E. LEGAL SUBMISSIONS
20The plaintiffs made a number of submissions in relation to the law. First, that the onus of establishing the appropriateness of the payments lay on Mr and Mrs Frost. I was referred to Hawksford v Hawksford [2005] NSWSC 463 at [54], where Campbell J stated:
"The distinction between an onus of proof and an onus of adducing evidence is of particular relevance in the present situation. Where party A has the legal onus of proving a negative proposition, and relevant facts are peculiarly in the knowledge of party B or where party B has the greater means to produce evidence relating to those facts, then provided party A establishes sufficient evidence from which the negative proposition may be inferred, party B then comes under an evidential burden, or an onus of adducing evidence".
21Reference was also made to Bird v Bird (No 4) [2012] NSWSC 648, where Rein J stated at [65]:
"Mona's payment of the proceeds into her own account was a prima facie breach of her obligations to Percy, the onus to establish approval of the payment of the proceeds to herself or ratification rests on the defendants".
(See also Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384 at 398, and Gudmundsen v Carrington [2012] NSWSC 147 at [56]-[58]).
22The significance of the onus is dealt with later in this judgment.
23Secondly, the plaintiffs referred me to the provisions of s 588FDA. It can be noted that paragraph (1)(c) of that provision adopts the test for an "uncommercial transaction" dealt with in s 588FB, which provides:
"...it may be expected that a reasonable person in the company's circumstances would not have entered into the transaction, having regard to:
(a) the benefits (if any) to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(b) the detriment to the company of entering into the transaction; and
(c) the respective benefits to other parties to the transaction of entering into it; and
(d) any other relevant matter.
..."
24White JA at [40] in Fielding v Dushas [2013] 2 Qd R 416 appeared to adopt with approval the comments of the primary judge in that case with respect to whether a transaction is uncommercial. The primary judge said that the full criteria in s 588FB(1):
"are not considered in a vacuum but by reference to the circumstances of the company including the state of knowledge of those who were the directing mind of the company, such as its controlling director or directors. For a transaction to be uncommercial it must result in 'the recipient receiving a gift or obtaining a bargain of such magnitude that it [cannot] be explained by normal commercial practice', or where 'the consideration ... lacks a commercial quality'...
The Court should examine the transaction in question very closely when considering the commerciality where that transaction involves a relative of a company's director."
25Among the authorities referred to by the plaintiffs, that which seemed most analogous or applicable to the present situation was the decision of Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507; [2005] HCA 23, and the cases there referred to. In Angas, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J referred to the decision of Pascoe Ltd (in liq) v Lucas (1999) 75 SASR 246 and, at [24], referred to:
"two related but distinct lines of authority, both of which turn upon the significance of knowledge and unanimous approval by shareholders of conduct of directors. The first line of authority, exemplified by Re Duomatic Ltd, concerns cases in which, by reason of some feature of a company's internal structure, or some failure to comply with its Articles of Association, there is a potential defect in a purported exercise of corporate power. In such a case, the unanimous consent of the shareholders, even if there has been no formal resolution of a general meeting, may be as binding as a resolution in general meeting would have been. This line of authority is often invoked to meet a contention that a company is not bound by some decision or conduct by reason of administrative irregularity, failure to comply with Articles of Association, or want of authority on the part of some internal organ. The second group of cases concerns ratification by shareholders of breaches of duty by directors. They are exemplified by Bamford v Bamford. The principles were considered and applied in Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd, and were discussed in Miller v Miller. Of particular relevance to the present case is one well accepted qualification to the capacity of shareholders to ratify or excuse directors' breaches of duty: shareholders cannot sanction improper expropriation of a company's property by the directors."
26As I have said, there was a reference to the decision of Pascoe where the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court in the judgment of Lander J, agreed to by the other members of the Court, said at [264]-[266], [269]-[270]:
"the shareholders may authorise or affirm a decision of the directors of the company which would otherwise be voidable because it involved a breach by those directors of their fiduciary duties to the company...
[265] In this case there being only one shareholder the approval by that shareholder in advance of the transaction, in my opinion, could amount to an authority by that shareholder for the company to enter into the transaction even if the entry into that transaction gave rise to a breach of fiduciary duties on the part of the director.
[266] However that proposition is subject to qualification. First the company must be solvent. In my opinion, for the reasons I have already given the company was solvent. Secondly the transaction itself must be intra vires. Thirdly the directors must make full disclosure to the shareholders. Fourthly the directors must be acting in good faith.
...
[269] When a company is incorporated for the sole purpose of entering into a transaction at the behest of its sole shareholder, provided that the company is at the time solvent and provided that the transaction is intra vires and the directors are not acting in bad faith the company cannot later complain about that transaction, provided of course that the directors have made full disclosure of that which is required to obtain the consent of its shareholders.
[270] It is not necessary that a formal decision of the shareholders should be made; an informal consent will be sufficient; Re Duomatic Ltd (1969) 2 Ch 365. Again it follows that where the corporation has only one shareholder there is even less need for a formal meeting."
See also [279].
27Gleeson CJ and Heydon J in Angas at [25] also referred with apparent approval to the decision of Doyle CJ in the Full Court in Carabelas v Scott (2003) 177 FLR 334; [2003] SASC 389 where Doyle CJ is quoted as saying:
"the informal assent by the shareholders...is sufficient to prevent [the company] complaining that ...the directors acted in breach of their duty to the company. The company was not insolvent at the time. There were no other shareholders. There was no other person with a claim to the property in question. There is no allegation that this was a dishonest or fraudulent transaction".
28In the present case, the conduct involving the transactions was undertaken by the sole shareholders and directors. Thus it seems that whatever conduct was undertaken was with the approval of the shareholders; I must infer that there was at least informal consent by the shareholders, if not express consent, by reason of the fact that they were the parties conducting the transactions. That issue does not seem to have been in dispute by the plaintiffs in this case. However, there still remains a need to consider whether there was an expropriation of the property (see Slaven v Menegazzo [2009] ACTSC 94 at [38]) and also whether the company was solvent at the time (see Woodgate v Fawcett [2008] NSWSC 868 at [104]-[106], [108]).
29Finally, the plaintiffs also submitted that the provision in the Act dealing with the remedies in s 588FF, that the Court "may" make certain orders does not entitle the Court in its discretion to refuse to make any orders. In Kazar, in the matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] FCA 1381, Flick J stated at [28]:
"Notwithstanding the use of the term 'may' in s 588FF(1), it has been said that the court does not retain a discretion to refuse to make one or other of the orders set forth in s 588FF(1)(a) to (j)".
30His Honour then referred to a decision of Cashflow Finance Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1999] NSWSC 671 where Einstein J accepted that "S 588FF more naturally reads as conferring a jurisdiction on the Court, rather than stating that there is a discretion in the court."
31However, the various orders that are available under s 588FF(1) must necessarily contemplate that some discretion is exercised as to which of the orders are appropriate in the circumstances before the Court. Those provisions, in my view, seem to allow consideration of whether the amount that should be repaid to the company should be an amount reflecting the extent to which the company has been deprived of funds or alternatively, should be an amount reflecting the extent to which the recipient has received funds.