The Orders as to Costs
19 The issue between the parties is whether the applicants, who were successful, are entitled to indemnity costs against the respondents. The background to the issue was set out in reasons I delivered on 20 February 2024 (Globaltech (No 5) at [2]):
Liability was heard and determined before relief. The issue of liability included the determination of a claim for infringements of the patent and a cross-claim that the patent is invalid. I delivered reasons on 26 November 2018 (Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Globaltech Corporation Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1839; (2018) 138 IPR 33) and made orders on 14 December 2018. I made declarations of infringements of the patent, granted injunctions and dismissed the cross-claim. My decision was the subject of an appeal to the Full Court of this Court which was dismissed (Globaltech Corporation Pty Ltd v Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 162; (2019) 145 IPR 39). There was then an application to the High Court for special leave to appeal which was also dismissed.
20 The claim for pecuniary relief was heard on 14, 15, 16 and 19 June 2023 and the reasons were delivered on 20 February 2024. The orders which were made immediately upon delivery of the reasons have already been set out (at [3]).
21 There was then an application by the respondents for a stay which I refused. The parties could not agree as to the appropriate orders following the reasons for judgment delivered on 20 February 2024. I have set out the orders I made on 7 March 2024 (at [18]) and they included a timetable with respect to submissions on costs and an order that the issue be determined on the papers. The two orders which are relevant for present purposes are those in paragraphs two and three.
22 The particular point of significance for present purposes is that the order as to damages was made against both respondents, whereas the order dealing with the amount for the account of profits was made against the first respondent only.
23 By Notice of offer to compromise dated 20 February 2023 and directed to the respondents, the applicants offered to compromise their claim for pecuniary relief in the proceeding following the final determination of liability as against the respondents and that offer was made in the following terms, relevantly:
1. Within 7 days of acceptance of the offer, the parties will submit consent orders to the Court in the following terms:
1. In full and final resolution of the applicants' claim for pecuniary relief in this proceeding, the respondents will pay the applicants $7,100,000, inclusive of interest, within 28 days of the date of this order.
2. For the avoidance of doubt, the Court notes that the amount in paragraph 1 of these orders does not include any amounts payable in respect of costs.
24 The total amounts the first respondent is required to pay the applicants by reason of the orders of the Court made on 7 March 2024 exceeded the amount of $7,100,000 inclusive of interest by an amount of $374,368 (interest being calculated as at the date of the offer). The total amount both respondents were ordered to pay the applicants is $2,121,807 plus $682,545.
25 The applicants seek the following order with respect to costs:
1. The Respondents pay the Applicants costs of the proceeding from 26 March 2019 as follows:
(a) from 26 March 2019 up to 11:00am on 22 February 2023, on a party and party basis; and
(b) from 11:00am on 22 February 2023 on an indemnity basis.
26 The respondents submit that the appropriate order with respect to costs is as follows:
The Respondents pay the Applicants costs of the proceeding from 26 March 2019 on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed pursuant to Order 2 below.
27 The parties agree that the costs orders should commence on 26 March 2019. They disagree as to whether indemnity costs should be paid to the applicants from 22 February 2023.
28 The respondents' argument is that the respondents jointly were ordered by the Court to pay $5,154,283 (i.e., the amount for damages) which is below the amount of the offer. The respondents contend that, in those circumstances, the offer does not operate by reason of the Rules to give the applicants the right to indemnity costs.
29 The relevant rule is r 25.14(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and that rule is in the following terms:
3. If an offer is made by an applicant and not accepted by a respondent, and the applicant obtains a judgment that is more favourable than the terms of the offer, the applicant is entitled to an order that the respondent pay the applicant's costs:
(a) before 11.00 am on the second business day after the offer was served - on a party and party basis; and
(b) after the time mentioned in paragraph (a) - on an indemnity basis.
30 The respondents submitted that there is nothing untoward or opportunistic on their reliance on a strict interpretation and construction of the terms of the offer made in the Notice of offer to compromise. They submitted that the offer is made to both respondents and it was made several months before the applicants made their split election as set out in my reasons for judgment (at [6]). They submitted that there would have been no difficulty in the applicants making an offer which involved a certain amount with respect to damages and a different amount with respect to an account of profits. The respondents referred to Rakman International Pty Ltd v Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 202 (Rakman International) to support the proposition that the language in a Notice of offer to compromise is important. The respondents also submitted that the decision in Stead v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 65; (2021) 386 ALR 237 (at [26]) should not dissuade the Court from adopting a different approach. In any event, the "practical consequence" is that the applicants seek a payment from both respondents jointly. In short, the respondents' argument is that the offer was addressed to both respondents and, therefore, the relevant amount is the amount both respondents were ordered to pay. On that approach, it is clear that the judgment is not more favourable than the terms of the offer.
31 In reply to the respondents' submissions, the applicants advanced six submissions.
32 First, the applicants submitted that there is no dispute that the combined effect of the orders made on 7 March 2024 is that the applicants were entitled to a payment of $7,474,368 inclusive of interest as at the date of the offer which is $374,368 more than the terms of the offer. The submission made by the applicants is that they are in a "better position" by proceeding to judgment rather than the position they would have been in had the respondents accepted the offer. The judgment is more favourable than the terms of the offer.
33 This submission as stated is correct to a point. However, the respondents' point is that the offer was made to both of them and the applicants did not obtain a more favourable judgment against the second respondent.
34 I think the first submission made by the applicants is to be given some weight, but is not by itself sufficient to be decisive.
35 Secondly, the applicants submitted that the offer was clear and there would have been no difficulty for the respondents to accept it on a global basis.
36 This submission is correct, but in view of the respondents' argument, it does not really advance the matter.
37 Thirdly, the applicants referred to the fact that there is evidence that the first and second respondents were related entities in the sense that as at April 2023, Mr Khaled Hejleh was the managing director of both respondents (Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Globaltech Corporation Pty Ltd (No 3) [2022] FCA 1189 (Globaltech (No 3)) at [52], [77] and [235]) and the respondents' corporate relationship and business operations as at October 2022 were set out in Globaltech (No 3) at [234]-[254]. The second respondent had no employees. The applicants submitted that, in those circumstances, it was not necessary or appropriate for the offer to have been divided into particular amounts referable to each of the damages and profits claims, or have been capable of acceptance by each respondent. In that regard, they referred to Rafferty v Time 2000 West Pty Ltd (No 5) [2010] FCA 873; (2010) 87 IPR 593 at [21] and [33] and WSA Online Ltd v Arms (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 108 at [18]. They submitted that an offer directed to the first respondent and separately to the second respondent would have created difficulties in terms of the respondents determining between themselves the amounts payable jointly or by the first respondent only.
38 This submission is to be considered with the fifth submission.
39 Fourthly, the applicants submitted that the operation the respondents give to r 25.14 is artificial and unrealistic. They submitted that in the case of a claim and cross-claim, global offers to settle both the claim and cross-claim may give rise to an indemnity costs order under r 25.14. It is not necessary for the offer to be directed to the claim and separately to the cross-claim (Kismet International Pty Ltd v Guano Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 705 at [41]-[43]).
40 This submission in terms of the reference to a global offer in relation to a claim and cross-claim is correct, but this is quite different from an offer to two respondents, particularly if they are completely independent of each other.
41 Fifthly, the applicants submitted it is not the case that they would have been in a more favourable position under the offer because the applicants would have been able to look to both respondents for payment of the offered sum. At the time of the offer, the second respondent did not trade and had as its sole purpose the provision of management services to the first respondent and the second respondent had no assets. It was the first respondent that had the assets and was conducting the business. In other words, the applicants' argument is that the offer was not more favourable to them. The amount of the offer is one thing, the practical benefit to the applicants is another.
42 Finally, the applicants sought to distinguish Rakman International. There is a difference between an offer to discontinue a claim and a cross-claim and the dismissal of both. There is no such difference in this case.
43 This submission is correct. There is a clear difference between a discontinuance and a dismissal which would be significant to the party considering the offer.
44 In my opinion, there should be an order that the respondents pay indemnity costs as claimed by the applicants. I agree, in substance, with the applicants' third and fifth submissions. The first and second respondents are closely related parties; the first respondent is the operating company and the second respondent has no assets or employees. I cannot think that those in the Globaltech Group who considered the offer would have placed any weight on the difference between the two respondents. They would have considered the offer from the point of view of the amount of the offer.
45 The following orders sought by the applicant should be made:
1. The Respondents pay the Applicants costs of the proceeding from 26 March 2019 as follows:
(a) from 26 March 2019 up to 11:00am on 22 February 2023, on a party and party basis; and
(b) from 11:00am on 22 February 2023 on an indemnity basis.
2. If the parties are unable to agree to the quantum of costs in Order 1:
(a) those costs be assessed on a lump sum basis in an amount to be determined by a Registrar of the Court in accordance with the procedures specified in the Federal Court Costs Practice Note (GPN-Costs);
(b) the Applicants file and serve their material in support of a lump sum costs claim in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-Costs) (Costs Summary);
(c) within 28 days of the Applicants' service of the Costs Summary, the Respondents file and serve any Costs Response in respect of the Respondents' Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note; and
(d) the Registrar be directed pursuant to r 1.37 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to determine the quantum of the lump sum for costs payable in such manner as he or she deems fit including, if thought appropriate, on the papers.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Besanko.