Consideration
105 The issue is the correct construction of claim 1 of the Patent. This is a matter of law in respect of which there can be only one correct answer. The appeal to this Court is an appeal by way of rehearing. If this Court on appeal were of the view that the correct construction of the claim were that contended for by Globaltech, it would follow that the primary judge erred: see Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 (Branir) at [25] per Allsop J (as the Chief Justice then was); Dincel Construction System Pty Ltd v AFS Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 360 ALR 273 (Dincel) at [50] per Besanko and McKerracher JJ (Kenny J agreeing).
106 However, in considering the correct construction of claim 1, it is appropriate to recognise certain advantages enjoyed by the primary judge, consistently with the principles discussed in Branir at [21]-[30] (followed in Dincel at [50]). In the present case, the primary judge heard expert evidence about the common general knowledge and the art before the Priority Date. This evidence was relevant to the task of construction, given that the Court is to place itself in the position of a person acquainted with the surrounding circumstances as to the state of the art and manufacture at the time (Kimberly-Clark v Arico at [24]). That said, none of the experts alone represented the person skilled in the art (in this case, a team). Further, it was not suggested that claim 1 contains technical or scientific terms and phrases, or words that have unusual or special meanings, matters in respect of which expert evidence may be significant.
107 It is convenient to start by addressing the three alleged errors of approach relied upon by Globaltech (see [97] above).
108 The first alleged error is that the primary judge did not construe the claims in the context of the specification. We do not accept that the primary judge made any such error. In the early part of the Reasons, at [14]-[38], the primary judge described the specification in some detail. In the section of the Reasons dealing with what his Honour described as the synchronisation issue, the primary judge noted at [202] that both parties referred to "the body of the Specification" and the claims themselves. His Honour then stated, at [203], that he would "start with the body of the Specification". Although his Honour indicated that he did not consider the specification to provide a great deal of assistance ([203]), he nevertheless discussed it in some detail at [204].
109 Globaltech's submissions emphasise that the one embodiment described in the specification involves the use of two timers that are started contemporaneously. The primary judge had regard to this in his discussion of the specification at [204] of the Reasons. His Honour noted that the specification states (in relation to the embodiment) that it is necessary to record the time duration between starting the core orientation device and extracting the core sample, and that this is followed by a statement that, typically, this is achieved by starting an external stop watch at the time of starting the orientation device (Patent, pp 18-19). However, as noted by the primary judge, the specification then states that "[o]ther arrangements are of course possible" (Patent, p 19). Of this statement, his Honour observed that it did not advance the argument that synchronisation is required. We accept that the one embodiment described in the specification uses two timers that are started contemporaneously or, at least, a counting forwards system. However, his Honour plainly had regard to this in the discussion at [204].
110 The primary judge also discussed, at [204], the third last paragraph of the body of the specification (Patent, p 21). For ease of reference, we set out that paragraph again:
From the forgoing (sic), it is evident that the present invention provides an orientation device which does not require physical marking of a core sample prior to extraction thereof from the ground. Indeed, the orientation device according to the embodiment is particularly convenient for an operator to use. All that is required is for the operator to start the orientation device prior to the inner tube assembly 36 being inserted into the drill hole, and contemporaneously start a timer for recording the time duration before the drilling operation ceases to allow the generated core sample to be retrieved.
The primary judge noted that Globaltech sought to rely on this passage in support of an argument that it limited the claims. His Honour stated that he did not accept this argument, noting that the statements in the second and third sentences "are clearly made by reference to the particular embodiment". In our view, his Honour was correct to so state. Although the first sentence of the paragraph refers to "the present invention", this sentence does not refer to the timers being started contemporaneously. The part of the paragraph that refers to the timers being started contemporaneously is the second and third sentences. The second sentence refers to the orientation device "according to the embodiment" and the third sentence is to be read in the same way. Accordingly, as his Honour concluded, the paragraph is relevantly concerned with the particular embodiment.
111 Further, at [204], his Honour accepted that it could be said that the statements in the best method section (i.e., the section describing the preferred embodiment) contemplate synchronisation or, at least, counting forwards. His Honour then stated that "as the principles make clear, one does not introduce into the claims, limitations based on the preferred embodiment". This statement was in accordance with the applicable principles. It also demonstrates one of the difficulties with Globaltech's submissions: although Globaltech accepts that the embodiment is illustrative and non-limiting, and says that it has never argued that claim 1 should be limited to the only embodiment, its submissions come close to doing so.
112 The second alleged error (see [97] above) is that the primary judge did not construe the claims in view of the state of the art. In our view, the Reasons make clear that his Honour did construe the claims in light of the common general knowledge and the state of the art. In the early part of the Reasons, his Honour made detailed findings regarding the common general knowledge: see the Reasons at [128]-[159]. This included a discussion of survey tools: see [138]-[139], [151]-[159]. In his statement of the relevant principles, the primary judge quoted Jupiters v Neurizon at [67], which includes the statement that a patent specification "is not to be read in the abstract but is to be construed in the light of the common general knowledge and the art before the priority date". His Honour directly addressed the main construction issue at [239]-[266]. At the commencement of this part of the Reasons, at [239], his Honour stated, correctly, that the issue was one of construction and that is a matter for the Court to resolve. His Honour then stated that he had had the "benefit of evidence as to the relevant common general knowledge" and the opinions of experts as to the meaning of the claims. In light of these matters, it is apparent that his Honour did construe the claims in light of the common general knowledge and the state of the art, including the aspects concerning survey tools.
113 The third alleged error (see [97] above) is that the primary judge construed the claims having regard to Globaltech's allegedly infringing products. We do not consider that his Honour made any such error. At [184] of the Reasons, his Honour specifically referred to the principle that it is not legitimate to construe a claim with reference to the alleged infringement, citing CCOM v Jiejing at 267-268.
114 It is true that, in the section of the Reasons dealing with infringement (commencing at [160]), his Honour described in some detail each of the Orifinder tools. In particular, the primary judge set out a description of the Orifinder v5 drawn from the joint experts' report at [172] of the Reasons. It was appropriate for his Honour to consider how Globaltech's products worked in order to frame the construction issues that needed to be determined. This appears to be what the parties did in framing the issues of construction for his Honour. There is no requirement that the Court shield itself from any knowledge of an allegedly infringing product until it has reached a final conclusion about construction. It would be impossible to conduct a trial and write a judgment on that basis.
115 Globaltech submits that his Honour's finding at [238] in relation to Professor Tapson's evidence was not to the point. At that paragraph, his Honour stated that he was not persuaded that Professor Tapson had deliberately changed his evidence from the previous proceedings to this proceeding to further AMC's cause. Globaltech submits that the real point was that Professor Tapson only construed the claims in a manner that applied to the Orifinder v5 after he had seen the product. We are not persuaded that the primary judge missed the point that had been made by Globaltech. To the extent that Globaltech submitted that Professor Tapson only construed the claims in a manner that applied to the Orifinder v5 after he had seen the product, this was considered by his Honour. The primary judge addressed this at [238]:
It seems to me that in the previous proceedings, Professor Tapson was focused on the alleged infringing product in those proceedings or the preferred embodiment of the claims in suit. A method involving synchronisation clearly falls within the terms of the claims and that was the focus of Professor Tapson's consideration in the previous proceedings. I do not think that it can be said from the passages I have identified that Professor Tapson identified the metes and bounds of the claims and has now changed his mind with a view to giving evidence that the Orifinder v3B and Orifinder v5 fall within the terms of the claims. That is not to say that the boundaries of claim 1, for example, as now stated by Professor Tapson were in his mind at the time of the previous proceedings.
This passage demonstrates that his Honour had regard to the evidence given by Professor Tapson in the previous proceedings, and had regard to the points raised by Globaltech.
116 For completeness, we note that at the hearing of the appeal senior counsel for Globaltech relied on a passage from the evidence of Professor Tapson (trial transcript, pp 378-379; AB Pt C pp 864-865). However, this does not appear to take the matter any further. In the passage, Professor Tapson was asked about evidence he had given in [234] of an affidavit in a previous proceeding. While Professor Tapson accepted that that evidence related to the integers of the relevant claim, and not merely the embodiment, the wording of the phrase being considered was "inputting the selected time interval", which is different from the wording of claim 1.
117 For these reasons, none of the three alleged errors identified by Globaltech is made out.
118 It is convenient, next, to identify the construction of claim 1 that we prefer. We will then address the particular construction issues raised in Globaltech's submissions, as identified in [103] above.
119 The Patent has been described earlier in these reasons: see [9]-[31] above. Claim 1 has been set out at [18] above. The following matters should be noted. First, the claim is directed to a method of orienting a core sample, not to a device to be used in doing so. No particular core orientation device is defined. Secondly, to the extent that the claim does refer to any equipment to be used in the method, this is limited to a core drill having an inner tube, which was conventional before the Priority Date. Thirdly, although the steps of the method include the recording, inputting and relating of time measurements, no particular means for carrying out these steps are defined. While it is apparent that such means must be used, the detail of these means is left to the skilled person to determine.
120 It was common ground at trial that two timers would need to be used, one downhole (where the orientation measurements would be recorded) and one on the surface (where the person using the method would be). However, the claim does not refer to these timers or how they are to be operated. In particular, it does not refer to the two timers being 'synchronised', or to the two timers being started at the same time.
121 The steps of claim 1 that deal with the recording, inputting and relating of time measurements are steps 2, 3 and 5. As the primary judge recognised, these steps cannot be considered in isolation from each other.
122 Step 2 refers to recording the orientation of the inner tube at predetermined "time intervals" during the drilling, the time intervals being "referable to an initial reference time". This occurs downhole, where the orientation measurements are recorded, and thus involves the use of the downhole timer. The time intervals at which the orientation measurements are recorded are "referable to" an initial reference time on that timer.
123 Step 3 refers to inputting "the specific reference time beyond the reference time", which is representative of the time at which the core is broken. It was common ground below that this step occurs on the surface. In contrast to step 2, the "specific time" inputted in this step is not said to be "referable to" the initial reference time. It need only be "beyond" the initial reference time. As a matter of ordinary language, this may simply mean that the "specific time" occurs after or later than the initial reference time. This issue is discussed further below.
124 Step 5 refers to "relating the inputted specific time to the recorded time intervals" to obtain an indication of the core orientation at the specific time. This is the step of the method at which the two sets of time measurements (downhole and surface) are related to each other, so as to enable the orientation of the core sample at the time of core break to be determined. The word "relating" is a broad term. In this context, it encompasses any means of relating the inputted specific time to the recorded time intervals so as to obtain an indication of the orientation of the core sample at the specific time.
125 In our view, in light of the above matters, and having regard also to the further matters discussed below, the correct construction of claim 1 is that: step 2 involves the recording of time measurements downhole, while step 3 involves the inputting of a time measurement at the surface; the step in which these time measurements are related to each other is step 5, which occurs later, after the inner tube with the core sample contained in it has been removed from the ground and brought to the surface (see step 4); there is no requirement that the time measurements be related to each other prior to step 5 (by the use of a common initial reference time); that work is done by step 5, which involves "relating" the time measurements to each other.
126 This construction is supported by other aspects of the Patent. First, the specification, after referring to a preferred method comprising (inter alia) inputting a time measurement representative of the instant in time when the core sample is separated from the body of material (Patent, p 4, lines 16-17), states that "[p]referably, the instant in time is representative of a duration of time relative to the initial reference time" (Patent, p 5, lines 4-5). Secondly, the Patent contains a number of narrower claims that use the same or similar language (claims 6, 26 and 52). For example, claim 6, which is dependent on claim 2, requires the instant in time (referred to in claim 2) to be "representative of a duration of time relative to the initial reference time". These parts of the specification and these claims suggest that when the patentee intends to indicate that the time of a core break is to be measured in a way that is referable to the initial reference time, it says so expressly.
127 While it may be accepted that the best method section (which describes one embodiment) contemplates a system of synchronisation, or at least counting forwards, as discussed above it is not usually legitimate, in the absence of an express reference in the claim itself, to import into a claim features of the preferred embodiment. In the present case, the claim itself does not contain an express reference to a system of synchronisation or counting forwards, and we do not consider there to be a proper basis to import this aspect of the preferred embodiment into the claim.
128 We will now address the particular construction issues raised by Globaltech (see [103] above).
129 First, Globaltech submits that the primary judge erred by finding that the invention claimed was not limited to a method/system involving two timers that each noted the same initial reference time at the beginning of drilling operations, with both timers counting from that time. In particular, Globaltech submits that the two timers record time by reference to the same initial reference time, and the times on the two timers are matched when the specific time is inputted into the surface timer to determine the orientation of the core sample. Globaltech submits that the primary judge erred in construing two critical phrases in step 2 ("initial reference time") and step 3 ("inputting the specific time beyond the reference time"). Globaltech submits that the primary judge considered these phrases in isolation from the other integers of the claim. Further, it is submitted that the primary judge did not pay sufficient, or any, regard to certain words of the claim - as a result, he read some words into the claim and read some words out of the claim. Globaltech also submits that the primary judge erroneously considered the steps of claim 1 separately, for example finding that the Orifinder v5 "falls within step 5 when that step is considered alone" (Reasons, [265]).
130 We do not accept these submissions. Critically, Globaltech's submissions do not reflect the language of claim 1. The claim does not require the use of two timers that "record time by reference to the same initial reference time". As noted above, only step 2 (involving the downhole timer) requires that the time intervals be "referable to" the initial reference time; step 3 (at the surface) merely requires that the inputted specific time be "beyond" the reference time. Further, the claim does not, as Globaltech submitted, provide that "the times on the two timers are matched when the specific time is inputted into the surface timer to determine the orientation of the core sample". As noted above, step 3 deals with the "inputting" of the specific time at the time of core break (at the surface); step 5, which occurs later, is the step in which the measurements are related to each other so as to obtain an indication of the orientation of the core sample.
131 Further, it is plain from a consideration of the Reasons that the primary judge did not consider the steps of claim 1 in isolation from each other. For example, at [241] his Honour stated that the construction issue turns primarily on the meaning of certain words and phrases in "steps 2, 3 and 5" of claim 1. In [249], the primary judge expressed the view that the meaning of "initial reference time" in step 2 "is linked to the construction of the next step" and, because of that link, he would set out his reasons in that context.
132 We also do not accept that the primary judge read some words into the claim and read some words out of the claim. Rather, his Honour considered the meaning of the words used in the claim, read in the context of the specification, and in accordance with the other applicable principles. Insofar as Globaltech criticises the statement at [265] of the Reasons that the Orifinder v5 "falls within step 5 when that step is considered alone", this needs to be read in context. His Honour was describing the particular concession made by Mr Edmonds about step 5: see the Reasons at [264]. His Honour did not consider step 5 in isolation from the other steps for the purposes of considering the construction of claim 1.
133 Secondly, Globaltech submits that the primary judge erred by finding that the "initial reference time" in step 2 of claim 1 includes the start of the timer in the downhole device but does not necessarily also refer to the start of the surface timer. Globaltech submits that, given that claim 1 requires the use of two timers, the only reasonably open construction of step 2 is that the initial reference time refers to the same start time on both timers. It is submitted that, if "initial reference time" does not refer to the starting time on both timers, it cannot be known whether the initial reference time refers to a time on the surface timer or the downhole timer. Globaltech submits that AMC's construction involves reading "initial reference time" so as to exclude the surface timer and, in effect, impermissibly reading into the claim the words "on the downhole device".
134 We do not accept these submissions. Step 2 refers to recording the orientation of the inner tube at predetermined time intervals during the drilling, "the time intervals being referable to an initial reference time". This recording takes place on the downhole timer. It is therefore apparent that step 2 refers to, at least, the downhole timer. The real issue is whether the time recorded on the surface timer must also be referable to the initial reference time. While there are arguments in favour of that construction, we consider the preferable construction to be that this is not required. In resolving this issue, step 2 cannot be considered in isolation. It is necessary to consider the other integers of the claim, in particular, steps 3 and 5. Step 3 does not in terms require the time on the surface timer to be referable to the initial reference time. Rather, it refers to inputting the specific time "beyond" the reference time. Step 5 is the stage at which the inputted specific time is related to the recorded time intervals. Having regard to these steps, in addition to step 2, the preferable construction is that the claim does not require the time recorded on the surface timer to be referable to the initial reference time. Contrary to Globaltech's submissions, this construction does not involve reading words into the claim; rather, it involves construing the words of the claim.
135 Globaltech criticises AMC's construction as set out in the first sentence of [246] of the Reasons. In that sentence, the primary judge stated that AMC submitted that the initial reference time "means no more and no less than a reference time that may be referenced time". It appears that this sentence contains a typographical or reproduction error. AMC's submission at trial was that the phrase "initial reference time" in claim 1 "means nothing more than a reference time that may be referenced against another time". When the submission is put in these terms, Globaltech's criticism falls away.
136 Globaltech's submissions seek to draw support from what it describes as a "finding" in [248] of the Reasons. That paragraph is set out at [69] above. Globaltech relies on the second sentence, in which the primary judge stated that "[a]t first blush, there is a good deal of attraction in Globaltech's submission …". It is not accurate to describe this as a finding. It is merely an indication, as part of the reasoning process, that Globaltech's construction had some initial attraction. Ultimately, for the reasons he gave, the primary judge did not accept that construction.
137 Thirdly, Globaltech submits that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the words "inputting the specific time beyond the reference time" in step 3 refer to a time that is referable to the initial reference time. Globaltech submits that the primary judge said that "a question arises as [to] the meaning of 'specific time'" (Reasons, [250]), but did not resolve this question. Globaltech submits that, given the primary judge accepted that the "reference time" in step 3 is the "initial reference time" in step 2 (Reasons, [250]), it should have followed that the only reasonable construction of this step, in the context of claim 1 and the rest of the specification, was that the specific time inputted into the surface timer is referable to the initial reference time. It is submitted that AMC's construction gives the word "beyond" a meaning in isolation from its context; it ignores that the steps of claim 1 are in chronological sequence - in particular, when step 2 is read with step 3, there is a clear link between the initial reference time and the inputting of the specific time; it ignores the word "reference" in the phrase "the reference time", which indicates that the initial reference time is used as a reference point in time.
138 We do not accept these submissions. First, contrary to Globaltech's submissions, the primary judge did construe the words "specific time". His Honour considered what the "specific time" represented at [250]. His Honour also considered how the "specific time" was required to be measured or expressed at [258]-[259]. Secondly, while there are arguments in favour of Globaltech's construction of the words "inputting the specific time beyond the reference time" in step 3, we consider the preferable construction to be that "beyond" does not mean anything more than "after" or "later than" and that the words do not require the inputted specific time to be referable to the initial reference time. The word "beyond", on a natural reading, does not mean "referable to". The wording of step 3 may be contrasted with that of step 2, which requires in terms that the time intervals be "referable to" the initial reference time. AMC's construction is supported by other aspects of the claims, in particular claim 6 (discussed further below).
139 Globaltech relies on the fact that the steps of claim 1 are in chronological sequence. However, this is consistent with "beyond" being construed as meaning no more than "after" or "later than". Further, the chronological nature of the steps tends to confirm that the step of "relating" the respective time measurements to each other in step 5 only occurs later, after steps 2 and 3 have been carried out.
140 Globaltech submits that the primary judge's construction disregards the word "reference" in step 3. We do not accept this. As the primary judge accepted, the "reference time" in step 3 is the "initial reference time" referred to in step 2. That gives effect to the word "reference". As AMC submits, the specific time inputted in step 3 is not required to be "referable to" that reference time. Step 2 specifically states that the time intervals are "referable to an initial reference time"; step 3 does not. It is apparent that when the patentee means to say that one time is referable to another, it does so expressly.
141 Globaltech relies on the evidence of its experts, Mr Ayris and Mr Edmonds, to the effect that the inputted time in step 3 is referable to the initial reference time. Globaltech submits that the primary judge rejected the opinions of Globaltech's experts on the basis that they involved reading words into the claim, but he did not identify any words that needed to be read into the claim (Reasons, [258]). It is submitted that the primary judge erred in not accepting this evidence, as it only involved a plain reading of the phrase in context. In our view, to the extent that the evidence of the experts was of relevance in the process of construction, it was open to the primary judge not to accept the opinions expressed by Globaltech's experts for the reasons he gave at [258] (set out above). In that paragraph his Honour noted that Mr Edmonds placed emphasis on the word "beyond" and said that "it needs to know what the initial reference time is, to know that it's beyond it". The primary judge stated that he did not accept this, based on the meaning of the word "beyond". Although not expressly stated, it is apparent that the primary judge considered Globaltech's experts' opinions to involve reading in words to the effect that the inputted time in step 3 must be referable to the initial reference time.
142 Fourthly, Globaltech submits that the primary judge wrongly accepted AMC's submission that claim 6 supported its construction of "beyond" in step 3 of claim 1 as meaning no more than "after" or "later than". Globaltech notes that claim 2 (set out at [19] above), which is dependent on claim 1, requires the inputted time measurement to be representative of the instant in time when the core sample is separated from the body of material and first held in fixed relation thereto. Globaltech submits that: this time must be measured by reference to the initial reference time, as required by step 3 of claim 1; claim 6 (set out at [20] above), which is dependent on claims 2 to 5, specifically requires the instant in time to be representative of a duration of time relative to the initial reference time; thus, in each of claims 2 and 6, the inputted time is measured by reference to the initial reference time. Globaltech submits that claim 6 alone does not answer the central question of construction as to whether claim 1 is limited to the use of two timers, both being started at the same time, referring to Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 2 (Nichia v Arrow) at [40]-[41].
143 In our view, contrary to these submissions, claim 6 provides some assistance in resolving the construction issue concerning claim 1. Globaltech submits that claim 2 requires the inputted time to be measured by reference to the initial reference time. However, claim 2 does not state this. Rather, as with claim 1, there is an issue as to whether the inputted time needs to be referable to the initial reference time. Claim 6 does in terms require a relationship between the inputted time and the initial reference time, by stating that the instant in time (referred to in claim 2) is "representative of a duration of time relative to the initial reference time". As stated above, this suggests that when the patentee intends to indicate that the time of a core break is to be measured in a way that is referable to the initial reference time, it says so expressly. Globaltech's reference to Nichia v Arrow does not assist. Here, the two claims under consideration (claims 1 and 6) do not raise the "same issue of construction", but rather use materially different wording.
144 For these reasons, we consider the construction of claim 1 adopted by the primary judge to be correct. We reject grounds 1 to 6 of the notice of appeal.