© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2012] VSC 319
Supreme Court of Victoria
2012-08-20
EMERTON J
Original judgment source is linked above.
LAND ACQUISITION - Compensation for compulsory acquisition of part of land - Before and after value - Market value - Highest and best use - Hypothetical zoning - Hypothetical availability of services - Ecological constraints - Comparable sales - Special value and disturbance - Expert evidence - Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) ss 40, 41, 43.
1 On 28 October 2005, the Secretary of the Department of Business and Innovation (the 'Secretary') acquired by means of a compulsory acquisition 55.14 hectares of land owned by the respondent ('Murdesk') at 335-413 Cooper Street, Epping.[1] The subject land, along with some adjoining land, was acquired for the purposes of relocating the Melbourne Wholesale Market ('MWM') from its current site on Footscray Road to a larger facility.
2 This proceeding concerns the compensation to which Murdesk is entitled under the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) (the 'LAC Act') as a result of the compulsory acquisition of the subject land.
3 The parties to the proceeding are a long way apart on the amount of compensation to which Murdesk is entitled. Murdesk contends that the subject land was a premium or 'investment grade' parcel of land that would have attracted a significantly higher price per hectare than other land in the vicinity, and that it had a special value to Murdesk and its sole director and shareholder, Mr Mervyn Dickey, who was in a unique position to take full advantage of the special attributes of the land. Mr Dickey, the Court was told, intended to develop the subject land as a high quality business park, and was uniquely placed to do so.
4 The subject land is in a prominent position on the northern outskirts of Melbourne, approximately 18 kilometres from the Melbourne CBD. It has extensive frontage to Cooper Street on its northern boundary and to the Hume Freeway-Craigieburn Bypass (the 'Bypass') on its western boundary. The on/off ramps for the Bypass at Cooper Street are located on its north-western corner. Cooper Street itself is dual carriageway and forms a major east-west connection between the town centre of Epping (Epping Plaza and the Northern Hospital) to the east and the Hume Highway industrial band at Campbellfield and Somerton to the west.
5 The subject land was originally part of a 74.56 hectare parcel of farming land acquired by Murdesk in February 2000 from George and Doris Bell, elderly siblings whose family had farmed the land for many years. The subject land was zoned Rural, but the area around Cooper Street had already been earmarked by the City of Whittlesea to be development for employment generating purposes and Murdesk wasted no time in formulating a development plan that involved rezoning the land to enable its development for both commercial and residential purposes. It engaged Coomes Consulting Group Pty Ltd[2] ('Coomes') to prepare a 'vision statement' for Cooper Street south, involving the development of a business/technology park with exposure to the proposed re-alignment of the Hume Freeway, Cooper Street and the Edgars Road extension, and a residential development to the south of that.
6 On 11 February 2002, the Roads Corporation of Victoria served on Murdesk a notice of acquisition for a 16.48 hectare corridor of land running north/south through the land for the purpose of constructing the Bypass.[3] The acquisition of this corridor resulted in the creation of a 'sliver' of land of a mere 2.9 hectares on the western side of the Bypass and the parcel of 55.14 hectares on the eastern side of the Bypass that is the subject land.
7 Murdesk remains the owner of the 'sliver' but, as a result of the compulsory acquisitions in 2002 and 2005, has essentially been divested of the significant parcel of land that it acquired from the Bell siblings in February 2000.
8 Pursuant to the proposal for the relocation of the MWM, the subject land has been consolidated with a 79.39 hectare parcel of land immediately to its east, which was referred to throughout the proceeding as the 'Haberfield land'. The Haberfield land was compulsorily acquired in May 2005, some 5 months before the compulsory acquisition of the subject land. It formed part of a deceased estate[4] of which Mr Peter Haberfield was the executor. The land owned by the estate comprised a total of approximately 132 hectares (the 'Haberfield estate land'). In late 2004, Mr Haberfield sought expressions of interest in the Haberfield estate land, and received responses from major developers in both industrial and residential markets, described as a 'who's who' of the Melbourne development community. However, the expressions of interest campaign undertaken by Mr Haberfield came to an abrupt end when the government announced that the Haberfield land was required for the purposes of the MWM and its ensuing compulsory acquisition.
9 It is common ground that the proposals to develop the Haberfield land and the subject land for the MWM form part of the same proposal for the purposes of assessing value under the LAC Act. The value of the subject land as at the date of acquisition is therefore not to be assessed on the basis that the neighbouring land would become the MWM, but rather on the basis that that the Haberfield land, like the subject land, was farming land that was to be rezoned for commercial and industrial development in accordance with the development plan prepared by the City of Whittlesea.
10 Under the LAC Act, Murdesk is entitled to compensation as a result of the compulsory acquisition of the subject land. It has already received an advance of compensation in the amount of $17,370,000.
11 By Amended Particulars of Claim dated 13 September 2011,[5] Murdesk claims the following:
(a) Pursuant to s 41(1)(a) of the LAC Act, market value of the subject land as of the date it was acquired (28 October 2005):
(b) Pursuant to s 41(1)(b) of the LAC Act, the special value of pecuniary advantage to Murdesk which was incidental to ownership and occupation of the subject land determined as follows:
Market value (as assessed by the Court) multiplied by 2.5% per month for such period as the Court may determine as being a reasonable time for the respondent to acquire replacement land with equivalent attributes, plus 6%, being a sum attributable to acquisition costs. (The multiplier of 2.5% representing, on the evidence before the Court, an average capital growth post 28 October 2005).
(c) Pursuant to s 41(1)(d) of the LAC Act, sums as loss attributable to disturbance in the form of consequential loss, namely pecuniary loss suffered by Murdesk as the natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the acquisition, being a sum calculated in the same way as the claim for special value.
(d) Pursuant to s 41(1)(f) of the LAC Act, sums for legal, valuation and other professional expenses estimated at $50,000 less the sum advanced of $50,000.
(e) Pursuant to s 44(1)(d) of the LAC Act, as solatium: $3,300,000
12 By the amended particulars of claim, Murdesk therefore claims in total $18,582,600 plus the amount for special value or loss attributable to disturbance referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c). The claims for special value or loss attributable to disturbance are made in the alternative. Murdesk also claims as solatium 10% of what it says is the market value of the subject land.
13 In its final submissions, the Secretary submitted the Court should conclude that the amount of compensation to be paid is as follows:
(a) as compensation for loss of market value on 28 October 2005:
No less than $15,120,000 and no more than $18,000,000
(d) in respect of legal and other expenses $43,148.86
14 The Secretary therefore submits that the compensation that Murdesk is entitled to be paid is in the range of $15,163,148.86 to $18,143,148.86, less amounts previously advanced.
15 There is therefore a significant dispute between the parties as to:
(a) the market value of the subject land at the relevant date;
(b) whether Murdesk is entitled to additional compensation for loss of special value or for disturbance; and
16 I deal with each of these questions in turn below.
17 The LAC Act provides for an interest in land described in a notice of acquisition given pursuant to that Act to vest in the acquiring authority upon publication in the Government Gazette of the notice of acquisition. Section 30 confers on any person who, immediately before the publication of the notice of acquisition, had an interest in land that was divested or diminished by the acquisition of the interest, a claim for compensation. Section 41(1) of the LAC Act then provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, in assessing the amount of compensation payable to a claimant in respect of an interest in land which is acquired under this Act, regard must be had to the following factors -
(a) the market value of the interest on the date of acquisition;
(b) any special value to the claimant on the date of acquisition;
(c) any loss attributable to severance;
(d) any loss attributable to disturbance;
(e) the enhancement or depreciation in value of the interest of the claimant, at the date of acquisition, in other land adjoining or severed from the acquired land by reason of the implementation of the purpose for which the land was acquired;
(f) any legal, valuation and other professional expenses necessarily incurred by the claimant by reason of the acquisition of the interest.
18 Murdesk claims to be entitled to be compensated for the market value of its interest in the land on the date of acquisition and for the special value to it of the land. Alternatively to special value, it seeks compensation for losses attributable to disturbance.
19 Section 40 of the LAC Act defines 'market value', in relation to any interest in land on a particular date, to mean:
the amount of money that would have been paid for that interest if it had been sold on that date by a willing but not anxious seller to a willing but not anxious purchaser;
To arrive at the value of the land at that date, we have, as I conceive, to suppose it sold then, not by means of a forced sale, but by voluntary bargaining between the plaintiff and a purchaser, willing to trade, but neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business consideration. We must further suppose both to be perfectly acquainted with the land, and cognizant of all circumstances which might affect its value, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, its surrounding features, the then present demand for land, and the likelihood, as then appearing to persons best capable of forming an opinion, of a rise or fall for what reason soever in the amount which one would otherwise be willing to fix as the value of the property.[8]
21 In this case, as only part of the land owned by Murdesk was acquired by the Secretary - the sliver remains in the hands of Murdesk - market value is to be assessed by way of a 'before and after' analysis. Section 41(3) of the LAC Act provides:
If less than the whole of the land in which a claimant's interest subsists is acquired or less than the whole of that interest is acquired, the market value of the acquired interest is the difference between the market value of the interest before the acquisition and the market value of the interest after the acquisition.
22 This embraces not only the loss of the value of the land acquired but also the effect of the acquisition upon the value of the balance of the land - the sliver - at the date of acquisition.
23 Section 43(1)(a) provides that in assessing compensation, any increase or decrease in the market value of the interest in the land arising from the carrying out, or the proposal to carry out, the purpose for which the interest was acquired must be disregarded. This reflects what is known as the 'Pointe Gourde principle'.[9] The effects of the implementation of a public purpose may be direct or indirect. The market value of land may be affected by the impact of the implementation of the public purpose not only on the land that has been acquired, but also on surrounding land or land in the surrounding area.[10]
24 In this case, it was agreed that the effects of the development of the Haberfield land for the purposes of the MWM were to be disregarded.
25 Section 5A of the Valuation of Land Act 1960 (Vic) also prescribes how the value of land is to be determined. It provides:
5A Determining value of land
(1) Unless otherwise expressly provided where pursuant to the provisions of any Act a court board tribunal valuer or other person is required to determine the value of any land, every matter or thing which such court board tribunal valuer or person considers relevant to such determination shall be taken into account.
(2) In considering the weight to be given to the evidence of sales of other lands when determining such value, regard shall be given to the time at which such sales took place, the terms of such sales, the degree of comparability of the lands in question and any other relevant circumstances.
(3) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing provisions of this section when determining such value there shall, where it is relevant, be taken into account -
(a) the use to which such land is being put at the relevant time, the highest and best use to which the land might reasonably be expected to be put at the relevant time and to any potential use;
(b) the effect of any Act, regulation, local law, planning scheme or other such instrument which affects or may affect the use or development of such land;
(c) the shape size topography soil quality situation and aspect of the land;
(d) the situation of the land in respect to natural resources and to transport and other facilities and amenities;
(e) the extent condition and suitability of any improvements on the land; and
(f) the actual and potential capacity of the land to yield a monetary return.
26 It has been said that the approach that market value is to be assessed by reference to the potential highest and best use available to the land as at the relevant date ensures that the assessment reflects the full value of the land to the owner.[11] In this case, there was little or no dispute that the highest and best use of the land was for development for industrial and/or employment generating uses in accordance with what the Council proposed in the anticipated C31 amendment to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme.
27 Of course, pursuant to s 41, market value is not the only basis upon which compensation falls to be assessed. In Minister for Public Works v Thistlethwayte,[12] Lord Tucker said:
It must not be forgotten that it is the value of the land to the owner that has to be ascertained, and that the willing seller and purchaser is merely a useful and conventional method of arriving at a basic figure to which must be added in appropriate cases further sums for disturbance, severance, special value to the owner and the like.[13]
28 To similar effect, in Turner v Minister for Public Instruction,[14] Dixon CJ said:
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry is to find a figure which represents adequate compensation to the land owner for the loss of his land. Compensation should be the full monetary equivalent of the value to him of the land. All else is subsidiary to this end.[15]
29 Section 40 of the LAC Act defines the concept of special value in relation to an interest in land as being the value of any pecuniary advantage, in addition to market value, which is incidental to the claimant's ownership or occupation of the land. This was explained by Callinan J in Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd[16] as follows:
The special value of land is its value to the owner over and above its market value. It arises in circumstances in which there is a conjunction of some special factor relating to the land and a capacity on the part of the owner exclusively or perhaps almost exclusively to exploit it. None of the examples given by the Full Federal Court are true examples of special value. There will in practice be few cases in which a property does have a special value for a particular owner. Obviously neither sentiment nor a long attachment to it will suffice. The special quality must be a quality that has an economic significance to the owner. A possible case would be one in which, for example, a blacksmith operates a forge in the vicinity of a racetrack on land zoned for residential purposes as a protected non-conforming use, the right to which might be lost on a transfer of ownership or an interruption of the protected use. Such a property will have a special value for its blacksmith owner, and perhaps another blacksmith who might be able to comply with the relevant requirements to enable him to continue the use but to no one else.[17]
30 In Arkaba Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (SA),[18] Bray CJ said:
...special value must, in my view, arise from some attribute of the land, some use made or to be made of it or advantage derived or to be derived from it, which is peculiar to the claimant and would not exist in the abstract hypothetical purchaser. Would a prudent man in the position of the claimant have been willing to give more for this land than the market value rather than fail to obtain or regain it if he had been momentarily deprived of it? A typical case of special value is where the land is peculiarly adapted to a particular kind of use made or intended to be made of it by the claimant, eg a doctor's consulting rooms, or agricultural land work in conjunction with a neighbouring residence or farm buildings'.[19]
31 In Coastal Estates Pty Ltd v Bass Shire Council,[20] Gobbo J described the concept of special value in the following terms:
In some cases it may be an advantage, such as particular knowledge or expertise or associated goodwill, which advances this owner but not another owner in the market.[21]
33 Loss attributable to disturbance is defined in s 40 of the LAC Act to mean any pecuniary loss suffered by a claimant as a natural direct and reasonable consequence of the fact that an interest of the claimant in the land has been divested or diminished, being a pecuniary loss for which provision is not otherwise made in Part 4 of the LAC Act.
34 In Roads Corporation v Love,[24] Osborn J summarised the principles applicable to an award of compensation for disturbance loss:
(a) The application of the requirement that the relevant pecuniary loss be suffered as a consequence of the divestment of an interest in land may give rise to difficult questions of fact;
(b) The expression 'natural direct and reasonable consequence' is to be understood by the use of the three adjectives in combination, to connote a very close and limited connection between the event giving rise to a right to compensation and the financial loss suffered;
(c) The notion of disturbance loss is drawn from common law principles, which apply to causation except as modified or supplemented by statute; and
(d) The question of whether a consequence is a reasonable consequence within the meaning of a statutory definition requires the application of an objective test.[25]
35 Murdesk pressed upon the Court the concept of a 'liberal estimate' when assessing compensation for compulsory acquisition.[26] In Commissioner of Succession Duties (SA) v Executor Trustee and Agency Co of South Australia Ltd,[27] Dixon J identified a difference of purpose in valuing property for revenue cases and in compensation cases: in the compensation cases the purpose is to ensure that the person to be compensated is given a full money equivalent of his loss, while in the revenue cases it is to ascertain what money value is plainly contained in the asset so as to afford a proper measure of liability to tax. His Honour then said:
While this difference cannot change the test of value, it is not without effect upon a court's attitude in the application of the test. In a case of compensation doubts are resolved in favour of a more liberal estimate, in a revenue case, of a more conservative estimate.[28]
36 Likewise, in McBaron v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales,[29] Talbot J said:
... it is appropriate to seek to do justice by adopting a generous approach in favour of the resumee to ensure that just compensation is paid so far as the Act allows. Therefore any discretion should be exercised in favour of the claimant where practicable in order to achieve a just result.[30]
37 By the same token, the notion of compensation envisages that an owner is entitled to be compensated fairly and fully for his or her loss, but is not entitled to receive more than fair compensation.[31] It has been said that the principle of equivalence is at the root of statutory compensation, and unless the legislation provides otherwise, the owner is entitled to neither more nor less than his or her loss.[32]
38 In order to evaluate the valuation evidence and Mr Dickey's evidence as to the special value of the subject land for Murdesk and/or the disturbance that it has suffered as a result of the acquisition, it necessary to describe briefly how the subject land was positioned on the northern outskirts of Melbourne, the planning history of the area, the development history of the area, including the availability of broadacre land in the northern region, and possible constraints on development in the Cooper Street area.
39 The subject land is in the City of Whittlesea in an area referred to as the 'Epping Bulge', which is one of Melbourne's growth areas. The City of Whittlesea was already experiencing high population growth in October 2005. By the end of 2005, large housing estates were being developed or were foreshadowed to the north and north-east of the subject site, and the population in the municipality was increasing rapidly. In November 2005, the State government extended the Urban Growth Boundary ('UGB') to the immediate north in response to population pressures.
40 As early as 1995, the City of Whittlesea had identified land along Cooper Street as appropriate to be rezoned for industrial and/or employment-generating uses in order to create employment opportunities for the burgeoning local population. In the City of Whittlesea, development along Cooper Street unfolded largely from east to west, but the route for the Bypass was announced in 2001, providing significant impetus for commercial and industrial development further west in the vicinity of the subject land.
41 Nonetheless, in October 2005, the subject land and the Haberfield land immediately to its east were still zoned Rural and remained undeveloped for purposes other than farming.
42 By contrast, the land opposite the subject land at 360 Cooper Street was rezoned to 'General Industrial' by way of a site specific amendment in 1997. This land, on the northern side of Cooper Street abutting the Bypass, was owned by interests associated with Mr Robert Scanlon and was being developed as the Northpoint Enterprise Park ('Northpoint'). Northpoint was and continues to be developed as a joint venture between interests controlled by Mr Scanlon and the McMullin Group, a privately owned commercial property development company.
43 An aerial photograph of 360 Cooper Street taken in late August 2005[33] shows very limited development of Northpoint at that time. Although most of the road network for the enterprise park appears to have been developed, there is very limited construction of buildings on the land.
44 Land to the east of 360 Cooper Street was acquired by the Northpoint joint venture in the second half of 2004. In August 2004, 310 Cooper Street (immediately to the east of 360 Cooper Street) was acquired by Edgars Road Pty Ltd, a Scanlon/McMullin joint venture vehicle. In November 2004, the joint venture also acquired 300 Cooper Street, which is located between 310 Cooper Street and the more established and older style industrial development along Yale Drive, Epping, to its east. 300 Cooper Street is now the site of a large medical complex, which complements the Northern Hospital on the other side of Cooper Street.
45 However, as at October 2005, both 310 Cooper Street and 300 Cooper Street were zoned Rural and largely undeveloped.
46 Directly to the north of the Northpoint properties (300, 310 and 360 Cooper Street) were a series of rural properties fronting O'Herns Road. The most significant of these for the purposes of this proceeding is 135 O'Herns Road, which was acquired by interests associated with the McMullin Group in June 2006.
47 At the relevant date, the Haberfield land adjoined the subject land to its east forming part of the larger parcel of Haberfield estate land that 'wrapped around' the subject land to the east and south. The southern portion of the Haberfield estate land abutted residential areas in the suburb of Lalor and was earmarked for residential development (and has now been redeveloped for that purpose). It did not form part of the area around Cooper Street targeted for development for employment generating uses.
48 The Haberfield land and the subject land are now being developed together for the MWM.
49 In order to support its claim that the subject land had 'premium value', Murdesk relied heavily on the preparedness of the City of Whittlesea to support development in what became known as the 'Cooper Street Employment Area'[34] and the extensive and sophisticated forward-planning undertaken by the City of Whittlesea from about 1996 onwards.
50 The expert planning evidence called by the parties was uncontroversial. Mr David Whitney prepared an expert report at the request of the Secretary's solicitors and Mr Robert Milner prepared a report on instructions from Murdesk.[35] Messrs Milner and Whitney then prepared a joint report for the Court summarising what they considered to be the planning position as at the relevant date, to which I will refer presently.
51 Mr Milner gave evidence that the Cooper Street Employment Area benefited from a very engaged and forward-thinking local government and that from 1996 onwards, the City of Whittlesea was probably the leading exponent of orderly strategic planning and development in Victoria.
52 The City of Whittlesea identified Cooper Street as a location for industry and other employment-generating activities, and as a significant opportunity for long-term public and private investment. Strategic planning for the Cooper Street area commenced in 1995 with the City of Whittlesea General Plan, which identified the potential for urban uses in the Epping North and Cooper Street areas. Later that year, the City of Whittlesea released the Epping Bulge Position Statement recommending that land south of Cooper Street and land extending north to O'Herns Road be investigated and developed for a range of employment generating purposes. Land north of O'Herns Road was to be developed for residential purposes. The Position Statement provided for the allocation of infrastructure capacity to employment-generating developments along Cooper Street, in priority to its allocation to residential development.
53 The Cooper Street Precinct Strategy was published in 1996.[36] It was jointly commissioned by the Cities of Whittlesea and Hume to establish a framework for the future planning and development of the nominated study area along Cooper Street and focused on improving the attractiveness of Cooper Street as a location for industry and other employment-generating activities. The subject land was included in a precinct identified as an area of transition between more intensive industrial uses to the west and residential uses to the east and which was to include low density, general light industrial uses, office and commercial buildings. A staging plan envisaged new development building upon existing development, from east to west. The subject land was included within 'Stage 2', with the notation that the ability to service Stage 2 would be based upon the availability of additional sewage capacity.
54 In 1997, Amendment L143 to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme secured the re-zoning of 360 Cooper Street from 'General Farming B' to 'General Industrial'. Despite a planning panel recommendation to the contrary, the Council promoted the amendment and gained Ministerial support for it. It was gazetted in February 1998 and resulted in the re-zoning of 360 Cooper Street to enable the development of Northpoint.
55 In 1999, the City of Whittlesea prepared a new format planning scheme. The Municipal Strategic Statement noted the opportunities for growth in the Epping Bulge and the intended role of Cooper Street as an area for employment-generating industrial and business park uses. It stated that the City of Whittlesea would 'continue to work with all servicing agencies to resolve issues relating to the provision of infrastructure within the Cooper Street growth area' and would support 'employment-generating industries in the Cooper Street Precinct'.
56 For some time, however, the re-zoning of land in the Cooper Street area remained in limbo because of uncertainty about the route for the Bypass. That issue was resolved on 21 February 2001 with the announcement of the Bypass route, and the City of Whittlesea moved to prepare the necessary documentation to amend the Whittlesea Planning Scheme to re-zone the Cooper Street precinct to facilitate urban development. This resulted in the preparation of Amendment C31 to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme.
57 Amendment C31 was exhibited between June and August 2004. It covered approximately 400 hectares of land referred to as the 'Cooper Street Employment Area' consisting of land to the eastern side of the Bypass and the western side of Edgars Road[37] on the northern and southern sides of Cooper Street, including the subject land. Under Amendment C31, the Cooper Street Employment Area would be re-zoned to a Comprehensive Development Zone in which uses such as office, research and development, industry and restricted retail premises would be encouraged. The land uses nominated were intended to take advantage of proximity to major infrastructure projects, including the Bypass, the duplication of Cooper Street, the Northern Hospital, the Epping Plaza and the public transport corridor from Lalor station to Epping North.
58 As it applied to the subject land, Amendment C31 envisaged primarily business uses along its Cooper Street frontage to a depth of approximately 150 metres, with industrial uses to the south.
59 The centrepiece of Amendment C31 was the Cooper Street Employment Area Development Plan (the 'Development Plan') and accompanying Contributions Plan. The Development Plan aimed to facilitate the establishment of a range of employment-generating uses and to contribute to the Council's objective of achieving a jobs/housing balance.
60 The progress of Amendment C31 through the planning panel stage was impeded by the announcement on 9 November 2004 of the Government's intention to acquire the Haberfield land for the MWM. The panel decided to suspend hearings until the Haberfield acquisition was resolved. That occurred on 5 May 2005, when the Secretary to the Department of Infrastructure compulsorily acquired the Haberfield land. On 28 October 2005, the notice of acquisition for the subject land was also gazetted.
61 In his expert report, Mr Milner described the progress of Amendment C31 following the announcement of the decision on the relocation of the MWM to Cooper Street. The City of Whittlesea suggested that Amendment C31 be divided into two parts: part 1, dealing with the area to the north of Cooper Street, and part 2, dealing with the land to the south, namely the subject land and the Haberfield land. The panel accepted this approach, although it subsequently recommended that Part 2 be abandoned and a new amendment be prepared to facilitate the development of the MWM. The City of Whittlesea amended the Development Plan so that it covered the area north of Cooper Street only.
62 The panel recommended that Amendment C31 be approved generally in accordance with the amendment proposed by Council. Following the adoption of Amendment C31 by the City of Whittlesea in August 2006, it was approved and ultimately gazetted as Ministerial Amendment C100 in May 2007.
63 It was Mr Milner's evidence that this outcome would not have been any different had the subject land remained in the area covered by Amendment C31. Amendment C31 would have been gazetted in August 2005, prior to the acquisition of the subject land in October 2005, had it not been for the disruption caused by the Government's actions to secure a site for the MWM.
64 In their joint report,[38] Messrs Milner and Whitney agreed, in respect of planning issues (putting ecological issues to one side for the moment), that:
(a) There was a long and progressive planning history that identified the subject land and the Cooper Street area for an industrial and business role dating back to 1996;
(b) Through a series of events and planning processes, the intention to use land at Cooper Street had advanced by June 2004 from a strategic concept and planning report to a proposed and exhibited amendment (Amendment C31) that provided for the subject land to be rezoned Comprehensive Development Zone. Amendment C31 proposed to give effect to the Development Plan;
(c) The exhibition of Amendment C31 was completed by August 2004, and shortly afterwards it became known that the MWM was being considered for the Cooper Street area;
(d) There was a set of reasonable circumstances in which the subject land and the land affected by Amendment C31 would have been rezoned prior to the relevant date (28 October 2005) had it not been for the implications of the proposal for the MWM;
(e) If the subject land had not been rezoned by the relevant date, there was an extremely high probability of the land being rezoned shortly thereafter, and a prudent purchaser would have had a high level of assurance of the land being rezoned generally as contemplated by Amendment C31;
(f) At the relevant date or shortly thereafter, the land would have been rezoned to Comprehensive Development Zone and the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme would have applied. It would have referenced the Development Plan and required:
(i) all land uses, including open spaces, to be generally in accordance with the Development Plan; and
(ii) in respect of any decision concerning a subdivision of the land, consideration to be given to the effect of the proposed subdivision on any area of environmental or cultural significance identified in the Development Plan.
65 I accept these conclusions. Moreover, I accept that a prudent hypothetical purchaser would have had a high level of assurance of the subject land being rezoned generally as contemplated by Amendment C31 had it not already been rezoned at the relevant date. I also find that the prudent hypothetical purchaser would have had a high level of certainty, based on the Development Plan, about the extent and nature of the development that would be permitted on the subject land and on land in the Cooper Street Employment Area more generally.
66 The Development Plan is an impressive document, particularly for its time. Whilst principally directed to facilitating the establishment of the Cooper Street Employment Area for employment generating uses and expressing the Council's commitment to the establishment of a high quality industrial and business area, the Development Plan contains analysis of flora, fauna and habitat significance, heritage and cultural significance, waterways, drainage and catchments, and transport networks. It articulates a 'development vision' and 'design philosophy', specifically provides for conservation areas and open space, and discusses service provision. Many of these things come together in Figure 29, 'Development Plan & Design and Development Overlay'. Figure 29 is colour-coded map that shows land uses (business/employment, industrial/employment, servicing authority infrastructure), unencumbered open space, encumbered land (wetlands, detention basins, drainage channels, creek corridors), areas of environmental importance (including those with the highest priority for retention), pedestrian and bicycle links, collector roads and access streets.
67 Importantly, the Development Plan contains a development contributions scheme to fund the relevant matters and includes an 'open space land budget' for individual properties. The contributions that must be made for open space by land-owners are thereby fixed.
68 Having regard to the Development Plan, I accept that there was, as at the relevant date, a detailed framework in place allowing for the commercial and industrial development in the Cooper Street area which received strong support from the City of Whittlesea. That framework anticipated high quality development for business and industrial uses to take place on the subject land and the Haberfield land, as well as on Northpoint and on the other land acquired by the Northpoint interests on the northern side of Cooper Street.
69 Mr Mervyn Dickey gave detailed evidence about Murdesk's plans for the land. Mr Dickey is and was the sole director of Murdesk and the driving force to acquire and develop the subject land. He gave evidence that he was an experienced and successful property developer with over 30 years of investment and development experience.[39] It would not be overstating the position to say that Mr Dickey believed the subject land to be the opportunity of a lifetime as one of the best, if not the best, parcel of in globo land in Melbourne.
70 Mr Dickey said that he was first was introduced to the Epping area in around 1998, when he was looking for land for his church. In February 1999, he decided to focus his investment and development activities in the Epping Bulge. Such was the extraordinary opportunity that it shortly became his sole business focus.[40] In 1999 and 2000, Mr Dickey bought four properties in the Epping Bulge, including the subject land.[41] Each property was purchased with a different purpose in mind, but the subject land was 'the jewel in the Crown'.[42] Mr Dickey said that in his 30 years as a developer he had not known any other opportunity that approached the subject land.
71 Mr Dickey was greatly impressed with the City of Whittlesea and its forward looking, pro-development perspective. After consultation with officers from the Council, he retained Coomes to develop a vision statement for the subject land. The vision statement was presented to the Council in May 2001.[43]
72 Mr Dickey identified Northpoint as the model of the type of development that he wished to pursue on the subject land. He saw it as a high quality development that attracted premium businesses. It was his preference to develop the subject land as a business park of this kind and to hold it as a long term investment. He also had other options, such as subdividing and development, perhaps in conjunction with the Haberfield land. Alternatively, he could have held some of the lots in prime locations for investment purposes, including leasing and possible joint venturing. In these alternative scenarios, he would be 'chasing the market' by completing buildings to tenant specifications and then renting them out in order to build up a rental stream.[44]
73 Mr Dickey believed he had the support of the City of Whittlesea, which was keen to encourage development for employment generating uses on Cooper Street as quickly as possible. Mr Dickey believed that the Council's Director of Planning, Mr David Turnbull, would 'stretch the boundaries in as many ways as he could to help [Mr Dickey].'[45] The Council's goals for the development of the subject land coincided with those of Murdesk, and if an opportunity came up in the market place, Mr Turnbull would raise it with Mr Dickey.
74 According to Mr Dickey, there was a 'gamut' of opportunities for the subject land.[46] Due to the high profile nature of the property, high end users could put offices and showrooms at the front; and industrial uses could be developed at the rear of the site. Zoning flexibility meant that the site could accommodate ancillary uses for the Northern Hospital. At one point Mr Dickey spoke to the Council about developing a retirement village and a hotel and Mr Turnbull had agreed he would consider an eight story building on the site. Mr Dickey said:
That in my mind would raise the profile of this site, particularly when the freeway was at my door. It's a site that would be known by almost everybody in Melbourne. It would be the only eight level building anywhere in the area.[47]
75 Mr Dickey told the Court that if office developments were not possible early on, he would consider car yards, which needed a lot of space but not a lot of capital. After 15 or 20 years, the time would be right to move from car yard to office uses. This ability to 'take another bite of the cherry' gave the investor, in Mr Dickey's words, the opportunity to do many things that a developer could not do. As a business park operator and as the owner of the land, he could maintain the quality of the business park.[48]
76 In his affidavit made on 16 August 2011, Mr Dickey stated that as at the relevant date, Murdesk was in a dominant position by reason of the special attributes of the land. These special attributes, which he believed were ignored by the Secretary's valuers, were described by Mr Dickey as follows:
(a) The sheer quality of the subject land: it was fully 'investment grade';
(b) Its location in one of Melbourne's prime corners;
(c) Excellent access and exposure to the Freeway and a main arterial road (Cooper Street), which gave it potential for B Double traffic;
(d) The logistics advantage of the site's location. Its geographic location in the north of Melbourne and the proximity of the Hume Freeway and the large amount of freight it handles offered further advantages;
(f) It is only 18 kilometres from the Melbourne CBD;
(g) Its size (55.14 hectares) provided economies of scale and offered the developer more control;
(h) It was in a deemed comprehensive development zone, which is a superior and flexible zone which allows high end uses in addition to industrial uses;
(j) The City of Whittlesea was pro-development and was very keen to develop employment opportunities;
(k) The Council had the expertise to envisage and assist to achieve the potential of the subject land;
(l) It was a relatively easy, flat, ex-farmland property to develop;
(m) Flooding issues were a feature in the area but not on the subject land;
(n) There were no easements or development restrictions of that kind on the subject land.
77 The special attributes of the subject land, and whether they were properly taken into account (or taken into account at all) by the Secretary's valuers, was the subject of a large amount of evidence and submission in the proceeding, which is described and analysed below. Suffice to say that for his part, Mr Dickey considered the subject land to present unique opportunities, which Murdesk was well placed to exploit. Those opportunities arose not only from the qualities of the subject land, but from the far-sighted and pro-development Council and the strength of Mr Dickey's relationship with senior managers in Council and with their advisers, Coomes. This confluence of factors would enable Murdesk to develop the subject land for 'higher' uses than other industrial land which, according to Mr Dickey, made the subject land much more attractive than comparable industrial land. The business or office park model was therefore central both to Murdesk's plans for the subject land and to what Mr Dickey and Murdesk's valuers considered to be its 'premium' value.
78 Mr Dickey's evidence about the development potential of the subject land was both supported and challenged by evidence given by Mr Robert Papaleo on behalf of the Secretary.[49] Mr Papaleo is the Director of Strategic Research at Charter Keck Cramer, specialising in property research and strategic market analysis. Among other things, he has advised about longer term opportunities for industrial and business park developments in Melbourne's northern and western corridors.
79 Mr Papaleo was instructed by the Secretary's solicitors to prepare a report on the release and take-up of land earmarked and then used for industrial purposes in Epping and the surrounding suburbs in the years leading up to and following the relevant date. Mr Papaleo gave evidence about the development prospects of industrial land in the northern region and, generally, about the availability of comparable land in the north.
80 Mr Papaleo's expert report incorporated a report prepared by him in March 2006 in support of a proposed rezoning of land in Craigieburn for industrial purposes (the '2006 reference report'). The 2006 reference report considered demand and supply affecting the industrial land market in the northern region in the period leading up to the relevant date. More specifically, the 2006 reference report dealt with development prospects in the North Industrial Node,[50] based on information in the Urban Development Program Annual Report 2005 (the '2005 UDP').[51] It emphasised the relative proximity and accessibility of strategic infrastructure, including the airports, national freight routes, multi-modal interchanges, ports, docks and wharves, the Western and Northern Ring Roads, the Hume Highway and the Bypass. It noted that the Bypass was expected to significantly increase the attractiveness of the Cooper Street industrial precinct in Epping, given the direct access to Melbourne's strategic road infrastructure that it would facilitate.
81 As a result, Mr Papaleo identified 'a number of inherent location advantages and economic resources which make [the North Industrial Node] an attractive location for investment by a range of industrial space users and other related businesses'.[52] It was well located with respect to connection points between Melbourne and other regional and interstate centres and, after the opening of the Western and Northern Ring Roads, Hume's previously poor inter-regional links had improved dramatically. Furthermore, there were improvements to the local road network, including the Cooper Street duplication, the Edgars Road extension and the Somerton Road duplication.
82 However, Mr Papaleo also noted poor perceptions of the region among the business and general community - although these perceptions were changing - and an economic base which suffered from a relative lack of service/knowledge industries.
83 Consistently with Mr Dickey's ambitions for the subject land, however, Mr Papaleo observed that since the late 1990s, industrial development in the North Industrial Node had become more characterised by higher quality business and industrial parks compared to previous development which was disconnected and typically on a smaller scale. Developers had increasingly been institutional investors rather than private developers. This change in profile had had a significant impact on the scale and quality of development in the north and the type of user that was attracted.[53]
84 Moreover, in arguing that there would be a high take up of land in the north in the future, Mr Papaleo referred to the following matters:
(a) There were diminishing opportunities to develop land in established precincts in Hume and Whittlesea;
(b) Improvements in transport infrastructure were making the region more attractive;
(c) Consumption in 2004-2005 was higher than the 2000-2005 average of 38 hectares per annum;
(d) The North Industrial Node had been attracting a proportionately higher share of metropolitan demand because of the continuing availability of land;
(e) Larger sites and facilities were being required by industrial land users involved in transport, warehousing and distribution;
(f) Major investors, traditionally underrepresented in the region, would seek to gain greater exposure to this area and would in turn offer property solutions through their networks to others.[54]
85 As to the availability of industrial land in the North Industrial Node more generally, Mr Papaleo gave evidence that in mid-2005 there was about 440 hectares net of zoned developable land in the North Industrial Node. This was sufficient to satisfy 10 years of demand, assuming the high scenario consumption rate of 45 hectares per annum. There was a further 360 hectares[55] of unzoned net developable land within the pre-November 2005 Urban Growth Boundary ('UGB') across the North Industrial Node. This took into account the 50 hectares of Haberfield land committed to the MWM and the 20 hectares adjoining the MWM site that was to be expected to be rezoned residential.[56] The unzoned land was sufficient to accommodate a further 8 years of demand assuming the 'high scenario' consumption of 45 hectares per annum.
86 In his oral evidence, Mr Papaleo said that if 50 hectares that had been taken out for the MWM were added back in, supply would increase by up to 9 years.[57]
87 Mr Papaleo also noted that in November 2005 there was an unexpected extension of the UGB, resulting in 1,058 hectares of unzoned and vacant land becoming available as future major industrial areas at Craigieburn and Mickleham/Kalkallo which could satisfy a further 23 years of demand.[58]
88 It was therefore Mr Papaleo's evidence that there was no shortage of in globo development land in the North Industrial Node. However, he conceded in cross-examination that there would be some scarcity associated with a very large site available for development and available for sale.[59] I accept his evidence both as to the general availability of in globo development land in the north and the relative scarcity of zoned land available for development and for sale.
89 I also accept Mr Papaleo's evidence that the North Industrial Node had a number of inherent location advantages and economic resources which made it an attractive location for investment to a range of industrial users and related businesses, that improvements in transport infrastructure made the region more attractive than it had previously been, that larger sites and facilities were being required by industrial land users involved in transport, warehousing and distribution.
90 I note his prediction (in March 2006) that major investors were likely to seek to gain greater exposure to the area, but also his observation that there was a poor perception of the region among the business and general community - although those perceptions were changing.
Possible constraints on the development of the subject land
91 As at the relevant date, the subject land was not connected to the sewer. There was evidence that there were limitations on sewerage capacity in the area and the Secretary submitted that at the relevant date, sewerage to the north or front section of the subject land was neither available nor assured in terms of timing or cost. This had the consequence, all other things being equal, that the subject land was less desirable than sewered land in the vicinity of the subject land.
92 Ms Elizabeth Hamila, a civil engineer and senior associate at Coomes, gave evidence about the servicing of the subject and surrounding land, and as to the availability of sewerage services in particular.[60] In Murdesk's 2002 claim against Roads Corporation in respect of the Bypass acquisition,[61] the provision of sewerage facilities was held to be a constraint on immediate development of the subject land. According to Ms Hamila, this constraint had been overcome by the allocation of an additional 2,500 lots capacity to the area when Yarra Valley Water revised its sewerage strategy for the Cooper Street and Epping North areas in 2003.
93 Yarra Valley Water's sewerage servicing strategy for Cooper Street[62] identified dry weather capacity for an equivalent 4,750 residential lots at connection points on the Edgars Creek system (750 lots), the Darebin Creek system (2,500 lots), the Central Creek system (200 lots) and the Merri Creek system (1300 lots). A flow control facility at Cooper Street would control discharges initially to the Edgars Creek sewer and later to the Darebin Creek sewer. However, Yarra Valley Water flagged that temporary servicing strategies might also be considered.
94 Ms Hamila also noted that in July 2005, new funding arrangements for Water Authority infrastructure works were introduced in accordance with Essential Services Commission guidelines. Works deemed to benefit more than one development would be funded by the Water Authority. However, if works were deemed to be constructed 'ahead of program' with respect to normal progression of development, a 'bring forward' contribution would apply in lieu of standard per lot charges for the area.
95 Ms Hamila estimated that a 'bring forward' contribution of 26% should be applied to the permanent outfall works. She prepared development costs for a 44 lot subdivision plan on the subject land on the basis of advice from Yarra Valley Water[63] that to access up to 750 equivalent lots capacity in the Edgars Creek sewers required the construction of a flow control facility ($2.2 million), sewerage pumping station ($1 million) and a rising main ($200,000); and that to access equivalent 2,500 lots capacity in the Darebin Creek sewer required a rising main to the Darebin Creek system ($2.3 million).
96 Ms Hamila addressed the availability of sewerage services to the subject land by dividing it into three sections from north to south. Different sewerage arrangements would have had to be made for each of those sections, at least in the short to medium term following the relevant date:
(a) The northern portion of the subject land would discharge to an existing branch sewer on the north side of Cooper Street. This would require the construction of a flow control facility and a pressure main south to access 750 lots capacity in the Edgars Creek system and then east to the 2,500 lots capacity in the Darebin Creek system;
(b) The central portion of the land would be serviced by the Haberfield branch sewer traversing the Haberfield land and discharging to the flow control facility and Darebin outfall;
(c) The southern portion of the land would ultimately be serviced by the golf course branch sewer connecting to the Central Creek and Merri Creek systems. This southern catchment would not be developed prior to the completion of sewer relief works in 2011.
97 The costs have been apportioned between the three major development sites, Northpoint, the subject land and the Haberfield estate land. Murdesk would contribute one quarter to the cost of the flow control facility, one third to the cost of the pumping station and two thirds of the golf course branch sewer.
98 Thus, in her costings for the 44 lot subdivision, Ms Hamila costed the sewerage works that would have to be undertaken by a developer purchasing the subject land at $1.023 million.
99 In Ms Hamila's view, informed prospective purchasers would have been aware that reimbursements for developer funded sewerage outfall works might be deferred or discounted. Prospective purchasers might also have considered the opportunities for shared funding of works with other developers in the Cooper Street area.
100 As will be seen, the Secretary's valuers held the view that, notwithstanding Yarra Valley Water's sewerage servicing strategy for Cooper Street, the provision of sewerage to the subject land raised issues of timing, cost and commercial cooperation. As to commercial co-operation, Mr Torr gave evidence of a conversation he had had with Northpoint's Mr Peter Scanlon in which Mr Scanlon asked rhetorically why he should share sewer costs and introduce a new competitor to the location. According to Mr Torr, there was also a risk that the service provider, Yarra Valley Water, might not provide the infrastructure required for Stages 1 and 2 at the time that the land was otherwise ready for development. Even if a 'bring forward' contribution of 26% was paid by the developers, Yarra Valley Water would still have to find in its budget 74% of the amount required, which might pose difficulties given the amounts involved in sewerage provision. Finally, Stage 3 (the southern portion of the land) had a downstream delay in that it could not be serviced without very great expense until some six years after the relevant date.
101 When cross-examined, Ms Hamila accepted that a competing developer such as Mr Scanlon of Northpoint might not want to assist the development of the subject land. If Northpoint did not contribute to the flow control facility, the cost of $2.2 million would be borne entirely by the developer of the subject land and the Haberfield land. Accordingly, there was a risk that the cost of sewerage works could be higher than the estimated $1.023 million.
102 I accept Ms Hamila's evidence. I find, however, that at the relevant date a hypothetical purchaser would have considered there to be some uncertainty about the timing for the provision of sewerage services to the subject land, such uncertainty arising from the need to obtain the cooperation of the nearby landholders and the contribution to funding by the services provider in the case of Stages 1 and 2 and from the anticipated delay to 2011 in the case of Stage 3.
103 A further important question was raised about the extent, if any, that a prudent hypothetical purchaser would have regard to possible constraints, costs and/or delays resulting from native vegetation requirements and the presence of listed species on the subject land. Mr Torr reduced his valuation based upon evidence of potential flora and fauna issues on the subject land and, in particular, the presence of the Golden Sun Moth ('GSM'), a listed species under the Environment Protection & Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (the 'EPBC Act').
104 According to the Secretary, the net effect of the ecological evidence that was placed before the Court was that the advice that a hypothetical purchaser would have received from ecologists on the relevant date was that:
(a) the relevant ecological approvals would take at least 12 months;
(b) 7.887 hectares would need to be set aside for native vegetation, along with a corridor for the Growling Grass Frog;
(c) Costs estimated at about $650,000 would be incurred for surveys, referrals, project management plans, net gain requirements and the provision of offset habitat.
105 The Secretary led expert evidence from Mr Stephen Mueck, botanist, and Mr Daniel Gilmore, zoologist, both of Biosis Research Pty Ltd ('Biosis'), about the results of a habitat hectare assessment carried out on the MWM site in August 2008 and earlier surveys of GSM on the site.[64] Murdesk called evidence from Mr Geoffrey Carr, botanist, of Ecology Australia Pty Ltd.[65] Mr Carr was one of the co-authors of a report prepared on behalf of Major Projects Victoria, 'Flora and Fauna Assessment - Melbourne Wholesale Market Extension, Cooper Street, Epping' dated 5 October 2006 ('Mr Carr's 2006 report'). Mr Carr's 2006 report contained the results of field surveys carried out on the MWM site in August and September 2005.
106 However, Murdesk's principal submission was that in October 2005 a prudent purchaser would have had regard to the ecological constraints on the development of the subject land that were identified in the Development Plan. The Development Plan refers to a study carried by Practical Ecology in 2001, which formed part of a series of studies undertaken by the City of Whittlesea to identify constraints on the development of the land in the Cooper Street Employment Area, including of an environmental and cultural heritage nature. Those constraints were mapped in the Development Plan. A particular area of environmental importance was identified on the subject land that was rated as being a priority for retention. The Development Plan incorporated into areas of open space all sites rated as being a priority for retention. It also required secondary vegetation surveys to be undertaken on all parcels of land prior to completion of subdivision designs, which were to be submitted to Council with permit applications. The requirements of the Victorian Native Vegetation Management Framework, including guidelines for net gain, also had to be addressed.
107 The planning experts, Messrs Milner and Whitney, reported jointly on the planning implications of the ecological evidence.[66] In their joint report they agreed:
(a) At the relevant date, if the prudent purchaser had the report of Mr Mueck and the report of Mr Carr, the implications of their advice would not have affected the timing for the rezoning of the land. Both reports would have necessitated a referral under the EPBC Act, but the time needed to obtain development approval may not have been any different.
(b) The importance of the Cooper Street Employment Area is such that its value for employment purposes would generally outweigh the need to set aside land for conservation purposes.
(c) Modifications could be made to the 44 lot Coomes plan to accommodate some of the implications of the report prepared by Mr Mueck. Other implications would have been addressed by a habitat hectare contribution.
108 Mr Milner also stressed that the land budget in the Development Plan, which showed how much land could be developed and how much land was required to be set aside for open space, had been incorporated into the Planning Scheme to 'lock in' the open space requirements, including for the protection of flora and fauna. The land budget operated as an equalisation scheme across all of the land in Cooper Street. In order to change these settings, the Whittlesea Planning Scheme would need to be amended.
109 Murdesk therefore submitted that the prudent purchaser would have had regard to the exhibited version of the Development Plan to understand what was required in respect of flora and fauna, and would reasonably have taken the view that the responsible authority had done the appropriate work and identified the important strategic areas that needed to be set aside for flora and fauna conservation. The prudent hypothetical purchaser would therefore have concluded that the balance of the land was available for business and industry.
110 However, Mr Carr's 2006 report identified a number of issues which could not be adequately resolved simply by reference to the Development Plan. The field surveys conducted on 12 August and 9 September 2005 identified a possible dispersal corridor or habitat link for the Growling Grass Frog and the occurrence of Matted Flax-Lily. Mr Carr reported that the occurrence of Matted Flax-Lily and the potential occurrence of Growling Grass Frogs could be a constraint on development and that an EPBC referral would need to be submitted to the Commonwealth Department of Environment, Heritage, Water and the Arts ('DEHWA') if the development were to have a significant impact on the Growling Grass Frog. Moreover, the removal of indigenous vegetation would be subject to requirements under the Native Vegetation Framework.
111 Mr Carr did not identify GSM on the MWM site. However, Mr Gilmore gave extensive evidence about the 'rediscovery' of GSM in Melbourne in around 2004, the species not having been sighted there for 100 odd years. That evidence was, in summary, as follows:
(a) In 2004/2005, GSM was recorded in a number of localities within the Craigieburn grasslands and Cooper Street grasslands reserves;
(b) In about 2005, there was a referral to DEWHA under the EPBC Act because GSM was found on grasslands adjacent to 25 Cooper Street. As a result of the referral, funds were made available for further studies. Surveys were carried out in 2005/2006 and 2006/2007, the summer period being the flight season for the species and the optimum time to carry out surveys.
(c) In 2007, Biosis prepared two reports forming part of a sub-regional survey of the GSM to map its distribution. These reports showed that GSM was more widespread than was previously thought.
(d) In 2008, two surveys for GSM were carried out on the MWM site. GSM was very apparent at that time.
112 According to Mr Gilmore, the original expectation was that GSM was likely to be found only in natural grassland, that is, on sites that had a minimum 40% cover of native wallaby grass. However, more recent research had found that GSM is more flexible than previously thought. The surveys undertaken by Biosis in 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 identified GSM on sites that were considered suboptimal for the species. One of those sites was virtually entirely covered in exotic vegetation. However, this fact was initially not widely known because the results of surveys were not widely available in the ecological community. The fact that GSM was not as specialised as had been thought only became widely known with the publication a paper co-authored by Mr Gilmore in 2008.
113 It was Mr Gilmore's evidence that in 2004/2005, there was generally a lack of knowledge about GSM. Prior to a flurry of publications commencing in 2007, there was very limited information about the occurrence of GSM in and around Melbourne. So far as Mr Gilmore was aware, it was the subject of only a very small number of publications. By 2005/2006, the state of knowledge had improved, but much of the information was embedded in consultant reports for private developers. It was not widely known that GSM occurred in Melbourne's north and west. Biosis, the Merri Creek Management Committee and one or two other researchers knew that to be the case, but they continued to be guided by the belief that GSM needed good grassland rather than degraded exotic grassland.
114 Mr Gilmore described the period from the middle of 2005 until October 2005 as a 'window period' during which it would have been acceptable for a person to fail to identify the GSM as an issue on the subject land.[67] However, when asked what his advice to a potential purchaser of the subject land would have been in October 2005 in respect of the occurrence of GSM, Mr Gilmore answered, 'I would have thought it was a likely occurrence at that time'.[68] He said he would have suggested that the potential purchaser undertake a targeted survey for GSM in the summer.
115 Mr Mueck conducted a habitat hectare assessment for the MWM site in August 2008 and gave evidence more generally about the potential implications of flora and fauna issues for the development of the MWM site. He focussed on native vegetation, the Matted Flax-Lily, and a number of species of fauna, including GSM, the Growling Grass Frog and the Striped Legless Lizard.
116 In his 2 September 2009 report, Mr Mueck prescribed reserves of 5.532 and 2.535 hectares respectively to conserve the range of ecological values that he had identified. These reserves would be required in order to avoid or minimise impacts on patches of native vegetation and to protect areas which supported Matted Flax-Lily and GSM, to allow for the passage of the Growling Grass Frog and retain some habitat of Striped Legless Lizard. Moreover, the clearing of the remaining vegetation would attract an offset prescription of 1.42 habitat hectares of very high conservation significance planes grassland. Development approval would most likely also require salvage of the Striped Legless Lizard and might require contribution to research and survey for nationally threatened species.
117 Mr Mueck provided a further report on 13 September 2010, in response to a series of questions about GSM, including whether its presence was an issue that a prudent purchaser of broadacre land for future development would have investigated at the relevant date or that a reasonably competent ecology consultant would have recommended to be investigated, whether the measures identified in his 2 September 2009 report would have been applicable to a prudent purchaser at the relevant date, and whether these requirements were sufficient for GSM.
118 Mr Mueck set out a brief history of the identification of GSM in Melbourne's north following its rediscovery in the Craigieburn Grasslands Flora and Fauna Reserve in 2003. Surveys which located significant populations of GSM had been undertaken in December 2004, January 2005 and in subsequent flight seasons (2005/2006). Mr Mueck confirmed that at the relevant date, prudent purchasers of broad acre land in the Craigieburn area were investigating sites for GSM. He also confirmed that at the relevant date, any assessment of native grassland by a reasonably competent consultant should have considered the presence of GSM, particularly near the known populations at Craigieburn and Epping.[69] Although an emphasis was placed on native grasslands environments at this time and the presence of GSM in areas supporting less than a 40% cover of wallaby grass was only suspected, Biosis had identified significantly more native vegetation on the MWM site than Ecology Australia. Mr Mueck concluded that while it was not the flight season, there was some potential at the relevant date to observe GSM on the subject land, and most likely an experienced ecological consultant with an up to date understanding of local issues, would have recognised the presence of potential GSM habitat.[70] Mr Mueck identified additional requirements for GSM including federal requirements for the protection and management of GSM habitat at least equal to the area of GSM habitat lost and a contribution toward research into the understanding of the distribution and ecology of GSM, estimated at $100,000.
119 By letter dated 17 August 2011, Mr Mueck described the advice he would give to a hypothetical purchaser about the impact of environmental controls on the use and development of the subject land.[71] Relevantly, he advised as follows:
(a) As at 28 October 2005, there were areas of native grassland, Matted Flax-Lily listed as endangered under the EPBC Act, and the potential presence of the listed GSM. Another listed species, the Growling Grass Frog, was likely to utilise the land as a movement corridor;
(b) Referral under the EPBC Act would be required and it was likely that development would be assessed as a controlled action;
(c) Approval was likely to require protection of habitat for GSM, salvage of Striped Legless Lizard, the construction of favourable habitat for the Growling Grass Frog and a contribution for research.
120 Mr Mueck advised that as at the relevant date, DEWHA was requiring an offset of at least 3 to 1 for areas of GSM habitat approved for clearing. In addition to the areas to be retained, there was at least another 30 hectares of GSM habitat. It was possible that DEWHA could therefore impose an offset prescription requiring the protection of at least 90 hectares of GSM habitat elsewhere. Further, any permit to clear native vegetation would be accompanied by a permit condition requiring offsets under the native vegetation framework.
121 By letter dated 18 August 2011, Mr Mueck provided an estimate of costs associated with the steps that he thought would be required to be undertaken. That estimate of costs was in the order of $650,000, not including a number of matters that were unquantifiable. Additionally, special construction and design would have to be undertaken to provide habitat for the Growling Grass Frog.
122 In a joint report prepared on 15 September 2011, Mr Mueck, Mr Gilmore and Mr Carr agreed on a number of important points, including the following:
(a) There were patches of native vegetation on site. Discrepancies in the type, extent, distribution and condition in the different reports is primarily due to the condition differences due to climatic and seasonal changes and difference in the time of the field assessments, grazing regimes by macropods and cattle, and due to the dynamic nature of the vegetation on site;
(b) Despite the differences in the vegetation mapping and habitat hectare scoring, the offset prescription described in the Biosis research report and Mr Carr's affidavit are not significantly different;
(c) The assessments of the likelihood of regular occurrence for GSM, Growling Grass Frog and Striped Legless Lizard within the Mr Carr's report were reasonable assessments;
(d) GSM was recorded as a species with a low to moderate likelihood of regular occurrence at the study site in the Mr Carr's initial report. It was not recorded on the site at this time and would not have been detected due to the timing of the survey. However, GSM was known to occur at the nearby Cooper Street grasslands before 28 October 2005;
(e) At the time of the Mr Carr's initial report, it was unlikely that GSM would have been predicted to occur at the site according to the DEWHA 'protected matters' search tool;
(f) At the time of the initial assessment undertaken by Mr Carr, the accepted habitat for GSM was vegetation with a cover of a minimum of 40% wallaby grasses. Such cover was not recorded on the site at the time and therefore it is agreed that the Mr Carr's assessment of GSM habitat is a reasonable assessment;
(g) Mr Carr's assessment of potential Growling Grass Frog habitat is a reasonable assessment;
(h) In respect of biodiversity constraints on the potential development, Mr Carr agrees with Mr Mueck's position in his comments dated 13 September 2010 in relation to GSM, including his statement that it would be reasonable to suggest that at 28 October 2005, any assessment of native grassland environments by a reasonably competent ecological consultant should have considered the potential presence of GSM, particularly any sites near known populations at Craigieburn and Epping. More specifically, where patches of native grasslands with greater than a 40% cover of wallaby grass were identified, a reasonably competent ecological consultant should have been aware of GSM as an issue, particularly in the Craigieburn area.
On the assumption that at the relevant date a hypothetical purchaser would rely on the advice of Stephen Garry Mueck (as stated in his first affidavit affirmed 12 February 2010 and as stated in his second affidavit affirmed 19 August 2011) the time that it would be expected to take to obtain any required approvals from State and/or Commonwealth authorities in relation to flora and fauna matters could be a highly variable outcome. The decision-making process would be strongly dependent on the design of the development proposal put forward by the developer and whether this proposal takes into account the biodiversity values on the site. Taking the Development Plan as presented in Geoffrey Carr's affidavit as an example [44 lot Coomes Plan], we are confident the development would be defined as a Controlled Action under the Commonwealth legislation and approvals from State and Commonwealth authorities would take a significant amount of time, which we consider would be in excess of 12 months.
On the assumption that at the relevant date the hypothetical purchaser would rely on the advice of Geoffrey Carr, the effect, if any, that flora or fauna matters would have on the likely timing of any development approval for the subject land would be that it would be likely that further targeted flora and fauna surveys be required as a result of the findings of the initial Ecology Australia report. It would also be likely that any development on the site would be deemed a Controlled Action under the Commonwealth legislation and as such the approvals for development would take a significant amount of time, which we consider would be in excess of 12 months.
124 The ecologists' evidence, which I accept, was therefore to the effect that at the relevant date the hypothetical purchaser would have been advised that:
(a) A planning permit for the development of the subject land would require areas of land to be set aside for native vegetation;
(b) The area of open space in the 44 lot subdivision plan proposed by Murdesk (prepared by Coomes) was insufficient for this purpose and the area proposed on the 41 lot revised plan prepared on behalf of the Secretary (by Millar & Merrigan) was the minimum area required to be set aside;
(c) In addition, an offset would be required in respect of native vegetation removed. Under the revised 41 lot plan, the offset requirement would be 1.42 habitat hectares;
(d) Because of the presence of listed species on the subject land, development on the land would be a controlled action under the EPBC Act requiring referral to DEWHA. At the very least, any approval would require setting aside the drainage line as habitat for the Growling Grass Frog and a translocation program for the Striped Legless Lizard;
(f) Surveys in 2003 and 2004 had identified GSM on land in Craigieburn and Epping. Where patches of native grasslands with greater than a 40% cover of wallaby grass were identified, GSM could be an issue. Moreover, even where less or no wallaby grass cover was present, a well informed consultant might have recommended that a survey for GSM be conducted during the flight season;
(g) If GSM were identified on the subject land, federal controls might require significant off sets and a contribution to further research.
125 Of course, none of this is fatal to the development of the subject land. It is a question of if, and if so how, a prudent purchaser of the subject land would allow for the likely costs and delays as a result of native vegetation requirements, and the presence on the land of the species that were identified, especially GSM.
126 The Court's task in assessing market value is to determine the price that would have been paid for the subject land if it had been sold on the relevant date by a willing but not anxious seller to a willing but not anxious purchaser. The relevant date for assessing market value is 28 October 2005.
127 It was common ground that the highest and best use of the subject land as at the relevant date was for future subdivision and development for industrial and employment generating purposes and investment.
129 Mr Torr and Mr Brown received their instructions prior to the relevant date and prepared valuations in late 2005. They subsequently produced supplementary reports having regard to new information or contentions. Mr Murray was first retained to provide a valuation report in respect of the subject land in September 2006, Mr Holland in March 2007 and Mr Wallace in March 2011. However, Mr Holland and Mr Wallace were well acquainted with the subject land, as they had provided advice to Murdesk in the context of the Bypass acquisition.[77]
130 A valuation report prepared by Mr Peter Dickinson in March 2005 was also in evidence.[78] Mr Dickinson's valuation was undertaken at Murdesk's request for financing purposes. It was relied upon by the Secretary as a further contemporaneous valuation of the subject land.
131 Mr Torr, Mr Brown, Mr Murray and Mr Holland analysed comparable sales of in globo industrial land as their principle method of valuation. Each of them also carried out a hypothetical subdivision analysis as a check. By contrast, Mr Wallace relied principally on a hypothetical subdivision analysis to value the subject land at the relevant date.
132 For the purposes of the hypothetical subdivision analyses that were carried out, four 'concept plans' for the hypothetical development of the subject land were used:
(a) a 79 lot plan prepared in 2003 by Coomes with costings by Millar & Merrigan, (which was the concept plan used in the Bypass proceeding);
(b) a 44 lot plan prepared in April 2009 by Coomes to reflect the Development Plan;
(c) a 41 lot plan prepared by Millar & Merrigan in September 2009 based on the 44 lot Coomes plan, adjusted to reflect the ecological requirements identified by Mr Mueck;
(d) a 'super lot' plan prepared by Coomes in July 2011 at the request of Mr Holland to show the form of development which he considered best reflected the attributes of the subject land.
133 The expert valuers referred to a large number of sales of in globo land, although the analysis and argument ultimately focussed on a relatively small number of those sales.
134 Mr Holland helpfully prepared a table listing in date order all of the in globo sales that were referred to.[79] Mr Holland's table lists 61 sales, 20 of which were in the north, 19 in the west and 21 in the south-east. Although the sales appear to be evenly distributed across the three regions, 19 of the 21 south-eastern sales occurred well after the relevant date in 2006 or 2007, with 18 of the 21 south-eastern sales occurring post June 2006 and nine in 2007. Ten sales, all in the north and west, occurred well before the relevant date in 2002 or 2003.
135 As a result, only 19 of the 61 listed sales occurred in 2004 or 2005, that is, within a reasonable time before the relevant date. The vast majority of those sales were in the north and west (rather than in the south-east).
136 Unsurprisingly, sales in Cooper Street and in nearby O'Herns Road in late 2004, 2005 and 2006 received the lion's share of the experts' attention. In the final analysis, the sales that received the most detailed consideration were the following:
137 The expressions of interest in the Haberfield land lodged in November 2004 and the figure for the industrial land component used in the settlement of the Haberfield compensation proceedings in 2006 were also considered by one or more of the valuers.
138 Having earlier described the properties in the immediate vicinity of the subject land, it is convenient to describe 25 Cooper Street, which emerged as one of the principal comparable sales. 25 Cooper Street is located to the west of the subject land and Merri Creek, close to the Hume Highway. It is an elongated parcel of approximately 47.37 hectares with a narrow frontage to Cooper Street which had previously formed part of the reservation for the Bypass. It was sold in November 2004 for $17.5 million on the condition that it be rezoned to Industrial 1. This was achieved in June 2006. It has since been developed as the Metrolink estate.
139 3 Heyington Avenue was also a significant comparable sale in the general northern area. It comprised 23.27 hectares in the older industrial area of Thomastown backing on to the Northern Ring Road (albeit without direct access to the Ring Road). It sold in June 2006 for $20,101,300 to interests associated with the MAB Corporation. Included in the sale, and retained on a short term lease-back by Goodyear Tyre & Rubber, was a large office and warehouse facility.
140 The Court undertook a view of all of the above sites.
141 Mr Torr's instructions predated the acquisition of the land, and his first valuation report was finalised shortly after the relevant date in November 2005.
142 Mr Torr accepted Mr Whitney's advice that, in the absence of the MWM relocation, Amendment C31 would have been approved in early to mid 2006. While rezoning was never guaranteed, he attributed a low degree of risk for that factor. As to services, Mr Torr had regard to advice from Millar & Merrigan about the (then) new procedure for bringing forward sewer works out of sequence to conclude that it was theoretically possible for the subject land to be serviced almost immediately and that this had to be taken into account in the valuation. However, as there was no detail on how the relevant authorities would finance the new process, there remained a risk that the proposed sewer would face delays due to a lack of allocated funding.
143 Mr Torr analysed 16 sales of in globo industrial land between July 2002 and March 2005 in the north and west, including 300 Cooper Street, 25 Cooper Street,[81] 142 Fairbairn Road, Mt Derrimut Road, the property on the corner of Palmer and Dohertys Roads (which I shall refer to simply as 'Dohertys Road') and 275 Hume Highway.
144 Mr Torr considered 300 Cooper Street to be the most comparable sale, because it was adjacent to the subject land and its zoning and servicing prospects were similar. However, it was superior to the subject land because its rezoning and servicing prospects involved less risk. Although Mr Torr relied primarily on 300 Cooper Street for his comparable sales methodology, he considered it to be in line with the trend in the other sales to which he had referred.[82]
145 Mr Torr analysed the sale of 300 Cooper Street at $225,000 per hectare, based on a developable area of approximately 21 hectares, noting that approximately 30% of the site would be required for future road and water infrastructure. On this basis, Mr Torr assessed the market value of the subject land at the relevant date at $12.4 million.
146 Mr Torr also undertook a hypothetical development analysis as a 'check method', using the 79 lot Coomes plan, current market values for subdivided lots in the area,[83] and estimated development costs of $16,798,797.[84] Mr Torr's estimated gross realisation from the hypothetical subdivision was $48,750,752.[85] By this means, Mr Torr derived a value for the subject land of $12.4 million (or $224,900 per hectare).
147 On 7 November 2005, Mr Torr attended a valuers' conference, following which he provided a report[86] referring to discussions with the purchaser of 300 Cooper Street about the allowance made for public purposes and with the Council in relation to drainage works and retarding basins. As a result of these discussions, Mr Torr concluded that drainage works would involve less than 30% of total land area and possibly as little as 20% and he revised the rate for the subject land to $255,000 per hectare, resulting in an overall land value of $14.1 million.
148 On 30 March 2007, Mr Torr wrote to the Valuer General in response to a request to review his assessment, having regard to the decision of this Court in the Bypass proceeding. In relation to the 'sewer scenario', Mr Torr said:
There is no doubt that at the relevant date the subject land faced major obstacles getting sewerage infrastructure. It was either a seven year wait (in probability) or a major upfront investment which, on our numbers did not appear viable.
The Millar & Merrigan report in 2005 represented, in our opinion, the view that a prudent purchaser would have reached at the time. Subsequent events do not appear to have changed that scenario. In addition, I have spoken to Robert Scanlon, who is associated with Northpoint and the purchaser of 300 Cooper Street, and he commented that he would not have agreed to share his sewer capacity with the subject land or the McKee land because he needed all of that capacity for his own development and did not in any event want a new competitor.
In our opinion the 25% allowed by the Court [in the Bypass proceeding] for this issue is an adequate reflection of the problem although the passage of three years from 2002 - 2005 would have mitigated the delay component to some degree.
149 As to sales evidence, Mr Torr confirmed that following the judgment in the Bypass proceeding, it was appropriate to base his valuation primarily on the sale of 300 Cooper Street. New details showed only around 6.2 hectares would be lost to drainage reserves, which gave a value of $242,000 per hectare for land that had superior rezoning prospects and much superior sewerage access than the subject land. When comparing 300 Cooper Street to the subject land, Mr Torr added 20% for time, deducted 20% for sewer and zoning risks and added 10% for Freeway frontage, giving a value for the subject land of $255,000 per hectare.
150 Mr Torr correctly recorded the sale price for 25 Cooper Street as $17.5 million, resulting in a cash equivalent of $327,000 per hectare. He noted that it was zoned industrial and did not have 'abnormal servicing problems'. Grasslands issues had been solved by way of land swaps and did not affect the analysis. When comparing 25 Cooper Street to the subject land, Mr Torr deducted 40% for zoning and sewer advantages and added 20% for time and 10% for freeway frontage yields, resulting in a value for the subject land of $259,000 per hectare.
151 On this basis Mr Torr confirmed his previous valuation for the subject land of $14.1 million.
152 On 20 June 2007, Mr Torr provided a further report, which followed a valuers' conference on 14 May 2007. Once again, Mr Torr considered the sales of 300 Cooper Street and 25 Cooper Street. He again analysed 300 Cooper Street at $242,000 per hectare; however, he analysed 25 Cooper Street at $341,000 per hectare, slightly higher than his previous figure of $327,000 per hectare. He expressed the view that 25 Cooper Street was 'a much superior property to the subject'. It was well placed to the new freeway (the Bypass), zoned for industrial purposes and had no significant servicing problems. Mr Torr also had regard to the Haberfield expressions of interest and, adjusting for terms settlements, identified the bids as ranging from $21.1 million to $35.4 million. He noted that his 'before' evaluation for the subject land was slightly higher than the highest Haberfield bid.
153 Mr Torr ultimately derived a rate of $280,000 per hectare for the subject land, giving a revised value for the subject land of $15.44 million. This was based on the rate of $242,000 per hectare for 300 Cooper Street, with a number of discrete adjustments: minus 3% for size, minus 20% for rezoning/servicing prospects, plus 35% for time, plus 10% for freeway abuttal.
154 Although he made a significant adjustment for time based on his analysis of a series of industrial in globo sales in the western region indicating an escalation rate of 2.75% per month, Mr Torr expressed some uncertainty about the extent of movement of sale prices from November 2004 to October 2005.
155 On 8 April 2008, Mr Torr provided a further report in response to a request from the Valuer General's office to advise whether a review of his assessment was warranted as a result of the Haberfield acquisition. Significantly, Mr Torr commenced this report as follows:
The period surrounding the relevant date was an extraordinary one in the Melbourne Industrial inglobo land market. The combination of robust economic growth and escalating prices for developed industrial lots pushed inglobo industrial land values onto a very steep escalation curve. The reality of such periods in property markets, where transactions are relatively infrequent, is that the true nature of the price trend does not become apparent until some time after the event. In other words, in those circumstances, subsequent sales can be highly informative in the analysis of market value at a prior date.
Based on the general trend shown in broadacre sales we now believe values for land with medium term rezoning development potential were escalating at 2% - 3% per month during the relevant period. It is, of course, difficult to be precise about these matters because each sale is influenced by different locational factors.
156 In reviewing his valuation, Mr Torr considered sales information after the relevant date. Mr Torr analysed 135 O'Herns Road, based on an (incorrect) September 2006 sale date and a purchase price of $15 million on 4 year terms. This produced a cash rate of $347,000 per hectare to which he made adjustments for time (minus 24.75%) and location (plus 15%) to indicate a rate for the subject land of $312,000 per hectare.
157 Mr Torr also analysed the Haberfield expressions of interest based on the highest bid of $38 million to derive a per hectare price of $221,000 for its industrial land component. This was adjusted for time and location (Freeway influence) to produce a rate of $323,000 per hectare for the subject land. Mr Torr also considered the outcome of the Haberfield mediation. The value agreed for the industrial component was $242,500 per hectare which, adjusted for time and location, indicated a value for the subject land of around $310,000 per hectare.
158 In his April 2008 report, Mr Torr gave a revised valuation assessment for the subject land of $315,000 per hectare and a total value of $17,370,000.
159 On 19 September 2008, Mr Torr provided to the Secretary's solicitors a list of main comparable sales for the purposes of settlement discussions. This time, he listed the O'Herns Road sale as having occurred in December 2005 for a price of $15.2 million on five year terms. This was not the sale that he referred to in his April 2008 report, which was a later sale (July 2006) to interests associated with Northpoint for $14.95 million.
160 On 21 June 2010, Mr Torr prepared a further report commenting on the fauna and flora issues identified by Mr Mueck. He noted some minor impacts on development potential from the Growling Grass Frog and Legless Lizard, but said that the GSM was a major valuation issue if shown to be a matter that a prudent purchaser would have become aware of at the relevant date. Both state and federal authorities were highly protective of the GSM and its habitat and it was not just the policy of these authorities which presented development approval risks but also the fact that any prospective developer would be required to deal with two separate approval authorities. Mr Torr concluded that the GSM was likely to be highly detrimental to the value of development land based on his experience with two sites, one at Sydenham and one at the Western Highway on the Deer Park Bypass. He requested further information on the impact of the GSM.
161 As a result of the further information provided by Mr Mueck, Mr Torr concluded from the Biosis reports dated August 2008, and 2 and 13 September 2010, that:
(a) At the relevant date there was an awareness of native vegetation issues and a prudent purchaser would have investigated that issue;
(b) The subject land had significant patches of native vegetation which would have been identified by a competent ecology consultant;
(c) While the GSM would probably not have been identified in October 2005, the presence of native vegetation patches would have alerted a competent ecology consultant to the risk of presence of GSM;
(d) GSM represented a significant development constraint;
(e) The requirements identified by Mr Mueck in relation to reserves and research contributions would have to be met.
162 Mr Torr adjusted for the quantifiable ecological costs and produced a revised valuation for the subject land of $15,120,000.
163 On 12 May 2005, Mr Brown received instructions from the Valuer-General to carry out an assessment of compensation for the subject land. He provided a preliminary report dated 26 September 2005 based on comparable sales.
164 Mr Brown's preliminary report referred to Amendment C31 and to planning advice which stressed the importance of Amendment C31 to enable the Cooper Street precinct to be comprehensively developed as a major employment node. Mr Brown also identified the provision, availability and cost of services, in particular sewerage reticulation, as a 'significant issue' which he said was difficult to quantify at that point in time. However, he assumed that reticulated water, electricity, gas and telecommunications were available, along with drainage.
165 Mr Brown identified six comparable sales and analysed their cash rates as follows:
(d) 142 Fairbairn Road (September 2004) = $48.68/m²;
(e) 300 Cooper Street (September 2004) = $28.82/m²;
166 According to Mr Brown, these sales gave an analysed direct comparison range of $257,370 per hectare to $486,800 per hectare for sites ranging between 30 hectares and 51.3 hectares. If the Fairbairn Road sale was put to one side, the prices ranged between approximately $26/m² to $32/m².
167 On the basis of his preliminary assessment, Mr Brown provided an estimate of market value for the subject land in the range of $15.2 million to $17.9 million.
168 Mr Brown subsequently undertook a residual cash flow analysis as a check for his comparable sales valuation using the 79 lot Coomes plan and development costings prepared by Millar & Merrigan. He assessed gross realisations of $58,696,525, reflecting an average rate of $133/m² for the 79 lots.[87] This analysis generated a value for the subject land of $18,261,917.
169 In his substantive report dated 7 November 2005,[88] Mr Brown again referred to the planning and servicing considerations described in his preliminary report. He repeated his understanding that permanent sewerage reticulation would not be available until 2010/2011, that development of the land would require the installation of temporary sewer storage facilities and that sewerage reticulation was a 'significant issue'.
170 The in globo industrial sales evidence upon which Mr Brown relied were the six sales referred to in his preliminary report. He observed that if the Hume Highway sale and the Fairbairn Road sale were disregarded, the analysed direct comparison range narrowed from $273,500 per hectare to $317,824 per hectare.[89] Mr Brown noted that Fairbairn Road was an infill site located in a long established industrial location within 500 metres of access to the Western Ring Road and that '[t]he purchase price appears to be at the upper end of market parameters notwithstanding the highly regarded location of this property'.[90]
171 As to 300 Cooper Street, Mr Brown noted that inquiries with the McMullin Group indicated 9.65 hectares would not be developable, that fill would be required to lift low lying areas above flood levels and the property would lack permanent sewer reticulation until 2010/2011.
172 Mr Brown identified 25 Cooper Street as 'arguably' the most comparable to the subject property in terms of location and size. He considered that it was inferior in terms of frontage, exposure and access, and had unresolved issues relating to net developable area, but that it was more readily developable by virtue of having available sewer reticulation.
173 On this basis, Mr Brown formed the view that the market value of the subject land would be reflected by the rate of $32.50/m². Reconciling his comparable sales analysis with his residual cashflow analysis, he settled on a valuation of $18 million.
174 Although Mr Brown attended conferences of the Secretary's valuers in November 2005 and May 2007, nothing in these conferences caused him to alter his opinion.[91]
175 On 15 December 2008, Mr Brown provided a report in response to a request for comments on the sale of 135 O'Herns Road. He recorded that it had sold twice: first in December 2005 to a company associated with Demar for $15.2 million on terms over five years; secondly, in July 2006 to the McMullin Group for $17 million on terms over four years. The analysed cash equivalent of these sales was $41.62/m² and $46.34/m² respectively. Mr Brown noted that the sewerage issues would not be as complicated as those on land south of Cooper Street and that the second sale was to an adjoining owner. He concluded that this sale represented the upper end of value and that the fact that it was to an adjoining owner may have influenced the price for the second sale. Mr Brown confirmed that he continued to regard 300 Cooper Street and 25 Cooper Street to be the most relevant sales.
176 On 18 June 2010, Mr Brown prepared a further report having regard to the 41 lot Coomes subdivision plan and costings that had been provided. The 41 lot subdivision plan set aside approximately 9.1 hectares for reserves. Mr Brown's hypothetical three stage subdivision analysis based on this plan, undertaken with similar inputs to his earlier analysis, generated a value for a three stage development of $13.42 million. Mr Brown concluded that the 41 lot subdivision was not necessarily the highest and best use of the land.
177 Following the provision of more information on the ecological issues, Mr Brown prepared a further report dated 25 November 2010 confirming the advice previously provided in his 7 November 2005 report.
178 Mr Brown was asked to further review his opinion following receipt of materials filed on behalf of Murdesk and materials from Messrs Whitney, Jordan and Merrigan. He prepared a report dated 11 March 2011 in which he confirmed the approach that he had outlined in his letter of November 2010 and reiterated that nothing in the further material caused him to alter any of his views. He remained of the view that the market value of the subject land at the relevant date (28 October 2005) was $18 million.
179 In examination-in-chief, Mr Brown was asked about his analysis of 25 Cooper Street. He said that his initial information for the sale was that the sale price was $15.5 million, but he had subsequently learned that the sale price was $17.5 million. This was analysed as $33.33/m². Although he reported that his assessment remained unchanged, he told the Court that 'in all honesty, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have influenced me to be somewhat higher on the subject land'.[92]
180 In his oral evidence, Mr Brown made the following comments about comparable sales:
(a) 25 Cooper Street was similar parcel of land zoned Industrial 1 and proximate to industrial development in Campbellfield. Its costs to develop would be less than those of the subject land and it aimed at smaller lot development. It had proximity to the Bypass (although it was not located on it), but it also had proximity to the Hume Highway, which was a recognised industrial locality.[93]
(b) 300 Cooper Street was a smaller parcel of land part of which was required to be set aside for drainage purposes and part of which required fill. Although he had not been provided with any development costs, his guess was that it was probably cheaper to develop than the subject, given that the land further to its west was already developed and issues of sewerage and water had been resolved for that land. Nonetheless, he regarded 300 Cooper Street as 'setting the low ball'. [94]
(c) 135 O'Herns Road was complicated by the two sales. It was Mr Brown's view that there was no possibility of the first sale in late 2005 being finalised. He had direct knowledge that the purchaser was having difficulties paying its debts. The second sale post-dated the relevant date by some eight months. The purchasers, who were related to the Northpoint joint venture, had a significant interest in land holdings in the Epping area and were obviously aware that approximately 135 hectares of industrial land had just been taken out of the market through the compulsory acquisition of two significant land holdings (Haberfield and the subject land). At the same time, the State government was signalling that it intended to put a major infrastructure asset in the locality. This suggested to Mr Brown that the purchaser might have been prepared to pay a premium for the land.[95]
(d) Heyington Avenue was an infill site, and the sale in June 2006 included a significant industrial building on lease-back. Although he had not been provided with any information on development costs, Mr Brown assumed that the costs to develop this land would be considerably less than the subject land, which was on the fringe of development.[96]
(f) The expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield estate land involved a reasonable who's who of the Melbourne development community and showed what big developers were prepared to pay, and on what terms and conditions. It was a significant offering and a major exposure of a significant parcel of land in that part of the world within a Comprehensive Development Zone.[97]
181 Mr Brown expressed the view that industrial land in the western suburbs was probably better than industrial land in the northern suburbs: there was a lot more industrial development in the western suburbs and it was a more recognised area. It had benefitted from the construction of significant infrastructure such as the Western Ring Road and the Deer Park Bypass. The other important point was that it was generally cheaper to develop land in the western suburbs than in the northern suburbs, and that was an important factor in what buyers were prepared to pay for land.[98]
182 Mr Brown was asked about the ecological issues and, in particular, the implications for value of the presence of GSM on the subject land. He said that the presence of flora and fauna had started to become an issue in around 2005. Some years later those issues were considered to be significant,[99] but the view that he took at that point in time was that he should ignore the advice of Mr Mueck and give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.
183 Having first received instructions to prepare a valuation report on 12 September 2006, Mr Murray's report is dated 11 July 2011. Based upon a comparable sales analysis, he arrived at a rate per hectare of $550,000 for the subject land at the relevant date, resulting in a market value of $30.33 million.
184 Mr Murray adopted the direct comparison approach and considered sales of other in globo holdings designated for future development on the basis that the highest and best use of the land was as broad hectare employment holding. His sales evidence included sales prior to and post the relevant date in the outer western growth area and in the outer south-eastern growth area as well as the surrounding area in the north.
185 Mr Murray's sales in the north were 310 Cooper Street, 300 Cooper Street, 475 Cooper Street, 25 Cooper Street, 135 O'Herns Road, 3 Heyington Avenue, 135-285 Donnybrook Road and 700 Hume Highway, Craigieburn. He also had regard to the Haberfield expressions of interest. In relation to sales in the north, Mr Murray concluded:
Available sales evidence within the surrounding area of outer northern Melbourne for future employment holdings inside the UGB, both prior to and post the relevant date generally reflected a broad range of between $250,000 per hectare and $965,000 per hectare, depending on development area, zoning, proximity to services, location and date of sale.[100]
186 Mr Murray referred to ten sales in the outer western growth area, including the sale of 32.38 hectares on the corner of Palmers Road for $21,125,000 in March 2006 (the 'Kador sale'). In relation to sales in the west, Mr Murray concluded:
The preceding sales evidence generally reflects a broad range of overall land rates between $225,000 per hectare and $650,000 per hectare overall, depending on size, location, date of sale, and proximity to zoned land. The majority of the sales reflect rates concentrated between $225,000 per hectare and $300,000 per hectare.
The outer western industrial and future industrial region is considered to be a strong area which is heavily committed to, as both zoned and unzoned future development holdings.[101]
187 In the outer south-eastern growth area, Mr Murray considered twelve sales, only three of which pre-dated the relevant date. In relation to sales in the south east, Mr Murray concluded:
We note that the preceding sales evidence generally reflect a broad range of overall land rates of between $200,000 per hectare and $965,000 per hectare, depending on size, location, date of sale, and proximity to zoned land. The majority of sales concentrated between $500,000 per hectare and $965,000 per hectare on a cash equivalent basis, depending on location and proximity to services and rezoning.
188 According to Mr Murray, the most comparable sale was the July 2006 sale of 135 O'Herns Road, at cash rate of $427,000 per hectare. The major factors which differentiated the subject land were its location, its assumed Comprehensive Development Zone, its premium frontage to Cooper Street and abuttal to the Hume Freeway and the ensuing profile and advertising advantages, and lack of difficulties arising from the need to fill. As a result, a premium rate was applicable to the subject land. Mr Murray described O'Herns Road as a parcel 'having a lesser location' and to be 'lesser in regards to when it would have been marketed or developed'.[102] While it was known at the time of the transaction (July 2006) that the MWM was going to be developed, the sale of O'Herns Road gave a reasonable indication of where market levels were for land in the area at that point in time because, had the MWM not been there, the Haberfield land would have been developed by another buyer, similar market conditions would have occurred and similar realisations would have been expected on this parcel.
189 In Mr Murray's view, O'Herns Road gave a very much lower level of value than the subject land at that time. Apart from is locational disadvantages, the development of O'Herns Road would have taken place some three to four years after the development of the subject land.
190 Mr Murray also had regard to the first sale of O'Herns Road (November 2005), which he analysed at $410,000 per hectare and 25 Cooper Street, which he analysed at $335,000 per hectare. According to Mr Murray, given these two sales, the subject land would have reached a minimum of $500,000 per hectare and as much as $600,000 per hectare when considered in the light of the Kador sale, which was a sale for in excess of $650,000 per hectare.
191 Mr Murray stressed the appropriateness of comparing in globo land sales and lot pricing in the western employment/industrial areas. He noted, however, that the outer northern industrial/future employment area of Epping, Epping North and Craigieburn achieved consistently lower rates than the alternative employment areas of outer western Melbourne and outer south-eastern Melbourne, which were more established, stronger industrial nodes, having experienced a greater level of development.[103] He thought the western area was probably a more appropriate comparison than the south-east. The south-eastern corridor was more developed and mature market and the sales showed that there were substantial numbers of developers prepared to enter the market. A number of sales occurred notwithstanding fluid development costings and development contributions. Developers were buying land that was still zoned Rural with many unknowns, which showed that there were a lot of anxious developers.
192 In his valuation rationale, Mr Murray explained that his views about general levels of value were formed by reference to the history of the earlier sales in Cooper Street and what was occurring in the west. He referred to the advice of Mr Milner as to re-zoning, the location of the subject land and its exposures, and the 'minimal' costs of construction. He also considered the Development Plan and the fact it allowed the use of most of the subject land. The layout was conducive to industrial development which could be integrated with the adjoining parcel. The other aspect was the limited quality and quantity of employment land available in the immediate area. There was a very small node of some 400-odd hectares in this area.
... I am of the opinion that an appropriate rate per hectare should fall between $500,000 and $600,000/ha. I have elected to apply $550,000/ha which is a premium above the cash equivalent rate of $427,000 achieved on the O'Herns Rd property attributable to the subjects' (sic) location, zoning and frontage to Cooper Street. I note that this rate is significantly less than the rate paid on the effective developable area on the Palmers Road property ($891,350/ha) purchased by Kador Group, but also note that the sale is post the relevant date. On balance I consider the applied rate to be reasonable and reflective of the market value of the subject given all it's (sic) attributes and limitations as at the relevant date of assessment.[104]
194 According to Mr Murray, it was inappropriate to assess the value of the subject land using the hypothetical development approach, as the market for constructed development land in the surrounding employment area was immature. He also noted that whilst development in the surrounding employment area had not progressed, there was significant developer interest in securing large parcels of land.[105]
195 It transpires, however, Mr Murray did carry out a hypothetical development analysis on the subject land which he did not include in his report.[106] This analysis was based on the 44 lot Coomes plan and costings. Mr Murray had difficulty solving for a market value of $30 million based on available lot prices. An input of $30 million market value produced a profit and risk factor of minus 23%. Mr Murray agreed that on that basis, no developer could afford the hypothetical value of $30 million for the subject land. [107]
196 The expert report prepared by Mr Holland[108] contains a before and after assessment of the value of the subject land at the relevant date using the comparable sales methodology. Mr Holland concluded that a value equivalent to $60/m2 for the subject land was both reasonable and supportable on the sales evidence. He also carried out a hypothetical subdivision analysis having regard to notional 'super lots', which generated in an in globo value in the order of $55 to $60/m2. On this basis, Mr Holland concluded that the subject land had a market value of $33 million at the relevant date.
197 Mr Holland was first instructed to prepare a valuation report for the subject land on 8 March 2007. However, he had long been familiar with the subject land, having been retained by Murdesk in 2003 provide advice with respect to the Bypass proceeding, and he continued to be involved following the MWM acquisition.
198 Mr Holland based his valuation on the significance of strategically planned development for land along Cooper Street and the great benefits this would have held for the subject land, had it not been compulsorily acquired. Had it not been for the uncertainty of the timing for rezoning which arose from the Bypass and MWM acquisitions, the subject land would have been included in a Comprehensive Development Zone by the relevant date.
199 Like Mr Murray, it was Mr Holland's view that an analysis on a direct comparison basis of known sales only in the immediate vicinity of the subject land would not give a definitive view of the market value of the land as at the relevant date. Sales of land opposite the subject land were made some years before the relevant date and there was uncertainty about when the rezoning of the land would occur and when new and expanded infrastructure, particularly sewerage, would be mandated. Moreover, there was little sales activity at or around the relevant date and what available land there was in the Cooper Street area was controlled by a small number of owners who were not desirous of selling.
200 According to Mr Holland, against the background that values elsewhere in the metropolitan area were escalating at a rapid rate, it was difficult to accurately determine value levels in the market. In the circumstances, it was both necessary and useful to consider sales elsewhere in the metropolitan area. Mr Holland found transactions in other locations useful to support an upward adjustment for the subject land because it had attributes which made it significantly superior to the older sales in the immediate locality.
201 According to Mr Holland, there was a significant increase in values in the Cooper Street precinct between 2004 and the relevant date, and this correlated with the massive growth in industrial land values throughout metropolitan Melbourne generally. At the relevant date there was a 'seemingly insatiable demand' for land suitable for industrial and commercial development in the western and south-eastern growth corridors of Melbourne. This, together with the superior characteristics of the subject land (its corner location on Cooper Street and the Hume Freeway, the immediate availability of services to enable development, and its position in one of the most rapidly emerging regions in the metropolitan area), led to the reasonable conclusion that the subject land would have been highly sought after and attracted a premium price.
202 According to Mr Holland, industrial land in the west was inferior to the subject land, largely because the subject land was in a proposed Comprehensive Development Zone which was far more flexible and encouraging of developments for employment generating uses. As to the south-east, Mr Holland observed that premium prices for predominantly industrial land were being achieved, and that the trend was strongly upward. However, much of the land in the south-east had an inferior zoning and large areas were purchased subject to anticipated rezoning. In respect to the Cooper Street area, he said:
In neither the west nor the south-east could it be said that a key gateway and business park site was available to be purchased at the time. The compelling factors of the constraint of such a (relatively) small land supply coupled with a burgeoning population and workforce combined to make the Cooper Street Precinct one of the most desirable in the Melbourne Metropolitan area and, in this regard, it would be literally impossible for Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd to replace its land with a similarly zoned gateway site suitable for development as a 'business park'.[109]
203 Mr Holland's principal sales in the northern region were 25 Cooper Street, 135 O'Herns Road, Heyington Avenue, 310 Cooper Street and 300 Cooper Street. According to Mr Holland:
(a) 25 Cooper Street required adjustment to equate it to the subject land to reflect, among other things, that it was an elongated parcel with limited frontage to Cooper Street, was not a prominent corner location and had what Mr Holland considered to be inferior zoning (Industrial 1). Mr Holland also observed that the timeframe necessary to achieve a rezoning of 25 Cooper Street might have been reflected in the terms sale price. Based on adjustments for the above factors, Mr Holland posited an equivalent value for the subject land in the order of $54/m².[110]
(b) The first O'Herns Road sale had a cash equivalent rate of $40/m² and the second a cash equivalent rate of $47.36/m². Whilst the second sale was completed after the relevant date and negotiations must be assumed to have been concluded with the knowledge of the MWM project, upward adjustments had to be made to equate it to the subject land to reflect, among other things, its inferior location (north of land owned or controlled by Northpoint which did not benefit from Cooper Street or Hume Freeway exposure), the state of O'Herns Road, the effect of the proposed transport corridor running through it, its topography (parts of the land were stony rises and other parts low lying and wet) and the fact that rezoning occurred some 19 months after the date of the initial sale in 2005. As a result, 135 O'Herns Road represented 'the very minimum value for the Murdesk land'.[111] With adjustments, this sale suggested a value for the subject land in the order of $51.69/m² before adjustment was made for the superior zoning.
(c) Heyington Avenue required adjustment to equate it to the subject land to reflect, among other things, that it was rear land which did not have ease of access to the metropolitan ring road system and it did not benefit from the same 'higher' zoning assumed for the subject land. This sale suggested a value for the subject land in the order of $62/m² before adjustment was made for the superior zoning of the subject land.
(d) 310 Cooper Street sold for a cash equivalent of $29.28/m². However, that sale should be treated with caution because it was a related party transaction and because it was clear from the Heyington Avenue and Fairbairn Road sales that land values had escalated substantially between the date of sale and the relevant date. Moreover, 310 Cooper Street required some 300,000 cubic metres of fill. On the basis of fill costs of $7.70 per cubic metre, filling would cost $2.3 million and take some years to complete. The sale of 310 Cooper Street suggested a value for the subject land in the order of $60/m² before adjustment was made for the superior zoning of the subject land.
(e) 300 Cooper Street sold for a cash equivalent of $20.21/m². However, a number of factors affected its value and its usefulness as a comparison to the subject land, in particular, the area required for a detention basin and drainage channel and the fact that significant fill was required for the remainder of the land. The cost of filling would be $635,250 and would take some years to complete. Adjustments were therefore required for fill, the time needed to place and compact it, the time to achieve rezoning and for the superior location of the subject land. Moreover, the sale was to interests associated with Northpoint, who would logically develop it after development of the adjoining land to the west. Development of 300 Cooper Street would therefore have been many years away. These adjustments would suggest a value for the subject land in the order of $41/m² before adjustment for the superior zoning of the subject land.
204 Mr Holland created a spreadsheet - Appendix G - for the five northern sales in which he made adjustments to take into account the following factors: terms, developable area, fill, time to relevant date, existence of MWM, location, size and shape and 'up-zoning'. Amounts for adjustments have been progressively added to or subtracted from the sale price. Thus, for example:
(a) 300 Cooper Street began with a cash price of $20.59/m², which Mr Holland adjusted to $25.77/m² for developable area, then to $28.36/m² to account for the cost of fill, then to $36.87/m² for time from the relevant date, then to $40.55/m² for location, then to $44.61/m² for up-zoning;
(b) 135 O'Herns Road began with a cash price of $47.36/m², which Mr Holland adjusted up to $47.57/m² for developable area, then down to $42.81/m² because the existence of the MWM was known, then up to $49.23/m² for location, then up to $51.69/m² for shape and finally to $56.86/m² for up-zoning;
(c) 25 Cooper Street began with a cash price of $33.55/m², but was adjusted up to $42.78/m² on the basis of time to relevant date, then to $49.20/m² on the basis of location, then to $54.12/m² on the basis of shape and finally to $59.53/m² for up-zoning.
205 Based on the adjustments made in respect of the sales of the five properties, Mr Holland concluded that the average adjusted price for the subject land was $60.86/m².
206 Mr Holland analysed Fairbairn Road as having a cash equivalent price of approximately $49.17/m². It was not as well located and had inferior zoning to the subject land, but provided a useful comparison with the Heyington Avenue sale and gave further support to the general proposition that at the relevant date any large parcel of well located and appropriately zoned industrial land was worth in excess of $50/m².
207 Mr Holland explained his fundamental approach to valuing the subject land when he gave evidence of how he went about tracing increases in market value over time using graphs and trend lines. He included two graphs in his report that showed increases in prices for land in the west and in the east that he explained as follows:
What I sought to do...was to take a representative sample of sales transactions in both the south east and the west, and just graph the transactions to get an idea of what was happening...[t]he task of a valuer is traditionally rooted in proceeding through life with their eyes on the rear vision mirror, but the reality is that the development community and the investment community and speculative community don't do that. They put rose coloured glasses on and try to predict, and they have an understanding of where the market's going, but they can't always rationalise it.[112]
208 Mr Holland explained that he selected some sales after the relevant date because looking at those transactions in more detail gave an understanding of what was going on, and it was possible to better see why events had occurred. This helped to understand what had happened in another location, in this instance, the subject land, where valuers were asked to assume that services, major infrastructure and zoning were in place.[113]
209 According to Mr Holland, it was clear from his analysis in the south-east and the west that demand for industrial land, including for commercial, office and 'big box' retail,[114] was growing at such a rate that it was difficult to ascertain the true strength of demand at the relevant date for land in Cooper Street. It was a known fact, however, that investment companies, developers, institutional holdings, many of which were driven by the needs of the superannuation funds, were very active in the market and it was clear from the expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield land as to who was looking to buy land in the Cooper Street location. Investment funds had unprecedented cash reserves at a time when everybody was encouraged to put 'massive amounts of money' into superannuation with the result that the superannuation funds were 'awash with funds' and desperately trying to get their weighting back into property.[115] For that reason, Mr Holland took the view that it was legitimate to value the subject land wearing the 'rose coloured predictive glasses' worn by the development community.
210 Mr Holland also undertook a hypothetical subdivisional analysis based upon the Coomes plan and costs.[116] However, he considered that a more reliable view of the in globo land value would be obtained by considering the sale of the land in 'super lots', as a super lot development would give the developer the opportunity to maximise returns by selling high value lots along the Cooper Street frontage first and to fund further development. He therefore undertook a further hypothetical subdivision analysis having regard to a plan prepared at his request that showed three large lots that could be further subdivided as demand warranted. The super lot plan showed two or three large allotments fronting Cooper Street which were capable of immediate sale and development, with larger super lots to the rear which could be sold to large end users or be developed over time as servicing and infrastructure requirements were satisfied. The development scenario was two or three large lots with frontage to Cooper Street suitable for a variety of uses, a stage 1 super lot immediately capable of development with ten lots to the south, a stage 2 super lot immediately capable of development into 14 lots and a stage three super lot further to the south capable of development into 20 additional lots (plus reserves and drainage basins).
211 Based on realisations for the three stages of $57,270,000, development costs of $3,346,599, interest on land at 6.38% and a profit and loss factor of 20%, this analysis produced an in globo value for the subject land of $32,639,000 or $59.19/m².
212 Mr Wallace is now retired, but was a certified practising valuer, a licensed estate agent and auctioneer. He was very familiar with the subject land, as he provided advice to Murdesk on the Bypass acquisition and as to the use and development of the remaining land. He was also an adviser to Mr Peter Haberfield on the expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield estate land. Mr Wallace has detailed first hand knowledge of that campaign, and it would be fair to say that he holds strong views about the actions of the State government in bringing the expressions of interest process to an abrupt end by using its power of compulsory acquisition and about the lost opportunity for that land.
213 Notwithstanding his long involvement with the subject and its neighbouring land, it was only on 24 March 2011 that Mr Wallace received formal instructions to prepare a valuation report in relation to the subject land for the purpose of this proceeding.
214 In his expert report dated 11 July 2011, Mr Wallace summarised the history of the subject land and surrounds. According to Mr Wallace, by purchasing the subject land, Murdesk obtained an uncommonly suitable site for development and investment. The subject land had a wide frontage to Cooper Street and no obvious features which would be expensive to overcome before it could be developed. It was conveniently located to the arterial network, had good exposure to the Bypass and was an ideal site for development. By the time it was compulsorily acquired, it was unique not only in the Cooper Street employment area, but very likely in the whole of the metropolitan area.
215 In Mr Wallace's view, the highest and best use of the land was for a subdivision development for employment-generating purposes and investment, possibly in conjunction with the Haberfield land. The nature of the development would be similar to Northpoint.
216 Mr Wallace assumed[117] that by the relevant date, essential services, including reticulated sewerage, would have been available and that the land would have been rezoned as a Comprehensive Development Zone or would have been ripe for such rezoning, which would have been accompanied by comprehensive overlays and permit conditions. [118]
217 Having regard to the foregoing, it was Mr Wallace's view that a prudent and well informed developer and investor considering the purchase of the subject land at the relevant date would have taken into account:
(a) its size, location and suitability for development;
(b) the scarcity of other sites in the location (given that it was the last broadacre property capable of being developed within the Cooper Street employment area fronting Cooper Street);
(d) the various feasibility studies that had been prepared for the land;
(f) the savings on rates, statutory charges and land tax for so long as it retained its rural zoning.
218 Mr Wallace observed that broadacre rural land in the proposed new suburb of Epping North and in the Cooper Street area moved from rural to urban status in a relatively short time at a relatively late stage in the history of urban growth in Melbourne, and in accordance with thorough and detailed planning policies. This meant that large and significant property development corporations quickly became interested in purchasing broadacre land in those areas, as was demonstrated by the expressions of interest lodged for the Haberfield estate land in October 2004. The most appropriate method for realising the subject land in such circumstances was to offer it to a broadly selected range of the types of corporations that had lodged expressions of interest for the Haberfield estate land, to fully inform them of the nature of the property and the terms of the proposed contract of sale, and to solicit expressions of interest.
219 It was Mr Wallace's view that broadacre sales did not provide a satisfactory basis on which to assess the value of the subject land. In his view, the subject land was superior to the comparable sales, but it was difficult to find a rationale to quantify the extent of that superiority.[119] He concluded that a hypothetical subdivision analysis would be a more reliable valuation methodology and better reflect market conditions at the relevant date. By this means, Mr Wallace sought to assess what the subject land would have realised if offered to a broadly selected range of corporations for sale by expressions of interest.
220 Mr Wallace carried out a 'capacity analysis' based on the 44 lot Coomes plan and costings. This involved a hypothetical subdivision of the subject land and the sale of lots in 3 stages, which produced an underlying in globo land value in the order of $40.2 million. From this, Mr Wallace concluded that the development opportunity of the subject land was highly profitable, showing a likely return on the land of not less than $30 million. Having provided a margin of $10.2 million to allow for the different ways in which developers would carry out the subdivision and for risks of various kinds, he assessed the market value of the subject land as at the relevant date at $30 million.
221 A statement of the evidence of Peter Richard Dickinson was tendered by the Secretary.[120] Mr Dickinson is a certified practising valuer and a Director of Valuation and Advisory Services for CB Richard Ellis (V) Pty Ltd ('CBRE'). He was approached by Mr Dickey in late January 2005 to value the subject land[121] for financing purposes. He subsequently received a letter of instruction from Suncorp-Metway Ltd to carry out a valuation for first mortgage security purposes.
222 Mr Dickinson produced a valuation report on 23 March 2005, assessing the market value of the subject land for first mortgage security purposes at $16.5 million as at 24 February 2005.
223 In determining the direct comparison rate for the subject land, Mr Dickinson considered 11 properties, but had particular regard to five of them, including the expressions of interest in the Haberfield estate land, 310 and 300 Cooper Street, Mt Derrimut Road, and Fairbairn Road.
224 In relation to Fairbairn Road, Mr Dickinson noted that at the time of sale, the property represented the last major infill site in Melbourne's west and was highly sought after by developers and property trusts seeking to expand their land banks. As a result, the sale price represented a record deal for the western industrial market, indicating a rate of $51.67/m².
225 Like Mr Holland and Mr Wallace, Mr Dickinson observed that the appetite for broadacre commercial/industrial development land at that time was strong and that the subject land benefited from a number of key attributes, including its inclusion within Amendment C31, its topography and size, its extensive exposure to the new Hume Freeway and interchange, the major upgrade works to Cooper Street, the urban expansion of the residential areas on Melbourne's northern fringe and the siting of the MWM on land adjoining the subject land. He concluded:
Notwithstanding the relatively high 'entry price' for the land coupled with high landholding costs (in particular State Land Tax), possible short to medium term restrictions on land development due to servicing issues, several large development companies/institutions would be keen to acquire the subject land parcel particularly given past experiences of land adjoining major freeway interchanges (e.g. Western Ring Road/Boundary Road interchange at Laverton) and the popularity of occupiers to such strategic land parcels.
An argument could be mounted that the land in its current state is subject to a Rural land zone designation and implementation of proposed Amendment C31 is not yet a reality. Whilst this is in fact a true reflection of the current situation, one needs to consider the thought/motivation of a prospective land bank purchaser. Given the extent of research and information undertaken by the City of Whittlesea to amendment C31 coupled with the relocation of the MWM to Cooper Street, Epping and the strategic nature of the subject site, such a purchaser class, in our opinion, would be prepared to accept short to medium term delays in development in order to secure such a prime freeway interchange site.[122]
226 Mr Dickinson subsequently received correspondence from Mr Dickey advising that the land was to be acquired for the MWM and asking for his view as to what was a fair and reasonable rent for the three months that the Secretary intended to occupy the land before becoming its registered owner. On 12 May 2005, Mr Dickinson provided Mr Dickey with a draft letter in which he assessed the rent for a four month occupation, based on a rate of $30/m² per annum plus GST. On about 17 May 2005, he received a letter from Mr Dickey asking him to make two changes to the draft letter: the first was to correct a reference to applicable legislation; the second was to refer to the unencumbered freehold land value as '$30 - $40/m²' rather than '$30/m²'. This amendment was intended to give Mr Dickey 'some room to move on the compensation case!' Although Mr Dickinson amended the letter as requested, he did not change the amount of rent that he had assessed.
227 On 25 January 2006, approximately 3 months after the relevant date, Mr Holland provided an opinion to Murdesk's then solicitors that a value for the subject land 'in excess of $40 per sqm may be sustainable' ('Mr Holland's January 2006 opinion').
228 As the Authority pointed out in its written submissions, Mr Holland's January 2006 opinion followed conferences with counsel and with Mr Dickey and responded to initial instructions given in November 2005, and the advice that the Secretary had offered $14.1 million in compensation (which Mr Holland described as 'grossly inadequate'). Mr Holland's January 2006 opinion involved consideration and discussion of the then relatively recent sale of 25 Cooper Street. Having regard to the terms price for 25 Cooper Street of $37/m², Mr Holland wrote:
Subject to confirmation of the Hewitt sale [25 Cooper Street], and based on my knowledge of recent purchases of rural land suitable for rezoning in the western suburbs at close to $30 per sqm, and subject to Coomes advice about timing for rezoning and servicing costs, I believe a value in excess of $40 per sqm may be sustainable for the MWM acquisition but am unable to commit to a figure at this time.
229 Mr Holland explained in evidence that this meant that he considered the subject land to be worth more than $40/m².
230 Some two and a half months later, on about 7 April 2006 and following a request from Mr Dickey made the previous day, Mr Holland provided a certificate of valuation for the subject land for $27.5 million or $50/m². Mr Holland was told by Mr Dickey that a claim had been lodged in February 2006 at a director's valuation at $500,000 per hectare. Mr Dickey asked whether Mr Holland could provide a Certificate of Valuation at that rate 'without spending a lot of time on it'. Mr Holland apparently obliged.
231 On 15 February 2006, Mr Wallace prepared a tax invoice addressed to Murdesk in respect of advice given and as to the 'valuation figure set out in our certificate of valuation of $22,000,000'.
232 The certificate of valuation for $22 million was not before the Court. The Court was informed that it could not be located.
233 The invoice in question was re-issued by Mr Wallace the following day, 16 February 2006. The re-issued invoice makes no reference to the certificate of valuation or, indeed, to any valuation carried out by Mr Wallace.
234 Mr Wallace was asked whether he carried out a valuation of the subject land at about the date of the original tax invoice (15 February 2006). He said:
No, I didn't. What I did was I'd been asked to provide a range of what I considered may be appropriate for the...value of the property resulting from the acquisition and to discuss what had occurred with Haberfield and I collated a lot of information, put it together and on the basis of what had occurred with Haberfield, I warned Murdesk that if you assumed that the Haberfield experience in relation to the expressions of interest were - of interest were treated in a certain way, you may not be able to sustain a direct comparison, using Haberfield, of a figure more than 22. Now, he didn't like that advice. He didn't like my warning to him and he refused to accept it and I received no formal instruction to proceed with a valuation and hand over the detail of those recommendations...[123]
235 Mr Wallace agreed that he had prepared a certificate of valuation for $22 million. He qualified his answer by saying that it was prepared on a certain basis. He agreed that he prepared the certificate after he had reviewed and analysed comparable sales and related considerations and that he had done the work that was set out in the invoice. After preparing the certificate of valuation he had discussed it with Mr Dickey. He said, 'I responded to his letter to me asking me to consider the range within which the property might sell ... or be valued and I gave him the bad news and on the basis of the bad news, it may be $22 million.' He also said, 'It was not my view of the market value of the land acquired. It was my view of the impact of the Haberfield experience which I considered to be an absolute disgrace and the way in which it could and is being used'.[124]
236 Mr Wallace was asked again whether, having regard to the sales of 25 Cooper Street, 300 Cooper Street, 310 Cooper Street and the Haberfield expressions of interest, he put pen to paper and put down the figure of $22 million as being his view as to the value of the land. He said:
I qualified it clearly on the basis of the experience on Haberfield and the likely application of that experience by people involved with the acquiring authority and it was a qualified opinion and that's what I was asked to do. To provide a range and that was the lower of the range and that's why I didn't proceed with the formal detailed valuation, nor did I send the account in that format at all because the account that I did send, and you will have a copy of that, says that I ... haven't got the copy of the account but it says that I will review and complete my advice on receipt of formal instructions to do so by your solicitor, words to that effect.[125]
237 He later described the advice that he gave as a review - and a careful review - of 'the impact of the Haberfield disaster and the effect that that may create in relation to a fair and reasoned valuation outcome as a result of the acquisition'.[126]
238 The valuers are a long way apart on the market value of the subject land: the Secretary's valuers (and Mr Dickinson) have valued the land in the range of $15 million to $18 million; Murdesk's valuers have valued it in the range of $30 million to $33 million - almost twice as much. This reflects a fundamental difference in approach to the valuation of the subject land. Murdesk's valuers have attempted to value the land to reflect what they believe to have been the strength of the market and the existence of a bevy of cashed up developers wearing the rose coloured predictive glasses that Mr Holland alluded to, rather than to deploy what Mr Wallace identified the 'diminishing perspective' of the more conventional valuations carried out by the Secretary's valuers.
239 To the extent that the valuers relied upon comparable sales, the disagreements centred on the following issues:
(a) the significance of sales after the relevant date as opposed to sales before the relevant date;
(b) the differences between the regions and, in particular, whether sales in the south-east were comparable to those in the north and whether, as between the north and the west, the west was 'best';
(c) whether 'infill' as opposed to 'green field' sites were truly comparable with the subject land;
(d) whether the subject land was better positioned and zoned than other land in the vicinity, in particular, 25 Cooper Street;
(e) generally, whether the subject land would attract a premium because of its special attributes.
240 For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that:
(a) Sales before the relevant date are more useful than sales after the relevant date to determine what would have been in the mind of the hypothetical purchaser at the relevant date. In this case, the contemporaneous valuations are to be preferred to those that were prepared many years after the relevant date;
(b) The northern region was more closely comparable to the west than to the south-east. However, both the south-east and the west were more established industrial areas and more sought after for industrial purposes than the north, particularly the Cooper Street precinct, which was less developed than the Hume corridor further to the west;
(c) Servicing remained an issue for the subject land, given its comparative isolation and the fact that it was on the fringes of development. I accept the evidence that infill sites will generally be easier to service, on the assumption that the surrounding development is already serviced, and will enjoy the benefits of concentrated commercial activity and the proximity of larger numbers of commercial users. Caution must be exercised in comparing the subject land, as a greenfield site, with infill sites in established industrial or commercial areas;
(d) The subject land and 25 Cooper Street, which I consider to be the most comparable sale, enjoyed locational advantages of different kinds;
(e) The subject land had many very good attributes. I am unpersuaded, however, that those attributes took it as far out of the price range for similar land in the north and the west as contended for by Murdesk's valuers. In particular, I am not persuaded that the deemed Comprehensive Development zoning made the subject land more valuable than comparable land zoned for industrial uses.
241 After careful consideration of the expert evidence, and having had regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches that were adopted, I prefer the evidence of Messrs Torr and Brown to the evidence of Messrs Murray, Holland and Wallace. Overall, I prefer the evidence of Mr Brown, and it is Mr Brown's expert opinion upon which I propose to base the award of compensation for the market value of the subject land.[127]
242 Murdesk submitted that the subject land had 'premium' status by virtue of its location beside the Freeway ramps, its substantial frontage to Cooper Street, and its proximity to the CBD and to rail, air and sea terminals. The fact that Major Projects Victoria, having searched far and wide for a suitable vacant site for the MWM, selected the subject land above all others suggested that there was no other vacant site which was superior to the subject land at the relevant date. The subject land was unique in that it had a combination of attributes that made it suitable for 'higher end' uses and this justified a substantial loading.
243 The Secretary's valuers accepted that the subject land had many strong attributes, including freeway access and visibility, extensive Cooper Street frontage, reasonably level land, and a zoning that encouraged business and industrial development. However, these attributes belonged to land in a secondary market that had little existing development. Moreover, the attributes were largely shared by its neighbours, such as the Haberfield land and Northpoint.
244 The claim that the subject land was the best development land in Melbourne at the relevant date cannot be accepted, given the immature or 'emerging' nature of the Epping Bulge as an industrial/employment area, its relative isolation from other industrial areas, delays in the provision of reticulated sewerage to at least parts of the land, and the emerging awareness of the presence of GSM on degraded as well as non-degraded land on the northern plains. It is instructive that both Mr Holland and Mr Wallace expressed opinions as to the value of the subject land closer to the relevant date which were much more conservative than the views that they expressed in 2011, and much closer to those of the Secretary's valuers.
245 The range of value of $15,120,000 to $18 million arrived at by the Secretary's valuers was consistent with prices being achieved for industrial/employment land across the northern and western regions at the time. It was also consistent with Mr Dickinson's valuation in March 2005. By contrast, in reaching values of $30 million plus for the subject land at the relevant date, Murdesk's valuers had to justify a significant departure from the range of values established for in globo industrial land in the northern region as at the relevant date. As a result, Mr Murray and Mr Holland relied heavily on sales well after the relevant date, together with sales of infill land that was more readily developable than the subject land. Mr Holland made much of the ability of the land to support what he called 'higher uses' and emphasised its 'superior' zoning in the absence of any evidence that these factors would dramatically increase the price of the land in the manner for which he contended.
246 Mr Murray's valuation report contains error and inconsistency that was exposed in cross-examination. His 'valuation rationale' includes passages which were apparently added between 5pm on 7 July 2011 and the filing of his report on 11 July 2011. Comparison of the final version of Mr Murray's report with the draft that was circulated four days earlier on 7 July 2011 shows, among other things, that:
(a) the description of the property market in the northern area has been changed from 'immature' to 'emerging';
(b) the upper figure in the range of prices for outer northern Melbourne has been changed from $500,000 per hectare to $965,000 per hectare (although this is an error);
(c) the rate per hectare for the subject land has been increased from $500,000 to $550,000, the 'before assessment' has been increased from $27,590,000 to $30,350,000 and the overall assessment from $27,570,000 to $30,330,000;
(d) Five new paragraphs have been inserted with regard to:
(i) the price paid for O'Herns Road reflecting its inferior rear position with consequences for rezoning and lead in time for development;
(ii) lot prices in the north being comparable with lot prices in the west;
(iii) the Kador sale, which was said to show a significant rise in the in globo market generally.
247 Having regard to his report as a whole, the amendments to Mr Murray's valuation rationale give the impression that they were made to bolster a valuation of $55/m² when the analysis in the main body of the report did not support such a value. For instance, the Kador sale was referred to only in general commentary in the main body of the report. However, in the amended valuation rationale, the Kador sale was relied upon to justify a steep increase in the value of the subject land.
248 Mr Murray acknowledged in cross-examination that his conclusion that the subject land should be valued at $55/m² could not stand with other statements in his report, namely:
(a) the outer west is a strong area heavily committed as to both zoned and unzoned future development holdings;
(b) outer northern/industrial/future employment area of Epping, Epping North and Craigieburn achieved consistently lower value rates than the alternative employment areas of outer western Melbourne; and
(c) the majority of outer western growth area sales reflected rates concentrated between $225,000 per hectare and $300,000 per hectare.
249 Mr Murray agreed that if the majority of sales in the west reflected rates concentrated between $225,000 and $300,000 per hectare, then 'there's no way the market value of the subject at October 2005 would exceed 300,000 per hectare'.[128]
250 In the course of preparing his valuation report, Mr Murray circulated to Murdesk's lawyers and advisers a sales commentary dated 23 April 2007, part of which was in evidence. The 2007 sales commentary formed part of a draft of Mr Murray's expert report and considered 12 sales in the immediate vicinity of the subject land, including the July 2006 sale of 135 O'Herns Road. In his 2007 sales commentary, Mr Murray said:
We note that the preceding sales evidence generally reflect a broad range of overall land rates of between $80,000 per hectare and $540,000 per hectare, depending on size, location, date of sale, and proximity to zoned land. The majority of sales reflect rates concentrated between $165,000 per hectare and $300,000 per hectare.[129]
251 The final statement about the concentration of rates in the north has not survived to be included in Mr Murray's final report.[130] However, all of the sales referred to in Mr Murray's final report pre-date his 2007 sales commentary, so the statement in the 2007 sales commentary that sales in the north reflected rates concentrated between $165,000 per hectare and $300,000 per hectare remained accurate as at the date of Mr Murray's final report.
252 Mr Murray accepted that there were no sales in the north or the west prior to the relevant date that put a price on in globo land of more than $300,000 per hectare.[131] Three of the four sales specifically listed in his valuation rationale (all of them in the northern region) occurred prior to the relevant date. The fourth, the sale of 135 O'Herns Road in mid-2006, was included in the 2007 sales commentary. At that time, Mr Murray also had information concerning the purported December 2005 sale of O'Herns Road to Demar.[132] Nonetheless, Mr Murray concluded his 2007 sales commentary in relation to the outer northern growth area with the statement that the majority of sales reflected rates concentrated between $165,000 per hectare and $300,000 per hectare.[133]
253 Mr Murray, like Messrs Brown and Torr, regarded the west as superior to the north. The west was considered to be a more established and stronger industrial area, which consistently achieved higher rates than the industrial/employment area in Epping. However, the only sale in the west at the level of value ascribed by Mr Murray to the subject land was the Kador sale. This was described by Mr Murray as an 'elevated sale'[134] and was excluded from the range of $225,000 to $300,000 per hectare in which he said sales were concentrated. The rate of $55/m² is very much higher than the vast majority of the sales evidence in the outer west in 2004, 2005 and 2006.
254 As the Secretary pointed out in its written submissions, two of the sales relied upon by Mr Murray in the outer west were properties on Robinsons Road, which were purchased by Leighton Properties and the Pellicano Group. Both of these developers lodged expressions of interest for the Haberfield estate land. The Pellicano Group's expression of interest, which was for both future industrial and future residential land, was $210,000 per hectare. One year later, in November 2005, it paid $244,000 per hectare when it purchased 165 Robinsons Road. It seems unlikely that the Pellicano Group would have offered $550,000 per hectare for the subject land at about the same date. The subject land may well have been superior to the Robinsons Road property, but not that much superior.
255 On this basis, an assessment of $550,000 per hectare for the subject land is difficult to justify. That, presumably, is why the Kador sale assumed significance in the final version of Mr Murray's report.
256 The Secretary submitted, and I accept, that the preparation of Mr Murray's report was influenced by Mr Dickey. When Mr Murray was instructed by Best Hooper in December 2006, he was given a copy of the notice of claim which clearly set out Murdesk's claim for $27.5 million ($50/m²). In April 2007, Mr Murray met with the legal advisers to Murdesk, who identified what were described as 'two main sales', including 135 O'Herns Road. After that meeting, Mr Dickey arranged to provide Mr Murray with a copy of sales evidence and analysis that he, Mr Dickey, had prepared.[135] In a later conference with legal advisers, Mr Dickey's views were again communicated to Mr Murray.
257 I find that Mr Dickey is likely to have influenced Mr Murray's views about the premium status of the land which underpin the value of $30.33 million that he adopted. The rest of Mr Murray's analysis provides poor support for such a value.
258 Although he did not include a hypothetical subdivision analysis in his expert report, Mr Murray carried out hypothetical subdivision checks using the Estatemaster program. He produced documents relating to this analysis on subpoena and was cross-examined about his results. Using the 44 lot Coomes plan and costings, gross realisations of $56.54 million and a profit and risk allowance of 17.67%, Mr Murray's analysis generated a market value for the subject land of $15 million or $27.20/m². When he carried out an analysis adopting $30 million as the land value, the analysis produced negative profit and risk and was not financially viable.[136]
259 Again, this calls into question the value of $30.33 million arrived at by Mr Murray.
260 I do not accept Mr Murray's valuation of the subject land at $30.33 million.
261 Mr Holland's evidence is also called into question by the lengthy course of dealing between Mr Holland and Mr Dickey and his advisers over a five year period. In my view, this course of dealing severely compromised Mr Holland's independence and must affect the weight that the Court can give to his opinion as to the value of the subject land. That course of dealing was set out in detail in an earlier ruling on the admissibility of Mr Holland's evidence,[137] but it bears repeating in part. While it did not render Mr Holland's evidence inadmissible, it affects the weight that can be given to it.
262 Two volumes of documents were tendered in evidence that reveal the course of dealings between Mr Holland and Mr Dickey.[138] They show exchanges of views and information well before the date upon which Mr Holland received instructions to prepare his valuation report.[139] These interactions continued and intensified in the period leading up to its production. I have already referred to the events in January and April 2006 that led to Mr Holland preparing a certificate of valuation for $27.57 million, which he apparently did at Mr Dickey's request to support a director's valuation for Murdesk's claim against the Secretary. In May 2007, Mr Holland had a discussion with Mr Dickey in which Mr Dickey said he wanted to lodge a claim based on values around $575,000 per hectare and asked Mr Holland whether he thought this was justifiable. Mr Holland's view was that, subject to the land being zoned to permit employment generating uses 'at RD of 10/06 [sic] and servicing not being in issue', $50-60/m2 did not seem unrealistic, given growth in region (population and business) and accessibility from the freeway. It is not clear whether this view was based on a misapprehension that the acquisition took place in October 2006.
263 In 2007, 2008 and 2009, Mr Holland and Mr Dickey had sporadic contact. In July 2009, Mr Dickey prepared and circulated a letter describing 'the next step in the process looking at the general position to see what we actually need our consulting and valuation team to do'. This letter (the 'strategy letter') set out how Mr Dickey thought Murdesk's case ought to be presented and what the evidence needed to cover and emphasise. The strategy letter was provided to Mr Holland and his annotations show that he read it carefully.
264 In the strategy letter, Mr Dickey included a section entitled 'Affidavit content: CPG, Valuation, Murdesk' in which he referred to the need for there to be 'a strength thread running through our evidence' in nominated areas. These included the importance of the Epping Bulge and the land within it, the pro-active and supportive local council, the positive planning situation, the absence of sewerage issues, the large premium that the Cooper St/Freeway corner would attract, the advantage of the Hume Highway frontage and so on. Mr Dickey expressed the view that the chief comparable sale was 135 O'Herns Road, with value added for location, sewerage and sequencing. Under a heading 'Valuation', Mr Dickey advocated a focus on 'value items', including the Epping Bulge as an important new development area, the corner location, the freeway exposure, the fact that the site was the last development site after Mr Haberfield's land, and that it was 'clean'. He again set out what he considered to be the prime comparables and the need to 'ram home' that the MWM was not the best and highest use for the site. He referred to 'exponential' and 'rapidly rising' land prices.
265 On 3 August 2009, Mr Dickey prepared a memorandum for a meeting between him, counsel and Mr Holland concerning the progress of the case generally. The memorandum contains the observation that, 'We will need lots of ammunition to defend our claim, both with our main comparables and other properties. ... We already have some priceless material in the MWM discovered documents'. Once again, Mr Dickey identified the main comparable sale as 135 O'Herns Road. He also set out the adjustment that needed to be made for this sale.
266 On 20 August 2009, Mr Holland sent an email to Mr Dickey with the subject 'MWM - valuation strategy' concerning the meeting the previous day, listing a series of issues 'for your input and guidance'. There followed a series of questions and observations in relation to the provision of information for the purposes of the valuation.
267 On 14 April 2010, Mr Holland sent to Murdesk's counsel schedules of sales in the west and in the south-east that he had prepared. On 27 April 2010, Mr Holland emailed Mr Dickey and Murdesk's counsel in relation to the planning evidence. Mr Holland said:
We need discussion about the planning and servicing in the context of competition for finished lots. The Demar sale helps our cause, but the arguments about servicing etc need to be headed off at the pass!!
I would not suggest instructing other valuer until we can give them the facts about servicing competition - remove that element of doubt, and emphasise the benefit of the Comprehensive Development Zone for employment generating uses.[140]
268 On 20 May 2010, Mr Holland emailed counsel for Murdesk attaching a draft of the approach he was wishing to pursue, which required input from the engineers in relation to a variety of matters. Mr Holland wrote:
You will see from my analysis, this detail is critical to argue 'up' from these sales. You will also see why I think it necessary to glean support from trends elsewhere - including sale 23 which I have not yet included in the discussion (draft).
I think you will agree, this is too important not to get absolutely right, and CPG's [Coomes'] assistance will be vital to achieving this. [141]
269 On 25 May 2010, Mr Holland sent a signed copy of a draft report to Murdesk valuing the subject land at $27.5 million. However, on 31 May 2010, Mr Holland emailed Murdesk's solicitors asking when the engineers would be responding to his requests for information and querying when he needed to provide a draft report. He said that 'this' (presumably the information outstanding from the engineers) would be important to help support his argument for a value equivalent of $50/m2. He said he was happy to submit his draft earlier than later to ensure appropriate discussion about the basis of his assessment, 'particularly in light of the claim figure of $33.0 million, equivalent to nearly $60.00 psm'. [142]
270 On 22 June 2010, Mr Holland prepared a further draft report valuing the subject land at $27.6 million. This draft referred to an appreciable lift in land prices around Cooper Street due to scarcity, and commented on the Haberfield land having 'large areas' used for extractive industry and the need to make an upward adjustment for the notional fill required for the Haberfield land. On 29 June 2010, Mr Dickey provided comments on Mr Holland's draft report emphasising that the subject land was no ordinary land holding. He informed Mr Holland that the subject land was 'outstanding' and 'irreplaceable'.
271 On 19 and 20 October 2010, there was an exchange of emails between Mr Holland and Mr Dickey concerning a spreadsheet analysis of the value of the subject land by reference to the settlement amount arising from the compulsory acquisition of the Haberfield land. In this analysis, Mr Holland included in the cost of the Haberfield land an amount of $15 million for 'civil works'. This added a significant amount to the value of the Haberfield land for the purposes of comparison with the subject land. The $15 million figure was apparently provided to Mr Holland by Mr Dickey based on his understanding of the contents of a letter from Major Projects Victoria to the relevant Minister that Murdesk had obtained on discovery. With the inclusion of the $15 million in the adjusted price of the Haberfield land, Mr Holland arrived at a value for the subject land of $34.2 million (which also included an adjustment of 10% for the subject's corner location). In his covering email to Mr Dickey, Mr Holland said:
Merv, you can fiddle with the figures in the spreadsheet to reflect changes in civil works and actual useable areas resulting from works on Haberfield site and also your own land.
This is a very different exercise to the one you were expressing - of adding $15.00 m to reflect the premium the authority can afford to pay for your land.
I think the correct approach is to determine the value of your land, and then, if you wish, argue that they could pay a premium to secure your site because they were saving $15.00 m in expenditure on Haberfield's land.[143]
272 Mr Dickey responded in some detail, arguing that the subject land would attract a higher premium than 10%. He said it had to be '20% plus'. Mr Holland replied the following day to say he had redone his spreadsheet to reflect the things Mr Dickey had mentioned, although he thought 20% was too much above 'notionally good land values'. He also queried the amount for civil works.
273 On 20 October 2010, Mr Holland emailed counsel for Murdesk to say that he was trying to get Mr Dickey to think carefully about his contention of value based on the Haberfield settlement. Mr Holland observed that '[m]uch hangs on the $15.00 m which seems a huge cost to me.' On 2 November 2010, Mr Holland carried out two further analyses of the Haberfield settlement, adjusting the subject land for its corner location by 10% in the one instance and 20% in the other. The inclusion of the cost of $15 million for civil works remained in both analyses.
274 On 8 December 2010, Mr Holland emailed to Mr Dickey the three graphs he had prepared showing land value trends. He also included a spreadsheet that appears to be an early version of Appendix G. Mr Holland wrote:
Can you call me to discuss what else you were looking for with respect to our analyses if this does not cover what you sought?
275 On 25 February 2011, Mr Holland sent a further draft of his report to Murdesk's solicitors, again valuing the subject land at $27.6 million.
276 On 7 April 2011, Mr Holland emailed Mr Dickey revised sections of his report explaining that he sought to encapsulate in the briefest way a compelling case to look beyond the Cooper Street sales and to the broader metropolitan area for guidance. He said, 'I would be grateful for your feedback when you have a moment'.[144]
277 On 5 May 2011, Mr Holland emailed Mr Dickey thanking him for dinner the previous evening and observing that Mr Dickey would see from Mr Holland's draft report that fill costs, compacting and timing of placement was critical to his basis of assessment - especially if he was to have a clearly demonstrable basis for an increase above $50/m2. Mr Holland asked for 'further feedback' as he continued to refine the final document.
278 On 17 June 2011, Mr Holland emailed to Mr Dickey and counsel his revised valuation report dated 4 May 2011 (again, valuing the land at $27.6 million). The covering email noted that the report was forwarded in the expectation it would be provided to Mr Dickey for review and be ready for Mr Holland to finalise upon his return from overseas.
279 On 6 July 2011, Mr Holland emailed to Mr Dickey and Murdesk's counsel a spreadsheet of adjustments for comparable sales in the area. This appears to be a version of Appendix G, which adjusts four comparable sales in the north by reference to factors such as time, location and zoning. Mr Holland asked Mr Dickey to call him so they could go through the spreadsheet together.
280 The following day, 7 July 2011, Mr Holland emailed to Mr Dickey and counsel his 'super lot' assessment. He said:
It is very sensitive to gross lot realization assumptions so we need to discuss the merits of its inclusion, but I think it is a less risky approach than a full development feasibility.[145]
281 On the same day, Mr Holland emailed to Mr Dickey and counsel Part 1 of his expert witness statement 'for discussion' and, at the end of that day, the final draft of his report.
282 This history shows Mr Holland to have had frequent contact with Mr Dickey for the purposes of preparing his expert report, especially following the strategy letter in 2009, throughout 2010 and while he was in the process of finalising his report in the first half of 2011. Although I found in my earlier ruling that many of the interactions were benign or innocuous, there were many that were inconsistent with an independent valuation process. The language used by Mr Holland in many of the communications is suggestive of collaboration with Mr Dickey and his advisers to maximise the value of the land. Mr Holland referred to his task as one of 'arguing up' the value of the land; references to 'our cause', to 'heading off [opposing arguments] at the pass', to achieving an 'optimum level of value' and so on, indicate that Mr Holland regarded his task as one of advancing the interests of Murdesk in this proceeding.
283 For his part, Mr Dickey treated Mr Holland as member of his team rather than as an impartial and independent expert whose principal obligation was to the Court. The strategy letter is addressed to his team. Mr Holland considered it carefully, as his annotations reveal. Mr Holland repeatedly referred parts of his draft report to Mr Dickey for Mr Dickey's 'input and guidance' and for 'feedback' (and 'further feedback'). In the period during which he was finalising his report, Mr Holland's revisions were sent systematically to Mr Dickey for his review.
284 In May and June 2010, Mr Holland prepared draft reports which valued the subject land at $50/m². In February 2011, Mr Holland's draft report still valued the subject land at $50/m² ($27.6 million). On 7 April 2011, Mr Holland emailed revised sections of his report to Mr Dickey, seeking Mr Dickey's feedback. On 4 May 2011, Mr Holland and Mr Dickey met for dinner. On 5 May, Mr Holland emailed Mr Dickey, referring to his draft report and noting that fill costs were critical if he was to have a 'clearly demonstrable basis for an increase above $50 psm'. The draft report dated 4 May 2011 emailed to Mr Dickey on 17 June 2011 still maintained the value of $50/m². As late as 17 June 2011, Mr Holland was apparently still looking for a basis to justify an increase in value over $50/m². However, on 7 July 2011, he finalised his report with a land value of $60/m². It is unclear what provided the impetus for the increase, as Mr Holland had had previously explored a number of avenues to 'argue up' the value of the land with Mr Dickey. The chronology suggests that Appendix G and the 'super lot' hypothetical development analysis may been important in this regard.
285 In this context, I note that Appendix G also underwent changes. The version prepared as at 8 December 2010 used a lower percentage (1.5% per month) for the adjustment for time.
286 There is nothing wrong with a valuation developing on an iterative basis over time. In my view, however, a concerted attempt to lift the value by exploring different possibilities with the owner seriously undermines the reliability of the valuation.
287 The Secretary pointed to a number of matters in the development of Mr Holland's report that it said demonstrated Mr Dickey's influence. It contended that, as a result of collaboration with Mr Dickey and his advisers, Mr Holland used the higher of two figures provided by the engineering expert for the cost of fill, he did not include the lot sales evidence discussed in his expert report and he omitted to use the third of the three graphs forwarded to Mr Dickey on 8 December 2010 illustrating rising land prices. The Secretary also pointed out that Mr Holland queried, but then accepted, information provided by Mr Dickey that the cost to fill the Haberfield land would be in the order of $15 million.[146] In fact, the $15 million figure was not for fill, but for civil works to enable the construction of the large shed proposed for the MWM.
289 The need for fill on 300 and 310 Cooper Street was an important factor in adjusting up comparable land values. Mr Holland factored in costs of fill at $7.70 per cubic metre for both properties, although Ms Hamila had provided a range of prices for fill. In the case of 310 Cooper Street, this led to an upward adjustment of price by $2,329,250. Mr Holland also carried out an adjustment on the Haberfield land on the basis that civil works would be in the order of $15 million, a figure that he was given by Mr Dickey. Mr Holland accepted this figure, although he had misgivings about it (he said it seemed like a huge cost to him). He then used the $15 million figure to 'adjust up' the Central Equity expression of interest for the Haberfield land from $28.38/m² to $43.31/m².[147] In fact, there was no proper basis for such an adjustment.
290 In my view, Mr Holland's treatment of fill and his use of the $15 million figure expose both the influence of Mr Dickey and Mr Holland's desire to arrive at or justify a particular value for the subject land.
291 It is also the case Mr Holland's use of growth trend graphs (one for the south-east and the other for the west) was selective. He did not use a further graph[148] that he had prepared for all of the sales analysed showing a value for industrial land at about the relevant date of less than $40/m². Although there is no direct evidence as to why the third graph was not included in Mr Holland's report, I infer that it was because it unhelpful to his argument that the subject land was worth $60/m².
292 The same general criticisms can be made about Mr Holland's valuation as are made about Mr Murray's. The vast majority of the sales of industrial land in the neighbouring area and, indeed, in the west,[149] at about the relevant date are nowhere near $60/m². Mr Murray identified the concentration of sales in both the north and the west. $600,000 per hectare is well outside of the ranges identified by Mr Murray.
293 In arriving at a value of $60/m² for the subject land, Mr Holland's opinion is premised on the subject land being not just superior, but very much superior, to the neighbouring land, including the Haberfield land. I do not accept this premise, despite the evidence - which I accept - that the subject land was a very good parcel of land of its kind. Based on the superiority premise, however, Mr Holland made numerous and large upward adjustments when he analysed comparable sales in the vicinity. While Mr Holland was generous with his upward adjustments, he made no downward adjustments for possible delays and expenses in servicing the subject land or for delays or constraints that might arise as a result of environmental issues. He made much of the need for fill on the Northpoint properties (and the Haberfield land), but did not consider whether development of the subject land might have been adversely affected by geological factors of its own, such as the presence of rock.
294 The exercise in Appendix G to Mr Holland's expert report seems to me to be singularly unhelpful in determining what a hypothetical purchaser would have paid for the subject land on the relevant date. The fact that the adjustments to comparable sales made by Mr Holland produced a value for the subject land that was almost double that of five out of six of the comparable sales must raise questions about the method used or whether the sales used were really comparable at all. Yet, with the exception of Heyington Avenue, the sales in question were sales of in globo parcels of land with the same or similar zoning prospects in close proximity to the subject land that took place within 12 months of the relevant date.
295 In my view, the flaw must lie in the method. The percentages that have been applied and the method of cumulatively applying percentages are questionable. I do not accept, for example, that the deemed Comprehensive Development Zone for the subject land requires an adjustment to land zoned for industrial purposes, let alone an upward adjustment of 10% across the board. Adjustments have been made upwards at the rate of 2.5% per month for time from relevant date, but no corresponding downward adjustment has been made to the sale that took place after the relevant date. Moreover, apart from the initial adjustment, each adjustment is made to a previously adjusted figure, so that, for example, a 10% adjustment for up-zoning is made to a figure that already includes a 10% adjustment for shape, as well as an adjustment for time. This process of repeatedly 'adjusting up' already upwardly adjusted prices has resulted in an anomalous valuation for the subject land, in my view.
296 Mr Holland's hypothetical 'super lot' subdivision analysis cannot be used to support the value that he arrived at by direct comparison and adjustment. The difficulty with Mr Holland's subdivision analysis is that his gross realisation of $57,270,000 was based on lot prices in subdivisions that were not 'super lot' subdivisions with minimal development costs, but fully fledged subdivisions with roads and services that involved significant costs. Thus, for example, although Mr Holland's stage 2 comprised two super lots, it was priced on the basis of potentially larger numbers of lots (14, 11 and 3) priced at $150/m2 and $125/m2. As a result, Mr Holland's gross realisation figure was comparable to Mr Brown's $58.69 million for the 79 lot Coomes plan and Mr Murray's $56.54 million for the 44 lot Coomes plan, but he used much lower development costs of only $3,346,599. In effect, Mr Holland's realisations were based on an intensive subdivision, which would entail significant development costs, but his development costs assumed no such intensive development. His analysis is flawed and cannot be used to support the value for which he contends.
297 I do not accept Mr Holland's valuation of $33 million.
298 The last of Murdesk's valuation experts, Mr Wallace, approached the valuation task quite differently from any of the other valuation witnesses. His assessment was heavily based on his long experience and 'feel' for the market. Given Mr Wallace's extensive experience and stature, there is a basis for this approach. However, Mr Wallace did not include in his report any explanation for how the critical $30 million figure for the land value was derived from the $40.2 million figure generated by the capacity analysis. In his oral evidence, Mr Wallace referred generally to the $10.2 million difference being attributable to the variables of timing, staging, costing, yield, form of development, equity, borrowings, interest rate, level of sales and profit and risk allowance. He said that the hypothetical purchaser would 'play with' such variables:
... OK, if you were to double the interest rate and make that as an additional charge in the subdivision, and even if you slightly dropped the rate of sale but kept the level of value, you can come back from 40 back to 34. Playing with things like that. And you can do other things as well [to come back to] 30 million. So I've looked at the range of variables and it doesn't mean that ... you tick one off as you go and therefore include every one. The adjustment of one means that it eliminates another variable because of the activity you've created in the adjustments that you've made.[150]
299 The Secretary submitted that it was not sufficient to refer generally to different adjustments that different purchasers might make depending on different assumptions. Although Mr Wallace allowed $10.2 million for such costs and adjustments, there was no way of knowing from his report or his oral evidence whether that was an appropriate sum or whether costs and adjustments might be twice as much (or some other figure altogether). There was simply no way of testing Mr Wallace's conclusion as to value.
300 I accept this submission. If Mr Wallace's general sense that a margin of about $10 million should be allowed is put to one side, it is not possible to know from Mr Wallace's analysis what the market value of the land is.
301 Murdesk submitted that Mr Wallace carried out his capability analysis with the principal objective of ascertaining what could loosely be described as the value of the land to the owner. Murdesk, as a developer, had invested a considerable amount of time and energy in consultations with the Council and with its consultants, Coomes. This included the preparation of the vision statement[151] in anticipation of the eventual subdivision and development of the subject land. The compulsory acquisition had occurred at exactly the point in time at which Mr Dickey was expecting rezoning to occur. The subject land had been taken from broadacre land to the point where it was likely to be rezoned and was capable of being developed very close to the relevant date. According to Mr Wallace, that was a very rare thing and, in the normal course, an owner would not sell a property like the subject land. For a developer to find a property like the subject land in a scarce market created a very, very strong level of interest and commitment.
302 In my view, this is no answer to the criticism that the way in which Mr Wallace arrived at a value for the subject land is incapable of being tested and inherently uncertain. The fundamental difficulty with Mr Wallace's analysis and modelling is that it does not generate a value for the subject land so much as fix upon one value out of many possible values. Mr Dickey's expenditure of time, effort and money to secure a re-zoning of the land and (if relevant) the preparation of the vision statement would be reflected in the zoning of the land and the timing of development. The need to account for 'value to the owner' does not explain how the figure of $40.2 million produced a market value of $30 million.
303 Furthermore, insofar as he carried out a conventional hypothetical development analysis, Mr Wallace's analysis is questionable in two respects: first, his inputs for gross realisations were very high having regard to the prevailing market at the relevant date because they were based on lot prices achieved after the relevant date; secondly, he did not allow for interest on the land value in his analysis.
304 As to the gross realisation figure, Mr Wallace set out in Appendix 7 to his report lot sales which showed, in respect of lot sales in Northpoint, a range of $130/m² to $221/m² for land on Cooper Street and a range of $90/m² to $96.50/m² for land sitting behind Cooper Street. For other sales in Epping of parcels of land of about 2,000m2, there was a range of $110/m² to $161/m². However, Mr Wallace did not use these lot sales, despite having included them in his report. The lot prices used by Mr Wallace were in the range of $185/m² to $200/m².
305 Mr Wallace accepted that he had not put forward any evidence to support levels of value for lots approaching $200/m² as at October 2005 and that the evidence in the immediate area of Northpoint or the adjoining streets did not appear to support $185/m² or $200/m².[152] He accepted that if the hypothetical purchaser had the information about the lot sales in Appendix 7, the purchaser might adopt a rate of somewhere between $90/m² to $180/m².[153]
306 To estimate gross realisations, Mr Wallace used prices that were achieved or might have been achieved after the relevant date.
307 Mr Wallace was alone in favouring such an approach.
308 Mr Brown, in particular, emphasised the need to have regard to what was occurring at the time of the valuation. If it were the case that market value as at a particular date could be determined on the basis of estimated future realisations, it would be necessary to apply lower realisation rates if the market could go down. Valuers were on strong ground if they applied values that were based on known sales as at the date of valuation. Whether the market subsequently went up or down, the value had been assessed at a fixed point in time.[154]
309 Mr Holland was cross-examined on this point. He was asked whether it was 'basic 101 Turner analysis that you take lot prices in the market on the day at which you're valuing, not at some future date'. He said:
Unless you have the benefit of hindsight which colours your thinking but yes, that's what you're supposed to do. You're right.[155]
310 Mr Holland agreed that if lot prices were escalated to some later date, it would also be necessary to escalate construction costs. He volunteered that it would also be necessary to change the profit and risk calculation.[156]
311 Mr Holland's view is the same as that of the learned authors of Rost and Collins, Land Valuation and Compensation in Australia: 'Prices assigned to lots should be based upon current sales of similar building lots within the locality.'[157]
312 There is, as Mr Holland pointed out, good reason for this. Estimating gross realisations on the basis of anticipated future prices for subdivision lots rather than current lot prices would require a number of other adjustments to be made to the analysis. In my view, it would tend to introduce further uncertainty into the hypothetical subdivision exercise.
313 Mr Wallace's analysis also assumed that the hypothetical purchaser would use its own money to buy the land and made no allowance for interest on land value. However, even if a fully funded purchase of the land is assumed, it is likely that the prudent hypothetical purchaser would make allowance for the opportunity cost of the money that is expended in lieu of borrowings. What the money in question could otherwise earn is plainly relevant to the cost of the development. I agree with the Secretary that there is unlikely to be a class of hypothetical purchaser that has the whole of the purchase price for land of this kind available and is not alert to the opportunity cost of those funds.
314 Murdesk defends Mr Wallace's position as reflecting 'the developer's perspective'. It submits that both Mr Brown and Mr Torr effectively conceded that developers are increasingly creative and flexible and that, in postulating gross realisations, may take into account such things as rising prices, the type of development and the timing of development. Mr Brown agreed that developers will sometimes take a more aggressive view of what happens in the market than valuers and will pay very aggressive prices for property.[158] The only logic that could be attributed to such conduct was that developers believed that prices would escalate.[159] Mr Torr agreed that there was greater flexibility of approach, greater flexibility in financing and a greater diversity of developers in the marketplace in the modern era[160] and that he had adopted the older, more staid and inflexible approach when he took into account the full interest component based on 100% borrowing.[161] However, he also pointed out that developers require a return on their equity. While it may be material whether the developer is constrained by heavy interest burdens to understand what funds are available for a development, Mr Torr did not agree that this meant that a hypothetical subdivision analysis could assume the acquisition of the land was fully funded and make no provision for the opportunity cost of the money. Mr Brown and Mr Torr also agreed that percentages for profit and risk may vary and that developers are likely to differ in their inputs in a subdivision analysis. However, I do not take this to be a concession that it is prudent to use predicted future realisations as an input or to ignore the cost of funds in a hypothetical subdivision analysis.
315 While I accept Murdesk's submission that Mr Wallace dealt with the inputs using his considerable skill and judgment in conjunction with his knowledge and experience of market conditions, I do not accept that his methodology has produced a result that is more reliable than the more conventional analyses undertaken by the Secretary's valuers and Mr Murray. To the contrary, I prefer the more transparent, if more conventional, methodology used by Mr Torr, Mr Brown and Mr Murray. I do not consider that methodology, as Mr Wallace suggested, to be 'forensic, critical and diminishing' [162] or as failing to give effect to the Spencer case definition of the prudent and well informed purchaser and the prudent and well informed vendor.
316 I have difficulty accepting the $30 million valuation advanced by Mr Wallace for two further reasons. The first is the valuation certificate for $22 million that Mr Wallace apparently prepared for the subject land in February 2006; the second involves a certificate of valuation for $21.7 million prepared by Mr Wallace in June 2006 for the Haberfield land. The existence of these valuations suggest that in the first half of 2006, Mr Wallace had a different view about levels of value along Cooper Street from the values that he now puts forward.
317 I have set out in my summary of Mr Wallace's evidence his responses to questions about the $22 million certificate of valuation and the work that he carried out for Murdesk over the relevant period. I consider it to be implausible that something described as a certificate of valuation nominating a specific value was in fact a wide ranging assessment based upon a worst case scenario, that is, that the Government would misuse the Haberfield expressions of interest to minimise the value of the subject land. I have no doubt that Mr Wallace held adverse views about the Government's action in bringing to a premature end the expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield land and that he communicated those views to Mr Dickey. There may or may not have been a basis for his disgruntlement. However, I do not see how or why his complaint would affect the preparation of a certificate of valuation, particularly when Mr Wallace must have assumed that Mr Dickey would be seeking to obtain the highest possible compensation for the subject land. It simply makes no sense to prepare a certificate of valuation for an amount which does not reflect the value of the land and which the valuer considers would be tantamount to theft if offered by the Government.
318 I have considered the changes made to Mr Wallace's invoice between 15 February 2006 and 16 February 2006.[163] The original invoice has been amended to remove the reference to the certificate of valuation and to insert words that give the work that has been billed a tentative or 'preliminary' flavour. The original invoice refers to instructions 'received from your solicitors'; the amended invoice refers to instructions 'pending from your solicitors'. The original invoice concludes, 'We thank you for your instructions in this matter'; the amended invoice concludes, 'Once our instructions are finalised, we will complete our valuation task'. The purpose of the amendments was clearly to present the valuation work as incomplete or preliminary. This is in contrast to the original form of the invoice, which refers to a valuation having been completed.
319 In both invoices, however, Mr Wallace is recorded as having carried out a great deal of work, including review and analysis of comparable sales and related considerations, and providing sales schedules, photographs, plans and the like. Mr Wallace has charged $28,000 for this work, which is described as being a discount from his usual fee of $42,000. This strikes me as a very large amount for work that was only preliminary or indicative.
320 The form of the changes leads me to conclude that the original invoice has been deliberately changed to remove the reference to a valuation having been carried and the provision of a certificate of valuation of $22 million.
321 Mr Wallace said that Mr Dickey was not happy with the advice that he was given. However, Mr Dickey gave evidence that he 'most certainly did not' ask Mr Wallace to remove any reference to an amount of $22 million from the invoice.[164] He said that Mr Wallace had come up with some preliminary advice about a range of values as he had asked him to. He thought the range of values was $22 million to $40 million[165] and he had no recollection of a certificate of valuation being prepared.[166]
322 It is unnecessary to make any finding as to whether Mr Wallace's invoice was changed at Mr Dickey's direction. However, on the basis of the original invoice - including the amount of work recorded and charged for and the fact that there was a 'usual rate' applicable to such work - and Mr Wallace's somewhat equivocal answers to questions about it, I find that a valuation was carried out by Mr Wallace and that a valuation certificate for $22 million was prepared by him. I find further that it represented his view of the market value of the subject land at the relevant date, such a view having been formed in February 2006 on the basis of a review and analysis of comparable sales and related considerations.
323 Furthermore, in June 2006, Mr Wallace prepared a certificate of valuation for the Haberfield land as at the date of its acquisition (May 2005) for $21.7 million.[167] This equated to $27.70/m² as at May 2005, approximately half the value that Mr Wallace now attributes to the subject land at the relevant date. In valuing the Haberfield land at $27.70/m², Mr Wallace must be taken to have understood the attributes of the Haberfield land relative to the subject land: it had frontage to Cooper Street about double the frontage of the subject land as well as frontage to Edgars Road, with much of that frontage indicated for business/employment use,[168] it was more proximate to the Epping Plaza and the Northern Hospital and was more convenient to sewer than land further to the west. Indeed, Mr Wallace conceded in cross-examination that a subdivisional development of the Haberfield land might have been better presented and more attractive to a range of buyers than the subject land.[169]
324 Mr Wallace's evidence in relation to his valuation of the Haberfield land was, in many respects, similar to his evidence about the $22 million certificate of valuation for the subject land. He was asked directly whether he had assessed the value of the Haberfield land at $277,000 per hectare. He said:
I did, based upon the experience of the Haberfield expressions of interest and the suggestion that if it went to court, that the actual expressions of interest would be highlighted as evidence at the time, the best evidence of terms of the level of inquiry and expressions of interest. Now, my criticism of that has always been that it was never concluded and we were never able to deal individually with the people and achieve the higher outcomes that we proposed for the land, and that I was advised that we'd need to have a concept of the value of the property that is realistic in those circumstances rather than have a brawl and use the mediation process to try and settle it at the best outcome.[170]
325 Mr Wallace agreed that he had prepared, signed and given to his instructing solicitors, who had in turn provided to the other side in the compensation claim and filed with the court, an unqualified certificate of valuation that valued the Haberfield land at $277,000 per hectare.
326 Mr Wallace told the Court that he did not need to explain how he moved from $277,000 per hectare for the Haberfield land as at 5 May 2005 to $544,000 per hectare for the Murdesk land as at 28 October 2005. He said he thought about doing so but did not think it was necessary. The reason was that the expressions of interest process for the Haberfield land was negated by the notice of intention to acquire and produced an outcome of uncertainty and no sale.[171] He said that a decision was made to try to achieve a settlement figure for the purposes of avoiding litigation and having to go to court. He referred to the difficulty of achieving a fair and reasonable settlement 'based upon the availability of the evidence arising from the notice of expressions of interest, assuming that they would be used in the way they're being used now'.[172]
327 As a result, although Mr Wallace agreed that he had made an affidavit in the Haberfield proceedings swearing that the market value of the Haberfield land was $277,000 per hectare, he said that this did not represent its market value. He referred to the requirements that had been imposed on the Secretary under the Haberfield settlement to make a contribution to the construction of Childs Road and the creation of a buffer. However, these conditions arose from the severance effect of the acquisition and disturbance loss. They did not relate to market value of the Haberfield land.
328 Again, I do not believe that a professional and well regarded valuer like Mr Wallace, knowing that the landowner (not unreasonably) would be seeking the highest level of compensation that he could reasonably obtain, would deliberately create a certificate of valuation which significantly understated the market value of the property, whilst swearing in an affidavit that it represented the market value. The aborted expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield land and/or the need to resolve the Haberfield proceeding provides no reasonable explanation for such conduct.
329 I find that Mr Wallace prepared a certificate of valuation for the Haberfield land as at 5 May 2005 for $277,000 per hectare and that this represented his opinion of the market value of the Haberfield land at that time.
330 It is difficult to reconcile Mr Wallace's assessment of the value of the Haberfield land at $277,000 per hectare as at May 2005 and his assessment of almost $550,000 per hectare for the subject land as at October 2005. That difficulty would remain even if Mr Wallace had valued the Haberfield land at 20% or 30% or even 50% more than $277,000 per hectare. The difference is simply too great.
331 For all of the foregoing reasons, I do not accept Mr Wallace's valuation of the subject land at $30 million.
332 It follows that I am unable to accept the conclusions as to the value of the subject land of the valuers called by Murdesk.
333 While Mr Murray and Mr Holland were at pains to provide a rational basis for valuing the subject land well above the rates paid for the vast majority of sales in the north and the west between 2004 and 2006, I do not accept their reasons for rejecting earlier sales in the vicinity of the subject land in favour of sales that occurred after the relevant date and in different locations, such as the Fairbairn Road, Heyington Avenue and Kador sales. Moreover, having regard to materials obtained by the Secretary on discovery relating to the preparation of Murdesk's expert material, I have concluded that Mr Murray and Mr Holland were unduly influenced by Mr Dickey's views about the subject land and actively sought to 'argue up' the value of the subject land to arrive at a value that corresponded more closely with Mr Dickey's aspirations. To so find is not to impugn the integrity or professionalism of either of the valuers; however, Mr Dickey is a forceful person who took a number of lessons from the conduct of the Bypass proceeding and was determined that the evidence and submissions in this proceeding unfold in a certain way. This was not so much an instance of dictation as of suggestion, but each of Mr Murray and Mr Holland succumbed to suggestion, in my view.
334 For his part, Mr Wallace embarked on a valuation process involving a methodology that I consider too speculative and uncertain to rely upon. Mr Wallace's approach to valuing the subject land and his attitude to the opinions expressed by the Secretary's valuers reflected his thwarted ambitions for the expressions of interest campaign for the Haberfield land. His opinions were coloured by his obvious frustration at what had occurred there. Mr Wallace presented as a man who had a point to prove and this cast doubt on the objectivity of his assessment of the subject land.
335 This leaves the valuations carried out by Mr Brown and Mr Torr. Although their approaches to valuation differed in some respects, they both relied principally on sales in the vicinity of the subject land that took place prior to the relevant date. Indeed, each of them valued the subject land at about the relevant date and neither departed markedly from his initial valuation.
336 As a general proposition, valuation opinions expressed on a date close to the relevant date and based on sales that have occurred and information then available to the hypothetical vendor and purchaser, are to be preferred to opinions formed at a later date. Although there were not a great many sales in the vicinity of the subject land, or indeed in the west, in the period leading up to the relevant date, I find no reason to depart significantly from the contemporaneous opinions of value expressed by Mr Torr and Mr Brown. Mr Brown's 2005 valuation of $18 million (or $32.50/m²) is at the high end of the $15.2 - $17.9 million dollar range which he gave in his preliminary report of September 2005, the lower end of which is represented by both the original 9 November 2005 opinion and the December 2010 revised opinion of Mr Torr. [173]
337 There is a consistency in the contemporaneous valuations which has survived subsequent review by Mr Torr and Mr Brown. The consistency extends to the opinions of Mr Wallace, Mr Dickinson and Mr Holland that were expressed in 2005 and early 2006. These opinions put the subject land in a band of $12.4 million to $22 million ($22.50/m² to $40/m²).
338 Murdesk contends that the valuations carried out by Mr Brown and Mr Torr are unsatisfactory because each has effectively confined his assessment to one sale: 25 Cooper Street in Mr Brown's case; 300 Cooper Street in Mr Torr's case. This, according to Murdesk, runs counter to the principle articulated by the High Court in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue[174] that a reasonably representative group of comparable sales is required and that a valuer does not proceed rationally if he or she is unreasonably selective in ultimately confining him or herself to two sales. Murdesk contends that as a result of his focus on one particular sale, each of Mr Torr and Mr Brown has fallen into the trap of ignoring or misinterpreting the wider picture.
339 More particularly, Murdesk submitted that Messrs Brown and Torr were obliged to consider whether and to what extent they should commit to a process of adjustment of the kind carried out by Mr Holland in Appendix G. Mr Torr, in his letter dated 30 March 2007, made a number of adjustments, including an allowance of 20% for a 12 month effluxion of time between his principal comparable sale and the relevant date. However, in his affidavit of 5 May 2011, Mr Torr carried out the exercise again and in the process varied his adjustments considerably.[175] For his part, Mr Brown made no express mention of adjustments and offered no explanation about the adjustments that he apparently carried out in his head.[176]
340 Mr Brown is the subject of particular criticism because he did not make any adjustment for time. This is contrasted with the approach taken by Mr Torr, who shared the opinion of all three valuers retained by Murdesk that the relevant date occurred during a period of rapidly rising land prices. Indeed, Mr Torr described the period as an extraordinary one in which 'the values for land with medium term rezoning development potential were escalating at 2-3% per month during the relevant period'. In reaching this conclusion, Mr Torr considered sales information after the relevant date, although only to a limited extent. Mr Torr did not consider the sales and resales of Glasscock's Road and Mt Derrimut Road referred to by Mr Holland, nor did he rely on the reviews and overviews of reputable publications dealing with the industrial property market, or the indexation factors used by councils and the State Revenue Office referred to by Mr Wallace.
341 According to Murdesk, the difference in approach between Mr Torr and Mr Brown in relation to adjustments for escalating prices over time demonstrates that the general approach by Mr Murray and Mr Holland of taking into account sales after the relevant date was preferable to the course adopted by Mr Torr and Mr Brown of focusing on 25 Cooper Street and 300 Cooper Street.
342 Importantly, Murdesk contends that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary's valuers in respect of 25 and 300 Cooper Street were inappropriate. Contrary to the opinion expressed by Mr Torr, all four of the other valuers who gave evidence were of the opinion that both properties, as at the date they were sold, were inferior to the subject land. Mr Brown, in particular, described 300 Cooper Street as 'setting the low ball';[177] Mr Brown also said in his evidence regarding 25 Cooper Street that with the benefit of hindsight, he would have been 'somewhat higher' on the subject land.[178]
343 Further, Murdesk submits that Mr Torr and Mr Brown wrongly failed to take the sale of Fairbairn Road into account. Although they both included Fairbairn Road in their sales evidence, Mr Torr did not address it and Mr Brown disregarded it because it was 'at the upper end of market parameters notwithstanding the highly regarded location of this property'.[179] According to Murdesk, Mr Brown did not make out his ground for rejecting Fairbairn Road as a comparable sale. That sale, analysed at $51.60m², was far higher than the $31/m² and $34.10/m² analysed by Mr Brown and Mr Torr respectively for 25 Cooper Street.
344 Murdesk also contends that Mr Torr and Mr Brown did not properly take into account the Dohertys Road and Mt Derrimut Road sales that occurred in March 2005. Mr Brown analysed those sales at $31.70/m² and $28.50/m² respectively, yet Dohertys Road was clearly not as well placed as the subject land: Mr Brown described it as 'remote' and 'diagonally opposite Port Phillip Prison'. Mt Derrimut Road sold again as vacant land in December 2006 for an analysed rate of $76/m². According to Murdesk, this suggested that on the relevant date, Mt Derrimut Road would have analysed at $51.60/m². In March 2005, it was zoned Rural and on the extreme edge of the outer west.
345 It is convenient to first consider Murdesk's submissions in relation to the sales that were not Mr Brown's or Mr Torr's principal sales.
346 Mr Brown had regard to the Fairbairn Road sale, but thought that it sat well above the range of the other sales to which he had regard. He did not consider Fairbairn Road to be comparable to the subject land: it was an infill site in an established industrial area and promised lower development costs than the subject land.[180] Importantly, Mr Brown considered that the greater maturity of the industrial area in the west was an advantage. Fairbairn Road was in a very well recognised industrial locality. Epping, by comparison, was a relatively immature market.[181] Although the presence of Northpoint gave the area some status as an industrial/commercial locality, Northpoint had not been a successful development having regard to the amount of land sold and the time taken to sell it.[182]
347 Mr Torr considered Fairbairn Road not to be comparable with the subject land. He noted that it was a good sized industrial parcel in a well established location available for immediate development and that it set a price record for the area.
348 Mr Holland regarded the subject land as superior to Fairbairn Road because the latter was limited to industrial development only while the subject land could be developed for 'higher' uses. Mr Holland conceded, however, that as an infill site, Fairbairn Road would be attractive to a class of end users that wanted to be in an industrial area and that there was a better likelihood of services being available immediately.[183]
349 I accept Mr Brown's opinion as to the comparability of Fairbairn road for the reasons that he gave. In my view, Fairbairn Road would have been regarded by the hypothetical purchaser to be significantly more attractive than the subject land at the relevant date. I consider Mr Holland's opinion that the subject land was superior to Fairbairn Road to be quite unrealistic, having regard to the prime location of Fairbairn Road. As an infill site, it would have been easier to service than the subject land. Given its location in the heart of the industrial area in the west, it offered significant advantages to businesses in terms of proximity to other industries and businesses. Moreover, for the reasons set out below,[184] I do not accept that its industrial zoning was inferior to the deemed Comprehensive Development zoning of the subject land.
350 I also find that Mr Brown treated the sales of Dohertys Road and Mt Derrimut Road appropriately. At $317,000 per hectare, Dohertys Road reflected the highest price per square metre of the properties in the direct comparison range identified by Mr Brown. It may have been diagonally opposite Port Phillip Prison, but it was purchased with a subdivision permit and with arrangements for the provision of sewerage. Mr Derrimut Road was located within a 'highly regarded industrial precinct'. Both properties fell within the range of prices identified by Mr Brown for industrial land and just outside the range identified by Mr Murray for the concentration of sales in the west, that is, between $165,000 to $300,000 per hectare. There was no need to adjust 'up' from these sales other than, arguably, for the passage of time. These sales confirm that values for industrial land in the west were concentrated in the range identified by Mr Murray, which is more consistent with the range of values identified by Messrs Torr and Brown for the subject land than the values given by Messrs Murray, Holland and Wallace.
351 This brings me to 25 Cooper Street and 300 Cooper Street.
352 Each of Mr Torr and Mr Brown placed significant weight on the sale of 25 Cooper Street. Mr Brown regarded this sale as one of two key sales; Mr Torr regarded it as the most useful comparison after 300 Cooper Street.
353 Murdesk contends that 25 Cooper Street did not have the advantages of the subject land, in that it did not enjoy proximity to and visibility from the Bypass, frontage to Cooper Street, deemed Comprehensive Development zoning to ensure a high standard of design and development and amenable surroundings, substantial area and dimensions offering the opportunity to plan a relatively large and flexible subdivisional layout, or marriage value with adjoining land of the same kind. Murdesk contends that at the time 25 Cooper Street was sold, it was unable to be subdivided or developed, and there was considerable uncertainty about the likely period of delay, principally because there was there was uncertainty with regard to 15 hectares that might be required for retarding basins, flora and fauna reserves and internal roads.
354 I am satisfied that 25 Cooper Street is an important comparable sale and that it was appropriately treated as such by Messrs Brown and Torr. As Mr Torr pointed out, native grasslands issues were resolved by a land swap prior to sale and, as a result, all environmental concerns had been resolved at the time of sale. Although it had limited frontage to Cooper Street, no direct exposure to the Freeway and its shape limited the form of development that it could accommodate, 25 Cooper Street displayed clear benefits because of its ease of servicing and its proximity to a large and well established industrial area. Its access to important transport linkages was not materially worse than the access enjoyed by the subject land - indeed, it offered easier access to the Hume Highway.
355 Mr Torr and Mr Brown both regarded the sale of 300 Cooper Street as highly relevant, because it was situated adjacent to the subject land and had the same zoning and similar servicing prospects. Mr Torr regarded 300 Cooper Street as the most relevant sale. He considered it 'far superior' to the subject, having regard to such matters as location and servicing risks.[185] He accepted Ms Hamila's evidence that 83,000 cubic metres of fill would be required, but as 40,000 cubic metres was actually required for the Edgars Road alignment, the land itself only required the balance of 43,000 cubic metres. As a result, Mr Torr did not consider that fill was a factor that would dissuade a potential purchaser from considering the site.[186]
356 For his part, Mr Brown considered that 300 Cooper Street 'set the low ball for value'. It was low lying land which was subject to flooding and would require filling. Nonetheless, he thought that it would probably be cheaper to develop than the subject land, given that land to its west was already developed (as Northpoint). With respect to location and road access, Mr Brown accepted that the subject land was at least equal to or better than 300 Cooper Street. However, the latter had the advantage of frontage to Edgars Road and it was closer to the hospital. While the subject land was closer to the Craigieburn Bypass, 300 Cooper Street was within an estate (Northpoint) that enjoyed proximity to the Bypass.
357 Murdesk contends that at the time 300 Cooper Street was sold, it could not be subdivided or developed, and that there was considerable uncertainty as to the likely period of delay for the following reasons:
(a) A total of 82,500 cubic metres of compacted fill needed to be placed and consolidated on a total of 10.75 hectares, being 43% of the gross developable area of the property;
(b) There was uncertainty about the amount of land that would be required by the Council for retarding basins and drainage. The figure turned out to be 21.15% of the total area, but Mr Torr originally thought about 30% of the site would be required for both road and water infrastructure;
(c) The Development Plan shows Edgars Road to pass through 300 Cooper Street;
(d) The Development Plan shows the drainage scheme requirements to be uncertain.
358 Murdesk made much of the need for 300 Cooper Street to be filled. As Mr Brown argued, however, if such a matter were to be determinative, it would be necessary to consider the presence of rock on the subject land. The evidence in relation to the cost of filling the land was, in my view, inconclusive (notwithstanding the detailed work carried out by Ms Hamila) and, although I accept that 300 Cooper Street was not as good a parcel of land as the subject land because of flooding and drainage issues, I do not accept the technique used by Mr Holland (in particular) of factoring in the cost of fill on a dollar basis and adjusting for it mathematically (add $635,250 for 82,500 cubic metres of fill). While I am satisfied that considerable fill would be required, the cost to fill the land would depend on a number of factors, including timing. The cost and timing of filling the land therefore remained an open question.
359 Again, I prefer the evidence of Mr Brown in respect of the comparability of 300 Cooper Street. Because of issues of drainage and fill, as well as how its development would be affected by its future role as part of the Northpoint development, 300 Cooper Street is more problematic as a comparator than 25 Cooper Street. I accept Mr Brown's evidence that it set a 'low ball' for assessing the value of the subject land.
360 I also have considered the evidence of the expert witnesses about the comparability of the O'Herns Road and Heyington Avenue properties. Each of these sales occurred after the relevant date.
361 There can be no argument that O'Herns Road is in a less prominent position than the subject land and that access would be more difficult, at least in the shorter term. A good argument can be made for the superiority of the subject land on this basis alone, notwithstanding that O'Herns Road will ultimately benefit from frontage to the Edgars Road extension, and it is closer to the Epping town centre than the subject land. Aside from the difficulty of establishing whether the December 2005 Demar sale was a genuine sale, the utility of the July 2006 McMullin sale as a comparator is diminished by two factors: the sale was to McMullin interests that may have been prepared to pay a premium to consolidate holdings in the area, and it occurred after the MWM announcement. The knowledge that the MWM was moving to Cooper Street could be expected to have a positive effect on the sale price for O'Herns Road, as it represented a both boost to the commercial reputation of the area and removed likely competition in the business park market. I do not think that Mr Brown and Mr Torr erred in not regarding O'Herns Road as a closely comparable sale.
362 Likewise, I find that Heyington Avenue was not closely comparable to the subject land. It was not a greenfield site on the urban fringe, but an infill site with existing buildings in an established urban location and with access to services.
363 I accept Mr Brown's evidence that 25 Cooper Street is the most comparable sale, and find that the approach taken by Mr Brown to establish the value of the subject land should generally be preferred to the approaches of the other expert valuers. To focus on 25 Cooper Street to assess market value is not to determine the market value of the subject land on the basis of a single sale. 25 Cooper Street sits at the higher end of the range of sales that have been analysed for comparative purposes. It reflects the market for broadacre land amenable to rezoning for industrial/employment purposes in outer parts of the north and west of Melbourne in late 2004/early 2005.
364 25 Cooper Street sold in November 2004 for $17.5 million on 12 month terms ($16.9 million cash equivalent).
365 Mr Brown ultimately analysed 25 Cooper Street at $33.33/m² based on the sale price of $17.5 million. However, in reaching his assessment for the subject land of $18 million, Mr Brown had initially analysed 25 Cooper Street at $30.67/m² based on a sale price of $15.5 million. He was asked in examination in chief whether he still considered his assessment to be an appropriate response to the changed information about 25 Cooper Street. He said, 'I think in all honesty, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have influenced me to be somewhat higher on the subject land.'[187] It is not clear what Mr Brown meant by this. The Secretary relies on the fact that, later in his evidence, Mr Brown declared himself satisfied that his assessment of $18 million was nonetheless 'fair and reasonable'.[188]
366 Mr Brown's assessment $32.50/m² for the subject land was slightly higher than the figure of $30.67/m² that he initially (incorrectly) analysed for 25 Cooper Street. Mr Brown gave evidence that he considered the subject land to superior to 25 Cooper Street.[189] On that basis, a slightly higher assessment for the subject land once the correct sale price for 25 Cooper Street was known could have been expected.
367 In my view, based on evidence of Mr Brown, the subject land must be valued at more than $33.33/m². In fact, in its final written submissions, the Secretary gave a cash equivalent rate for 25 Cooper Street of $34.10/m², which was the rate analysed by Mr Torr.
368 In this context, I note that Mr Holland treated 25 Cooper Street as a conditional rather than a terms sale and analysed it at $36.50/m². However, Mr Murray produced a cash equivalent rate of $33.50/m². I propose to adopt Mr Torr's figure of $34.10/m² as the starting point for assessing the market value of the subject land, as it recognises the delayed payment of the purchase price (albeit on a slightly more generous basis than Mr Murray), and to then consider whether any specific adjustments need to be made for the matters identified by Murdesk's valuers.
369 In Appendix G, Mr Holland made adjustments to the sale of 25 Cooper Street for location, zoning, size and shape. These adjustments, as well as an adjustment for time, resulted in a price movement from $33.55/m² to $59.53/m².
370 Mr Brown agreed that it was necessary to make adjustments in order to compare the sales on Cooper Street with the hypothetical sale of the subject land on the relevant date. However, he said that valuers make adjustments in their minds and he was not sure that it was appropriate to simply apply percentages for individual factors. An allowance of 10% for 'up-zoning' was a case in point: if land is going to be re-zoned and that re-zoning is imminent, then generally an allowance for the re-zoning will have found its way into the market value of the land.
371 In cross-examination, Mr Brown was pressed to explain the way in which he had adjusted for various factors. He said:
Well, I believe I have done that. There are plusses and minuses, I accept, and I accept that the claimant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt in respect of those issues. I believe, in the various issues that have been put to me over the time I have attempted to resolve those matters in the claimant's favour.[190]
372 Mr Brown was then asked whether he could be more specific than that. He said:
I think [there are] issues ... in relation to flora and fauna issues potentially impacting the land, and I don't need to go over it but some nine hectares of land may be affected by that. I was given that material, I've resolved that and said, 'Well look, that's what people paid at that point in time, they've accepted those risks. I'm not going to make any allowance for that'...
I think also there was an issue in respect of servicing and the potential to have to share servicing. I didn't get bound up in all of that. The exercise that I undertook on feasibility really proceeded on the basis that the development would occur. I acknowledge as a secondary approach, but I didn't build in any significant lead ins or delays. I believe I just saw it in a fair and reasoned manner.[191]
373 When asked whether he considered the method that he used to be simplistic he said:
No, I don't believe simplistic, but I believe, taking your point, that I don't believe I've dwelled on every negative that's come along to try and down value the land in any way.[192]
374 Murdesk placed particular emphasis on the advantages of the Comprehensive Development Zone ('CDZ'), contending that the subject land was superior to the land included in the sales evidence that was zoned industrial or business, and vastly superior to land included in the sales evidence that was zoned farming or rural. The CDZ made reference to the Development Plan, which contained a detailed specification of what would be permitted, and described such things as the primary road network, environmental and cultural heritage factors, open space requirements, water servicing strategy, drainage and sewerage infrastructure and an open space land budget for individual properties. By contrast, in an industrial zone a great deal was left to chance, generating uncertainty about the nature of the development that would occur. From the point of view of the developer purchasing in globo land and the end user of subdivided lots, the presence of a development plan eliminates uncertainty by underlining and reinforcing the basic objective of the responsible authority, that of creating a high amenity business and industrial environment suitable for industrial and business use.
375 Mr Brown agreed that a developer could protect itself from unwanted developments in a CDZ. However, he was not convinced that land in a CDZ would be considered to be superior to land zoned for industrial purposes. While he understood the intellectual argument, he was not convinced that sales in the north showed that buyers were prepared to pay premiums for lots in a CDZ.[193]
376 Mr Torr, in particular, rejected the notion that the CDZ was a more desirable zone that resulted in higher land values than an industrial zone. While he accepted that the CDZ allowed greater flexibility of uses and required higher design quality, it also limited the market for lots. It might appeal to that part of the market that was looking for a better quality aesthetic, but it would not appeal to a market that was not, because costs would be higher as a result of the CDZ requirements. The market that just wanted the cheapest box that could be put up would be disinclined to move to a CDZ because it would cost more to go there.[194]
377 Mr Torr observed that the key drivers of in globo land value were how quickly lots could be sold and at what price. In this regard, the Metrolink subdivision (25 Cooper Street) had performed significantly better than the higher quality Northpoint development. The sale rate for lots at Northpoint was running at about four lots per annum, which was a very low sale rate and much lower than sales of about 12 per annum on average achieved by Metrolink. Metrolink not only had a much higher sale rate but the prices it achieved per square metre were higher.[195]
378 Mr Torr's evidence was supported by that of Mr Papaleo. Mr Papaleo confirmed that the rate of development at Northpoint had been relatively slow since it was established in 2002 compared to rates of development in competing estates in the north industrial node such as the National Business Park, Northcorp and Austrak developments. Although Murdesk and its valuers had criticised the quality of the Metrolink development, Metrolink had sold quickly and had achieved high prices. Mr Papaleo considered Northpoint to be under-performing. By contrast, Metrolink was responsive to market demand for smaller lots. Because it was attractive to small builders and owner/occupiers, it was able to take advantage of a broader market. Although it did not have the level of exposure that the subject land enjoyed, it was adjacent to a large concentration of existing industrial users. In Mr Papaleo's view, a very long lead time would have been required for the subject land to achieve a higher rate of development. The subject land was a greenfield site, which was reflected in the fairly minimal rate of development at that time.[196] At the relevant date there would have been a recognition that future demand for the subject land from end users would be slow at least in the short to medium term, and that it would be in the order of 10 years before the higher rate of development in the Hume corridor would carry across to the Cooper Street precinct.[197]
379 According to Mr Papaleo, regardless of zoning, the Cooper Street precinct as an industrial/business park location was secondary to the broader Hume Corridor because the more established industrial markets around Campbellfield and Somerton supported a much larger number of users and demand.[198]
380 I find that the subject's deemed or immanent CDZ would not necessarily translate into higher land values and that the CDZ had the potential to result in lower values and slower sales of subdivided lots. 25 Cooper Street cannot be considered to be inferior to the subject land on this basis.
381 I also accept the evidence given by Mr Papaleo that the Cooper Street precinct was a secondary location for industrial and business uses to the broader Hume corridor, by virtue of the fact the more established industrial markets around Campbellfield and Somerton supported a much a much larger number of users and demand.[199] The prospects of attracting future demand would be stronger in the Hume part of the north industrial node than further east along Cooper Street.[200]
382 I do not accept Mr Holland's opinion that because the subject land was potentially amenable to 'higher' uses due to its shape, size and location,[201] it would attract a higher price than land that would only support a development of the quality of the Metrolink estate or a standard industrial subdivision. There was no evidence of demand for higher use developments such as offices or hotels in the Cooper Street precinct, and there was evidence that the higher quality Northpoint development had not achieved the levels of sales of lower quality business parks in the northern industrial node. Indeed, Mr Papaleo gave evidence that there were very few examples of successful office parks in northern Melbourne for structural reasons relating to a paucity of users.[202]
383 Mr Papaleo's evidence, which I accept, was therefore that Amendment C31 reflected a planning aspiration rather than the market reality. In other words, as at the relevant date the Cooper Street precinct, as an emerging but still small industrial area, could not readily support the higher end uses that Mr Holland used to justify his valuation for the subject land. I accept Mr Papaleo's evidence that the smaller lot sizes on the Metrolink estate were more responsive to market demand at the time and that there were fewer users of larger lots. The Metrolink estate was able to tap demand from a broader range of the market, whereas a business park was generally confined to tapping demand from a more defined demand profile.
384 Murdesk's valuers downplayed the difficulties with the provision of sewerage to the subject land. They treated this as an issue that had been fully resolved. I do not accept that the hypothetical purchaser would consider the provision of sewerage to have been fully resolved as at the relevant date. The provision of sewerage to the subject land prior to 2011/2012 by way of temporary works depended on both the co-operation of surrounding land-owners, including Mr Scanlon, and the funding of some part of the works by the relevant water authority. The availability of that funding was outside of the developer's control. Mr Scanlon told Mr Torr that he would be reluctant to co-operate with a potential competitor for the provision of sewerage to the competitor's land. In my view, the prudent hypothetical purchaser would have realised that both co-operation and co-funding involved an element of risk.
385 Accordingly, I find that the advantage enjoyed by 25 Cooper Street with respect to ease of provision of services was a real and significant one, and that uncertainty as to servicing was likely to have been reflected in the price that a hypothetical purchaser would have been prepared to pay for the land at the relevant date.
386 I find therefore that no specific adjustments need to be made for location, shape or zoning. Although the shape of 25 Cooper Street is inferior to that the of the subject, and it does not have either the Cooper Street or Freeway frontage enjoyed by the subject land or its immediate access to the Bypass, it had other important attributes that off-set these disadvantages, particularly its location in the more active part of the northern industrial corridor and the ready availability of services.
387 The question remains as to whether a specific adjustment should be made for time. 25 Cooper Street sold in November 2004, some eleven months before the relevant date.
388 Mr Brown was asked specifically whether he made allowance for price rises after September/October 2004. He answered by reference to the two sales 'in Derrimut'[203] and said that he was mindful that the relevant date was October, the most recent sales (March 2005) were in Derrimut and that was a different market, but those sales didn't seem to him to be suggesting that anything cataclysmic had happened at that point in time. He was satisfied that the view that he had come to in respect of the value of the subject land was a fair and reasonable assessment. He allowed no specific percentage for time, but in arriving at a value for the subject land, he was conscious of the [relevant] date and the dates of the [Derrimut] sales.[204]
389 This evidence is to be contrasted with the evidence of Mr Holland and Mr Torr, each of whom made specific provision for an increase in prices in the period before the relevant date.
390 Mr Murray also referred to a significant rise in the in globo market rates that were paid in the early part of 2005 in the west. According to Mr Murray, the March 2006 Kador sale showed the strength of the market and the desire of developers to enter the market aggressively at that time. There were significant increases in in globo and retail developed lot values over the later half of 2005 and in 2006. The value increases in the employment/industrial property sector were less obvious in the north because of the planning issues and the limited supply of employment land. However, increases in value were very obvious in the residential development market in the Epping Bulge.
391 Mr Papaleo's 2006 reference report (March 2006) also recorded that land values within the region had experienced strong growth. The release of the Melbourne Airport Business Park had been met with solid demand and had had an upward effect on land values, with increases of over 40% in the three years to 2006. The benefits of the Bypass, as well as the announcement of the impending arrival of the MWM, had driven rising land values since 2003. These factors were likely to have positive effects on the local market similar to those observed in Altona North and Laverton following completion of the Western Ring Road. Large tracts of land along Cooper Street and through Craigieburn had been opened up and had become more attractive to developers because of their enhanced accessibility.[205]
392 Mr Holland based his valuation on a significant increase in land values in the period leading up to the relevant date. Appendix G, which set out adjustments for the four northern sales, adjusted those sales at the rate of 2.5% per month for time. This represents an increase of 30% for the year leading up to the relevant date.
393 In his expert report, Mr Holland extracted passages on market growth from industry research and commentary prepared by national real estate agencies Savills, CBRE and Colliers. In his oral evidence, he referred specifically to the Colliers' Winter Report for 2006, which he described 'as picking up on events that led up to' that date. The Colliers' Winter Report for 2006 stated that land values had increased by an average of 30% over 12 months 'due to strong demand in a tight market'. Mr Holland also drew the Court's attention to a passage from the CBRE November 2005 report, [206] which he incorrectly described as referring to 'the Cooper Street industrial precinct', to the effect that the development that was occurring was representative of about 21% of the construction within metropolitan Melbourne at the time.[207] In fact, that figure is for the 'Craigieburn Bypass Industrial Precinct' ('CBIP'), which is defined to include the industrial localities of Craigieburn, Somerton, Epping, Broadmeadows and Thomastown.
394 Insofar as they give an indication of the rate (if any) of increase in the value of in globo industrial land between say, October 2004 and October 2005, the relevant industry reports are those prepared in the second half of 2005 or the very beginning of 2006. The CBRE November 2005 report and the Colliers Spring 2005 report were each to be found in Mr Holland's research materials subpoenaed by the Secretary.[208]
395 The CBRE November 2005 report contains the passage about the high levels of construction within the CBIP. It contains the following further indications of movements in land values in the 12 months leading up to the relevant date:
(a) Over the year to September 2005, the CPIB experienced significant growth in land values and prime rents, which in turn further increased investor appetite and capital values. The CPIB could be largely characterised as an emerging transport and logistics distribution hub. Like the Dandenong and Laverton North industrial precincts, the CBIP enjoyed strong competition between industrial estates. Within the larger end of the market, these estates continued to aggressively market pre-lease packages.
(b) With the final stage of the Craigieburn Bypass due for completion in December 2005, Melbourne's northern region had attracted significant attention from both investors and tenants, resulting in considerable industrial growth within the region.
(c) Industrial land values in the CBIP had significantly increased over the year to September 2005, largely as a result of the Craigieburn Bypass (due for completion in December 2005). Land values for smaller sized lots (0.25ha) grew by 17.5% to average $157/m². Larger lots (1.6ha) jumped by 26.5% to average $103/m², with some areas increasing by as much as 37.5%. With the completion of the Bypass, demand for industrial stock within the CBIP was expected to intensify in the short to medium term, encouraging further land value growth within the precinct. As part of the Melbourne 2030 strategy, around 1,093 hectares of rural land had been earmarked for rezoning to industrial land, however neither land release timing nor exact parcel boundaries had been set by the Department of Sustainability and Environment.
(d) Future growth drivers for the CBIP were identified as the Craigieburn Bypass, population growth, the P&O Somerton Intermodal Terminal in the Austrak Business Park, the relocation of the MWM to Epping and the 1,093 hectares of land earmarked to be rezoned for industrial use.
396 The Colliers Spring 2005 report[209] stated:
On the investment side fierce competition between institutions for both englobo land and major industrial complexes in the upper end of the market and between smaller investors and owner-occupiers in the sub $10 million end of the market, has seen yields continue to push the sub-7 per cent barrier and rise in off-market deals.
397 In this context, a table in the Colliers Spring 2005 report sets out average land values for retail and in globo land at each of the 'fringe', outer east, south-east, west and north. In globo land values in the north are recorded as $30 to $45/m². By contrast, the west is $35 to $45/m² and the south-east is $35 to $150/m².
398 Apart from general statements about growth in land values, there is nothing in these reports that clearly established rates of growth applicable to in globo industrial or future industrial land in the Cooper Street precinct in the year leading up to the relevant date. The specific figures given in the CBRE November 2005 report (37.5%, 26.5%, 17.5%) are for lot prices, and are applicable to lots sold over a large area, including in the more mature industrial markets in Somerton and Thomastown.
399 Moreover, in documenting increases in land values in this fashion, the CBRE November 2005 report refers to the relocation of the MWM to Epping as one of the important drivers of growth. It is generally very difficult to measure growth in prices in the northern industrial node in the 12 months leading up to the relevant date without reference to the relocation of the MWM. Insofar as there was growth in land values in 2005, the relocation of the MWM was an important driver of such growth.
400 Mr Wallace also provided industry reports and other information to support an increase in prices over the longer term and the existence of a very buoyant industrial market in the northern region. However, much of this material post-dated the relevant date. In this context, I note that the CBRE Market Overview for the third quarter of 2006, which was relied upon by Mr Wallace, referred to land values within the Northern sub-region having experienced significant growth 'in recent years', and the six months that had just elapsed had been no exception. However, it stated that there had been 'little growth in the later half of 2005'. Again, this seems to relate to lot prices rather than to the value of in globo industrial land. Nonetheless, it raises a question about the increase in in globo land values in the Cooper Street precinct in 2005.
401 I find that there is little definitive information in the industry commentary that establishes or refutes the rise in in globo industrial land values in the northern region between September 2004 and October 2005 for which Murdesk's valuers contend, particularly given the need to disregard the effects of the relocation of the MWM. However, the in globo industrial land values set out in the Colliers Spring 2005 report for the north do not support increases in value to anywhere near the level claimed by Murdesk, that is, to $55-$60/m².
402 Mr Holland's primary method of establishing growth trends was by way of comparing sales and re-sales of in globo industrial land. Mr Holland drew the Court's attention to the sales and resales of 45-85 Glasscocks Road, Lyndhurst, and 324 Mt Derrimut Road, Deer Park.[210] Glasscocks Road sold in October 2004 for $46.32/m², zoned Rural, and re-sold in April 2007 for $83.05/m², still zoned Rural. According to Mr Holland, this equated to an increase of 79.3% or 2.6% per month over the period. Mt Derrimut Road sold in March 2005 for $28.50/m² and re-sold in December 2006 for $76.03/m². It was zoned rural at the time of the original sale, but had been rezoned as industrial by the time it was sold again. According to Mr Holland, this growth equated to 166% or 7.9% per month. If a simple growth rate of 2.5% per month was assumed, the rezoning of the land equated to a 75% increase over the period.
403 Mr Holland's report contains the two graphs showing rises in land values for the south-east and the west discussed previously.[211] These graphs plot Mr Holland's sales over time to produce a trend line. In both cases, the trend line rises sharply over time. It is necessary, however, to consider the time period for the trend. The south-east graph covers the period August 2004 to June 2008, and the graph for the west covers the period January 2004 to April 2007. In both cases, the trend line is influenced by sales well after October 2005.
404 Using Mr Holland's sales, Mr Brown prepared similar graphs for each of the western, south-eastern and northern regions, but only in respect of sales prior to the relevant date.[212] Mr Brown's graphs for western region land values, south-eastern region land values and northern region land values are for the period April 2004 to December 2005 in the case of the west and the south-east, and for the period December 2002 to November 2004 for the northern region.[213] These show flat or declining trends in land values.
405 I do not accept that in globo industrial land values declined over the relevant periods. However, I understand that the purpose of the graphs prepared by Mr Brown was not to show declining land values, but to show how the trends vary depending on the period covered. In this way, graphs of the kind prepared by Mr Holland and Mr Brown can produce misleading results.
406 Likewise, the sales and re-sales of Glasscocks Road and Mt Derrimut Road express price rises over particular periods. The growth in value in Glasscocks Road occurred over the period October 2004 to April 2007, some two and a half years. On the evidence before the Court, it is not possible to discern whether that growth was evenly spread. Putting aside the complication of discerning which part of the price rise is attributable to re-zoning, the growth in Mt Derrimut Road occurred over a period of 18 months, 12 months of which was during a period post the relevant date that all of the valuers agreed was a period of significant growth in values. Furthermore, apart from re-zoning, there may have been specific factors that influenced the price paid for the properties on re-sale. The comparison of sales and resales, while moderately helpful as indicative of a general growth in values over time, is far from conclusive about the increase in broadacre land values between November 2004 and October 2005.
407 In order to support a steep increase in land values prior to the relevant date, Mr Wallace referred to land tax indexation factors and explanatory material published by the State Revenue Office.[214] The land tax indexation factor produced by the State Revenue Office for the City of Whittlesea for 2005 was 1.3. For the 2005 year, valuations made in 2002 were therefore to be used and adjusted by the indexation factor of 1.3. Site valuations are made every two years and the indexation factor represents half the aggregate movement in the site value of land between the applicable general valuation and the subsequent general valuation. Accordingly, the indexation factor of 1.3 represents half the movement in site values between the 2002 valuation and the 2004 valuation.
408 According to Mr Wallace, this means that between 1 January 2002 and 1 January 2004, there was a 60% increase in the general valuations returned by the City of Whittlesea. This is based on a doubling of the indexation factor, having regard to the fact that the indexation factor represents half the percentage of movement in site values over two years. Another way of looking at this is that the indexation factor represents the difference in site values over a year averaged over two years. However, it is applied to a valuation that was carried out three years earlier. In this case, application of the indexation factor to obtain land tax payable in 2005 requires the amount of the 2002 valuation to be increased by 30%.
409 It is difficult to know quite what to make of this. Land tax is imposed on a very wide range of properties and the indexation factor is applied uniformly to all taxable properties across the municipality. Any large increase in residential land values would affect the tax payable by the industrial property market and vice versa. One or other of those markets could be stagnant and yet still be subject to land tax increases. The land tax indexation factor is therefore an inaccurate indicator of rises in land values of in globo industrial land in the Cooper Street precinct. I do not accept that the land tax indexation factor is reliable evidence that the value of in globo industrial land in the City of Whittlesea rose by 60% between 1 January 2002 and 1 January 2004. In any event, even if it was, it would not necessarily tell the Court much about price differences in in globo land suitable for industrial zoning between November 2004 and October 2005.
410 The question of adjustment for time is a difficult one. Mr Brown's evidence about how he took into account market movements between the end of 2004 and October 2005 when he valued the subject land was as follows:
(a) When asked in examination-in-chief about the use of later sales in determining the value of the subject land at the relevant date he said:
... I think there were more sales seemed to transact in '06 than had transacted in '05. I think it's fair to say in looking at the sales evidence in '05 that it was a reasonably quiet year and that there were far more transactions in '06. There's no doubt that the market was moving in '06, so I suppose any sale that's occurred after the date probably needs some adjustment for time, in a moving upward market, as long as one can establish what's a fair adjustment for time. I'm not persuaded by the argument that you can have a sale and a resale and draw a line and say, 'Well, that's the way the market moved'. And I think the residential market's a case in point, the market can be quite flat and then move upwards very quickly, and just joining two dots doesn't necessarily indicate that the market was moving equally over a period of time.[215]
(b) To similar effect, in response to a question from counsel for Murdesk about trend lines, Mr Brown said:
I'm not persuaded ... that just joining two dots, you just look at any economic data and you say, 'Well, the CPI was then, and then it's this, and we just join a line' but we know that CPI will do all sorts of things in between the dots, so I'm not persuaded that movement in a market such as real estate is a linear and moves equally each month, no. If there's sufficient evidence to, if there's more than two dots, don't get me wrong, if there's more than two dots or there's sufficient evidence to support the proposition, I'm not blind to it, but I just think it's a bit simplistic.[216]
(c) Mr Brown was asked by counsel for Murdesk to confirm that he hadn't increased the price per hectare of 300 Cooper Street by any amount to represent the rise in prices of land during the period from October 2004. He said:
There's no evidence that I'm aware of ... to justify any material adjustment, no.[217]
Mr Brown went on to say there were no sales up to the relevant date and no evidence that he was aware of supporting and increase of 2.5% per month.
(d) Mr Brown was taken in cross-examination to the passage in Mr Papaleo's 2006 reference report referring to the release the Melbourne Airport Business Park having had an upward effect on land values, 'with increases of over 40% in the past three years'.[218] Mr Brown agreed that there had been growth, but said he was not sure whether the author was suggesting growth was in the value of in globo land or end lots. He presumed the author was talking about lots on the ground. He was asked to assume that the passage was a general passage that referred to in globo as well as smaller lots. He agreed that 40% was 'a fair rate of increase'.[219]
(e) It was put to Mr Brown in cross-examination that if one went into the 2006 sales, then the evidence was clear that there had been an increase in prices. Mr Brown responded:
There's been a - there was a significant volume of sales in 2006, so there's - and as I indicated this morning I don't believe you can just put two dots and just join them and say...[220]
(f) In relation to a question about sales that could be relied upon in 2005, Mr Brown again said he was not aware of any evidence that supported a movement in value per month like the one Murdesk was talking about. He said he disagreed with Mr Holland's analysis and he did not know what Mr Torr had done to reach a conclusion of between 2% and 3% per month for a rise in prices throughout 2005.[221]
(g) When discussing 'caveats' applicable to the sale of O'Herns Road, Mr Brown said that there was a timing issue, and some eight months difference between the sale of O'Herns Road and the relevant date, 'and certainly in '06 there's indications that there was a lot more activity in the industrial market'.[222] Later, also in relation to the O'Herns Road sale, Mr Brown said:
As I said I think eight months is a reasonable period of time past the date of acquisition in a market and I think it was clearly demonstrated in '06 was upwardly moving. I think for those reasons and the fact that I believe the sale had been influenced by the project [the MWM] made it for a number of reasons a sale that I don't think was very helpful.[223]
(h) In response to being asked whether he agreed that a rise in prices occurred in 2006, Mr Brown said there was no doubt that the market on 2006 started to move up quite rapidly.[224] In answer to a question about increases in prices between 2004 and the end of 2006, Mr Brown said there was no doubt that values had risen significantly during that period. In 2006 there was certainly significant interest and increase in values in the market. The majority of sales that he was looking at were mid 2006, when things seemed to have really taken off. [225]
When asked whether a concession had to be made in favour of the claimant because the question could not be resolved, Mr Brown said, 'Well I suppose I believe on balance, given the issues that I'm aware of in relation to the subject land, that I believe I've done that'.[226] He said he had allowed no specific percentage, but in arriving at the value he arrived at, he was conscious of the relevant date and the dates of the sales.
(i) In response to a question on profit and risk allowances in a hypothetical sub-division analysis, Mr Brown described the market in October 2005 as a rising market, not an aggressive market.[227] He suggested that in the latter part of 2006, the market was becoming an aggressive market where it was difficult to rationalise what people were paying for land based on how you would develop it and make a profit.
(j) In re-examination, Mr Brown was taken to the Dohertys Road and Mt Derrimut Road sales which he had recorded as $31 per square metre and $27 per square metre respectively. He was asked, standing at the relevant date, what view he took as to whether those 2005 sales and the earlier 2004 sales showed an increase or a change in land values as at the relevant date. He said:
I wasn't detecting significant movements in the period that we're talking about, although I would acknowledge that there is an absence of sales between March and October.[228]
(k) Mr Brown referred to sales 'taking off' in mid-2006 and to there being an aggressive market in 2006. He was asked whether there was evidence in the form of sales or otherwise at the relevant date that indicated the likelihood or otherwise of such an event in mid-2006. He answered:
411 The thrust of Mr Brown's evidence was therefore that he considered steep increases in market value to have occurred after the relevant date. He rejected the method of simply joining dots to chart increases over time, largely because of the unsteady rate at which prices move. However, he acknowledged there was some increase in values during the period from March to October 2005, which he implicitly took into account in reaching his valuation of $18 million for the subject land.
412 I am conscious of the need to give Murdesk the benefit of the doubt in relation to factors affecting the market value of the subject land. Nonetheless, the preponderance of the evidence does not support an increase of 30% in the year leading up to the relevant date for which Murdesk's valuers contend. There were not sufficient sales to support such a finding. I agree with Mr Brown that drawing trend lines based on later sales is not a useful way to ascertain rises in value during the relevant period because the market does not move in a regular fashion but rather in stops and starts. There is reason to conclude that the relevant market in 2005 was significantly slower than in 2006 and that increases in value were smaller than in subsequent years. In 2006, there were many more sales and those sales indicated rapidly rising values. The same cannot be said of 2005, when the market was comparatively quiet. It was only by reference to 2006 and 2007 sales that Mr Holland was able to chart upward growth trends in the charts that he produced in his report.
413 Mr Brown was of the opinion that the market 'took off' after the relevant date. I accept his evidence that when he carried out his valuation of the subject land in November 2005, he had regard to the time lapse between the relevant date and the earlier (March 2005) comparable sales in the west and concluded that it was not necessary to make a specific adjustment for time. In his valuation of November 2005, Mr Torr based his assessment on the $225,000 per hectare that he analysed for 300 Cooper Street and did not make any adjustment for time. It was not until subsequent revisions that he made adjustments of 20% and 35% respectively.
414 Nonetheless, as at November 2005, the expert valuers did not see any reason to make an adjustment (or any great adjustment) for time, even though the comparable sales on which they relied had taken place some time earlier.
415 I note also that as at December 2010, Mr Holland's draft of Appendix G adjusted for time at the flat rate of 1.5% per month. This rate was later increased to 2.5% per month, although it is unclear what transpired in the seven months to July 2011 to cause Mr Holland to change the rate. In all probability, it simply reflects the difficulty in fixing on a rate given the paucity of evidence.
416 Mr Brown analysed 25 Cooper Street at $33.33/m², which, without adjustment, would produce a value for the subject land of $18,378,162. His final valuation of $18 million for the subject land based on 25 Cooper Street as the most comparable sale plainly does not include provision for increases in land values over time.
417 Although I accept the greater part of Mr Brown's evidence, I am persuaded that an adjustment should be made for time. Having carefully reviewed the evidence, it would be open to conclude that no adjustment should be made because the market was flat in 2005. Alternatively, it would be open to conclude that such increases as existed in the Cooper Street precinct were attributable to the effects of the announcement of the relocation of the MWM. However, there were increases in in globo industrial land values across the metropolitan area in 2005 and, although the market in the north is distinguishable from the industrial property markets in the south-east and the west, it is reasonable to conclude that there would have been some increase in the north industrial node generally, including in the Cooper Street precinct.
418 In view of the uncertain state of the evidence, and having regard to the need to resolve doubts in favour of a more liberal estimate,[230] I have concluded that the flat rate initially used by Mr Holland of 1.5% per month is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and best reflects available evidence.
419 Applying this rate increase to the purchase price for 25 Cooper Street, which sold 11 months before the relevant date, would result in an adjustment of 17% for time.
420 Again, this is a difficult issue. Mr Brown did not make any adjustment for the ecological factors that were identified by Mr Gilmore and Mr Mueck because he felt Murdesk should be given the benefit of the doubt. Mr Torr, on the other hand, reduced the market value of the subject land from $17,370,000 to $15,120,000, a factor of some 12.95%.
421 I find that a prudent hypothetical purchaser would have looked beyond the Development Plan to inquire into whether there were any ecological issues that might preclude or impede the development of the subject land or any parts of it. It would not have taken very much to identify the Growling Grass Frog, the Legless Lizard and the Matted Flax-Lily as matters that were the subject of environmental controls, and therefore as potentially involving costs and delays. Although the relevant period was described as a 'window period' in relation to the state of knowledge about the GSM and its presence on degraded land, if a knowledgeable consultant such as Mr Gilmore was retained to advise on ecological matters, he or she would have recommended that a survey be conducted for GSM. A survey carried out during the flight season in December 2005 would have identified GSM on the subject land.
422 It is therefore likely that the well informed and prudent hypothetical purchaser would have been informed that approval under the EPBC Act would be required for GSM, as well as for other species identified. Based on the evidence of Mr Mueck, DEWHA could have required an offset equivalent for GSM of an area three times the area of GSM habitat -in this case 90 hectares - as well as other measures and contributions aimed at preserving listed species.
423 It is unnecessary to decide whether Mr Mueck's estimated costs arising from the applicable environmental controls are accurate in every respect. It is sufficient that the presence of native vegetation and listed species on the subject land would have given the prudent hypothetical purchaser pause for thought. The hypothetical purchaser would have been aware that there was a risk that there would be a reduced developable area, delay and additional costs for this reason.
424 However, having regard to the appetite for industrial in globo land at the relevant time, the strong attributes of the subject land and the fact that other in globo land on the periphery of Melbourne, particularly in the north and west, was likely to be affected by similar constraints, only a small discount to the market price should be made for ecological considerations, notwithstanding the potential for significant costs and delays to have been involved. I have settled on a discount of 5%, which is what I have concluded that the prudent hypothetical purchaser would have applied for the risks associated with ecological factors.
425 The Secretary submits that Mr Brown's $18 million assessment is at the upper end of the range of contemporaneous valuations and that the Court should go no higher. It is certainly higher than Mr Torr's assessment, but that assessment was based on 300 Cooper Street, which I accept set the 'low ball' for comparable values in the area. Mr Brown's assessment was also higher than Mr Dickinson's valuation, but that valuation predated the relevant date by some seven months. It was lower than Mr Wallace's and Mr Holland's estimates of $22 million in early 2006.
426 I have preferred the expert opinion of Mr Brown to that of the other valuers, although I have had close regard to the way in which Mr Torr carried out his valuation. I have accepted Mr Brown's opinion that 25 Cooper Street is the most comparable sale, and that, although it lacked some of the advantages of the subject land, it had other advantages which balanced those of the subject land. However, because of the need to adjust for time, I have concluded that it is necessary to go higher than the $18 million valuation given by Mr Brown.
427 My starting point is the analysed rate for 25 Cooper Street relied upon by the Secretary of $341,000 per hectare. This produces an unadjusted value for the subject land of $18,802,740. That amount adjusted for time (plus 17%) produces a figure of $21,999,206 (or 39.9/m²). I have concluded, however, that a small adjustment should be made for ecological constraints and have settled on minus 5%, which aims to take account of the risk presented by the unquantifiable as well as the quantifiable potential costs identified by Mr Mueck. This produces a final market value of $20,899,246 - say $20.9 million.
428 I find that the market value of the subject land at the relevant date was $20.9 million.
429 Murdesk claims a significant amount over and above the market value of the subject land to compensate it for what it contends is the special value to it of the land or, alternatively, for loss attributable to disturbance.
430 Special value is the value of any pecuniary advantage, in addition to market value, to a claimant that is incidental to the claimant's ownership or occupation of the land. A loss attributable to disturbance is any pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant that is 'the natural, direct and reasonable consequence' of the fact that the claimants' interest in the land has been divested, being pecuniary loss for which provision is not otherwise made.
431 In each case, the amount claimed by Murdesk is an amount equal to the market value of the subject land multiplied by 2.5% per month for such period as the Court determines was a reasonable time for Murdesk to acquire replacement land with equivalent attributes, plus 6% for acquisition costs.
432 Mr Dickey filed 5 affidavits in the proceeding,[231] parts of which were ruled to be inadmissible, largely on the ground that he purported to express opinions about land values that he did not have the expertise to express.[232] However, he was given free rein to tell the Court about his plans for the development of the subject land and its particular value to him as its owner, and he did so at length.
433 It was Mr Dickey's evidence that he intended to subdivide and develop the subject land for the purpose of a high quality business park and to hold it as a long-term investment. With the Council's support, Mr Dickey intended to press forward with subdivision and development, perhaps in conjunction with the Haberfield land. As an alternative to developing a business park, Mr Dickey had in mind selling some lots following subdivision, developing others as land and building packages, and holding some lots in prime locations (either before or after building construction) for investment purposes, including leasing and possible joint venturing. Mr Dickey explained that if he could not retain the whole of the land, he would design the complex so that he could engineer prime areas in the subdivision and hold onto those areas. As a subdivider of land, he would be opening up opportunities and servicing opportunities that presented themselves in the market from time to time.
434 In the light of these possibilities, Murdesk submitted that it was entitled to what a prudent man in Mr Dickey's position would have been willing to pay for the land sooner than fail to obtain it.[233] In Commonwealth v Milledge,[234] Dixon CJ and Kitto J held that an owner is entitled to compensation not only the amount which a prudent purchaser would find it worth his while to pay for the land, but also any additional amount which a prudent purchaser in the position of the owner, that is to say, with a business such as the owner's already established on the land, would find it worth his while to pay sooner than fail to obtain the land. Murdesk contends that this is not the same as compensation for business profits or savings which an owner might expect to make from the use of the land. The suitability of the land for the purpose of the owner's special business affects the value of the land to the owner, and the prospective savings and additional profits which it could be shown would probably attend the use of the land in the owner's business furnishes material for assessing what is the real value of the land to the owner.
435 In opening submissions, Murdesk submitted that it was entitled to compensation for special value because there was a 'unique conjunction' between the subject land, which it claimed had unmatchable attributes, and an owner who was in such a personal position at that site that it was incapable of being fairly reinstated at an alternative site, even if one were available.[235] The special value to the owner made the owner an unwilling vendor and the question of the value of the land was turned into an inquiry about what it would take to 'chisel the owner off the site'.[236] The evidence had to demonstrate 'the concurrence of the owner's circumstances which elevates the consideration of its particular circumstances to a level warranting the recognition of special value to it'.[237]
436 In this regard, Murdesk submitted that its situation reflected a degree of sensitivity and vulnerability which would not be present in the case of the ordinary hypothetical owner/vendor. Compensation for market value was insufficient, as that was appropriate for an ordinary owner/developer without the fragility which characterised the position of Murdesk. Murdesk was in place and was only in place because Mr Dickey had organised its affairs to enable it to be entirely focused on the opportunities of the subject land. Because of its exclusive focus on the subject land, the compulsory acquisition of the subject land amounted to the destruction of Murdesk's business vision and opportunities.
437 In respect of its claim for compensation for disturbance, Murdesk submitted that in circumstances where its advanced vision for its land and all the efforts invested in the pursuit of that vision were rendered nugatory, where that vision and invested effort could not effectively be transported elsewhere because, in simple terms, the door had been slammed in its face due to the extraordinary escalation of land prices, Murdesk was deprived of any opportunity to 'reinstate' that vision and it should be compensated for that.
438 Mr Dickey's evidence was that since 1999, he had committed substantial funds and time to the development of the subject land.[238] He said:
... my opinion, was (and is) that the subject land met the requirement for a high quality business park, and that as at the relevant date it was irreplaceable, in the sense that no other land in the Cooper Street Employment Area was suitable for this purpose, and in any event none was available for purchase at all, or for the amount offered by way of compensation for the compulsory acquisition.[239]
I don't know of any other opportunity that gives me anything like the opportunity that I had on this site. Now that's not just here in Victoria, I looked at opportunities both in South Australia and New South Wales as well. I just - when I say irreplaceable I mean I just don't have the funding or the ability to replace the land with what has been taken from me.[240]
440 He gave evidence that no other comparable land was available for him to purchase for the amount offered to him as compensation.[241] He said:
The Northpoint Estate and my property, I thought, were far superior to anything else in the area. Cooper Street, it was a very attractive location to be on. For me, it was that prime corner, it was the combination between the freeway and Cooper Street which gave it an identity that most people around Melbourne would know, and in 2005 I had my sights set on building at least one eight level building which would give it even much greater exposure. So it would be known by most people coming down the Hume Highway. The site's truly irreplaceable.[242]
441 According to Mr Dickey, the subject land was especially valuable for him due to his contacts at Council and his relationship with Coomes, the fact that he had substantial equity in the land, and a better understanding of it and its prospects than a hypothetical purchaser might have.[243] Moreover, unlike any other purchaser of the subject land, he did not have to pay stamp duty on the purchase.
442 Mr Dickey described his position when looking to purchase another parcel of land:
... I'd started with a fairly wide angle lens at the front end and I'd stepped that through to Cooper Street over the course of five years so, really that was my chief focus at that time. Ah, now, if I'm looking for another property I've got to widen the lens again and follow that same process through but, um, I'm up against some very powerful, um, opposition with very well heeled developers, ah, competing for any land that's around of any worth. So, um, it would have been a very difficult thing to achieve. Ah, certainly I wouldn't have been able to replace it with a - with like value.[244]
443 To establish an entitlement to compensation for special value, Murdesk must demonstrate a pecuniary advantage that is incidental to its ownership or occupation of the land in addition to market value. Special value must arise from some attribute of the land, some use made or to be made of it or advantage derived or to be derived from it, which is peculiar to the claimant and would not exist in the abstract hypothetical purchaser.[245]
444 The Secretary submitted that there was no evidence of any pecuniary advantage derived or to be derived from the subject land that was peculiar to Murdesk. The highest and best use of the subject land at the relevant date was agreed to be for future subdivisional development for industrial or employment-generating uses. This is what Murdesk was proposing to undertake, and the market value of the land would reflect this use.
445 The Secretary, in its written submissions and through cross-examination of Mr Dickey, carefully traced Mr Dickey's record in property development up until the point when he came to focus on the Epping area, starting with his involvement with the Burlock Group of companies, through the Market Square and Cardiff Properties developments to his involvement with the Concord Group of companies. Mr Dickey was challenged squarely on his competency as a property developer on the basis that he had been involved in failed business ventures and that, in some cases, unsecured creditors had not been paid in full. The Secretary also submitted that, despite the very favourable terms of Murdesk's contract to acquire the subject land from the elderly Mr Bell and his sister, when the time came to settle on the subject land, Murdesk was not in a position to do so. Mr Dickey's own evidence revealed that Murdesk was really only able to complete the contract of sale for the subject land because Mr Bell agreed to vary the contract and, once the contract was varied, Murdesk was fortuitously able to make use of cash advances of compensation made by Roads Corporation arising from the Bypass acquisition.
446 On this basis, the Secretary submitted that the financial position of Murdesk was inferior to that of many other developers and that it was in no better position to exploit the opportunities of the subject land than any other developer.
447 I accept this submission, as the evidence shows Mr Dickey to have had mixed success in his career as a property developer and to have had limited financial means to develop the land as at the relevant date. Murdesk plainly did not have the financial strength or the depth of expertise of the large corporations that were its competitors. Little can be made of Mr Dickey's close relationship with officers of the City of Whittlesea or its consultants, Coomes. The effect of the planning evidence was that the City of Whittlesea was anxious to provide for development in the municipality, especially in relation to employment-generating uses, and that would have been the case regardless of the identity of the particular developer. The work that Mr Dickey undertook with the Council and Coomes to prepare the 'vision statement' and to secure the rezoning of the subject land would be reflected in the market value of the land. I note in this context that at the relevant date, Murdesk had not prepared a plan for the subdivision of the subject land that accorded with proposed Amendment C31. Had there had been a subdivision plan prior to the relevant date which was consistent with proposed Amendment C31, however, the value thereby created would be reflected in the market value of the land.
448 In my view, therefore, the matters for which Murdesk contended to support its claim for special value were matters going to the market value of the land. The land in question was broadacre land, suitable for future subdivision and development. It would have been of interest to a range of large and successful developers of the kind that lodged expressions of interest for the Haberfield land. This interest would clearly have been reflected in its market value. Given the relative financial strength and development experience of those companies, the proposition that Murdesk had more expertise or was in a better position to exploit the development opportunity presented by the subject land cannot be accepted.
449 Nor, in my view, does any vulnerability arising from Murdesk 'putting all its eggs in one basket' give rise to a claim for compensation for special value. That was a commercial decision made by Murdesk as a property developer seeking to put its business on a firm foundation. Special value cannot flow solely from the fact that a claimant has concentrated its development activities on a single parcel of land.
450 As to its claim for compensation for disturbance, Murdesk must show actual loss arising as natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the divestment of the land, for which provision is not otherwise made. However, no actual loss has been claimed. Although Murdesk argued that it found itself in a difficult position trying to replace the subject land in a rising market, it did not advance any concrete evidence of loss or detriment. As the Secretary submits, Murdesk finally settled the purchase from the Bell siblings only in February 2005. It was able to do so in part due to compensation received from the Roads Corporation in respect of the Bypass acquisition. It received an advance of compensation of $14.1 million for the MWM acquisition on 12 December 2005. For land for which it had outlaid less than $7 million, Murdesk had therefore received a total of $16 million in compensation by December 2005. There is no evidence of what Murdesk did with the money that it received. Nor is there any evidence of any action taken by Murdesk with a view to purchasing replacement land. The material before the Court consists largely of assertions that Murdesk was unable to replace the land because it was so special as to be irreplaceable.
451 The measure of loss based on the rising price of land post the relevant date does not reflect any actual loss or, indeed, the special value claimed. It is unrelated to anything other than the difficulty Mr Dickey asserts he had or would have had entering a rising market with a fixed amount in his pocket to spend on replacement land. That is not a difficulty that arises from any special value of the land to Murdesk. Any vendor wishing to re-enter the market would find itself in that position. It might give rise to an entitlement to compensation if there was evidence of actual loss, but no actual loss has been claimed.
452 The claims for special value and/or disturbance are not made out.
(1) The amount of compensation may be increased by such amount, not exceeding 10% of the market value of the land, by way of solatium as is reasonable to compensate the claimant for intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantages resulting from the acquisition.
(2) In assessing the amount payable under subsection (1) there must be taken into account all relevant circumstances applicable to the claimant including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing -
(a) the interest of the claimant in the acquired land; and
(b) the length of time during which the claimant had occupied the land; and
(c) inconvenience likely to be suffered by the claimant by reason of removal from the land; and
(d) the period of time after the acquisition of the land during which the claimant has been, or will be, allowed to remain in possession of the land; and
(e) the period of time during which, but for the acquisition of the land, the claimant would have been likely to continue to occupy the land; and
(f) the age of the claimant; and
(g) where the claimant at the date of acquisition is occupying the land as the claimant's principal place of residence, the number, age and circumstances of other people (if any) living with the claimant.
454 Murdesk contends that the circumstances that warrant an award of solatium are largely related to the frustration of its commercial objectives and opportunities and to the manner in which Major Projects Victoria ('MPV') dealt with Murdesk in relation to relocating the MWM to the subject land.
455 In considering the appropriate quantum of solatium, Murdesk submitted that it is relevant that Murdesk is the corporate trustee of a family trust, the beneficiaries of which are the six children of Mr Dickey and his late wife Margaret. Mr Dickey is the sole director of this family company. Although investment and land development are its core business, it is appropriate to focus on the intangible concerns of worry, trouble and nuisance arising from and in the context of the acquisition of the subject land, and it is not unreasonable to presume that a sole director managing a family company for the benefit of his children can be assumed to feel worries, troubles and nuisance more acutely than a large corporation that is in the business of land development.
456 In Roads Corporation v Love,[246] Osborn J referred to both the dictionary definition of solatium and its description in March v City of Frankston (No 1)[247] as an 'expression apt to describe an award of some amount to cover inconvenience and in a proper case distress caused by compulsory taking.'[248] Although his Honour accepted both the dictionary definition and the description in March for the purpose of illuminating central aspects of the class of disadvantage which is ordinarily compensable by way of solatium, Osborn J did not accept that either should be substituted for the statutory definition, which was potentially broader in compass than either. The statutory definition, it will be recalled, refers to compensation for the 'intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantages resulting from the acquisition'.
457 Solatium is to be assessed taking into account the specific factors in s 44(2) of the LAC Act as they apply to the case. The Secretary submitted that, on the evidence, this requires the Court to have regard to the fact that:
(a) Murdesk was the registered proprietor of the acquired land;
(b) Murdesk had occupied the land from 6 March 2002, when Mr Bell vacated the property;
(c) no inconvenience other than of a pecuniary kind was identified by Murdesk as having been suffered or likely to be suffered by it by reason of its removal from the land;
(d) there is no evidence of Murdesk being or not being allowed to remain in possession of the land after the relevant date, but in any case, the subject land was not occupied in the same manner as a home or business premises;
(e) if the subject land had not been acquired, then it is most likely that Murdesk would have continued to occupy the land only for a short time until sold;
(f) the age of the claimant is irrelevant in the case of a corporation;
(g) the land was not occupied as the principal place of residence of the claimant company or its director.
458 The considerations in s 44(2) of the LAC Act do not point to an award of solatium to a property development corporation that buys and develops land for profit. The considerations in s 44(2) are largely directed to the position of individual claimants who have been divested of land or property to which they have an emotional attachment and/or whose circumstances make it difficult to move or leave the property.
459 Nonetheless, the considerations in s 44(2) do not preclude an award of solatium to a property development corporation in circumstances where the claimant is a family run business, and the land in question is of particular importance to it or the acquisition in question has been handled so as to give rise to particular worry, trouble and nuisance.
460 It is difficult to distil from the rather general material about Mr Dickey's ambitions for the subject land and his dealings with MPV exactly why Murdesk says that it is entitled to compensation for intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantages resulting from the acquisition. The matters which Murdesk raises in relation to its entitlement to solatium are something of a 'rag bag' of assertions and complaints from which the Court is asked to infer worry, trouble and nuisance. They include:
(a) the fact that the subject land was the 'jewel in the crown' which Murdesk intended to subdivide and develop using funds from the sale of other land that it owned in the Epping area;
(b) the fact that Mr Dickey considered the subject land to have great potential for long-term investment and he was looking forward to his children growing up into their teens and securing long-term investments for his family;
(c) the speed with which Mr Dickey moved to retain Coomes and to work with the Council to subdivide and develop the subject land for employment-generating purposes, including by way of a site-specific planning scheme amendment;
(d) the evaporation of any prospect of a site-specific rezoning as a result of delay caused by the relocation of the Craigieburn Bypass route, which entitled Murdesk to compensation in the form of solatium from the Roads Corporation;
(e) Mr Dickey's particular familiarity with and enthusiasm for the Epping area, the fact that he wanted to stay in property development and saw the Epping Bulge as the best opportunity in Victoria at the time;
(f) the fact that Murdesk committed substantial funds towards the project and Mr Dickey himself committed a considerable amount of time, in the course of which he acquired expertise and experience;
(h) the fact that on 17 January 2003, following consultation with officers at the Council and MPV, Murdesk offered the subject land for the purpose of the MWM by means of an expression of interest accompanied by a letter in support from the Council;
(i) the fact that Mr Dickey expected to become involved on behalf of Murdesk in negotiations with MPV, the result of which would be that Murdesk would enter into an arrangement with the government under which it would manage the subdivision and development of an overall site and would probably continue as owner of part or all of the subject land, with MWM located on some part of it, either as owner or tenant, thus allowing Murdesk to manage the sale or lease of the rest of the site;
(j) MPV's failure to follow up on this and the frustration and delay caused by the 'unbusiness-like antics of MPV';
(k) the fact that all of this was re-ignited a second time in 2004, but again MPV failed to cooperate;
(l) the manner in which MPV acquired the Haberfield land, leaving open questions as to which part of that land would be acquired and whether the subject land would also be acquired;
(m) MPV's failure to negotiate with a view to purchasing the relevant part of the Haberfield land and rushing in to serve its own purposes, regardless of the inconvenience and frustration to others (including Murdesk) which had lodged an expression of interest in that land;
(n) the blighting the Haberfield land by uncertainty for six months and the subject land for 12 months.
461 According to Murdesk's Senior Counsel, Mr Dickey determinedly pursued his vision for the subject land, putting all his eggs in one basket. This was not unreasonable, given the potential of the subject land and the fact that Murdesk was not a giant corporation in the development market. The saga that Murdesk found itself dragged into was not an instance of 'ups and downs in the market' that could have been planned for; rather, it was an unexpected pounce by the government to 'grab the golden egg before the egg hatched'. This was an instance of delay, frustration, obstruction and shattered expectations, Mr Dickey having been led up the garden path by MPV. Whereas the prospect of the MWM was initially seen as an opportunity to be pursued potentially in partnership with the Government, it became a land grab after much of the preparatory work had been completed.
462 On this basis, Murdesk contends that it should receive the maximum amount of compensation for solatium, namely 10% of the market value of the land.
463 The Secretary submits that Murdesk was not a disadvantaged person hit hard by a second compulsory acquisition whose feelings were injured by the compulsory nature of the second taking. Although Mr Dickey was disappointed by the compulsory acquisition, that disappointment arose from pecuniary considerations. Murdesk held a development site which it proposed to sell and for which it was actively seeking buyers. Although Mr Dickey put his eggs in the one basket and those eggs (and the basket) were taken from him, compensation is to be assessed and paid.
464 According to the Secretary, the only truly intangible hurt that could have been suffered by Murdesk was as a result of losing to control the sale process. If compensation is payable for the loss of the ability to control the sale process (which the Secretary does not concede), then any allowance must be modest. Any solatium awarded should not exceed $100,000, including for any disappointment due to offering the land for the MWM project and then having the land compulsorily acquired.
465 The Secretary submitted that Murdesk was an active seller of the subject land both prior to and at the relevant date. In Murdesk's response to the call for expressions of interest for the relocation of the MWM Mr Dickey identified the price of the land on that date as being approximately $10 million.[249] Documents discovered in the proceeding also show that in May 2005, Mr Dickey was dealing with Mr Vito Garra of CBRE, apparently with a view to selling the land.[250] In his instructions to Murdesk's legal advisers in March 2011, Mr Dickey said that at the relevant date he was considering putting the land up for tender.[251]
466 The expression of interest in the MWM proposal prepared by Mr Dickey with the help of Council in January 2003 states as follows:
Murdesk purchased the property with a view to developing it, and we would prefer to retain an interest in some way (perhaps a ground lease) but we understand that this would not be attractive to you. From the time we first became involved with the subject site in early 1990, we have been seeking to create opportunities that would create points of difference, and to attract groups with a standard of excellence.
Because both of these aims will have been achieved should you pursue this Expression of Interest, and because of the economic benefits that would accrue to the City of Whittlesea, Murdesk would be seeking to accommodate your requirements.
467 This document, while revealing some ambivalence about the sale of the subject land on the part of Mr Dickey, does display a preparedness to sell the land to the MPV for the purposes of the MWM development. It should be noted that at the time this document was prepared and lodged, the registered proprietor of the land was Mr Bell, not Murdesk. Although Murdesk had the right to complete the purchase, it had not yet done so. Murdesk therefore stood to make a significant profit on the land, with relatively little outlay on its part.
468 There was also evidence that Mr Dickey was communicating with Mr Vito Garra of CBRE in relation to the sale of the subject land. A reference to Mr Garra is contained in Mr Dickey's letter to Mr Dickinson requesting a valuation for mortgage purposes on 28 January 2005, one week after Murdesk settled on the subject land. The letter states:
Vito from your city office has introduced me to a couple of Major players who are interested in purchasing all or any part of this land and can attest to its ready sellability.
469 On 5 May 2005, following advice that MPV would be acquiring the subject land, Mr Dickey again wrote to Mr Dickinson commencing:
It is probably just as well Vito Garra is out of the country at the moment. I don't want to be the one to tell him this!
470 When it was put to Mr Dickey in cross-examination that he didn't want to tell Mr Garra about the compulsory acquisition because Mr Garra had been trying to sell the land on his behalf, Mr Dickey first responded that Mr Garra was a leasing agent, but then said:
With a property development and property investment one needs to keep an eye on value and so I'm always deriving estimates for the value of the land and you can only do that by talking to people who are interested in buying, so that's a process that goes on all the time.[252]
471 It is not at all clear how Mr Dickey was using Mr Garra, and whether he was in fact using Mr Garra to sell the subject land. In cross-examination, Mr Dickey denied that he was an active seller. He said that he had worked with the government to achieve a negotiated settlement and he did so because he had a very good relationship with the City of Whittlesea and he would bend somewhat to oblige and, secondly, because he was under 'massive financial pressure' at the time because of the Bypass acquisition.[253] He said that he may have been forced to sell the land and he did talk to people with a view to selling, should he not be able to clear his obligations to the bank.[254]
472 Mr Dickey undoubtedly put time and effort into working out how the subject land could best be exploited, and I do not doubt that he gave careful consideration to its potential as a longer term investment. However, given that Murdesk's business was ultimately to make money out of property development, and given that it was not flush with funds, it also seems to me to be likely that Mr Dickey kept an open mind about selling the land if an opportunity arose to obtain a sufficiently good price for it. The land was development land and its highest and best use lay in subdivision and development for employment-generating purposes. Its value to Mr Dickey, like its value to any other developer, lay in the price that could be achieved for the land, be it in developed or undeveloped form or in the shorter or longer term.
473 I therefore accept the Secretary's submission that what Mr Dickey was principally deprived of by the compulsory acquisition was the opportunity to choose the timing and method of the sale or disposal of the subject land. Ultimately, this is a matter affecting Murdesk's pecuniary interests and its loss in the circumstances of a compulsory acquisition is not an intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantage that cannot otherwise be compensated under the LAC.
474 As to breach of the alleged undertaking by MPV not to compulsorily acquire the land and the alleged delay, frustration, obstruction and shattered expectations arising from the 'un-businesslike antics of MPV', I am not satisfied on the very limited evidence before the Court about the course of the parties' conduct in the compulsory acquisition that anything said or done by MPV (or other government agency involved in the acquisition) would give Murdesk an entitlement to solatium.
475 I am not satisfied on the evidence relating to the acquisition of the subject land that there was 'an unexpected pounce by the government to "grab the golden egg before the egg hatched"' in the sense that there was an unconscionable departure from the normal course in a compulsory acquisition once land had been determined to be required for a public purpose.
476 I accept, however, that Mr Dickey suffered worry and disappointment as a result of the acquisition. He regarded the subject land as his great opportunity in life and believed that he had struck an unmatchable bargain with the Bell siblings to obtain the best development land in Melbourne. Although he must have anticipated that Murdesk's retention and development of the subject land would be difficult given its straightened financial circumstances, I consider it likely that Mr Dickey was nonetheless anxious about the process of compulsory acquisition and disappointed at being denied the opportunity to exploit in the manner he considered most advantageous the terrific 'once in a lifetime' opportunity that had come his way. Mr Dickey found himself having to try to replace his only business asset in a rapidly rising market with many large players keen to extend their holdings. This must have caused him worry.
477 I am satisfied that the compulsory acquisition of the subject land caused Mr Dickey worry and disappointment. Murdesk, as the vehicle through which Mr Dickey conducted his business, is entitled to some solatium for this worry and disappointment. However, the amount awarded must be relatively small, having regard to the nature of Murdesk's business and the fact that Mr Dickey is and was, on his own evidence, an experienced professional property developer who was fully acquainted with the highs and lows of the industry.
478 On balance, I consider that an amount of $100,000 is appropriate compensation for the worry and disappointment suffered by Mr Dickey.
479 The quantum of this part of Murdesk's claim is $50,000. In his affidavit seeking to verify the claim for expenses under s 41(1)(f) of the LAC Act, Mr Dickey has detailed expenses totalling $43,148.86.[255] Accordingly, Murdesk is entitled to that amount for this item of its claim.
480 The amount of compensation to be paid is as follows:
Compensation for loss of market value on 28 October 2005
[1] Certificate of Title Volume 10859 Folios 937 and 938.
[2] Later known as CPG Australia Pty Ltd.
[3] The amount of compensation payable to Murdesk as a result of the compulsory acquisition of the corridor of land for the Bypass was the subject of separate proceedings in this court: Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363 (the 'Bypass proceeding')
[6] Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 537; Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363.
[7] Spencer v Commonwealth [1907] HCA 82; (1907) 5 CLR 418.
[9] Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565.
[10] Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363 (5 October 2006) [32], citing Road Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Mosca [2006] NSWCA 159.
[11] Turner v Minister of Public Instruction [1956] HCA 7; (1956) 95 CLR 245, 264; March v City of Frankston [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350, 356.
[24] [2010] VSC 32, [112]-[115].
[26] See generally Alan Hyam, The Law Affecting Valuation of Land in Australia (The Federation Press, 4th ed, 1995) 316.
[31] Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 32, [83] and the cases there referred to.
[32] Transport for London v Spirerose [2009] UKHL 44; [2009] 1 WLR 1797, 1814, referring to Horn v Sutherland Corporation [1942] 2 KB 26, 49.
[33] Exhibit A2, Bundle of aerial photographs dated 28 August 2005, 11 November 2006, December 2008, January 2009, January 2010, outline showing street and layout, tendered on 20 September 2011.
[34] By the Whittlesea Planning Scheme Amendment C31 - see below.
[35] Affidavit of Robert Milner dated 11 May 2010 and expert report dated 21 April 2010. Mr Milner supported his report by giving oral evidence. Mr Whitney was not called to give evidence, but his affidavit dated 12 February 2010 and expert reports dated 13 December 2004, 16 June 2005, 13 March 2007 and 14 September 2009 were admitted into evidence.
[36] Prepared by Tract Consultants for the City of Whittlesea and the City of Hume.
[37] Including the proposed Edgars Road extension.
[39] Affidavit of Mervyn John Dickey dated 7 July 2011.
[41] 70 Brush Rd, 415 Harvest Road, the subject land and 235 Harvest Road.
[42] Transcript of Proceedings, Secretary to the Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of Victoria, S CI 2006 08035, Emerton J, (19-29 September, 3-7, 17-21 October 21-25 November, 12, 14 December 2011) 2372 ('Transcript').
[43] Exhibit R5, Coomes Concept Plan - Cooper Street South Vision, May 2001, tendered on 19 September 2011.
[46] Affidavit of Mervyn John Dickey dated 7 July 2011; Transcript 2376.
[47] Transcript 2377. See also Transcript 2394.
[49] Affidavit of Robert Patrick Papaleo sworn 22 August 2011, Exhibit RPP-3.
[50] The North Industrial Node was defined in the 2005 UDP as the contiguous industrial precinct incorporating industrial zoned land and identified future industrial land generally within the Hume Highway/Bypass corridor stretching to also incorporating the Cooper Street Employment Precinct in Epping.
[51] The UDP 2005 was published in December 2005 and was based on data gathered by the Department of Sustainability and Environment throughout 2005. According to Mr Papaleo, the planning and economics industry generally regarded the data as being reflective of the known situation as at approximately June 2005.
[55] In his letter to the Authority's instructors dated 22 August 2011, Mr Papaleo noted that the figure of 380 hectares given in his reference report did not properly take into account the 20 hectares on the southern boundary of the proposed MWM.
[56] The reference report inaccurately refers to 380ha. This was corrected by Mr Papaleo in his expert report at [12]. Other incorrect data included in the reference report was corrected in re-examination at Transcript 1979.
[60] Affidavits of Elizabeth Mary Hamila dated 18 May 2010 and 19 May 2011, and expert reports dated 18 May 2010 and 19 May 2011.
[61] Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363 (5 October 2006).
[62] Valley Water, Updated Cooper Street Sewerage Servicing October 2003 (Exhibit R12, Yarra Valley Sewerage Strategy Plan, October 2003, tendered on 19 September 2011)
[64] Mr Muecks' affidavits were made on 12 February 2010, 19 August 2011 and 8 September 2011. Mr Gilmore's affidavit was made on 21 June 2011.
[69] The Craigieburn Grasslands and the Aurora residential development.
[70] Affidavit of Stephen Garry Mueck affirmed 8 September 2011, Exhibit SGM-10 (Report dated 13 September 2010).
[71] On the assumption that the purchaser knew at the relevant date all of the information contained in the reports concerning the subject site regardless of the reports having been prepared at later dates.
[72] Reports dated November 2005, 9 November 2005, 20 June 2007, 8 April 2008, 19 September 2008, 21 June 2010, December 2010, 18 March 2011. Mr Torr is a Director of Property Dynamics, Independent Property Consultants.
[73] Reports dated 26 September 2005, 4 November 2005, 7 November 2005, 10 November 2005, 31 May 2007, December 2008, 18 June 2010, 25 November 2010 and 11 March 2011. Mr Brown is a Director of m3property (Vic) Pty Ltd.
[74] Reports dated 11 July 2011 and 16 August 2011. In his affidavit sworn 11 July 2011, to which he exhibits his expert valuation report dated 11 July 2011, Mr Murray deposes that he was first instructed by Murdesk's then solicitors, Best Hooper, to prepare a valuation report in September 2006. He received further instructions from Murdesk's solicitors, Norton Rose, in May 2010 and from Murdesk's current solicitors, Richmond & Bennison, on 4 July 2011. Mr Murray is a Director, O'Brien's Valuers & Property Consultants.
[75] Reports dated 7 July 2011 and 16 August 2011. In his affidavit sworn on 11 July 2011, to which he exhibits his expert valuation report dated 7 July 2011, Mr Holland deposes to having been first instructed by Murdesk's then solicitors, Best Hooper, in March 2007. He received further instructions from Murdesk's subsequent solicitors, Norton Rose, on 24 May 2010 and on 22 November 2010, and further confirmation of his instructions from Murdesk's current solicitors, Richmond & Bennison, on 1 July 2011. Mr Holland is Manager, Specialized Valuation & Advisory Services, Opteon Property Group.
[76] Reports dated 11 July 2011 and 16 August 2011. In his affidavit sworn 11 July 2011, to which he exhibits his expert report dated 11 July 2011, Mr Wallace deposes that he was first instructed by Murdesk's then solicitors, Norton Rose, on 24 March 2011. He received further instructions from Norton Rose on 8 April 2011 and, by letter dated 1 July 2011, further confirmation of his instructions from Murdesk's current solicitors, Richmond & Bennison. Mr Wallace is a Real Property Consultant, Certified Practising Valuer and Licensed Estate Agent and Auctioneer.
[77] Mr Murray also deposed to having given advice to Murdesk for this purpose. However, he gave evidence that the statement to that effect in his affidavit was an error.
[78] Exhibit A30, Statement of Evidence of Peter Dickinson dated 18 October 2011, tendered on 20 October 2011.
[79] Exhibit R71, Revised table of in globo sales - All regions, tendered on 14 December 2011.
[80] Also referred to as 280 Cooper Street.
[81] Referred to as 280 Cooper Street and given an incorrect sale price.
[82] In respect of Fairbairn Road, Mr Torr analysed the rate for the subject land at $320,000 per hectare, accounting for deferment in development of the subject land; in respect of 275 Hume Highway, he analysed the sale rate of the subject land, accounting for delay in servicing, at $182,250 per hectare.
[83] Although Mr Torr later commented on the 'relative lack in directly comparable sales within estates surrounding the subject property': See letter dated 9 November 2005 to the Valuer General.
[84] Transcript 1703. Based on costings by Millar & Merrigan .
[85] Transcript 1702; Affidavit of Christopher Edward Torr dated 5 May 2012, Exhibit CET-2 (November 2005 Report), Appendix 8. Realisations were based on lot prices of $150-165/m² for the lots along Cooper St, $130/m² for smaller lots, $110/m² for lots with frontage to the Craigieburn Bypass, and $100/m² for internal lots. Mr Torr factored in an annual interest rate of 9.5% per annum, 4.5% for selling expenses, and a 25% profit and risk allowance. He estimated a selling rate of two lots per month with selling to run over a period of 39 months, assuming five presales. Mr Torr allowed a period of 39 months to sell a property after a hypothetical subdivision as it may not be possible to develop the land immediately as the necessary service infrastructure may not be available. There could also be simple commercial constraints to the extent that there are too many subdivisions already operating in that location. See Transcript 1749.
[86] In the form of a letter dated 9 November 2005.
[87] The net development costs were the same as those used by Mr Torr, namely $16,798,781. Mr Brown factored in selling costs at 3%, finance costs at 8%, acquisition costs at 5.75% and a developer's margin of 25%.
[88] Which Mr Brown describes as his 'final report'.
[91] And he said as much in his supplementary reports dated 10 November 2005 and 31 May 2007.
[99] He said the ecological issues would have been dealt with 'quite harshly' (Transcript 2006).
[100] Report dated 11 July 2011), p 37. The reference to $965,000 per hectare is an error. The highest sale that Mr Murray considered in the northern region was Heyington Avenue, which he analysed at $859,180 per hectare.
[105] Ibid 20; Transcript 488-9, 524-5.
[114] Mr Holland gave extensive examples of the kinds of integrated business park developments that could be developed on the subject land. The Court was shown photographs of business park developments around Melbourne that included 'big box' retailing, hotels, and business and technology parks (Transcript, 606).
[117] Based on the affidavits of Ms Hamila and Mr Jordan.
[118] Based on the affidavits of Messrs Milner and Whitney.
[119] Mr Wallace briefly considered the sales at 300 Cooper Street, 310 Cooper Street, 135 O'Herns Road and Heyington Avenue. As he considered 300 and 310 Cooper Street to be barely within the relevant timeframe, upward adjustments would need to be made for the purpose of comparison. Mr Wallace did not consider it acceptable to make adjustments for differences between the features of those sites and the subject land, as such adjustments could only be based on subjective opinions. However, in respect of both 300 and 310 Cooper Street, Mr Wallace emphasised the need for fill and uncertainties associated with the availability and costs of fill of sufficient quantity and quality, the time that might be needed to locate and purchase the fill, and the time that might be needed for consolidation. This was critical in the context of what he described as a rapidly escalating property market.
Mr Wallace assessed the value 135 O'Herns Road at $49.45/m², but stated that its location was inferior, largely because it lacked immediate access to Cooper Street and because such access as it had would not be satisfactory, for the time being at least. He referred to the proposal for a light rail service to cut across the property. Again, adjustments would need to be made, and he did not consider it acceptable to make adjustments to take account of the differences between the features of 135 O'Herns Road and the subject land.
As to Heyington Avenue, Mr Wallace suggested that both in globo and subdivisional lots did not experience the level of capital appreciation or enjoy the locational advantages, the marriage value, the ease of development and market opportunities of the Cooper Street Employment Area. Accordingly, it did not measure up as a viable alternative comparable sale.
[120] Exhibit A30, Statement of Evidence of Peter Richard Dickinson dated 18 October 2011, tendered on 20 October 2011.
[121] Described as the land at 335-413 Cooper Street, but the sliver was excluded from the valuation.
[127] I do so notwithstanding the criticism that Mr Brown did not carry out a 'before and after' analysis of value as required by the LAC Act, but simply valued the subject land as a stand alone parcel. In this case, where the remaining land was a very small sliver that was physically separated from the acquired land by the Bypass, nothing turns on this.
[129] Exhibit A15, Tab 6, Folder of materials put to Mr Murray in cross-examination, tendered on 27 September 2011.
[130] In his final report, Mr Murray distinguished between sales prior to the relevant date and sales that took place after the relevant date. He expressed a range of rates for each of these categories ($160,000 to $335,000 per hectare for pre-relevant date sales; $235,000 to $513,000 per hectare for post relevant date sales).
[132] Mr Murray made express reference to the on-sale from Demar Developments to the McMullin Group, noting various aspects of that property which he regarded as negatives.
[135] Exhibit A15 Tab 9; Transcript 2535.
[137] Secretary to the Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 581.
[138] Derived from discovery and a subpoena addressed to Mr Holland. Exhibit A21, Two volumes of documents relating to Mr Holland's retainer and instructions, tendered on 3 October 2011.
[139] This is unsurprising, as Mr Holland was involved on behalf of Murdesk in the earlier proceeding in relation to the Craigieburn Bypass acquisition.
[146] This was apparently based on a letter that Mr Dickey had obtained through the discovery process from a senior bureaucrat in the Department of Infrastructure to the relevant Minister describing the costs to the government of developing the Haberfield land for the MWM.
[149] With the exception of the Kador sale, upon which Mr Holland did not rely.
[151] Exhibit R5, Coomes Concept Plan - Cooper Street South Vision May 2001, tendered 19 September 2011.
[157] R O Rost and H G Collins, Land Valuation in Australia (Southwood Press, 3rd ed, Reprint with commentary, 1993) 151.
[163] Exhibit A23, Invoices dated 15 February 2005 and 16 February 2005 from Wallace Commercial to Murdesk Investments, tendered 6 October 2011.
[168] The uses on the plan largely approximated the land uses shown on the development plan. See Transcript 1264.
[173] Mr Torr's original 2005 level of value at $12.4 million (or $22.50/m²) adjusted on 9 November 2005 to $14.1 million (or $26.29/m²) was lower than that adopted by Mr Brown due to Mr Torr's view of the market and allowances for sewerage, risk and delay. Although he made inquiries of the owner's representative as to any known native flora or fauna, he made no adjustment on account of that issue. His revised figure of $17,370,000 (or $31.50/m²) in April 2008 was subsequently reduced on account of environmental considerations to $15,120,000 (or $27.42/m²). In the Authority's submission, the hypothetical vendor and purchaser - assumed to be prudent - would allow for the risk of reduced developable area, and of extra costs and delay on account of the known but emerging flora and fauna considerations. Mr Brown's level of value of $18 million therefore marks the upper end of the value range identified by the Authority's valuers.
[174] [2003] HCA 8; (2003) 212 CLR 111, 121.
[175] Murdesk criticises Mr Torr's adjustments based on flora and fauna issues. In this regard, Murdesk points to Mr Brown's evidence, which was to the effect that in 2005, valuers might not have been alert to possible flora and fauna issues on the subject land.
[179] Report dated 7 November 2005, 15; Transcript 2132.
[180] For example, the developer would not have to negotiate with adjoining owners about sewerage and would not have to pay to bring sewerage to the property.
[188] Transcript 2007. Mr Brown gave this answer to a question about whether he would change his view about his $18 million valuation, taking into account the ecological information provided by Mr Mueck and the changed information about 25 Cooper Street.
[201] Such as a 'big box', bulky goods, or a three or four storey office development or an eight storey hotel.
[203] Presumably 324 Mr Derrimut Road (March 2005) and Dohertys Road (also March 2005).
[206] Exhibit A21, Two volumes of documents relating to Mr Holland's retainer and instructions, tendered 3 October 2011, Tab 2.
[208] Exhibit A21, Two volumes of documents relating to Mr Holland's retainer and instructions, tendered 3 October 2011.
[209] Exhibit A21, Two volumes of documents relating to Mr Holland's retainer and instructions, tendered 3 October 2011, Tab 3.
[211] Report dated 7 July 2011, 29-30.
[212] Exhibit A18, Graphs of western, northern and eastern land values prepared by Mr Brown, tendered on
[213] There were no further sales in the northern region until after the relevant date.
[214] Transcript 1195-6; Report dated 7 July 2011, Attachment 6; Exhibit R53, Three documents relating to land tax indexation factors, tendered 5 October 2011.
[218] Report dated 22 August 2011, exhibiting his report dated March 2006, p15.
[230] Commissioner of Succession Duties (SA) v Executor Trustee & Agency Co of South Australia Ltd [1947] HCA 10; (1947) 74 CLR 358, 374.
[231] Dated 7 July 2011, 16 August 2011, 23 August 2011 (two affidavits) and 13 September 2011.
[233] Pastoral Finance Association v The Minister [1914] UKPC 77; 15 SR (NSW) 535; [1914] AC 1083, 1088-9.
[234] [1953] HCA 6; (1953) 90 CLR 157, 164.
[238] Affidavit of Mr Mervyn John Dickey dated 23 August 2011; Transcript 2391.
[239] Affidavit of Mr Mervyn John Dickey dated 23 August 2011.
[245] Arkaba Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Highways [1970] SASR 94, 100, referred to with approval by Gleeson CJ in Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64; (1999) 167 ALR 575, 596 [80].
[246] [2010] VSC 32, (2010) 173 LGERA 1, [771]-[773].
[248] Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 32, [771] citing March v City of Frankston (No 1) [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350, 356 ('March').
[249] Exhibit R61, Murdesk's Expression of Interest dated 17 January 2003, tendered 24 November 2011.
[250] Letter of 5 May 2005 from Murdesk to CBRE and the evidence of Mr Dickey at Transcript 2476-7.
[251] Exhibit A15, Folder of Materials put to Mr Murray in Cross-examination, tendered 27 September 2011, Tab 19; Transcript 2540-1.
[255] Affidavit of Mervyn John Dickey sworn 23 August 2011, Exhibit MJD5.
Secretary to the Department of Business and Innovation
Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 319
(1907) 5 CLR 418
(1956) 95 CLR 245
(1999) 167 ALR 575
(2006) 149 LGERA 234
(1947) 74 CLR 358
(1995) 87 LGERA 238
(2003) 212 CLR 111
(1953) 90 CLR 157
(2010) 173 LGERA 1