(3) The Court may at any time require a liquidator to answer any inquiry in relation to the winding up and may examine the liquidator or any other person on oath concerning the winding up and may direct an investigation to be made of the books of the liquidator.
24 In Northbourne Developments Pty Ltd v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434, McLelland J said of the predecessor to s.536 that it "is concerned with aspects of the conduct of liquidators and others which are liable to attract sanctions or control for what might be broadly described a disciplinary reasons".
25 It appears from the material before the court that compliance systems within the plaintiff's firm either were not capable of identifying the need to convene s.508 meetings or, being so capable, did not operate to do so in this case and that the liquidator simply did nothing for almost a year after the first deadline of 21 December 2001 had passed. These are circumstances calling for the kind of inquiry with which s.536 is concerned. ASIC has a clear role to play in a case where there is reason to think that a liquidator's statutory compliance systems may be defective. ASIC also has at its disposal a range of powers calculated to facilitate the gathering of information. The present circumstances should, in the first instance, be brought to the attention of ASIC so that it may consider whether it should inquire into them and, in due course, place before the court in accordance with s.536 anything it thinks should be the subject of attention by the court.
26 Because the effect of the order sought by the plaintiff, insofar as it relates to s.508, will be to absolve the plaintiff from the consequences of past non-compliance with that section in circumstances where, in my judgment, assessment by ASIC of the kind I have mentioned should first be undertaken, it is not appropriate that the order be made at this stage.
The s.509 aspect
27 I pass now to what is the quite separate issue posed by the part of the order claimed that relates to future compliance with s.509 and the question whether s.446A, insofar as it causes s.509 to require that members as well as creditors should be included in the final meeting not yet due to be convened, should have a modified operation in this case so that members are ignored for all purposes of s.509.
28 The reality in this case is that there will be no return to members and that creditors will receive less than 100 cents in the dollar. The situation is accordingly one in which the interests to be served by the liquidator are, in a realistic sense, confined to creditors' interests. At paragraphs 53 to 62 of his judgment in Gibbons v LibertyOne (above), Austin J traced the history of what is now s.508 and, in particular, the recognition by the Greene Committee in its report of 1926 (Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee, HMSO Cmd 2657) that provisions originating in the Companies Act 1862 and requiring only an annual meeting of the members of a company in the course of winding up should, in the case of an insolvent administration, be modified to encompass creditors as well. The Greene Committee made precisely the same recommendation with respect to the final meeting now dealt with by s.509 (Report, para 80 III (b) (vii)). Austin J's exegesis on s.508 concluded:
"In my view, this brief history of the development of s 508 is of some assistance in the resolution of the questions before me now. It shows that s 508 was treated in the process of law reform as an ancillary or consequential provision, rather than a primary focus of legislative policy-making. Moreover, it suggests the possibility that no rigorous thought has been given to the need to have any meetings of members at all, in a case where the company is hopelessly insolvent, the shares are fully paid-up and on any view of the matter, the members do not stand to receive any distribution.
The policy underlying the Greene Committee's recommendations is that where a company is insolvent, control of the liquidation should be transferred from the members to the creditors. It is arguable that, notwithstanding that overall policy, members should retain an entitlement to information and the opportunity to play a limited role at meetings of members - although that has never been a requirement in the case of a court-ordered winding up. However, where it is clear that the members will receive nothing out of the winding up, rigorous application of the policy enunciated by the committee should lead to a total transfer of control to the creditors, and therefore the removal of the requirement for meetings of members would be justifiable. This is particularly so where, as here, the cost of convening meetings of members is substantial. In effect, that cost is borne by the creditors to whom (as Mr Maugham put it) "the assets belong".
29 These statements made in relation to s.508 in the case of a winding up such as the present apply with equal force to s.509. The accountability of the liquidator, in the case of an insolvent administration, is to the creditors. The interests of members are subordinated in such a way that they may, as a general matter, be regarded as somewhat academic.
30 It is to be remembered, however, that a meeting under s.509 is a single meeting comprising both members and creditors together. The plaintiff does not seek to dispense with the meeting altogether. Nor would there be grounds for doing so, given the clear interest of creditors in the matters with which the meeting is intended to deal. The plaintiff merely seeks to bring about a situation where the meeting will be a meeting of creditors only, with members excluded.
31 It is true that the interests of members in the winding up are probably little more than theoretical. But that alone is scarcely enough to deprive them of a statutory right to be part of the s.509 meeting should they wish. The only cogent basis for their exclusion would be, I think, some burden or detriment that was seen to outweigh the statutory right which, in the circumstances outlined, cannot be regarded as a particularly valuable right. The plaintiff points to matters of cost. According to the evidence the plaintiff has adduced, it will cost $750 to hire a suitable meeting venue. Inclusion of members as well as creditors involves no incremental cost in that respect. Nor is there incremental cost in the publication of the advertisement called for by s.509(2). Inclusion of members in addition to creditors will, however, entail significant additional cost in the copying, enveloping and posting of material to be sent individually to some 8,300 shareholders, as well as 194 creditors, in conformity with reg. 5.6.12(1)(b) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth), the meeting concerned being one to which that provision applies by virtue of reg. 5.6.11(2)(a)(ii). The evidence shows that additional cost to be of the order of $9,500.
32 I accept that this additional cost of $9,500 may be regarded as out of proportion to the benefit involved in complying with reg. 5.6.12(1)(b) by way of individual communication with 8,300 persons whose interest in the winding up may be regarded as theoretical only, with the result that those persons may appropriately be deprived of the right to receive the individual communication. But it does not follow that the persons concerned should be deprived of participation rights the fulfilment of which, although reflecting or protecting no more than a theoretical interest, does not entail any incremental cost or other apparent burden.