Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited v Dollisson

Judgment

1. BELL ACJ: Mr Ryan Thomas Dollisson (Mr Dollisson), a resident of New South Wales and employed by Zero 05 Pty Limited trading as CR Rail (CR Rail), a company incorporated in and which carried on business in New South Wales, was injured in Victoria whilst working on a rail line owned by the applicant, Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited (ARTC).
2. Mr Dollisson is not and was not entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) (the ACA) because his employment was not connected with Victoria within the meaning of s 80(1) of that Act. He was, however, entitled to and did receive compensation under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) and the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) as his employment was connected with New South Wales within the meaning of s 9AA of the Workers Compensation Act.
3. Mr Dollisson sought damages for personal injury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales from ARTC for its alleged negligence in failing to provide, install and maintain a safe operating system co-ordinating safe procedures between all persons on the site, designed to ensure the safety of workers thereon.
4. Because it was in Victoria that he was injured, Mr Dollisson's claim (including any question of limitations) fell to be determined by reference to the law of Victoria (including, if applicable, the ACA) in accordance with John Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; [2000] HCA 36 (Pfeiffer).
5. Mr Dollisson required an extension of time pursuant to s 27L of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) within which to bring his claim. An extension of time was granted by Harrison AsJ (the Associate Justice) and it is from this decision that an application for leave to appeal is made.
6. Both the decision at first instance and this application for leave to appeal turned on s 134AB(1) of the ACA which relevantly provides that "[a] worker who is, or the dependants of a worker who are or may be, entitled to compensation in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of, or due to the nature of, employment on or after 20 October 1999" shall not, in proceedings in respect of the injury, recover damages for pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss except in certain specified circumstances. These circumstances include, inter alia, passing through what have been described as "gateways" which involve a non-curial assessment of the seriousness of the injury in respect of which damages are sought.
7. The precise issue for determination thus is whether or not the limitations on or prerequisites for the recovery of damages imposed by s 134AB(1) of the ACA apply to a worker who has received or is entitled to compensation under any statutory regime in respect of an employment related injury, or whether they apply only to an injured worker who has received or may be entitled to compensation under the ACA.

Competing contentions

1. The issue identified in [7] above is not raised by CR Rail (which was not a party to the underlying proceedings, although it was named as third respondent to the application for leave to appeal) but rather by ARTC.
2. ARTC contended that the Associate Justice should not have granted Mr Dollisson any extension of time on the basis that it was futile to do so. This was said to be because Mr Dollisson had not satisfied the steps which it was argued he needed to take before he could claim damages - namely, he had not been assessed under s 104B of the ACA as having a serious injury (see ss 134AB(2) and (15) of the ACA) nor had he, under s 134AB(4) of the ACA, made an application to and been certified by the Victorian WorkCover Authority or self-insurer (see s 134AB(16)) as having a "serious injury" (as defined within s 134AB(37)). In this context, it may be noted that it is settled law in Victoria that these steps need to be taken when a worker who suffers injury arising out of or in the course of his or her employment wishes to pursue a claim for damages against a non-employer defendant, such as ARTC, in respect of that injury: see Martin v Bailey (2009) 26 VR 270; [2009] VSCA 263 at [42] (Martin) and the cases there cited.
3. Mr Dollisson's riposte was that it was not necessary for him to take any of these steps since (as was common ground) he was not entitled to compensation under the ACA and that, as such, there was no need for him to demonstrate that he had suffered a "serious injury" within the meaning of that Act or had otherwise obtained certification that would allow him to claim damages, even if the injury did not rise to the prescribed 30% degree of impairment (see s 134AB(15)). In other words, it was put that the ACA's prohibition on seeking damages for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss in s 134AB(1) did not apply to him.
4. ARTC's rejoinder was that the fact that Mr Dollisson was entitled to compensation (albeit under the NSW Acts) was sufficient, and that the restrictions imposed on receipt of damages pursuant to s 134AB(1) of the ACA were deliberately not confined to a case of entitlement to compensation under or in accordance with the ACA. ARTC contended that s 134AB(1) simply referred to a worker being "entitled to compensation" without specifying in terms, in contrast to other provisions of the ACA, that the compensation being referred to was compensation "under" or "in accordance with" the ACA.
5. It was submitted by ARTC that this point was free of authority, notwithstanding that the ACA and s 134AB and related provisions have been subject to extensive litigation in Victoria with a number of cases, some of which are referred to later in these reasons, coming before the Victorian Court of Appeal. (I note for completeness that nothing in the High Court's decision in Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown (2011) 242 CLR 647; [2011] HCA 22, which considered aspects of s 134AB of the ACA, appears to bear upon the question under consideration in the present case).
6. A review of the ACA, including its history and shifting policy underpinnings, makes it tolerably clear, in my opinion, that the Victorian legislature's failure to use the expression "under the Act" to qualify the reference to "compensation" in s 134AB(1) was not deliberate, and was certainly not designed to preclude, limit or condition the recovery of third party damages by a worker who was not entitled to compensation under the ACA.
7. Further, as will be seen, a number of decisions of Victorian courts, including the Court of Appeal, have either stated or proceeded on the basis that the reference to "compensation" in s 134AB(1) is a reference to "compensation under the ACA".
8. In my opinion, Mr Dollisson's failure to pass through the statutory gateways erected by the ACA does not stand in the way of his claim for damages and the Associate Justice's grant of an extension of time as sought by Mr Dollisson was not futile.
9. For the reasons that follow, in my opinion the reference to "compensation" in s 134AB(1) of the ACA is a reference to compensation "under the ACA" or "in accordance with the ACA", and nothing is to be read into the absence of those words in the section.

Legislative history

1. Major amendments to the ACA were introduced by the Kennett Government by s 46 of the Accident Compensation (WorkCover) Act 1992 (Vic). One of those changes was to introduce s 135A(1) in the following terms: "A worker who is, or the dependants of a worker who are or may be, entitled to compensation in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of, or due to the nature of, employment shall not, in proceedings in respect of the injury, recover any damages except in accordance with this section or section 135 (1)."
2. The 1992 amendments, of which s 135A was a critical component, were subsequently described by the Minister for Finance, RM Hallam, as involving the striking of a compromise such that (see Victorian Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 9 December 1997 at 1005): "…while workers would be protected under a compulsory, no-fault scheme, those workers who had the misfortune to be 'seriously injured' (as strictly defined) would have the added right to take action at common law, on the basis that any settlement awarded by the court would expunge both their statutory right to compensation for the physical injury (under the table of maims) and any future entitlement to weekly benefits. The logic of that compromise was that for the profoundly injured, with little or no prospect of returning to work, a common-law settlement may represent a reasonable basis of 'capitalising' their weekly entitlement over the long term".
3. The expungement of the statutory right to compensation and the foregoing of any future entitlement to weekly benefits upon the receipt of an award of damages to which the Minister referred highlights, in my view, the fact that the Victorian legislature in 1992, in allowing for the compromise position to which s 135A(1) of the ACA gave effect, considered that damages were a limited alternative to compensation under the no-fault scheme introduced by the 1992 amendments, the limitation being (broadly speaking) conditioned by the requirement that a serious injury had been sustained by the injured worker.
4. In other words, the reference to "compensation" in s 135A(1) of the ACA as it stood in 1992 was a reference to compensation "under the Act".
5. It is plain that s 135A(1) of the ACA was the precursor to s 134AB(1) which, for present purposes, is expressed in materially identical language. So much was observed by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Barwon Spinners Pty Ltd v Podolak (2005) 14 VR 622; [2005] VSCA 33 at [14] (Barwon Spinners); see also Georgopoulos v Silaforts Painting Pty Ltd (2012) 37 VR 232; [2012] VSCA 179 at [30] (Georgopoulos). That having been said, it is desirable to follow through the legislative history that led to the introduction of s 134AB into the ACA in 2000.
6. Section 135A(1) of the ACA, as introduced in 1992, was amended by s 47(1) of the Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997 (Vic) so as to be limited to injuries arising prior to 12 November 1997. That Act ushered in a comprehensive statutory benefits scheme, similar to the accident compensation regime in New Zealand, which excluded any common law recovery. Subject to a very limited exception connected with the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), s 134A(1) of the ACA, as introduced by s 45 of the Accident Compensation (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, provided that: "A worker who is, or the dependants of a worker who are or may be, entitled to compensation in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of, or due to the nature of, employment on or after 12 November 1997 shall not, in proceedings commenced in respect of the injury or otherwise, recover any damages of any kind." The drafting of this section plainly derives from s 135A(1) of the ACA, and what I have said about that section and the meaning of "compensation" in it (at [19]-[20] above) applies equally to s 134A(1) and the meaning of the word "compensation" as used in that section.
7. Further, and especially in light of authorities such as Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304; [1908] HCA 63; Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625 at 635-636; [1990] HCA 28; Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 437; [1994] HCA 15; Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union (2004) 221 CLR 309; [2004] HCA 40 at [21]; and Berowra Holdings Pty Ltd v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364 at 373 [23]; [2006] HCA 32, which require very clear legislative language where common law rights are being curtailed, I would be loath to attribute to the Victorian legislature an intention to proscribe the recovery of common law damages of any kind by an injured worker on the basis that he or she was entitled to some compensation, however inadequate or negligible, under the compensation regime (perhaps chronically underfunded) of some other state or territory.
8. Far more likely, in my opinion, especially bearing in mind that s 134A(1) amounted to an abrogation of the common law right to damages, is that the Victorian legislature introduced the amendments in circumstances where it knew and could control what compensation was available to an injured worker under the comprehensive no fault statutory compensation scheme that was established in Victoria.
9. In this respect, the Victorian legislature has no control over the levels of compensation available to workers in other states or territories or, to put it more precisely, workers whose employment is not connected with Victoria. There is no guarantee or necessary likelihood that the levels of available compensation will be the same from state to state, and they may be affected by a host of considerations, including complex actuarial modelling. By contrast, it is understandable that the Victorian legislature would seek only to control and limit the availability of damages to a worker who has received or is entitled to receive compensation under the ACA, especially in circumstances where damages awards against employers are indemnified by the Victorian WorkCover Authority, pursuant to the Accident Compensation (WorkCover Insurance) Act 1993 (Vic) s 7.
10. Returning to the tortured legislative history of the ACA, the radical amendments effected in 1997 were to be short lived and the Accident Compensation (Common Law and Benefits) Act 2000 (Vic), passed following a change of government, introduced a new Division 8A into the ACA which restored, in a qualified way, a worker's right to common law damages in circumstances where, putting the matter broadly, the worker had sustained a "serious injury". That concept supplied the "gateway" to the recovery of common law damages and, in this respect, played a conceptually similar role to that which had originally formed part of the 1992 Act, although there were important changes to what was described as the "narrative test" for "serious injury" in the 2000 amendments: Barwon Spinners at [2].
11. Section 134AB(1) of the ACA, with which the Court is concerned in the present case, was inserted upon the introduction of Division 8A. It related to injuries arising out of or in the course of or due to the nature of employment "on or after 20 October 1999", this expression qualifying the concept of employment, and not injury: Barwon Spinners at [11]−[13].
12. Section 134A was amended by s 21 of the 2000 amendments, so that its operation was confined to workplace injuries arising from employment after 12 November 1997 but before 20 October 1999. It remained part of the ACA however and, like s 134AB(1), refers to "compensation" without specifying that the reference is to compensation "under the ACA" or "in accordance with the ACA", as opposed to compensation at large.
13. In the Second Reading speech for the 2000 amendments to the ACA, Mr Cameron, the Minister for WorkCover, said in respect of s 134AB (see Victorian Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 13 April 2000 at 1010): "New sections 134AA and 134AB reinstate the right of an injured worker who is or may be entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of or due to the nature of employment to recover damages in respect of the injury subject to limitations and conditions imposed by the sections as to date of injury, the application of the Transport Accident Act 1986, whether or not the injury is a serious injury within the meaning of section 134AB, the classes and amounts of damages which may be recovered, the discretion of the court to order costs and procedural requirements, including time limits." (emphasis added).
14. This passage is plainly inconsistent with ARTC's argument in the present case. It is permissible under s 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) to have regard to reports of proceedings in any House of Parliament to arrive at a construction that would promote the purpose or object of an Act, in preference to one that would not. The use by the plurality of the High Court of legislative history and extrinsic materials in the form of a Second Reading speech to support a particular construction of s 10(1A) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW) in SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles (2018) 361 ALR 206; [2018] HCA 55 at [33] and [36] may also be noted in this regard.
15. The ACA has engendered judicial frustration in Victoria for its lack of linguistic coherence. Marks J put it graphically in Robart v Matchplan Pty Ltd (in liq) (Victorian Court of Appeal, 21 December 1993, unrep) (Robart), a case which considered the amendments to the ACA which had been introduced in 1992. His Honour said: "[u]nfortunately, inconsistent use of words and phrases, imprecise expression and failure to state clearly what is intended on important topics are historic characteristics of the Act which have been maintained, with some assiduity, in the provisions which we are now obliged to construe". In the same case, Fullagar J referred to the "studied obscurity which is characteristic of this scandalously opaque statute".
16. These observations are relevant to ARTC's resort to expressio unius reasoning (see further at [44]-[52] below).
17. It is not without significance that Marks J in Robart used the expression "compensable injury" as "an injury in respect of which a worker was or is entitled to compensation under the Act whether before or after amendment" (emphasis added). His Honour used that expression in the following part of his judgment which is consistent with an understanding of the unqualified word "compensation" in s 135A(1) and, by extension, s 134AB(1) as meaning compensation "under the ACA" or "in accordance with the ACA": "In summary, before the 1992 Act a worker who suffered a compensable injury could claim damages at common law whether injured in a transport accident or at work. If he were injured in a transport accident he was not affected by the restriction in s135(1) of the Act even if the accident was a cause of a work journey injury. However, if the worker were injured in a transport accident his or her claim for damages at common law was barred by the TAA [Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic)] unless he or she suffered a serious injury. If a serious injury was involved, then the recoverable damages were not restricted to non-pecuniary loss. The worker could also claim pecuniary loss subject to limitations (with which we are not here concerned). This background assists an understanding of the amendments effected by s46 of the 1992 Act. It is common ground that one consequence of them is that the common law rights of victims of work related accidents are brought into line with those of victims of transport accidents. Since 1 December 1992, a worker who suffers a compensable injury is only entitled to recover damages at common law if the injury is a serious injury."
18. This understanding was echoed more explicitly in the decision of Maxwell P (with whom Redlich JA agreed) in Martin. At [18], the President observed: "The prohibition on proceedings at common law applies to 'a worker who is ... entitled to compensation in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of ... employment.' The manifest policy of s 134AB (and its predecessor provisions) is that a person who is entitled under the Act to compensation in respect of a work-related injury may not bring proceedings at common law in respect of that injury. Subject to the exceptions in s 134AB, the bar on proceedings at common law is co-extensive with the entitlement to compensation under the Act. Section 82(1) of the Act provides: 'If there is caused to a worker an injury arising out of or in the course of any employment, the worker shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with this Act.'" (emphasis added).
19. The word "co-extensive" reflects the policy "quid pro quo": subject to exceptions, compensation under the Act was available to injured workers in lieu of common law damages. Thus, in Martin at [21], the President said: "As already noted, the prohibition on common law proceedings is the reflex of the entitlement to compensation under the Act. Without exception, the decisions under consideration are concerned with the scope of the entitlement, not with the scope of the prohibition. That is, the court or tribunal has been concerned with the question whether the worker (or in the case of death, his/her dependants) can successfully bring the circumstances of the injury or death within the entitlement provisions for workers compensation. The decisions are directly on point nonetheless." (emphasis added).

Expressio unius reasoning and the ACA

1. ARTC's argument had, at its fulcrum, the varying usage in the ACA of the word "compensation". Whilst it is correct, as ARTC submitted, that in contrast to s 134AB(1), the phrase "compensation under" or "in accordance with this Act" appears in a number of other provisions of the ACA (see, for example, ss 4(4), 5AA(2), 80(1) and (8), 82(6) and (8), 82C(1), 84B(1) and (2), 85(1), (4), (5) and (6), 86(1), 88(1), 91(3AAA), 91A(1), 92D(4) and (5), 97(4) and (4B), 98A(1), 99A(1), 103A(1), 114F(3), 116, 117, 123B, 125(4), 125A(5), 129D(4), 129N(1), 130(1)(c) and 138B(1) and (3)), there are many sections where the word "compensation" is used without any explicit qualification that it is a reference to "compensation under this Act" (see, for example, ss 3(d), 82(2A), 82(2B), 82(3C), 82(3), 82(4), 92(1), 92A(3), 92B(2), 93, 98C(1), 98E(1), 99(1), 125(1), 125A(1)&(2), 125B(1), 126(3), 127(1)) but where the simple reference to "compensation" must, in context, be a reference to compensation under the ACA.
2. Reference has already been made in [36] above to the objects clause of the ACA. Section 3(d) of the ACA is an example of a section where the simple reference to "compensation" in the object "to provide adequate and just compensation to injured workers" must be a reference to compensation "under the ACA", even though words to that effect are not used. (The subsequent amendment to s 3 by the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic) s 624(1) which replaced the words "adequate and just compensation to injured workers" with "appropriate compensation… to injured workers in the most socially and economically appropriate manner" does not alter this position).
3. The provision of compensation, moreover, is a matter that is prima facie to be understood as a matter "in and of Victoria": Interpretation of Legislation Act s 48(b). Compensation provided in Victoria is compensation under the ACA.
4. Expressio unius reasoning of the kind sought to be invoked by ARTC attributes a rigorous linguistic logic and consistency to the author of the statute or instrument under consideration. Such characteristics, whilst not unattainable, are far from inevitable, especially when the authorship of a frequently amended statute undoubtedly changes over time and where it may be that amendments to existing Acts or the passage of new bills are subject to last minute political debate and compromise cf. Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hadgkiss (2007) 169 FCR 151; [2007] FCAFC 197 at [15]. "Patchwork" statutes, to borrow Lord Hoffmann's language in National Grid Co plc v Mayes [2001] 1 WLR 864 at [55] (Mayes), rarely contain the linguistic logic and consistency upon which the expressio unius maxim depends for it to operate as a useful construction tool. His Lordship described such arguments as "often perilous": Mayes at [55].
5. In this regard, the ACA is a statute that has, as has been illustrated, grown "like topsy", coinciding with changes of government and changes of policy in Victoria in relation to the ambit and quantum of benefits available to injured workers. The amendments made to the ACA since the 1990s have been extensive and often of byzantine complexity.
6. Even though, as I have noted, s 134AB with which the Court is concerned in the present case was not introduced into the ACA until passage of the Accident Compensation (Common Law and Benefits) Act as part of a new Division 8A concerned with actions in respect of injuries arising on or after 20 October 1999, many of the sections that were referred to by both parties in their written submissions (see [44] above) predated the introduction of that section. The observations of both Fullagar and Marks JJ in Robart, which I have set out at [31] above, therefore bear upon the utility of resort to expressio unius reasoning in the present case. Moreover, in that case, their Honours were grappling with s 135A which, as I have pointed out at [21] above, employed the same language as was subsequently adopted in s 134AB of the ACA.
7. ARTC's attempt to draw assistance from expressio unius reasoning in relation to the ACA is, in my opinion, fraught with hazard. As has famously been said, that maxim, whilst it may be a "valuable servant", can be a "dangerous master": Colquhoun v Brooks (1888) 21 QBD 52 at 65; see also Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49 at [34] and the cases there cited; see also P Herzfeld and T Prince, Interpretation (2nd ed, 2020, LawBook Co, forthcoming) at [6.120]-[6.130].
8. As a unanimous High Court said in Houssein v Under Secretary, Department of Industrial Relations and Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88 at 94; [1982] HCA 2, the maxim "must always be applied with care, for it is not of universal application and applies only when the intention it expresses is discoverable upon the face of the instrument".
9. For the reasons set out above, the maxim cannot be reliably invoked in the present case.

Case law

1. The view that "compensation" as referred to in s 134AB(1) is to be understood as a reference to compensation "under" or "in accordance with" the ACA is also supported by two further decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal, in addition to Robart and Martin that have been referred to at [31]-[35] above.
2. In Georgopoulos, the Court said (at [46]−[47]): "Section 134AB(1) first defines the class of persons to whom it applies by reference to those who are or may be entitled to compensation in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of or due to the nature of employment on or after 20 October 1999. This is a reference back to s 82(1) of the Act. 'If there is caused to a worker an injury arising out of or in the course of any employment, the worker shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with this Act.'"
3. Earlier, in Grech v Orica Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 14 VR 602; [2006] VSCA 172, Chernov JA said (at [2]), referring to Barwon Spinners, that: "[i]n that case the Court made it plain that the plaintiff must identify the compensable injury (in respect of which he or she claims there is an entitlement to compensation under the Act [Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic)] and establish that it occurred on or after 20 October 1999)."
4. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of Beach J (as his Honour then was) in Rogers v State of Victoria [2011] VSC 298 (Rogers) which involved a claim for damages by a plaintiff who was injured at the Mildura Court Complex whilst performing jury service. Section 55(1) of the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) provided that if a person suffered personal injury arising out of or in the course of jury service, compensation was to be paid in accordance with Part 8 of the Juries Act. Section 55(4) of the Juries Act provided that: "The person to whom or for whose benefit compensation is payable are those persons to whom or for whose benefit compensation would be payable under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 or the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 if - (a) the person attending for jury service were a worker within the meaning of that Act; and (b) the personal injury were caused in the person's employment arising out of or in the course of the employment."
5. It was contended by the defendant in Rogers, the State of Victoria, that Ms Rogers was not entitled to recover damages in the proceedings because of her failure to comply with the "serious injury requirements" contained in s 134AB of the ACA. Beach J rejected this argument for a number of reasons, the first one of which (at [29]) was as follows: "The short answer to the defendant's defence that the plaintiff has not satisfied the serious injury requirements contained in s 134AB of the Accident Compensation Act, is that those requirements do not apply to the plaintiff. First, by the terms of s 134AB(1) and (2), the serious injury requirements are only engaged in cases where a worker is or may be entitled to compensation under the Accident Compensation Act in respect of an injury arising out of or in the course of, or due to the nature of, employment on or after 20 October 1999. That description does not apply to the plaintiff in this case." (emphasis added).
6. Senior Counsel for ARTC submitted that Rogers was not directly relevant for present purposes because a juror was not a "worker" and because the Juries Act had an historically different purpose to the ACA. Further, he submitted that ss 55(7), (8) and (9) of the Juries Act made it "clear that what is being received is not compensation but an emolument, which is regarded to be treated as close as possible to what the Accident Compensation Act allows for workers". That last submission is difficult to reconcile with the legislature's express use of the term "compensation" in ss 55(8) and (9) of the Juries Act.
7. Further, whilst it is true that part of Beach J's reasoning that s 134AB of the ACA did not apply to Ms Rogers derived from an analysis of s 55 of the Juries Act, the first answer his Honour gave to the submission that s 134AB(1) and (2) applied to Ms Rogers was, as I have already set out at [57] above, that it did not because she was not a recipient of compensation under the ACA.

[2015] VSCA 230

[1998] VSCA 25

[2012] VSCA 179

[1982] HCA 2

[2015] VSC 463

[2011] VSC 298

(1990) 169 CLR 625

(2005) 14 VR 622

(2006) 225 CLR 364

(1994) 179 CLR 427

(2007) 169 FCR 151

(2002) 213 CLR 543

(2004) 221 CLR 309

(2012) 37 VR 232

(2006) 14 VR 602

(1982) 148 CLR 88

(2000) 203 CLR 503

(2009) 26 VR 270

(2011) 242 CLR 647

(1908) 7 CLR 277

(2018) 361 ALR 206

(2013) 83 NSWLR 162

[2006] HCA 32

[2004] HCA 40

[1994] HCA 15

[2011] HCA 22

[1908] HCA 63

[2013] NSWCA 66

[1990] HCA 28

[2018] HCA 55