The absence of a "claim" against Attree for "compensation or damages"
- Whilst it can be accepted that the claims made by the existing and former employees against Attree constituted a civil proceeding or a written demand within the definition of the word "claim" in cl 9.5(a) of the Policy, none were "for compensation or damages". In the context of a policy of liability insurance, that expression is inapt to refer to the payment of an existing statutory or contractual entitlement to a person whose entitlement to receive it has not been fulfilled. Such was the conclusion in Kantfield Pty Ltd v Lockwood [2003] VSC 420, where a receiver claimed on a policy of liability insurance in respect of proceedings brought by the supplier of goods for a debt incurred in the course of a receivership. There was no doubt that the debt had been incurred and that the receiver was liable for it under s 419 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). As such, he did not oppose the giving of final judgment against him, and summary judgment was subsequently entered against him on the claim. In rejecting the receiver's claim for indemnity, Byrne J observed the following (at [12]) in relation to the expression "compensation or damages":
… the expression in the definition of claim, "compensation or damages", shows that what is there intended is a claim for pecuniary redress for some actionable wrong. An obligation in contract or otherwise to pay a sum in a certain event is not properly to be seen as an obligation to compensate; it is an obligation to perform the contract. …
- This passage was subsequently considered in Kyriackou v ACE Insurance Ltd [2013] VSCA 150 [51] - [52], where Harper JA (with whom Tate JA agreed) observed:
51 Kantfield is … authority for the proposition, with which I respectfully agree, that a claim for civil damages or civil compensation does not include a claim in debt. Like reasoning points equally strongly to the conclusion that nor does such a claim encompass a claim for restitution, or for a civil penalty. …
52 Aggrieved persons may have claims of various kinds - for example, in restitution, or debt, or damages - or some combination of these (the terms 'damages' and 'compensation' are synonymous). But a claim for damages requires a breach of a duty or obligation and would therefore exclude claims for restitution or debt. Thus, in the present case the available evidence suggests that, if any claims were to be made by aggrieved investors, they would likely be for the return of borrowed funds, or to enforce contractual rights - in other words, for restitution of money had and received, or for a debt due or payable under contract - neither of which would constitute payment of compensation or damages. Such claims fall outside the insuring clause (clause 1.1) of the professional indemnity policy with which these proceedings are concerned.
(Footnotes omitted).
- The foregoing authorities have been subsequently applied for the proposition that the words "damages" and "compensation" when used in the context of policies of liability insurance are referable to claims for pecuniary redress in response to actionable wrongs: see APD Technology Pty Ltd v Maximo Developments Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 678 [181] - [184], and on appeal, APD Technology Pty Ltd v Maximo Developments Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 141 [181] - [188], [218] (APD v Maximo).
- The distinction between awards of damages arising from a wrongful act and the effective payment of restitution or fulfilment of an antecedent obligation was eruditely articulated in Desmond Derrington and Ronald Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2013) 1189 [8-130]:
Since the essence of liability insurance is indemnity against loss, if there is no loss, there is no call for indemnity. Consequently, for example, the insured's liability to pay a contract debt voluntarily incurred or an obligation contractually undertaken by the insured for which there has presumably been good consideration, does not involve the insured in any net loss; and in such cases if there is some loss, the nature of the insured's liability is not that of the kind to which the policy applies, and it is immaterial on what cause of action the claim is made against the insured. …
The primary reason is that the insured suffers no loss by reason of the incurring of the liability because consideration will have been received for the obligation to pay, and there is consequently no loss from that source, even if the contract itself led to a loss because of its imprudence. …
(Footnotes omitted).
- A little later (at 1190 [8-310]), the learned authors say:
Damages are intended to provide the victim with monetary compensation for an injury to the person, property or reputation, while restitution is intended to return to the victim the specific money or property taken or, it is suggested, wrongfully withheld contrary to the insured's contractual or similar obligations. For example, wrongfully withheld wages that have been appropriated to the employee's entitlement, but not paid, are the property of the employee to whom they are owed and the insured who withholds them may be said to cause harm to that person's property, but this only demonstrates the artificiality of the reasoning of this kind when attention is directed to the form of the insured's liability in a technical sense rather than whether the insurer would suffer loss by making the payment. …
(Footnotes omitted).
- The foregoing observations are fortified by the use of the word, "damages", in the definition of "claim" and not, "damage". The word "damages" should be given its legally recognised meaning, being in the nature of "pecuniary recompense given by process of law to a person for the actionable wrong that another has done to him": Bartoline Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance plc [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1043, 1074 - 1075 [108] - [110], citing the definition from vol 12(1) of Halsbury's Laws (4th ed, 1998) para 802; see also Hall Brothers SS Co Ltd v Young; The Trident [1939] 1 All ER 809. As such, the expression does not include an obligation to satisfy a liability which arises outside of the court process, such as by contract or under statute. Here, the obligation to pay the employee entitlements did not arise by the process of law and the amounts claimed are not in the nature of damages. It matters not that the order of a court requiring an employer to fulfil its antecedent obligations might be characterised as "compensating" the employee for the employer's failure; the substance of the claim is not for damages, but to require the insured to pay the amount that was due.
- This appropriately limited scope of the expression, "compensation or damages", is consistent with the nature of the Policy in this case, being one to indemnify the insured against "loss" arising on account of claims made against them. Where an insured has acquired goods or, in this case, services, but has failed to pay the required consideration, a claim against them for payment of the purchase price will not, if successful, result in the insured suffering any loss. All that will occur from a successful claim is that the insured is required to perform its antecedent obligation to pay the price for the benefit which it has obtained by receipt of the goods or services. If a policy responded to such claims, the insured would be able to obtain the goods or services without being required to pay for them. That is not the concern of liability insurance.
- In both form and substance, the employees' claims were for the payment of amounts which Attree was obliged to pay them under the Fair Work Act or the Award as the consideration for the work which they performed. They sought specific amounts in relation to unlawful deductions made from the employees' entitlements, unpaid motor vehicle allowances, unpaid mobile phone allowances, and unpaid minimum wages. These were merely part of the price which Attree had assumed; the obligation to pay the employees for their services, and their claims for the fulfilment of those obligations involved no claim for damages or compensation. Indeed, Attree's obligation to pay the amounts claimed were in the nature of debts created by statute: Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410, 418 - 419, 424: and the power of the courts to grant the relief sought by the employees existed only where there was an existing entitlement to be paid: see s 545 of the Fair Work Act. Though Attree sought to rely on the powers of the courts to make remedial orders, it is pellucid that the orders which can be made are to require the employer to pay an amount which it was already bound to pay to the employee, but which it had failed to do.
- That critical observation on the nature of loss in this case is undergirded by the definition of the word "loss" which is said "means … damages, compensation …", and, as that definition uses the word "means", it should be accepted that "means" means means. It follows that the loss which is the subject of the indemnity must be in respect of damages or compensation flowing from the claim. That does not include payments made in respect of antecedent obligations which existed prior to the occurrence of a wrongful act. So much is confirmed by the Policy's exclusions which operate generally to exclude cover in respect of a failure to perform existing obligations to make payments or to provide benefits to others.
- The foregoing is sufficient to establish that the claims made by the employees against Attree were not "for compensation or damages" within the scope of the Policy. Commensurately, they were not claims which would occasion Attree any "loss" as contemplated by the insuring clause.
- Attree sought to rely upon the reasons of the Full Court in APD v Maximo in support of its construction of the Policy, where the insuring clause covered "civil legal liability for any claims for compensation". There is no need to address the facts of that case in any detail. It is sufficient to note that the claim made against the insured sought, inter alia, compensation for breach of fiduciary duty and for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct (each of which was a claim for damages), and that it was held that the policy responded to the claim. There is nothing in that case which assists Attree in the present matter. There is also no need to consider the reasons of the Court at [222] to [227] and the analysis of the manner in which the claims in that case were formulated. It suffices to observe that the form of the proceeding against an insured is not decisive of whether the claim is within or outside the relevant policy. It is its substance rather than its form which will determine its nature and, importantly, whether it will give rise to "loss": Derrington and Ashton, The Law of Liability Insurance (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2013) 1145 [8-285].
- Nor does the fact that the employees' claims sought interest on the outstanding amounts transmogrify them into ones for compensation or damage. Although an order for interest to be paid on an amount ordered by the Court can have a compensatory element to it, it is ancillary to the substantive relief sought, being the repayment of a debt which was due and owing. It would be a most unexpected outcome were the Policy to exclude the substantive relief sought against the insured because it is not in the nature of damages or compensation, but respond to the obligation to pay interest on that debt.
- In the present case, the employees' proceedings were governed by the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) and the Industrial Magistrates Court (General Jurisdiction) Regulations 2005 (WA), which afforded the Magistrate a discretion to award pre-judgment interest in relation to Attree's retention of money belonging to its employees beyond the date on which it should have been paid to them. In such circumstances, an award of interest would deprive Attree of the benefit of the use of money which it ought to have paid to the employees and to restore the benefit to them: cf Lahoud v Lahoud [2010] NSWSC 1297 [145]; National Australia Bank Ltd v Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd [1991] 1 VR 386, 597: and is not in the nature of damages or compensation.
- When the issue is examined from the perspective of whether the employees' claims might occasion loss to Attree, the same result ensues. The claim for interest merely deprives Attree of the benefit which it received from the use of its employees' money which it had improperly retained. Being required to disgorge that benefit at the suit of the employees does not occasion it any "loss". For this reason as well, the claims are not within the insuring clause.
- It follows that none of the former employees' claims that Attree pay the amounts due to the employees plus interest were for compensation or damages or nor would they result in Attree suffering any "loss".
- It was submitted that the expression, "claim", as defined by the Policy, extended to civil actions brought against Attree, regardless of whether they were claims for compensation or damages. This was said to arise by the punctuation used in the first limb of the definition which reads:
Claim means:
(a) A civil proceeding, or written demand for compensation or damages; or
…
(Emphasis in original).
- The existence of the comma between the words, "proceeding", and, "or", does not have the consequence that subparagraph (a) covers any civil proceeding, regardless of whether it was one for compensation or damages. It would make no business or commercial sense for the Policy to cover any civil proceeding but then limit the scope of the coverage in relation to written demands to those for "compensation or damages". Whilst, conformably with the well-recognised paucity of quality in policy drafting, the punctuation of subparagraph (a) is not grammatical, its intendment is clear. It is concerned with claims against the insured for compensation or damages, regardless of whether they were in the form of a civil action or of a written demand made prior to litigation being commenced. It is, with respect, easily concluded that the comma has not been used carefully by the drafter, but rather haphazardly and inconsistently: Zhang v ROC Services (NSW) Pty Ltd; National Transport Insurance by its manager NTI Ltd v Zhang (2016) 93 NSWLR 561, 576 [73], 608 [254]; Mainteck Services Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (2014) 89 NSWLR 633, 659 - 660 [105].
- That conclusion is supported by the structure of the other subparagraphs of the definition of "claim" in cl 9.5. They each refer to some form of activity against the insured, either by a claim or written demand, a criminal proceeding, or a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding, which is then limited by the remaining words in the clause. The same drafting technique should be attributed to subparagraph (a), which would then have a sensible meaning. To adopt Attree's preferred construction would accord it an operation inconsistent with that of the related subparagraphs.
- The adoption of Attree's construction would also render part of subparagraph (d) redundant. That clause provides:
(d) A civil proceeding, or a written demand, by an employee for compensation or damages alleging an employment practice breach.
(Emphasis in original).
- If subparagraph (a) was to be construed as Attree suggested, the reference to a "civil proceeding" in subparagraph (d) would be superfluous because that would be covered by subparagraph (a). It is axiomatic that a construction which avoids that result is preferable: Chapmans Ltd v Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 402, 411.
- Attree's preferred construction of subparagraph (a) should be rejected, least of all because it lacks any commercial sense.