Relevant principles
29 Section 439A of the Act relevantly provides as follows:
(1) The administrator of a company under administration must convene a meeting of the company's creditors within the convening period as fixed by subsection (5) or extended under subsection (6).
Note: For body corporate representatives' powers at a meeting of the company's creditors, see section 250D.
(2) The meeting must be held within 5 business days before, or within 5 business days after, the end of the convening period.
(5) The convening period is:
(a) if the day after the administration begins is in December, or is less than 25 business days before Good Friday the period of 25 business days beginning on:
(i) that day; or
(ii) if that day is not a business day-the next business day; or
(b) otherwise-the period of 20 business days beginning on:
(i) the day after the administration begins; or
(ii) if that day is not a business day-the next business day.
(6) The Court may extend the convening period on an application made during or after the period referred to in paragraph (5)(a) or (b), as the case requires.
(7) If an application is made under subsection (6) after the period referred to in paragraph (5)(a) or (b), as the case may be, the Court may only extend the convening period if the Court is satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the creditors if the convening period were extended in accordance with the application.
(8) If an application is made under subsection (6) after the period referred to in paragraph (5)(a) or (b), as the case may be, then, in making an order about the costs of the application, the Court must have regard to:
(a) the fact that the application was made after that period; and
(b) any other conduct engaged in by the administrator; and
(c) any other relevant matters.
30 Section 439C of the Act provides that, at a meeting convened under s 439A, the creditors may resolve that the company execute a deed of company arrangement, that the administration should end, or that the company be wound up.
31 There is a question as to whether s 439A(6) in its current form empowers the Court to grant an extension of time to convene the second meeting of creditors where one or more extensions have previously been granted. That question was considered by Barrett J in Lombe, Re Australian Discount Retail Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 110 (Lombe) at [25]-[32]. His Honour observed that, in a number of cases decided before the provision was amended in 2007, it was concluded that the provision did not empower multiple extensions (at [25]). That conclusion was reached on the basis that the provision, in the form it stood prior to the 2007 amendments, required any application for an extension to be made within the original period for convening the second meeting. By amendments made in 2007, the provision was altered to permit an application for an extension to be made during or after the original convening period. However, his Honour expressed doubt as to whether, by those amendments, the legislature intended to create a general jurisdiction to make multiple extensions under s 439A(6) (at [31]). His Honour declined to express a concluded view on the question in circumstances where it had not been the subject of full argument, and where it was well-established that s 447A of the Act is available to facilitate further extensions of the convening period.
32 Section 447A(1) of the Act relevantly provides that the Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how Part 5.3A of the Act is to operate in relation to a particular company. Pursuant to that power, further extensions to a convening period following an earlier extension under s 439A(6) have been granted on numerous occasions: see, for example, Mentha, in the matter of the Griffin Coal Mining Co Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2010] FCA 499 at [36] (McKerracher J); Owen, in the matter of Rivercity Motorway Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Madden (No 4) [2012] FCA 1491; 92 ACSR 255 at [31] (Logan J) (Rivercity Motorway); Billingsley, in the matter of B K Chemists Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 1059 at [12] (Gleeson J) (B K Chemists); Strawbridge, in the matter of Virgin Australia Holdings Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 7) [2020] FCA 1182 at [12]-[13] (Middleton J) (Virgin Australia (No 7)); Park, in the matter of Collection House Limited (Administrators Appointed) [2022] FCA 1083 at [9] (Derrington J). The exercise of power under s 447A(1) for that purpose is consistent with the function of the provision as expressed in Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v O'Brien (2000) 200 CLR 270 at [24] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (Australasian Memory), which is to permit alterations to the way that Part 5.3A operates including in respect of the time periods applicable under s 439A.
33 The principles for determining an application for a further extension of the convening period are the same as those in respect of the initial grant: Virgin Australia No 7 at [14]; B K Chemists at [14]; Strawbridge, in the matter of CBCH Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 4) [2020] FCA 671 at [25] (Markovic J); Chamberlain, in the matter of South Wagga Sports and Bowling Club Ltd (Administrator Appointed) [2009] FCA 25 at [10] (Jacobson J). In Strawbridge, in the matter of Virgin Australia Holdings Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 717; 144 ACSR 347 (Virgin Australia (No 2)), Middleton J observed ( at [64]):
The circumstances in which the Court will extend a convening period are well established. In making such an order, the Court must reach an appropriate balance between an expectation that the administration will be relatively speedy and summary, and the countervailing factor that undue speed should not be allowed to prejudice sensible and constructive actions directed to maximising a return for creditors: Mann v Abruzzi Sports Club Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 611 (Young J); Re Diamond Press Australia Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 313 at [10] (Barrett J).
34 In Re Riviera Group Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 585; 72 ACSR 352 (Re Riviera) at [13]-[14], Austin J identified the matters in relation to which the Court may have regard when determining whether to grant an extension. These matters relevantly include: (i) whether the extension will allow the sale of the business as a going concern; (ii) the time needed to execute an orderly process of disposal of assets; (iii) the size and scope of the company's business, (iv) the time needed for a thorough assessment of a proposal for a deed of company arrangement, and (v) the prejudice, if any, to those affected by the moratorium imposed by an administration. The matters identified in Re Riviera were referred to by Kiefel CJ, Edelman and Gageler JJ in Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes (2018) 265 CLR 480, where their Honours observed (at [73]) that in circumstances of the kind described by Austin J:
… Provided the evidentiary case for extension has been properly prepared, there has been no evidence of material prejudice to those affected by the moratorium imposed by the administration, and the administrator's estimate of time has had a reasonable basis, the courts have tended to grant extensions for the periods sought by administrators …
35 The ability of the administrator to sell the business of the company as a going concern as part of a restructure or deed of company arrangement is often one of the most significant factors in support of an extension: see Kirk, in the matter of RL Adams Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2017] FCA 1111 at [23] (Derrington J). Further, the opinion of the administrator as to the need for an extension should be given weight in an application of this kind: see, for example, Rivercity Motorway at [26]; Virgin Australia (No 2) at [68].