REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 The respondent ("Thai") is a foreign corporation. It is one of a number of international airlines that colluded with each other to fix certain fees and surcharges relating to the transport of air freight and against whom the applicant ("the ACCC") has brought proceedings alleging contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) ("the Act").
2 The Act treats conduct of this kind as anti-competitive (s 45A) and prohibits corporations (including foreign corporations) from engaging in it (s 45). The community's disdain for conduct of this kind is reflected in the penalties available for it. A single contravention of s 45 attracts a pecuniary penalty of up to $10 million (s 76(1A)(b)). Collusive behaviour of this nature now also attracts criminal sanctions.
3 The conduct in question in this case concerns understandings about the price for the supply of freight services from Indonesia to various other countries including Australia.
4 The ACCC instituted proceedings against Thai on 28 October 2009. It alleged that Thai contravened the Act by arriving at numerous understandings with its competitors in Indonesia, Hong Kong, Thailand and Singapore and by giving effect to those understandings, and applied for pecuniary penalties and injunctive relief. In its most recent iteration, the statement of claim alleges that the airline arrived at 33 such understandings and gave effect to 26 of them. Thus, subject to the totality principle (see, for example, Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR ¶41-375 ("TNT")) Thai faced the possibility of paying pecuniary penalties of up to $590 million. Thai denied all allegations of contravening behaviour and, with respect to the allegations concerning understandings reached in Hong Kong and Thailand also contended that the allegations were non-justiciable and that its conduct conformed to local government requirements.
5 The hearing, which was scheduled to run for 20 weeks, was due to begin on 6 November 2012. It was originally listed together with the ACCC's applications against several other airlines including Malaysia, Emirates, Cathay Pacific, Singapore Air Cargo, Air New Zealand and Garuda. But Malaysia, Emirates and more recently Cathay Pacific and Singapore Air Cargo reached agreements with the ACCC to admit to certain contraventions (a small fraction of those actually alleged), to pay penalties, to submit to injunctions and to pay a contribution towards the ACCC's costs so as to dispose of the proceedings. Earlier Qantas and Korean Air Lines had entered into similar agreements. On the day before the hearing was due to start, Thai did too. It now admits (for the purpose of this proceeding only) that it engaged in conduct in contravention of s 45 of the Act (by reason of s 45A) by arriving at and giving effect to understandings in relation to:
(i) a fuel surcharge from in or about October 2001 to October 2005;
(ii) a security surcharge from in or about October 2001 to October 2005; and
(iii) a customs fee from in or about May 2004 to no later than October 2005
on freight carried internationally by air from Indonesia to several other countries including Australia.
6 The parties jointly submit that a penalty of $7.5 million should be imposed, that injunctions should be granted pursuant to s 80 of the Act restraining Thai for a period of five years from engaging in similar conduct and that Thai pay the ACCC a contribution of $500,000 towards its costs. The proposed orders are contained in short minutes signed by the solicitors for the parties and dated 13 December 2012.
7 Despite the agreement, as the parties acknowledge, it is for the Court to determine whether the alleged contraventions occurred, whether the proposed penalties are appropriate and whether the other relief should be granted. That is because s 76 of the Act, which empowers the Court to order the payment of pecuniary penalties, and s 80 which permits the Court to grant injunctive relief depend on the Court being satisfied that the contraventions occurred and that the penalties and the terms of the injunction are appropriate. Nevertheless, there is an obvious public interest in giving effect to the agreement of the parties. Doing so encourages other infringers to cooperate with the regulator, with consequential costs savings for all concerned, the Court and the community in general. As the Full Court observed in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 ("NW Frozen Foods") at 291, a negotiated settlement might include measures designed to promote for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market. On the question of penalty Burchett J put the matter well in TNT at [7]:
So long as a negotiated sum is not outside the range within which a court would fix a penalty, there is no good reason why parties should not be at liberty to reach an agreement about what will be submitted to the court. If they were to attempt to go outside the range, the purposes of the law would be in danger of frustration, and it would be incumbent upon the court to insist upon its function of determining the matter, irrespective of the agreement of the parties. But, subject to that, the public interest was obviously served by what was done in the present case, insofar as great expense to a public authority was avoided, as well as the inevitable unavailability of its human and material resources for other tasks. At the same time, considerable further cost to the community in other ways was averted, including the clogging effect of very lengthy litigation upon the Court lists.
8 Consequently, provided the parties act responsibly, it will be a rare case in which the Court will not make the orders they jointly seek. This is not such a case. For the following reasons I am satisfied that the contravening conduct occurred and the proposed orders made.
9 Section 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act prohibits a corporation (defined in s 4 to include a foreign corporation) from making a contract or arrangement or arriving at an understanding that includes a provision the purpose or likely effect of which is to substantially lessen competition. Section 45(2)(b)(ii) prohibits giving effect to such a provision. At the relevant time, s 45A deemed a provision in a contract, arrangement or understanding made with the purpose or actual or likely effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining a price for services to have the purpose or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. "Competition" is defined in s 45(3) for the purposes of the section (and s 45A) as competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party to the contract, arrangement or understanding supplies or acquires or is likely to supply or acquire goods or services or would be likely to do so but for the provision.
10 "Market" is defined in s 4E for relevant purposes as a market in Australia and includes a market for goods or services and other goods or services that may be substituted for, or are otherwise competitive with, them. For the purpose of this proceeding the parties accept that during the relevant period the relevant market or markets included outbound freight from Indonesia to several other countries including Australia and that that is a "market" within the meaning of s 4E. Thai's competitors in this market included Singapore Airlines (and later its subsidiary, Singapore Air Cargo) British Airways, Emirates, Cathay Pacific, Qantas, Garuda, Korean Air Lines, Cargolux and Malaysia Airlines.
11 Thai has made admissions and the parties have agreed upon the facts pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Section 191 provides that, unless the Court gives leave, where the parties to a proceeding have agreed that a fact is not for the purposes of the proceeding to be disputed, evidence is not required to prove it and may not be adduced to contradict or qualify it. As Stone J explained in Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 10 at [35], it nonetheless remains for the Court to determine whether the facts are to be accepted as true and to determine the weight to be attributed to them. That may depend on their inherent credibility and the coherence of the narrative. In that case her Honour referred to the possibility of mutually inconsistent agreed facts. That problem does not arise here. The facts agreed upon are inherently credible and the narrative is coherent. I accept them to be true.