Ground 4 - error in the delegation of authority to the delegate
40 In support of this ground of review, Mr Ashby submits that the delegation of authority to decide whether an act of grace payment application should be granted was flawed, with the consequence that the delegate either did not have authority to refuse the application, or alternatively, an impermissible fetter was placed on the delegate's ability to exercise the discretion.
41 Section 107 of the PGPA Act gives the Minister the power to delegate the exercise of his or her power to the Secretary of the Department of Finance. That power of delegation was exercised by the Minister, authorising the Secretary to consider all applications for act of grace payment, but limiting written authorisation for act of grace payments to $100,000. Section 109 of the PGPA Act gives the Secretary power to, inter alia, further delegate powers to officials within the Department by an instrument in writing. The Secretary's power of delegation was relevantly exercised by way of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (Cth), Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Finance Secretary to Finance Officials) Delegation 2020 (No 1) (22 January 2020), being the instrument that is now challenged. Part 11 of Schedule 1A of Delegation 2020 (No 1) at cl 11.1 conferred on delegates, by reference to identified positions within the Department, two powers, in keeping with the delegation from the Minister. The clause provided:
(1) for an unrestricted or plenary power, in common for all named delegate positions and in common with the delegation to the Secretary herself, to "consider all applications for act of grace payment", without any stated cap or limit: cl 11.1(1) of Delegation 2020 (No 1); and
(2) that a delegate "may not provide written authorisation for act of grace payments for amounts in excess of" specified limits from $100,000 to $10,000 per payment by reference to particular positions held from Deputy Secretary to Director level: cl 11.1(2) of Delegation 2020 (No 1).
42 It is common ground that the relevant delegate in the present matter was the Assistant Secretary of the Risk and Claims Branch, Procurement and Insurance Division, and that the applicable monetary cap for that delegation was "$50,000 per payment".
43 Mr Ashby contends that this part of Delegation 2020 (No 1) can only be interpreted in one of two ways, both of which render the delegate's decision invalid by reason of flaws in that delegation. That is because, on his argument, either:
(1) the delegate purported to refuse his application on a final basis, which he did not have power to do because the application sought more than $100,000, such that he was authorised to consider it, but not to refuse it, those two aspects being part of a single discretion; or
(2) the delegation purported to give the delegate power to refuse the application, but not to approve it because it sought more than $100,000, which was invalid because the power under s 65 of the PGPA Act could not be bestowed only to refuse an application, but not to grant it.
44 A necessary part of Mr Ashby's argument is therefore that there is but one decision-making step in either granting or refusing an act of grace application. Mr Ashby submits that the process of considering an application, and at that stage making a decision not to authorise an act of grace payment, is bundled up with the decision to authorise in writing the making of an act of grace payment. He argues further that both steps are required to be carried out by the same person.
45 The practical effect of this interpretation would be that the Minister or the Secretary would have to deal with all applications for act of grace payments that sought sums of money in excess of $100,000, irrespective of their merit. No proper process of screening would be possible in deciding the question of appropriateness by reason of special circumstances being shown to exist before such senior individuals had to become involved. At most, someone more junior could make a recommendation, but the decision would still have to be made at that level. The alternative would be to enlarge the pool of persons delegated to approve the payment of substantial sums of public money, noting that authorisation to pay any sum above $100,000 must be given by the Minister in person.
46 There needs to be a compelling reason to read a delegation and the statutory power to which it relates in such an impractical and improbable way, apparently contrary to its evident purpose: see Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW) (1976) 137 CLR 208 at 214 and 219; see also Fisk v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2) [2017] FCA 1490 at [32]. In Taylor, a delegate was able to determine that disciplinary charges had been made out, and the Board then adopted that finding in order to make the dismissal decision. The High Court decided there was nothing wrong in the function being divided in that way. Any other interpretation would have involved practical inconvenience and a frustration of the evident purpose of the power of delegation.
47 I do not consider that Mr Ashby's construction is the sensible or correct way in which to read this part of Delegation 2020 (No 1) in relation to the power being delegated under s 65(1) of the PGPA Act. The plain words of s 65(1) contemplate two separate steps: first, to consider whether it is appropriate that an act of grace payment be made by reason of special circumstances being demonstrated, and if not, to decide upon that basis not to authorise an act of grace payment; and second, only if satisfied it is appropriate that an act of grace payment be made by reason of special circumstances being demonstrated, to decide whether to authorise such a payment being made.
48 Thus the way in which s 65(1) is expressed puts paid to the suggestion made by Mr Ashby that the general rule of administrative functions being indivisible must apply: cf GPT Re Ltd v Wollongong City Council [2006] NSWLEC 303; (2006) 151 LGERA 116 at [49], affirmed by Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd v GPT Re Ltd [2007] NSWCA 171; 153 LGERA 450 at [1], [53]-[54] and [75]; also cf Singh v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 90 ALR 397 at 402. The present case concerns a very different statutory regime than one which, drawing from the examples in the authorities referenced above, provides for consent to be granted or refused by a council, or for a visa to be granted or refused, which are powers generally cast in terms that do not permit the binary nature of grant or refusal to be split and require the same considerations to be addressed either way. Rather, the two functions in s 65(1), one operating as a gateway to the other, are spelt out in the provision bestowing the power, being s 65(1). An application can fail at the first hurdle, without there being any need to consider authorisation of a payment if that point is not reached.
49 The design of this part of Delegation 2020 (No 1), following the clear and express structure of s 65(1) of the PGPA Act, is to give much wider scope, by a wider pool of delegations descending down to lower (but still senior) levels of the bureaucracy, to consider act of grace applications, but to give much narrower scope to the approval of payments to be made by reference to the amount of money involved if the first hurdle is surmounted. As noted above, not even the Secretary may authorise an act of grace payment of over $100,000.
50 If the requirement of a payment being appropriate by reason of special circumstances is not met, the step of approval of a payment is never reached. The lower the amount sought, and considered appropriate by reason of special circumstances being established, the more likely it is that a single delegate can decide the second step if the threshold question has been met. In this case, had the delegate formed the view that a payment was appropriate because special circumstances had been established, then, if the amount in contemplation was above that delegate's cap, the appropriate delegate to consider approval of a payment, perhaps by the Minister in person, would have been revealed by that amount, which might or might not have been at the level sought by the application.
51 For completeness, it should be observed that this interpretation of both s 65(1) of the PGPA Act and of this part of Delegation 2020 (No 1) is supported by s 24 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, made under the PGPA Act, the express purpose of which is to require the Minister to consider the report of an advisory committee before, inter alia, making an authorisation for an act of grace payment that involves an amount in excess of $500,000. Section 24 of the Rule contemplates appropriateness potentially requiring more than special circumstances being established. Section 65(2) of the PGPA Act provides that authorisation of a payment, thus recognised to be a separate exercise of power, must be in accordance with any requirements prescribed by such rules. It is therefore clearly contemplated, contrary to Mr Ashby's argument, that when considering whether an application for an act of grace payment should result in a payment being authorised, it will first and separately be determined whether any such payment first meets the test of being appropriate by reason of special circumstances having been established.
52 Ground 4 must therefore fail.