5.2 The correct approach to the remittal
103 Section 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act provides that where the High Court is equally divided in opinion in relation to a decision of the Federal Court, the decision appealed from "shall be affirmed". Affirmation of such a decision normally yields the result that the decision appealed from applies, however, in the present case the matter is complicated by the fact that the Full Court made the remittal order which requires questions of substance to be considered. The terms of the remittal order warrant repetition:
The proceedings are remitted to the primary judge for determination of any residual issues in light of the Full Court's reasons including any issues which concern the position of [the residual claims] and the costs of the hearings before the primary judge.
104 The "residual issues" referred to concern the question of whether or not the residual claims are a manner of manufacture within s 18(1A)(a) of the Patents Act (the question of costs having been deferred pending this judgment). What divides the parties is the application to be given to the words "shall be affirmed" in s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act and the words "in light of the Full Court's reasons" in the remittal order.
105 The decision of the High Court does not create any binding precedent because only unanimous or majority decisions of that Court have binding authority; Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 4; (1981) 146 CLR 336 at 432 (Aickin J); Milne v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1976] HCA 2; (1976) 133 CLR 526 at 533 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Stephen JJ agreeing).
106 In Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; (1999) 198 CLR 511, Gummow and Hayne JJ considered the consequences of the operation of s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act:
101 It was submitted that the Court should adopt a different rule from the rule stated by Dixon J in Tasmania v Victoria and subsequently applied on several occasions (that a decision of a full court of this Court in which opinions are equally divided creates no precedent binding this Court). But any different rule must grapple with the difficulty of identifying what principle is established by a decision of an equally divided Court. In general, this Court considers itself bound by its earlier decisions. (The exceptions to, or qualifications on, that general rule are of no immediate relevance.) But what is binding is not the order that is made disposing of the particular proceeding. The Court is bound by the principles of law that are established by its decisions. The expedient prescribed by s 23 of the Judiciary Act enables a decision to be given in the particular case but the application of that provision does not give to the opinion of those members of the Court who favoured that disposition of the matter any special status. And it is not possible in a case such as Gould v Brown to resort to the decision of the court below as serving to identify the principle that is established by the decision. That is, the relevant question is not whether some principle can be found to have commended itself to a majority of judges who considered the matter; the question is whether any principle was established in this Court that the Court should consider authoritative, to be overruled only in what Aickin J said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd "may conveniently, but imprecisely, be described as special circumstances". No such principle was established in Gould v Brown.
(Footnotes omitted)
107 In support of the proposition that a split decision of the High Court may nonetheless produce binding authority, Aristocrat refers to Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCA 58; (2013) 252 CLR 530 at [50], where the High Court referred to the common reasoning of both Hayne J (at [125]) and Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (at [317]) in the decision of Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4; (2013) 249 CLR 92 in support of a legal proposition, notwithstanding that the Court in Monis was evenly split.
108 However, the circumstance where a court may search for an authoritative principle to be gleaned from a split decision as contemplated in the above passage from Re Wakim is to be distinguished from the present case, where the question concerns the effect of the decision of the intermediate court whose decision was affirmed as a result of the split on the trial judge to whom the matter had been remitted.
109 The language of s 23(2)(a) is plain in its terms. The decision of the Full Court in the present case has been "affirmed". For the following reasons I do not consider that it is correct to draw upon the reasoning of the High Court to influence my decision making in the relation to the residual claims.
110 The policy and purpose underlying s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act is to enable the court to perform its institutional responsibility of resolving the dispute before it. That is, the court's "unique and essential function"; Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12; (1983) 152 CLR 570 at 608(Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ); Perara-Cathcart v The Queen [2017] HCA 9; (2017) 260 CLR 595 at [73] (Gageler J). In Perara-Cathcart, Gageler J observed (at [75]) the distinction between the effect of s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act and an attempt to extract a ratio decidendi from the reasons of the High Court. Where s 23(2)(a) applies, the decision-making rule is directed to ensuring an outcome in the case, without necessarily producing a binding precedent; Perara-Cathcart [75] - [76]. The statutory affirmation of the decision of the Full Court does that by resolving the appeal to the High Court in favour of its dismissal. The result is that the decision of the Full Court remains in place. The orders of the Full Court are to be understood in light of the reasons given. Those orders and the reasons for them bind me as a single judge.
111 The language of the remittal order, which gives effect to the decision of the Full Court, further reinforces this conclusion as it requires that I determine the residual issues "in light of the Full Courts reasons including any issues which concern the position of claims other than claim 1". That language is unequivocal. It calls for the determination of the question of the manner of manufacture of the residual claims by having regard to the reasoning of the Full Court.
112 The consequence of these two matters is that, even if I were disposed to consider that a relevant principle of law emerges from the decision of the High Court, by virtue of the operative language of s 23(2)(a) and the remittal order, this Court is not permitted the latitude that might apply to other courts to discern from the High Court decision a relevant binding principle: I am bound by s 23(2)(a) and the terms of the remittal order to apply the reasons of the majority decision.
113 Furthermore, although for the reasons given I do not need to address the point, I am also not persuaded that any principle emerges from the High Court decision that can properly be considered to be relevant to the remitter.
114 Aristocrat submits that in circumstances where neither the allowing reasons nor the dismissing reasons create any binding precedent, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate at first instance in this Court to apply any of the principles set out in the High Court decision. It contends that it is, and that the principles to be applied are those of the allowing reasons.
115 Aristocrat submits that the High Court was unanimous in its rejection of the two-step analysis propounded and followed in the majority decision with the consequence that this Court on remitter is required to apply the general principles governing manner of manufacture rather than follow the reasoning of the majority decision. It contends that only the allowing reasons are consistent with previous High Court authority, including NRDC and Myriad, which this Court must follow, the dismissing reasons representing a "radical departure" from those principles which Aristocrat courageously describes variously as: "propound[ing] a new test", "fail[ing] to follow the previous decisions of the High Court", and being "wrong to require that there be something 'new or inventive about the interaction between the configurable symbols and the game'".
116 Addressing the first of these points, it is true that each of the dismissing reasons and allowing reasons was critical of the two-step analysis set out in the majority decision. However, a review of each set of reasons indicates no uniformity of approach from which a ratio decidendi may be discerned.
117 The dismissing reasons considered at [77] that the two-step analysis unnecessarily complicated the analysis of the crucial issue as to the characterisation of the invention. Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ formed the view that asking whether the claimed invention is an advance in computer technology as opposed to gaming technology or an advance in technology at all was neither necessary nor helpful. Instead, the dismissing reasons considered that the characterisation of the invention was to be done by reference to the terms of the specification having regard to the claim and in light of the common general knowledge. However, the criticism of the majority decision was not as to the characterisation of the invention, or of the view that there must be some variation or adjustment to "generic computer technology" to give effect to or accommodate the needs of the new game ([73]). The dismissing reasons required consideration of those aspects of the claim that were considered to be "new" and it is only in relation to the feature game (defined by integers 1.10 - 1.12) that the "invention" was claimed to subsist. The dismissing reasons considered that the claimed invention took its character as an invention from those elements, which were not part of the common general knowledge and those elements did not include a component that produced "some adaptation or alteration of, or addition to, technology otherwise well-known in the common general knowledge" ([75]). On that basis, the dismissing reasons distinguished the approach of the majority decision..
118 The allowing reasons' rejection of the approach of the majority decision was more fundamental. Those reasons did not criticise the characterisation of the invention. Indeed, the various characterisations of the invention claimed in claim 1 in each of the first instance, majority and minority decisions was considered to be "reasonable" (at [149]). The allowing reasons noted that claim 1 of the 967 patent was not to be characterised as a scheme or idea for a game that is separate from the external or artificial application of the game, such that the operation of the game controller cannot be "severed" from the interdependent player interface in the EGM. In considering whether claim 1 of the 967 patent, as properly characterised, was patentable subject matter, the allowing reasons considered (at [152]) that the question of whether a claim is for a manner of manufacture should not be deconstructed to require, separately from the general principles of patentability, consideration of whether the subject matter is "computer-implemented", and instead the implementation of a scheme or idea on a computer (as with any other machine) should create "an artificial state of affairs and a useful result" as propounded by NRDC ([153]). On that basis, the approach of the majority decision was rejected.
119 From this brief analysis it is apparent that, contrary to the submissions advanced by Aristocrat, it cannot be said that a common thread of reasoning can be discerned in the High Court decision that is critical of the two-step analysis in the majority decision. Rather, for reasons aligned with the differences of principle expressed between the dismissing reasons and the allowing reasons, each expressed a different basis for its critique.
120 Aristocrat next submits that only the allowing reasons are consistent with established High Court authority, and so it must be preferred to the dismissing reasons. This argument too must be rejected. The dismissing reasons without disagreement refer to and apply the established authorities to which Aristocrat refers. As the summary set out in section 3.1 above indicates, this includes each of NRDC, Myriad, CCOM, Grant, Research Affiliates, RPL Central, Encompass and Rokt. At no point do the dismissing reasons criticise previous High Court decisions or purport to overturn existing Full Court authority. The allowing reasons of the High Court also refer to those authorities but consider that their application calls for a different outcome. I, therefore, do not see a basis upon which a single judge on remitter can form the view that the dismissing reasons must be set aside in preference to the allowing reasons. Nor do I consider any of the various other criticisms advanced by Aristocrat of the dismissing reasons to provide a basis for me to favour the allowing reasons over the dismissing reasons.
121 Similarly, nor do I consider that on remitter it is available to me to express a view that the majority decision purported to, or did, reach its decision in a manner that was contrary to the reasoning of the cases to which I have just referred. To do so would be to ignore the judicial hierarchy in which this matter is to be decided.
122 Aristocrat also submits that when one reasons by analogy, it should be concluded that the invention claimed in each of the residual claims is for a manner of manufacture, referring in particular to the decision in Konami 1 and also to a subsequent decision of Nicholas J in Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Konami Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2022] FCA 1373; (2022) 409 ALR 418 (Konami 3) at [84], [85] where the claims were found to be a manner of manufacture. It may be noted that in Konami 3 the Court was concerned with the quantification of profits for which the respondent was liable to account in respect of the infringement found in Konami 1. In that regard, Konami 3 involved no substantively different consideration of the question of manner of manufacture to Konami 1.
123 Aristocrat's argument is that because: (a) claim 1 of the 967 patent (and by extension, the residual claims) is "analogous to" the claims in Konami 1 and Konami 3; (b) the majority decision found there to be no conceptual distinction between the invention claimed in the 967 patent and that in the patent the subject of Konami 1; and (c) the correctness of Konami 1 was expressly affirmed by the dismissing reasons, the inventions the subject of the residual claims must "by analogy" be regarded as falling comfortably within the existing concept of manner of manufacture.
124 In my view this argument stretches the syllogism too far. The majority decision found the claims of the two patents to be analogous, but rejected that either was a manner of manufacture. The dismissing reasons accepted the decision in Konami 1 to be correct but nonetheless found claim 1 of the 967 patent not to be a manner of manufacture. The allowing reasons made no finding on the subject. No consistent thread of reasoning is available to establish that by analogy the residual claims can necessarily be regarded as a manner of manufacture.
125 Aristocrat next submits that this Court on remitter should make factual findings of the type that the dismissing reasons observed to be missing and which the first instance decision considered to be unnecessary when it held claim 1 to be a manner of manufacture. The factual findings sought are those which would provide a basis for the Court to conclude that the residual claims are for an invention that involves a technical contribution, including in the field of gaming technology.
126 Unfortunately for Aristocrat, it is caught in a procedural bind which precludes such an approach on remitter. The majority decision (at [96]) rejected as procedurally misconceived Aristocrat's submission that if the first instance decision was wrong in finding that claim 1 was not a manner of manufacture, then the Full Court should proceed to consider its Notice of Contention that the invention the subject of claim 1 of the 967 patent was nevertheless a manner of manufacture because it is "technical in nature and solves technical problems in, and involves technical and functional improvements to, the operation of EGMs". The majority decision noted that the evidentiary material necessary for consideration of that contention was not before it and declined to find in favour of the Notice of Contention. The majority decision explains (at [97]) that the basis for the remitter is "to determine any residual issues in light of the Full Court's reasons". It is apparent that, having failed to establish that the first instance decision was correct on a basis other than the reasons set out in that decision, the majority decision has left no avenue open for Aristocrat to circle back and seek different or additional findings of fact to support an alternative analysis.
127 Nor does the High Court's decision assist Aristocrat's contention. Even if, contrary to the view expressed above, the combined effect of 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act and the remittal order did not apply, the paragraphs of the dismissing reasons cited by Aristocrat ([76] and [82]) do not support the submission advanced. Indeed, the dismissing reasons reject (at [82]) Aristocrat's submission that the majority decision reflected error for failing to remit the matter for that purpose. The dismissing reasons (at [73], [83]) expressed the view that the essential question of characterising the invention is an enquiry conducted by reference to the claim in light of the specification as a whole and the common general knowledge and that it was neither necessary nor helpful to consider whether the claimed invention is an advance in technology ([77]). As such, no door is left open by which it may be said that the dismissing reasons considered that additional findings of fact on the basis of the expert evidence adduced ought to be reconsidered.
128 Having regard to its conclusion that claim 1 of the 967 patent was for a manner of manufacture, it was not necessary for the allowing decision to address the question of remitter.
129 It follows that I am bound to follow the reasons set out in the majority decision in considering the patentability of the residual claims. It is not open to me to consider whether those reasons are in conformity with established principle. The starting point is the finding of the majority decision that claim 1 of the 967 patent is not for a manner of manufacture.