Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill

Factual background and affidavits

1. I have set out the events that led to this application, in substantial part, in my judgment declining to grant interlocutory relief in an application brought by an entity under common control with DRA, ABCD Corporation Pty Ltd ("ABCD"), determined on 16 May 2017 ([2017] NSWSC 597). I am conscious that ABCD and DRA are separate entities, notwithstanding their common control by Mr Minus and/or his wife, Ms Minasian, and I do not treat any finding made in that judgment as a finding for the purposes of this application. Nonetheless, I do not consider it necessary to set out, in this judgment which will be delivered orally, a detailed account of the relevant history. Some aspects of that history relevant to this application, in terms of when proceedings were commenced, and when matters were determined by the Court, are matters of record as to which there can be no controversy. Other aspects, including the particular dealings between Mr Sampson and, in particular, Mr Minus, are matters of greater controversy and, of course, nothing that I found in my earlier judgment binds DRA in respect of those matters. This application by DRA was brought immediately after my delivery of judgment declining that interlocutory relief to ABCD. I will return to the significance of the timing of this application below.
2. The parties relied on a substantial amount of affidavit evidence in this application, some of which had also been read in earlier stages of the proceedings before Brereton J, some of which had been read in the earlier application by ABCD, and some of which was first read in this application.
3. DRA relies on parts of the affidavit of its sole director, Mr Minus, dated 6 December 2016, which was previously read in an unsuccessful application before Brereton J to extend a stay of the appointment of Mr Sampson as receiver with power of sale of the relevant property. That affidavit referred to the use of the relevant property by DRA in respect of a contract to provide dispute resolution services to the Commonwealth Government, which was concluded shortly before the receiver was appointed for the sale of the property, and to Mr Minus' dealings with Mr Sampson, initially in his capacity as liquidator of Australian Barristers Chambers Pty Limited (in liq) ("ABCPL") and before his appointment as court-appointed receiver to sell the property. That affidavit stated that the contract between DRA and the Commonwealth: "will allow ABCD, subject to the Court's approval, to finalise the terms of the lease to DRA for the rental of the chambers in the amount of $5,000 per month plus outgoings." On its face, that statement appeared to refer to a lease yet to be finalised. However, the transcript of the proceedings before Brereton J and his Honour's ex tempore judgment ([2016] NSWSC 1939) both make clear that Mr Minus had there referred to an "oral lease" already said to have been granted by ABCD to DRA, consistent with DRA's position in this application.
4. DRA also relies on parts of Mr Minus' affidavit dated 16 March 2017, which refer to the conduct of the receivership and, relevantly, seek to explain ABCD's delay in seeking injunctive relief, a matter which I had addressed in my earlier judgment in respect of ABCD's application for injunctive relief.
5. DRA also relies on Mr Minus' affidavit dated 17 March 2017, also read in the earlier application, which relevantly refers to an earlier lease of the property to Mr Minus, a suggested lease by Mr Minus to DRA in 2005, and a conversation between Mr Minus and his wife, Ms Minasian (who is, with Mr Minus, one of the two directors of ABCD) said to have given rise to an oral lease by ABCD to DRA on 10 October 2016. Although neither Mr Minus nor Ms Minasian acknowledge this matter in their affidavit evidence, it is apparent that that conversation occurred, and that oral lease is said to have been created on the same day as the applicant for the winding up of ABCPL effected service on Mr Minus of the application for the appointment of Mr Sampson as receiver with power of sale of the property.
6. Mr Minus also there refers to the execution of a written lease on 6 December 2016. There is a question, of some complexity, not fully addressed in submissions, whether that occurred after the stay had lapsed, which was to occur on that day, and after the appointment of Mr Sampson as receiver had taken effect. I proceed on that basis, which is the most favourable position to Mr Minus, and the position which Mr Minus previously asserted in earlier proceedings before me as to this matter. The converse position, where that lease was executed before the stay had lapsed and before the receiver had been appointed would involve an apparent breach of an undertaking given by Mr Minus to the Court not to engage in any adverse dealing with the property while the stay was in place. I therefore proceed, throughout this judgment, on the basis for which Mr Minus previously contended, which does not involve a breach of that undertaking but does involve a recognition that the receiver was already in place at the time that lease was executed. Mr Minus also gives evidence of a conversation with a person associated with the Second Respondent, which appears to have referred to Mr Minus (as distinct from DRA) having previously held a long term lease of the property. That conversation is consistent with the evidence to which I referred above, that Mr Minus in fact claims previously to have held a long term lease of the property, in his personal capacity, although that conversation does not in itself establish notice to the purchaser of DRA's claim to a lease over the property.
7. DRA also relies on the affidavit of Mr Minus' wife, Ms Minasian, dated 4 May 2017, which refers to the history of attempts to lease the property and also refers to the conversation on 10 October with Mr Minus, but also omits reference to the service of the application for the appointment of a receiver on that day.
8. A further affidavit of Mr Minus dated 17 May 2017, read by leave although not properly sworn, refers to the 10 October conversation in somewhat different terms from his initial affidavit as to that matter, and to the circumstances in which the lease of 6 December 2016 was finalised. Mr Minus there refers to having disclosed that lease to Mr Sampson on 7 December 2016. It is common ground that that conversation is disputed and that the Court will not decide the dispute as to that conversation in this application. On that basis, an affidavit of Mr Sampson taking issue with Mr Minus' account of that conversation was not read for the purposes of this application.
9. Mr Sampson in turn relied on several affidavits, setting out the history of his appointment as liquidator of ABCPL, his dealings as receiver in respect of the property, and the steps which were taken to bring about a sale of the property to the purchaser. It is not necessary to summarise those affidavits in detail, given the findings which I reach below.

Leave to bring this application

1. DRA recognises the possibility that leave is required to bring this application, because Mr Sampson is a court-appointed receiver, for reasons noted in paragraph 30 of my earlier judgment concerning ABCD's application. Against the contingency that such leave is required, I will grant that leave, for the same reasons that I granted that leave for an application by ABCD, namely, that it is desirable that the application be determined on its merits. It does not follow, of course, that the Court would necessarily grant such leave in respect of any further applications by Mr Minus or interests associated with him canvassing the same or similar matters, because there must be a point at which the merits of the matters have in fact already been determined, and re-agitation of them serves no useful purpose.

Whether a serious question to be tried is established

1. The parties are in agreement as to the applicable principles in determining whether interlocutory relief should be granted. The parties accept that the Court would adopt the approach set out by the High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, to which Mr Stitt, who appears for DRA, referred. In order to obtain interlocutory relief, DRA must demonstrate a prima facie case or serious question to be tried as to its entitlement to the relief sought at a final hearing, and also that damages would not be an adequate remedy and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction on an interlocutory basis. These considerations are interrelated so that, the stronger DRA's case for final relief, the less that may be required to tip the balance of convenience in its favour, and the weaker its case for final relief, the more that may be required to establish that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of interlocutory relief.
2. Mr Stitt relies on the 10 October oral agreement as constituting an equitable lease over the property in accordance with the principles in Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D9 to which I will refer below. Subject to any question as to whether that lease is recorded in writing, or that part performance can be established, an agreement for lease may confer an equitable interest, at least where a court of equity would compel specific performance of that agreement by the execution of a lease: York House Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1930] HCA 7; (1930) 43 CLR 427 at 435-436. Knox CJ and Starke J there observed, by reference to Walsh v Lonsdale above that: "If the agreement can be specifically enforced, the landlord has the same rights as if a lease had been granted, and the tenant is protected in the same way as if a lease had been granted. There is thus the equivalent of a lease, and the tenant is the lessee in Equity..." The same view was taken in Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 14; (1985) 157 CLR 17 at 26, where Mason J observed that the relationship between the parties in equity is that of landlord and tenant, where an agreement for lease is capable of specific performance.
3. Mr Stitt also relies on the written lease executed on 6 December 2016 (which for the reasons noted above, I treat as executed after the appointment of the receiver had taken effect) as a written lease capable of being registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). Mr Stitt summarised DRA's position in respect of a prima facie case or serious question to be tried as follows: "[DRA's] prima facie case, in summary, is that there is a valid lease of the [p]roperty held by DRA and that [Mr] Sampson disregarded DRA's rights in selling the [p]roperty without acknowledging that lease in the contract, and/or selling the [p]roperty with vacant possession. This is a serious question to be tried in these proceedings and, accordingly, supports the grant of an injunction."
4. Mr Stitt also advanced detailed submissions to seek to establish that the receiver was on notice of the existence of a lease over the property. Those submissions are, to an extent, derivative of the prior proposition that there exists an enforceable lease over the property, and the question of the conversations between Mr Sampson and Mr Minus in that respect is the subject of significant dispute, which it is plainly not possible to resolve in an application on an interlocutory basis and without cross-examination. In those circumstances, I proceed on the basis that there is a seriously arguable question that the receiver was on notice of the existence of the relevant leases if, of course, a serious question is established that those leases are enforceable.
5. Mr Marshall, who appears for the receiver, responds that DRA's substantive case is weak, because there is no lease between ABCD and DRA of which a court would have ordered specific performance. He advances a further submission that, if there is such a lease, it does not have priority over the purchaser's interest in the property pursuant to the sale contract. Mr Marshall points to differences in Mr Minus' two accounts and Ms Minasian's account of the 10 October conversation and to matters not dealt with in those conversations in respect of the terms of the lease. Mr Marshall indicates that, for the purposes of this application, the receiver does not challenge the proposition that the 6 December lease was signed after Court on that day, and after Brereton J had declined the application to extend the stay of orders appointing the receiver made on 25 October 2016.
6. Mr Marshall in turn indicates that the receiver does not admit that ABCD and DRA entered into the purported oral lease on 10 October 2017. However, Mr Marshall indicated that the receiver's submissions proceed on the "assumption" (which he says is not otherwise admitted and may be denied in any further hearing) that the purported oral lease constitutes a binding contract under ordinary contractual principles and that, from 1 December 2016, Mr Minus occupied the property, which may have constituted possession on behalf of DRA and part performance sufficient to permit reliance on the rule in Walsh v Lonsdale above. It seems to me that that submission can only be read as a concession as to those matters, albeit limited to this interlocutory application.
7. The consequence of the receiver's concession as to those matters is that several questions which might otherwise have arisen do not need to be determined in this application. These include whether the conversation relied on to establish the 10 October oral lease was between Mr Minus and Ms Minasian, acting on behalf of ABCD and DRA, and intending to create legal relations between those companies; and whether part performance could be established, so as to displace s 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) if DRA's occupancy of the premises may also be explicable by arrangements other than the 10 October oral lease, including the lease which Mr Minus as distinct from DRA appears to claim over the premises. I also recognise that, although Mr Marshall had conceded that part performance was established for the purposes of this application, Mr Stitt relied, not on part performance, but on the execution of the 6 December lease as a memorandum in writing signed by ABCD as the party to be charged, in order to satisfy the requirements of s 54A of the Conveyancing Act. Given the concession made by the receivers, it is also not necessary to determine further questions in respect of that matter, including any significance of the fact that Ms Minasian had signed the 6 December lease in her own name rather than expressly for and on behalf of ABCD or that that lease was not signed by two directors of ABCD as contemplated by s 127 of the Corporations Act. However, it will be necessary to address below whether that document, if executed after the receiver was appointed, cannot take effect because Ms Minasian's powers as a director of ABCD were then suspended.
8. Mr Marshall in turn submits that the oral agreement of 10 October does not comply with s 53 of the Real Property Act so far as it is (on the concession made) a lease for a term of more than three years. However, that would not prevent the existence of such a lease in equity. Mr Marshall also submits that DRA's claim is a "mere equity" in the sense described by Bryson J in Double Bay Newspapers Pty Ltd v AW Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 409 at 424. That proposition seems to me to be potentially inconsistent with Mr Marshall's concession as to the application of the principle in Walsh v Lonsdale to the suggested oral agreement of 10 October and, in any case, does not seem to me to assist the receiver, where DRA's claim and the purchaser's claim would seem to be of the same character.
9. Mr Marshall also submits that ABCD had no authority to enter into a purported lease, because of an undertaking given by Mr Minus on 25 October 2016 that restricted dealings with the property and the receiver's appointment when the stay lapsed on 6 December 2016. I cannot accept the former submission, because the suggested 10 October agreement preceded the undertaking given by Mr Minus when the stay was imposed on the receiver's appointment on 25 October 2016. I do accept that, on the assumption favourable to Mr Minus that the appointment of the receiver had become effective on 6 December 2016, and that Mr Minus had not breached the undertaking given to the Court in that respect, then the authority of the directors of ABCD to enter a lease had lapsed on that date, by reason of the receiver's appointment. That consequence of a court-appointed receiver's appointment was recognised in Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whinney [1912] AC 254 at 263 and recently, in the context of a privately appointed receiver, in Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 9; (2013) 295 ALR 708 at [62]ff. In a sense, that proposition is so obvious that it does not require authority, since it can scarcely be conceivable that, as soon as the Court appoints a receiver for the sale of a company's property, the company's directors could deal with that property so as to defeat the power of sale by transferring it to such persons as they wished or creating such interests in it as they wished. As I have noted above, the converse assumption that the stay had not lapsed and the receiver had not been appointed before the lease of 6 October was executed would not give rise to the same consequence, but would potentially give rise to a much more serious consequence for Mr Minus, namely, a breach of his undertaking previously given to the Court in that respect.
10. For this reason, it seems to me that there is no serious question to be tried arising from the written lease of 6 December 2016 because, on the basis for which Mr Minus has previously contended, and on which I proceed, Ms Minasian had no authority to create such lease on behalf of ABCD when it was signed. The case law in that regard seems to me to be so well established that it is not open to challenge. I add, for completeness, that the execution of that lease by Ms Minasian alone may also not have complied with s 127 of the Corporations Act, where the company had two directors, but the receiver took no point as to that matter and I do not have regard to it. Nonetheless, on the concessions made by the receiver, I find that there is a serious question to be tried arising from the 10 October agreement, so far as it is capable of creating an equitable lease over the property, and the receiver has conceded the possibility that part performance may bring that equitable lease outside s 54A of the Conveyancing Act.

Balance of convenience

1. Mr Stitt submits that the balance of convenience favours DRA as damages are not an adequate remedy where loss of the premises will, he contends, affect DRA's ability to provide services under the contract with the Commonwealth, and exclude DRA's access to expensive equipment which it is said to have installed in the premises, albeit some time before, and Mr Stitt also relies on a wider proposition that damages are not an adequate remedy for the loss of an interest in land.
2. I should add that I raised a question with Mr Stitt, in the course of submissions, whether the final relief sought by DRA would assist it, since the balance of convenience would plainly be affected if the final relief sought would not have advanced DRA's position. That final relief is, first, to have the sale contract for the property amended to record the sale as "subject to existing tenancies" and, second, to have the written lease dated 6 December 2016 attached to the lease. It seems possible that the former change would have little impact in equity on the purchaser's position, at least if DRA sustains its position that the purchaser was already on notice of the lease. However, although Mr Stitt did not refer to this matter in the course of submissions, the former change would have a contractual impact under clause 24.4.5 of the sale contract, since a disclosure of the lease in the contract would require the purchaser, as a matter of contractual obligation to ABCD, to comply with any obligations to the tenant under that lease. It seems to me that the final relief sought, in respect of attaching the written lease dated 6 December 2016 to the contract, cannot assist DRA's position, where I have held above that there is no seriously arguable case that Ms Minasian had authority to commit DRA to that lease.
3. Mr Marshall responds that the balance of convenience is against ordering injunctive relief, by reason that damages are an adequate remedy. Mr Marshall also submits that DRA did not give notice of the lease to the receiver until it lodged a caveat on 13 February 2017, although I recognise that the extent to which oral notice of the lease was given is in dispute, and I cannot resolve that dispute in an application of this kind as I noted above. Mr Marshall submits that DRA failed to bring an application for an injunction before the exchange of contracts, when Mr Minus was aware of the receivers' proposed sale of the property from early December 2016 and was given specific notice on 24 January 2017 that the contract was expected to be exchanged on the afternoon of the next day, although it was not in fact exchanged until somewhat later. Mr Marshall also points to the failure of DRA to join in the earlier injunction application by ABCD; the absence of any evidence as to the value of any undertakings to damages given by DRA; and the interference to the contract with the purchaser and real risk that the purchaser would terminate the contract for sale and sue the receiver for damages, if an interlocutory injunction is granted.
4. I have concluded that, notwithstanding that the concessions made by the receivers as to the 10 October lease mean that DRA's case should be treated as seriously arguable, for the purposes of this application, the balance of convenience does not favour the grant of injunctive relief for several reasons. First, it does not seem to me that it has been established that damages are not an adequate remedy. I recognise that damages may not be available against Mr Sampson personally, if no breach of any personal obligation on his part is established. I recognise that there may also be an open question, not addressed by reference to authority in submissions, as to extent of any liability of the purchaser if it obtains indefeasible title to the property, although it is, as DRA contends, on notice of the lease. However, there is no suggestion that ABCD, which is bound by the lease if it exists, would not have sufficient assets to meet a claim in damages against it, even after meeting its obligations to ABCPL, the receiver's costs and, potentially, the costs of earlier proceedings. For this purpose, I must treat ABCD and DRA as separate legal entities, notwithstanding any common economic interest of Mr Minus or Ms Minasian in those entities. Any question of the impact of the completion of the sale on DRA's business also appears to be mitigated by the fact that DRA is now conducting that business elsewhere, or by other means, a matter to which Mr Stitt referred in oral submissions, although he characterised it as a mitigation of DRA's loss.
5. Second, there seems to me to have been significant delay by DRA in taking any step to protect its rights. It claims to have entered an oral lease on 10 October 2016, the day on which the application was made for the receiver's appointment, but it did not lodge a caveat which would have put a potential purchaser of the property on notice of its rights as equitable lessee until after the sale contract was concluded between the receiver and the Second Respondent, and then did not resist the lapsing of the caveat. It seems to me that that is a significant failure, which exposed DRA to the risk of a sale of the property. It can scarcely be contended that, where DRA entered into an oral lease on the very day that an application for the appointment of a receiver with power of sale of the property was made, it had not recognised the risk that the property would be sold. I do recognise that it is arguable that DRA could not have lodged a caveat, without the Court's leave, after the appointment of the receiver became effective on 6 December 2016, although in fact it did so. However, that matter is not an explanation for the failure to lodge a caveat between 10 October and 6 December 2016.
6. I also note that DRA was given specific notice on 24 January 2017 of the receiver's proposed entry into the sale contract with the purchaser and took no step to seek injunctive relief at that point. I recognise that Mr Minus gave evidence of various difficulties in dealing with various previous legal practitioners, prior to those that ABCD and DRA have now retained, but there is no explanation of why he, a barrister, could not have approached the Duty Judge to seek injunctive relief before the sale contract with the Second Respondent was exchanged. That failure exposed the receiver to the risk of liability for damages to the Second Respondent, if an injunction is now granted on an interlocutory basis. The importance of that risk in an application of this kind was noted in CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 231 and in my earlier judgment in ABCD's claim. The receiver, and ABCD's creditors, would also be exposed to the risk of a falling property market if injunctive relief was now granted on an interlocutory basis.
7. It also seems to me that DRA's delay in this matter is exacerbated by its failure to join ABCD's earlier application for injunctive relief. I recognise that there is some force in Mr Stitt's submission that DRA could reasonably have thought that joining ABCD's application would complicate that application, or that it would not be necessary for it to bring its application, if ABCD had succeeded, where it and ABCD were under common control. However, it seems to me that the weight of that proposition is outweighed by the fact that here, there was in fact a further two month delay in bringing injunctive relief, during which not only was no interlocutory application brought, but no interlocutory application by DRA was foreshadowed, to allow the receiver to address the risk that it might later be brought, or the Court to deal with any questions of case management which might arise as to whether those two applications should be heard together.
8. The significance of that delay is all the more striking where, when ABCD's application for injunctive relief was first identified, I had observed in my judgment in Re Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2017] NSWSC 245 at [11], that: "An application [for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the sale of the property] could and should be approached with expedition, particularly in circumstances where the time for completion of the sale has already passed." That observation was made in the presence of Counsel and solicitors who then acted for ABCD and now act for DRA, and in circumstances that those entities are under common control. It seems to me that a further delay of some two months, and DRA's silence as to its foreshadowed application throughout that two month period, is a significant discretionary factor tending against injunctive relief in this case.
9. Mr Marshall also pointed in submissions to the issue as to the adequacy of DRA's undertaking as to damages, and it is notable that DRA did not address that question by evidence, submissions, any offer of any personal undertaking by Mr Minus or Ms Minasian, or any proof of its or their capacity to meet such an undertaking. The absence of evidence of DRA's capacity to meet such an undertaking exists in the context of ABCPL's failure or incapacity to meet its obligations, leading to its liquidation; ABCD's subsequent failure to meet its obligations to ABCPL; and Mr Minus' failure to proceed to pay out the creditors of ABCPL and costs so as to terminate the winding-up, when the appointment of a receiver had been stayed by Brereton J to give him the opportunity to do so; and Mr Minus now having discharged the original debt of the petitioning creditor but not the costs of the liquidation or receivership, so as to bring either the liquidation or the receivership to an end. The risk attached to that undertaking where DRA's capacity to meet it is not shown is greater where there will inevitably be some delay before a final hearing, and there is a risk of termination of the contract by the purchaser and a claim against the receiver for damages, and of a risk of a fall in the property market. It seems to me that the uncertainty as to DRA's capacity to meet an undertaking as to damages is also a significant factor weighing in the balance of convenience against the grant of injunctive relief.
10. I should finally identify one further issue, although I have not placed any weight on it in determining this application. The oral agreement dated 10 October on which DRA now relies appears to have been entered into, as I noted above, on the day on which the applicant for the winding-up of ABCPL served its application for appointment of a receiver for sale of the property. Mr Minus and Ms Minasian do not address that matter in evidence or suggest that, by coincidence, that agreement was formed by discussions in their home shortly before, rather than immediately after, a process server had served that application on Mr Minus there. The written lease of 6 December was executed immediately after a court hearing at which Brereton J had not extended the stay of the receiver's appointment and, adopting the most favourable view to Mr Minus, his undertaking not to adversely deal with the property had lapsed, because the receiver had been appointed and was in control of that property.
11. Mr Minus' and Ms Minasian's evidence makes clear that the execution of the lease between DRA and ABCD was intended to preserve occupancy of the property by DRA against the risk of a sale by Mr Sampson of the property, in circumstances that the application served on 10 October, and Brereton J's failure to extend the stay on 6 December, had the predictable consequences that a receiver would exercise the power of sale that was sought and then conferred upon him. Mr Stitt, in oral submissions, recognised that a sale of the property without vacant possession was likely to be at a lower price than a sale with vacant possession, and it follows that a grant of a lease by ABCD to DRA was potentially adverse to its interests and the interests of its creditors, including ABCPL. To the extent that the written lease of 6 December is said to formalise an earlier oral lease, that emphasises the fact that that oral lease was itself likely entered into after Mr Minus and Ms Minasian and DRA were on notice of the risk of a receiver's appointment to the property. There may be a real question, which I do not decide, whether the Court would grant interlocutory or final relief to enforce transactions which were likely entered into to frustrate, or make more difficult, the exercise of the powers that it itself conferred on Mr Sampson to bring about a sale of the property. That may be a question for a final hearing, and I do not decide it now.

Orders and further directions

1. For these reasons, I order that the Interlocutory Application brought by the Applicant, Dispute Resolution Associates Pty Ltd, is dismissed with costs. Mr Marshall has indicated that the receiver seeks to be heard as to the basis of that costs order.
2. I also make the following directions.
3. The First Respondent serve, and send to the Associate to Black J, its written submissions, of no more than five pages in one and a half spacing, as to its application for indemnity costs by 4pm 22 May 2017.
4. The Applicant, Dispute Resolution Associates Pty Ltd, serve and send to the Associate to Black J its written submissions in response, limited to five pages in one and a half spacing, by 4pm 31 May 2017.
5. Note that judgment as to costs will be delivered in chambers.
6. Stand over the Interlocutory Process seeking final relief brought by Dispute Resolution Associates Pty Ltd for directions only in the Corporations List at 10am on 5 June 2017.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 19 May 2017