INTRODUCTION
1 These two appeals concern the extent of coverage available under insurance policies in favour of the first respondent, Quintis Limited ('Quintis'), a sandalwood plantation investment company subject to a deed of company arrangement. The claims arise in relation to two shareholder class actions where it has been alleged that Quintis and others engaged in conduct in contravention of various statutory norms causing loss and damage for which the class action applicants and group members seek compensation. A settlement in principle in respect of those proceedings has been reached but the application for settlement approval has been adjourned so as to determine the correct value of any responsive insurance policies, being the only asset of value held by Quintis.
2 In the period 30 September 2016 to 31 March 2018, Quintis carried insurance policies with various Lloyd's of London ('Lloyd's') underwriting syndicates providing up to $100 million in coverage for directors and officers ('D&O') liability. The policies that are relevant to these appeals are those that Quintis entered into in 2016, when it sought to renew its expiring insurance coverage on the Lloyd's market. Quintis relevantly entered into the following policies (collectively, '2016-17 Policies'):
(a) a policy schedule identified as policy number B0507N16FA15350 and Munich Re Financial & Professional Risks Policy 09/14 policy wording ('2016-17 Primary');
(b) a first excess layer policy identified as policy number B0507N16FA15360 ('2016-17 1XS'); and
(c) a second excess layer policy identified as policy number B0507N16FA15370 ('2016-17 2XS').
3 There was also a third excess layer policy identified as policy number B0507N16FA15380 ('2016-17 3XS') which is not the subject of any dispute.
4 It is common ground that, when entering into the 2016-17 Policies in 2016, Quintis intended the coverage layers to include $50 million in entity securities liability ('Side C') cover and instructed its Australian producing broker ('PSC') to this effect. Before the primary judge, Quintis claimed the 2016-17 Policies included $50 million in Side C cover. Yet after construing the 2016-17 Policies, the primary judge found that Side C cover was in fact only available under the policies up to a 'sub-limit' of $10 million: Quintis Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London Subscribing to Policy Number B057N16FA15350 [2021] FCA 19 (28 January 2021) ('J' or 'January judgment') at [53], [55]-[60].
5 However, the primary judge found that this construction of the 2016-17 Policies did not reflect the intentions held by certain parties: [303], [348], [383], [392] J. The primary judge thus determined to rectify the 2016-17 1XS and 2016-17 2XS ('Excess Policies') to reflect what he considered to be the common commercial intention of:
(a) Quintis;
(b) Quintis' Lloyd's placing broker ('Price Forbes');
(c) one insurer subscribing to the first excess layer 2016-17 1XS, Argo Managing Agency Ltd ('Argo');
(d) and another insurer subscribing to the second excess layer 2016-17 2XS, Vibe Syndicate Management Limited ('Vibe'),
that the 2016-17 Policies would collectively provide for Side C cover of up to $50 million: see [392] J; Quintis Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London Subscribing to Policy Number B0507N16FA15350 (No 2) [2021] FCA 327 (6 April 2021) ('J2' or 'April judgment').
6 It is these findings as to the intention held by Price Forbes, Argo and Vibe, as well as the related decision to rectify the Excess Policies, which are the subject of the present appeals.
7 The appeals are brought by Argo and Vibe on behalf of participating syndicates in the 2016-17 1XS and 2016-17 2XS, respectively. The syndicate represented by Argo was a 50% participant in (and lead insurer for) the 2016-17 1XS, and the syndicate represented by Vibe was a 6.25% participant in the 2016-17 2XS. Argo and Vibe represent two of the four syndicates that were the respondents to proceedings in the court below (the other two syndicates being subscribed to the 2016-17 Primary and the 2016-17 3XS which were not subject to rectification orders).
8 There are, broadly, three common issues in the appeal brought by Argo ('Argo Appeal') and the appeal brought by Vibe ('Vibe Appeal'):
(1) whether the primary judge erred in finding that Price Forbes held the Side C Coverage Intention - being the intention that Side C cover under the 2016-17 Policies was not subject to a sub-limit of $10 million but was in fact equal to the limit of liability for "Section 1B cover" under each of the 2016-17 Policies such that they collectively provided Side C cover of up to $50 million - at all relevant times up to the point that Argo and Vibe subscribed to the 2016-17 1XS and 2016-17 2XS;
(2) whether the primary judge erred in finding that Argo and Vibe held the Side C Coverage Intention;
(3) whether the primary judge erred in granting relief that is said not to reflect the subjective intentions of the parties and create a contractual structure whereby different parties to the 2016-17 1XS and 2016-17 2XS are bound by unreconciled yet interacting obligations as between the rectified and unrectified contracts, and which departs from the relief sought by Quintis in its amended originating application.
9 There was no issue before us as to the principles applicable to the grant of the equitable remedy of rectification adopted by the primary judge.
10 A convenient summary was set out in Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85 by Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ at [103]-[104]:
[103] Rectification is an equitable remedy, the purpose of which is to make a written instrument "conform to the true agreement of the parties where the writing by common mistake fails to express that agreement accurately". For relief by rectification, it must be demonstrated that, at the time of the execution of the written instrument sought to be rectified, there was an "agreement" between the parties in the sense that the parties had a "common intention", and that the written instrument was to conform to that agreement. Critically, it must also be demonstrated that the written instrument does not reflect the "agreement" because of a common mistake. Unless those elements are established, the "hypothesis arising from execution of the written instrument, namely, that it is the true agreement of the parties" cannot be displaced.
[104] The issue may be approached by asking - what was the actual or true common intention of the parties? There is no requirement for communication of that common intention by express statement, but it must at least be the parties' actual intentions, viewed objectively from their words or actions, and must be correspondingly held by each party.
(Citations omitted)
11 As to the form of relief (which is the third common issue in the appeals), the observations in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 of Campbell JA (agreed with by Allsop P and Giles JA) are apposite and worth repeating here:
[431] A striking feature of the order for rectification made in the court below is that it amends the written terms of the Supply Agreement in a way for which neither party contended at the hearing below, and which neither party supports on the appeal. For a remedy that is supposed to give effect to the common intention of the parties to be said by both parties to be erroneous is not a sufficient reason to overturn the order, but is sufficient to make one consider carefully the reasoning that led to the order.
…
[444] In considering whether to grant rectification of a written contract, equity does not use any of its own principles to decide what the terms of the contract are, or how they are construed - those matters are decided solely by the common law. Rather, equity focuses on what it is unconscientious for a party to assert about the contract. The rationale is that it is unconscientious for a party to a contract to seek to apply the contract inconsistently with what he or she knows to be the common intention of the parties at the time that the written contract was entered. In other words, when a plaintiff succeeds in a claim for rectification, the plaintiff is found to have been justified in effect saying to the defendant "you and I both knew, when we entered this contract, what our intention was concerning it, and you cannot in conscience now try to enforce the contract in accordance with its terms in a way that is inconsistent with our common intention."
…
[446] The remedy that is granted is, as with all equity's remedies, one that will seek to undo, so far as is in practice possible, the departure, that the litigation has shown to exist, from equity's standards of conscientious behaviour. The way this is achieved, when a remedy of rectification is granted, is by rewriting the contract so that it […] no longer departs from the common intention of the parties. The rewriting is done in a quite literal sense - the proper form of order identifies the precise words of the contract that are to be struck out, the precise words that are to be inserted, and where those words are to be inserted: H W Seton, Forms of Judgments and Orders in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal 7th ed, vol 2 (1912) London, Stevens and Sons Ltd at 1638-1643 ("Judgments and Orders"). As well the order usually (but not always - for example, Wilson v Registrar-General (NSW) [2004] NSWSC 1220; (2004) 12 BPR 22,667 at [13]-[14]) involves calling in the original document and actually endorsing the order on the instrument that is to be rectified: Seton, Judgments and Orders (at 1644-1645); Re Jay-O-Bees Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2004] NSWSC 818; (2004) 50 ACSR 565 at [74]; Stock v Vining (1858) 25 Beav 235 at 235; 53 ER 626 at 627; Malmesbury v Malmesbury (sub nom Phillipson v Turner) (1862) 31 Beav 407 at 419; 54 ER 1196 at 1201; Johnson v Bragge [1901] 1 Ch 28 at 37. In that way the executed contractual document is no longer able to be a potential source of error and confusion, by appearing to state legal relations that in truth are not as the document says.
[447] That this is the type of remedy that is granted has an effect on the sort of "common intention" that is relevant for rectification. The common intention of the parties has to relate to what the mutual rights and obligations of the parties will be, and has to be sufficiently well-defined and clear to be able to be stated in words that can be incorporated in a contract.
[448] The rewriting should not do anything more than rewrite the contract to the minimum extent that is necessary for it to no longer fail to express the common subjective intention the parties had when the contract was entered. Thus, to the extent that the words of the contract cover some situation concerning which the parties had no common subjective intention, the words of the contract continue to govern that situation.
…
[450] Crafting a remedy in rectification involves close attention to the words of the document. However, in the prior step of making a finding about a common intention, for the purpose of a rectification order, it is important that the court not confine itself to a narrow focus on particular words of the document. It is the document as a whole that is rectified, and the point of the exercise is that, once rectified, the document will not be contrary to the common intention of the parties to the document. Thus if a particular change to some words will result in some other words of the document operating in a different way, rectification will be justified only if that different operation of those other words is shown to be in accordance with the common intention of the parties.
12 In addition, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company Australian Branch trading as Liberty Specialty Markets v Icon Co (NSW) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 126; (2021) 396 ALR 193 ('Liberty Mutual') at [284] the Full Court stated that:
… As the primary judge made clear, this was not a rectification case in which the parties were mistaken as to the words used. If it were, there would need to be a clear common intention as to what words were intended. But it is not. It is a rectification case in which the parties were said to have a common intention as to the effect of the policy: that it could be utilised to provide contracts commencing cover up to and including the defects liability period. For Mr O'Reilly and Mr Burgess, this common intention was founded in a mistaken (on the hypothesis necessary for examining the rectification case) belief that condition 15 if invoked brought about that result. In these circumstances there was no requirement for there to be a common intention as to the words necessary to give effect to the common intention as to the effect of the policy. The Court must, however, determine with textual clarity the variation to the wording to give effect to the common intention: GPI Leisure Corp Limited v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 4) (1990) 9 BPR 17,461 at 17,465-6 (Young J); Muriti v Prendergast [2005] NSWSC 281 at [137] (White J); Crane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662 at 669 (Simonds J); and Bush v National Australia Bank (1992) 35 NSWLR 390 at 407 (Hodgson J).
13 We should indicate that it is not necessary to show exactly and precisely the form to which the contract to be rectified should be brought: see eg Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505.
14 The aim of any relief that is granted is to formulate the precise terms by which the contract is to be made so as to conform to the relevant common intention, provided the principles of granting the equitable remedy of rectification are otherwise satisfied.
15 There was also no dispute in these appeals as to the exactitude of proof needed as to the existence of the relevant common intention. In Liberty Mutual, the Full Court (Allsop CJ, Besanko and Middleton JJ) at [269] and [270] recognised that "clear and convincing proof" must be present.
16 It is then worth saying something briefly about the way in which the matter proceeded before the primary judge. The matter was heard over the course of two days (on 11 August 2020 and 18 September 2020) and all of the evidence was documentary. None of the parties called any witnesses, and the only affidavit filed in the proceeding related to the verification of a list of documents. The primary judge in his detailed and careful judgment set out the relevant documentation and the inferences he drew from the primary evidence before him. We are mindful of the somewhat advantaged position of a primary judge presiding over the presentation of a mosaic of evidence (see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Glencore Investment Pty Ltd (2020) 281 FCR 219 at [150]), to which the appeal court should give appropriate respect. In these appeals we are not in a dissimilar position to the primary judge, and perhaps in a somewhat better position having regard to the analysis so well undertaken and explained by the primary judge. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the appellate court recognise that its role is the correction of error. Such may appear from a difference of view, notwithstanding the respect given to any advantage in the primary judge in presiding over the presentation of evidence in the mosaic, or from some identified error of approach. In either the aim of the appeal is the correction of error: see the discussion in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd (2018) 261 FCR 301 (at [2]-[10] per Allsop CJ, at [47]-[53] per Perram J and at [169] per Markovic J; see, especially for factual questions, as here, involving no impressionistic evaluation, [47]-[49] agreed in at [2] and [169]. In this case we have come to the view that important assumptions made by the primary judge lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation, and other probabilities so outweighed inferences made by the primary judge that it can be concluded his Honour's conclusion was wrong.
17 We make another preliminary observation. There is no appeal from the construction conclusion reached by the primary judge that the Side C coverage was subject to a sub-limit of $10 million. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that there may be differing views as to the proper construction of the relevant policies. Perhaps more significantly, personnel in a busy insurance market who are considering various aspects of coverage, not necessarily by the same mode of communication across the commercial world, and without the aid of ongoing legal advice, may have different understandings of the coverage being provided or sought. A general misunderstanding of the coverage being sought on the part of some participants leading up to and at the time the relevant insurance policies were entered into does not lead to a conclusion that there was a consensus amongst them as to the coverage. In fact, it would tend to the opposite conclusion. More specifically, the fact that two participants (Quintis and PSC) intended that the coverage layers included a total of $50 million Side C cover does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that other participants (Price Forbes, Argo and Vibe) held a similar or common intention. In other words, a mutual mistake or misunderstanding as to what each party intends is not sufficient to establish a common intention which could lead to the grant of the equitable remedy of rectification. In our view, this was the position that existed based upon the evidence before the primary judge, where there was no common intention sufficient to displace the written agreements and their integrity as the written instruments governing the contractual relationship between the parties. On this basis, both appeals should be allowed.