 amendments was described by the contradictor as a very different structural world to the provisions in this case. It is, perhaps, overstating it to describe the provisions at that time as being so structurally different in substance, as opposed to form, to those now in place. The drafting mechanism adopted in March 2000 produced a set of provisions that were laborious and difficult to follow. Each criminal offence was created in either of two places, being either in the dispersed provision itself or by virtue of s 1311(1). However, the criminal and civil penalty streams were clearly separate, as they are now.
55 It may be seen from the foregoing that the contradictor has made good his first proposition, as far as it goes, namely that for 30 years between 1970 and 14 December 2001 (immediately prior to the application of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code), the content of the market manipulation provisions was the same whether they were enforced civilly or criminally. The position was somewhat different for other proscriptions, and in particular, as already noted, there were separate criminal sanctions for general duty provisions in s 184, with express additional elements of fault. However, what the first proposition does not address is that for the relevant period of time there were no civil penalty provisions for market manipulation proscriptions. Nor does the contradictor's first proposition in terms acknowledge that by March 2000 there were separate streams for civil penalty provisions and criminal offence provisions.