Amarjit Singh
538 Amarjit, who is the son of Manmohan Singh ('Manmohan'), swore six affidavits read in this proceeding which were dated: 29 April 2016, 3 June 2016, 10 June 2016, two of 21 June 2016 and 6 July 2016. He gave oral evidence on the fourteenth and fifteenth days of the trial which were 12 and 13 July 2016.
539 As I have mentioned earlier in these reasons at [220], Amarjit is the CEO of Unique. He is also a director. He gave evidence of having a background in education. This consisted of his having trained as an elementary school teacher in the Punjab in 1995. He arrived in Australia in 1998 and before setting up Unique, which was incorporated in 2006, he was involved in a number of positions, none of which involved education.
540 Amarjit became its CEO in 2007, a role in which he has continuously served since that time. He described his duties as including the overall day-to-day management of Unique and promoting a culture of ethical and professional practice amongst the staff and within the organisation. Unique was registered as a training organisation in October 2007.
541 Initially, Unique was registered for 60 international students but this was subsequently increased to 120. Courses in hairdressing and salon management were offered. In January 2008, Unique began its referral program whereunder students who introduced other students were paid $200 per student.
542 In 2010, Unique's approval was increased to 400 students. In the same year, Amarjit's father, Manmohan, took over as the sole director of Unique. Amarjit said that he then reported to his father. The ownership structure of Unique was in evidence which, combined with Amarjit's affidavit evidence at paragraph 51, showed that all of the shares in Unique were held by two trusts. The trusts gave the trustee a power to appoint beneficiaries and the trustee in the case of both trusts were companies in which the only shareholder and director was Manmohan. In May 2012, Amarjit became a director of Unique again.
543 In 2010, Amarjit began investigating the merits of Unique obtaining registration under the VET FEE-HELP scheme.
544 By June 2011, Unique had reached an arrangement with a number of tertiary institutions under which Unique's Diploma of Management and its Diploma of Salon Management would be counted towards the award of one of the institution's tertiary qualifications. At this time, this was a prerequisite to registration under VET, as I have previously explained. Unique applied for registration as a VET provider on 16 October 2012 but subsequently withdrew that application. It renewed the application in June 2013. As part of the qualification requirements, Unique was required to have a large number of policy documents, all of which it duly submitted. On 27 November 2013, this application was approved by the Department. A meeting was convened the next day to discuss how these courses should be pursued. It was decided around this time that Unique would offer them online. At a meeting the next day, Amarjit decided that Unique should offer laptops or iPads to students doing the online courses as 'part of Unique's responsibility to provide students with adequate resources to complete the courses that we provided'. There was also discussion of the desirability of contacting former students and applying an already existing student referral program where students were paid $200 per new student enrolled, to the new courses which were eligible for VET FEE-HELP. Amarjit implemented each of these initiatives.
545 Amarjit gave evidence about the roles of individuals within Unique in relation to VET FEE-HELP and also about staff training. An important aspect of this evidence was his evidence that from December 2013, a sales script had been prepared by Ms Kang for the information sessions. An initial copy of this script was in evidence. I will not set it out. It is a detailed document and if it was used as the basis for an explanation of the VET scheme it is likely that explanations based upon it would be satisfactory. For example, the script explains:
the courses on offer;
that the courses are not free and have to be repaid to the government once more than $51,309 is earned (which was the minimum repayment amount at that time);
the course costs;
the iPad/laptop offer; and
eligibility for VET FEE-HELP.
546 The script dealt with many other topics besides.
547 It was not suggested to Amarjit that this document had been falsely created after the event. Nor do I think it would be procedurally fair to entertain such a notion. I accept, therefore, that Unique had such a script in December 2013.
548 Amarjit also gave evidence of the existence of the policies and manuals which set out the procedures for enrolling students. He said that he gave Ms Kang the role of ensuring that the policies were enforced and also to ensure that they were updated to reflect changes to regulations and any applicable standards. Further, he said that he directed all of Unique's employees to comply with these policies.
549 He also gave evidence similar to that given by other witnesses called by Unique, which related to:
the operation of stalls in shopping enters by Unique employees; and
the provision of iPads and laptops;
550 Amarjit said that the student information sessions had begun in early 2014 largely as a result of the referral program. He denied that there was any policy of targeting particular groups and said that where the information session took place was often quite random.
551 Amarjit also gave evidence that during the relevant period, Unique had enrolled in VET courses 3,631 students of whom 561 had come from Bankstown, Boggabilla, Bourke, Brewarrina, Emerton, Granville, Moree, Taree, Toomelah, Walgett and Wagga Wagga.
552 Amarjit gave evidence that at a Budget Estimates Hearing on 2 and 3 June 2014 questions had been asked about Unique's use of incentives. However, Unique had previously been told on 27 February 2014 by the Department that the use of incentives did not breach the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth). Answers given to Senate Estimates confirmed this view.
553 Throughout 2014-2015, Amarjit said that Unique's marketing team was expanded. Johanne Richardson was added in September 2014. In February - March 2015, Chris Bell, Rupinder Kaur and Jyoti Chaudhary were added.
554 This expansion reflected a dramatic increase in Unique's student numbers:
2008 177
2009 367
2010 394
2011 676
2012 789
2013 631
2014 3,251
2015 4,677
555 Amarjit said that the dramatic increase in enrolments created a strain on its processes. One way this was manifest was by increasing the size of the marketing and training teams. He also gave evidence that in August 2015 he created a 'Student Screening Services Unit' which appeared to consist of Rubbal. He was said to be the student screening manager. It was said that the unit was introduced as a 'pro-active measure to have an extra layer of checks on the student enrolments files'. This was said to have involved ensuring that each student file was properly screened, audited and checked before entering the student's details in the Registered Training Organisation software manager.
556 The other evidence in this case supports the idea that the forms were indeed checked back at Granville. However, the evidence of Ms Chaudhary and Rubbal is capable of suggesting that the role was performed by ensuring the paperwork was complete rather than that it was appropriate, a process which I have found involved falsifying staff declarations.
557 Amarjit said he also set up in August 2015 a 'Student Engagement Unit' which was designed to contact students to follow them up. It will be recalled that I have set out at [433], Mr Bell's evidence that he was on this team for a two to three week period during which he apparently made a large number of calls.
558 Amarjit gave evidence that students were unenrolled if such requests were made in accordance with Unique's policies. He also said that staff were trained about the intricacies of VET FEE-HELP. He said that the referral scheme worked very well and had led to a significant increase in enrolments.
559 Amarjit gave evidence that the Ammonite software (referred to at [217] of these reasons) was implemented in part to make Unique's online portal more interesting. He also gave evidence that his complement of trainers increased from 6 before the introduction of VET-FEE-HELP to 30 as at 8 August 2014.
560 In the course of Amarjit's evidence he produced (and there were tendered) formal job descriptions for the positions of 'Trainer and Assessor' and 'Online Trainer and Assessor'. The main difference between the two positions was that the online trainer did not do any direct teaching. The implication of this is that a single online trainer could work with a much larger number of students. That seems to me a reasonable proposition. Amarjit said that Unique assigned a single online trainer for no more than 80 students but one trainer for each face-to-face class of 25. This is consistent with Penny Martin's evidence at [215]-[224] above.
561 There was evidence that some persons doing the online course asked for the physical materials which were posted to them. These people completed the assessments on paper and sent them back. There was no evidence about the extent of this practice.
562 Amarjit gave evidence that the Department first indicated that it would stop paying Unique advance payments in November 2015. At that time, Unique was receiving monthly VET payments of around $7 million.
563 At various points during the trial, the topic of how much money Unique made and the final destination of those funds loomed into view. Amarjit addressed this issue in his third supplementary affidavit of 21 June 2016. A great deal of cross-examination was directed at this issue which cannot be assessed without grasping this material. As already mentioned, Unique had two shareholders who were trustees of discretionary trusts.
564 VET approval was only received in November 2013. For the financial year ending 30 June 2013, Unique's audited accounts reveal total revenue of $1,702,612 and a net profit after tax of $40,301. On 5 November 2013, Amarjit and Manmohan, as directors, resolved to declare a dividend of $65,500.
565 It will be recalled that Unique received VET approval in the same month. Almost immediately its revenues began to increase beyond the modest income it had been receiving until then. In practice, the Department made VET payments in advance and monthly based on a determined annual figure. From time to time there would be reconciliation payments.
566 Starting in February 2014, Unique began to receive monthly payments of $49,731.81 and these were scheduled to be paid right through until 15 December 2014 (a total of $547,049.91). This approval was rapidly superseded by another which became available on 14 April 2014. Under this there was to be a monthly payment of $2,475,000 being instalments for an annual figure of $29,700,000. Considering that the total revenues for Unique in the previous financial year were $1,702,612 this must have been an extraordinary development in the life of the company (and its shareholders). It was a seventeenfold increase in revenue.
567 This does not appear to have caused even a ripple at the Department. In his evidence, Amarjit put the dramatic increase down to increased VET enrolments.
568 But there was more to come. It appeared that Unique had been underpaid for the period between February and April 2014 so it received a reconciliation payment of $9,800,536.36.
569 As a result of this increase in its revenues, Unique's audited financial statements reveal revenues for the financial year ending 30 June 2014 of $15,942,449 which yielded a net after tax profit of $8,214,031. This was a 203-fold increase over the result in the previous year. These accounts were signed by Amarjit and Manmohan on 23 December 2014. On 14 December 2014, the directors resolved to declare a dividend of $8,235,488.10. This dividend is said to have been paid to the shareholders on or around 22 May 2015.
570 On 19 December 2014, the Department approved a new payment schedule for the 2014-2015 year totalling the eye-watering sum of $84,329,978 made up of monthly instalments of $7,027,498.16. It was in November 2015 that the Department finally stopped these payments. But this was not before the Department gave Unique a further $46,997,985 in July 2015 as a reconciliation payment for the 2014 year.
571 For the financial year ended 30 June 2015, Unique's audited financial statements show revenues of $56,183,682 and an after tax profit of $33,779,726. They also show that by then Unique's expenses seem to have jumped to $7,920,972.
572 On 4 August 2015, Unique resolved to pay a dividend of $5,799,741.40. On 14 September 2015, the directors declared a fourth dividend of $33,952,061. The resolutions appear to be defective because they do not indicate out of which year's profits they were declared and do not appear to be interim. Whether, in light of the gathering clouds of the ACCC's inquiries which had commenced, to Unique's knowledge, on 29 June 2015, the requirements of s 254T of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) were met is not a question for this Court. In any event, Amarjit said this dividend was paid in November 2015.
573 It appears that the directors also declared a further dividend of $42,030,421.30 on 2 October 2015. This was paid in December 2015 and May 2016 in two tranches.
574 Amarjit gave evidence that as a result of the stopping of payments by the Department in November 2015 the Commonwealth still owes Unique a further $23 million. He also said that Unique purchased a property at Kenthurst in Sydney's north-west for $5.7 million on 26 June 2014. It was his intention that this was to be owned by Ms Kang and Jasmeen. It was sold to them in July 2015. They paid a market price for it of $5.8 million and it was not an attempt to avoid creditors according to Amarjit.
575 He gave evidence about loans to and by directors and additional salaries. Unique's board decided to grant Manmohan an annual salary of $126,000 for the 2015 financial year. This was done on 2 July 2015. It also granted him a salary of $199,000 for the 2016 financial year. The salary for 2015 was paid in part in cash in sums of $30,000 on 3 September 2015 and $10,000 on 15 September 2015. Amarjit said this was recorded in the Mind Your Own Business ('MYOB') statements. He also said that Unique advanced Manmohan a loan of $847,209.
576 He also gave evidence that his father had advanced a loan of $668,601 to Unique during the 2014 financial year. He went on to say that Unique repaid the loan although he does not say when. But, so it seems, there was in place a standing loan agreement with Manmohan (designed, I assume, to ensure that the loans were not treated as income for tax purposes).
577 Unique's accounts for the financial year ending 30 June 2014 record loans to directors of $688,601. Amarjit said that these were loans to his father. Unique's MYOB records for that financial year show four payments to Manmohan as follows:
'30 September 2014 $123,556.85 Loan
30 December 2014 $180,551.68 Loan
3 September 2015 $30,000 Salary
15 September 2015 $10,000 Salary'
578 Amarjit said there were other payments for which there are no records. He also gives evidence that figures recorded in the MYOB statements as loans to directors in September 2015 were in fact loans to his father under a fresh loan agreement dated 1 July 2015.
579 There were aspects of Amarjit's evidence which suggested that he was not willing to accept propositions which were obvious. Exhibit 35 was a copy of bank statements for an account in Unique's name held with the Commonwealth Bank. Amarjit was asked whether it was he who had transacted most of the business on this account. This he denied on the basis that he had provided his login and password to other key managers. Yet when pressed further he accepted that 'the overwhelming majority of transactions' were his.
580 Another aspect of Amarjit's evidence which I regarded as unsatisfactory was his evidence of the circumstances leading to the end of the incentive programs at the end of March 2015. The government had announced that it would no longer be permitted for VET providers to have incentive programs in place within their businesses after 31 March 2015. The evidence unequivocally showed that Unique's enrolments increased sharply at the end of that month. Exhibit 73 was a graph of enrolments at this time. It looks like this:
581 The word 'spike' seems apt. Raw numbers were also provided to further illuminate the graphic representation. Those numbers, which I have chosen selectively but relevantly, were as follows:
Date Students enrolled
12/03/2015 10
13/03/2015 3
14/03/15 0
15/03/2015 0
16/03/2015 7
…
26/03/2015 50
27/03/2015 112
28/03/2015 87
29/03/2015 70
30/03/2015 189
31/03/2015 328
01/04/2015 1
02/04/2015 0
03/04/2015 0
04/04/2015 1
05/04/2015 0
582 Amarjit denied that this represented an attempt to sign up as many students as possible before incentive programs had to be suspended. His explanation was twofold:
(a) the new Ammonite system increased the completion rates in January to March 2015; and
(b) Unique enrolled students on the basis of invitations.
583 I accept neither of these. (a) is wide of the mark. The present debate is why enrolments increased in March 2015. That completion rates were increasing across the first quarter of 2015 has nothing to do with enrolment rates at the end of the quarter. Proposition (b) really means no more or less that that the spike is to be explained by coincidence. I do not accept this.
584 I therefore conclude that Amarjit was lying to the Court about this. The significant spike in enrolments at the end of the first quarter was, in fact, caused by a corresponding effort on Unique's part to increase in its enrolments prior to the end of the incentive program.
585 There is a further matter which may be deduced from this. It is that Amarjit must have been fully aware that the incentive programs were having a significant impact on enrolments and that without them, enrolments would not continue as they had been. In fact, he did say this in his affidavit evidence.
586 Another unsatisfactory aspect of Amarjit's evidence concerned the payment of incentives after the 31 March 2015 deadline. According to his affidavit of 29 April 2016, Amarjit's response to the government requirement that incentives end on 31 March 2015 was as follows:
he terminated the use of agents who were paid to enrol students;
he caused Unique to stop paying for referrals; and
he caused Unique to stop giving laptops and iPads to students who enrolled with Unique on or after 1 April 2015 and implemented a program of lending them instead.
587 There is no doubt that this evidence was intended to convey to the Court that all types of incentive programs had been terminated on 31 March 2015.
588 That evidence was largely supported by Unique's internal accounting. Amarjit gave evidence in his third supplementary affidavit of 21 June 2016 that Unique kept track of its cash flow on a day-to-day basis using MYOB software. This was Exhibit 47. He specifically said that MYOB software 'allows Unique to record, amongst other information, cash payments made by it from the cash withdrawn from its bank account for any given period of time'.
589 Amarjit was cross-examined on this document. Exhibit 47 was produced from Unique's MYOB records as a result of a request by the Applicants. Amarjit eschewed all knowledge of the document. According to him, other people were better placed to answer questions about Exhibit 47.
590 Amarjit's unwillingness to engage directly with Exhibit 47 on the basis that others were better placed to answer, allowed him the luxury of being able not to answer certain questions about Exhibit 47 which had no obvious answers. Exhibit 47, Unique's internal record, showed cash withdrawals for April 2015 of $543.50. This was quite consistent with the incentives program ending. But the corresponding Commonwealth Bank records in Exhibit 35 suggest cash withdrawals of $60,000. Similarly, in May 2015 the MYOB records show cash withdrawals of $723.27 but the bank records show $150,000 was taken out in cash.
591 This suggests that the MYOB records are unreliable. I so conclude.
592 The Applicants devoted considerable energy to proving that Exhibit 47 was inaccurate in other ways. For example, it contains numerous references to payments of dividends in substantial sums. Amarjit conceded during cross-examination at T-1506 that they were not dividends but may have been loans to directors or directors' salary. At other times he tried to say that payments to third parties were actually loans to his father. Amarjit could throw no light on this, saying only that his father had directed it. Other curious transactions such as the recording of undocumented dividend payments (one in the amount of $22 million) were also said to have been the result of directions from his father. When Amarjit's father gave evidence (I return to this below) he said he was not an active director. If I accept both men's evidence, it seems that the payments just happened by themselves.
593 Amarjit's evidence about the financial records showed either that he was a spectacularly incompetent CEO and had no idea what was going on inside his own business or that he was a liar. My impression of Amarjit was that he was a man of some intelligence. I therefore conclude that his evidence about Unique's finances was false.
594 For those reasons, I conclude that the evidence of Amarjit Singh should not be relied upon.