What did the parties agree to?
48 The JVA was intended to comprehensively address the contractual relationship between Heathgate and Alliance for a discrete period: from the date the agreement was signed (30 August 2002), in the "Free Carry Period" as defined in the JVA, to the "Mine Decision Date" (22 October 2008) and beyond, but only until a new agreement (entitled the Mining Joint Venture Agreement) had been signed. Clause 10.2 in part provides:
If Heathgate decides to proceed to develop a commercial mining operation the development and operation of the mine shall be regulated under a separate joint venture agreement and the Mine Development Area will be made subject to that joint venture. The separate Mining Joint Venture Agreement incorporating the broad principles contained in clause 6, this clause 10 and in clause 12 will apply to the Mine Development Area and, pending the execution of such separate Mining Joint Venture Agreement, this Agreement, or any agreement superseding this Agreement, shall govern the parties.
49 Clause 12 of the JVA in part provides:
As soon as is practicable and desirable after the Mine Decision Date, the joint venturers shall proceed to document a comprehensive Mining Joint Venture Agreement, to be drafted by Heathgate, to incorporate such matters commonly found in agreements of like nature and, without limitation, such an agreement shall deal with the following matters.
50 The JVA, which imposed onerous obligations upon Heathgate (and later Quasar) to invest substantial sums of money at the exploration stage and before the Mine Decision Date, was directed essentially to regulate the interests of the parties during the initial period of the exploration of the tenement.
51 During the initial period (that is before the decision to mine was made) Heathgate was appointed manager for the JV (see cll 6.3, 6.4 and 10.5 of the JVA). By cl 10.1 Heathgate, as manager, was required to provide a budget if it made a decision to mine. However, in the initial period Heathgate (and after the assignment, Quasar) was to act in the capacity of manager and not as agent for the JV. Clause 11.1 of the JVA states:
Heathgate shall be the first Manager in relation to the Mine Development Area and shall remain the Manager while it holds the largest Joint Venture Interest or until it retires or is removed from office and prior to execution of the Mining Joint Venture Agreement in relation to the Mine Development Area under clause 10.2, the provisions of clause 6 of this Agreement shall apply to management of the Mine Development Area.
52 Importantly, cl 13.6 of the JVA expressly disclaims any agency relationship:
No Partnership: Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, nothing contained in or otherwise arising from this Agreement shall constitute the parties as partners or any party as the agent for or legal representative of another and no party shall pledge the credit of another party.
53 "Agency" in law connotes "an authority or capacity in one person to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties": International Harvester Company of Australia Proprietary Limited v Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Company (1958) 100 CLR 644 at 652. Cf. Peterson v Maloney (1951) 84 CLR 91 at 94:
The legal conception of agency is expressed in the maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se", and an "agent" is a person who is able, by virtue of authority conferred upon him, to create or affect legal rights and duties as between another person, who is called his principal, and third parties.
54 The mere existence of a joint venture does not justify the conclusion, for example, that one of the venturers is the agent of the other in relation to the former's dealings with third parties: Consolo Ltd v Bennett [2012] FCAFC 120 at [88]. An agency relationship can only be established by the consent of both principal and agent (whether actual or implied): South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club v News Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 611 (Finn J) ("South Sydney DRLFC") at [132]; Tonto Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (2011) 15 BPR 29,699 ("Tonto"). In the present case there was no such consent. The parties expressly agreed that they were not in any relationship of principal and agent.
55 It may be accepted that an express disclaimer cannot disguise what is in truth an agency relationship (South Sydney DRLFC at [133]-[134]; Technology Leasing Pty Ltd v Lennmar Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 709 at [159]). Whether such a provision is effective will depend on whether, given "the actual incidents and content of the relationship" (what Finn J referred to as "the factual relation"), the parties have nonetheless consented to an agency relationship. But unless the disclaimer is a sham, the Court must give appropriate weight to it as a manifestation of the parties' intention: South Sydney DRLFC at [135].
56 Alliance sought to confine the operation of cl 13.6, submitting that it was directed to the relationship of the parties as joint venturers and was not intended to apply to Heathgate (or Quasar) when it was acting in its capacity as manager. We do not accept that the clause should be read in such a narrow way. In our opinion, cl 13.6 clearly shows that the parties intended that for the duration of the initial exploration period whilst the JVA was current, Alliance and Heathgate (and subsequently Quasar) would be neither partners nor agents for each other. This situation was to be in effect at least until the JVA was replaced by another agreement. There is no evidence to suggest that the express disclaimer is a sham. Accordingly, full weight must be given to the words of cl 13.6
57 In Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 97, Mason J said of those instances where a contract provides the foundation for a fiduciary relationship:
In these situations it is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction.
58 These remarks were cited with approval by five justices of the High Court in the joint judgment in John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [91].
59 In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said (at 206):
[I]n my judgment, the derivation of the general principle from fiduciary duties may be instructive as to the impact of any contractual relationship between the parties on the general duty of care which would otherwise apply. The phrase "fiduciary duties" is a dangerous one, giving rise to a mistaken assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. That is not the case. Although, so far as I am aware, every fiduciary is under a duty not to make a profit from his position (unless such profit is authorised), the fiduciary duties owed, for example, by an express trustee are not the same as those owed by an agent. Moreover, and more relevantly, the extent and nature of the fiduciary duties owed in any particular case fall to be determined by reference to any underlying contractual relationship between the parties. Thus, in the case of an agent employed under a contract, the scope of his fiduciary duties is determined by the terms of the underlying contract. Although an agent is, in the absence of contractual provision, in breach of his fiduciary duties if he acts for another who is in competition with his principal, if the contract under which he is acting authorises him so to do, the normal fiduciary duties are modified accordingly: see Kelly v. Cooper [1993] A.C. 205, and the cases there cited. The existence of a contract does not exclude the co-existence of concurrent fiduciary duties (indeed, the contract may well be their source); but the contract can and does modify the extent and nature of the general duty that would otherwise arise.
60 Numerous authorities establish that where a contract exists, the relationship of the parties is delineated by the agreement contained in the contract. These authorities have been usefully collated by Beech J in Red Hill Iron Ltd v API Management Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 323 (see [365]-[380]). At [365] his Honour said:
The relationship will be fiduciary to the extent, and only to the extent, that the fiduciary has agreed or undertaken to exercise powers or discretions for the principal, or, in the case of a horizontal relationship, for the parties jointly: Hospital Products (96 - 97); Pilmer v The Duke Group Ltd [71] and Grimaldi v Chameleon [179].
61 At [375] his Honour emphasised that the relationship between a manager of a joint venture and the venturers "must always be subject to the terms of any relevant contract" and it will only be a fiduciary relationship to the extent "that the manager is entrusted with powers and authorities to be exercised for or on behalf of the venturers". That, he explained, "invites attention to the scope of the powers and authorities of the manager to act on behalf of the venturers".
62 Although the JVA authorises Heathgate (and later Quasar), in its capacity as manager of the JV, to "procure services" and to carry out similar functions, the nature of the relationship between the parties is governed by cl 13.6 of the JVA. There is no agreement that Heathgate or Quasar exercise its powers or discretions for the parties jointly.
63 We conclude that the relationship between Alliance and Quasar, as manager, is not a relationship of principal and agent. This is not merely because of the express disclaimer in cl 13.6. A number of other provisions of the JVA lead to this conclusion.
64 Clause 4.4(a) imposes on Heathgate (and later Quasar) an obligation to manage the exploration and development, if any, on the tenement and gives it sole responsibility for programs and budgets relating to such exploration and/or development.
65 Clause 6.3 imposes limits on the liability of the manager inconsistent with those that would ordinarily arise from a principal and agent relationship. Clause 6.3 provides:
Heathgate as Manager shall not have any liability to the joint venturers for losses sustained or liabilities incurred if, in the circumstances of the particular case, it has acted or refrained from acting in the course of an effort made in good faith to perform its obligations under this Agreement and has not committed any act of wilful misconduct and has not been grossly negligent. For the purposes of this clause "grossly negligent" means such conduct as constitutes a reckless or wilful disregard for harmful and foreseeable circumstances.
66 Clause 6.4 entitles Heathgate (and later Quasar), as manager, to enter into such agreements and or to make such other arrangements with Native Title claimants as it alone deems appropriate or necessary to comply with Pt 9B of the Mining Act.
67 Clause 10.1 gives Heathgate (and later Quasar) "sole discretion" to make a decision "in its sole judgement" to mine after it has received a feasibility study, the scope and content of which is satisfactory to it, not the joint venturers. At that time it must give notice to Alliance and provide it with a preliminary development, mining, processing and production program and budget.
68 Clause 10.5 provides that the manager is to estimate the amount of expenditure that will be incurred by the JV in the upcoming month.
69 Clause 11.2(c) gives the manager responsibility for the creation of a program and budget setting out the proposed work and expenditure for the relevant period. The program and budget are subject to the Committee's approval. Given the majority control Quasar held though this would be a mere formality.
70 The JVA gives the manager a very wide discretion in conducting the affairs of the JV, particularly with respect to proposing the work and expenditure for the relevant period. This reflects the considerable financial investment made by Quasar in the venture (spending approximately $42 million on exploration before the decision to mine was made), which was vastly disproportionate to Alliance's modest contribution of $50,000.
71 These clauses may be contrasted with the provision made in cl 10.11 for the appointment by Alliance of Heathgate to market and sell "on its behalf" its share of minerals other than gold produced by the mining operation. This provision envisages the creation of an agency relationship for a specific purpose. It is one of the specific provisions contemplated in the exceptional category for which cl 13.6 allowed. Another is cl 4.4(d) which expressly authorised Heathgate during the Free Carry Period to apply for any substitute or successor title to the Tenement.
72 Little evidence was available concerning the actual incidents and content of the parties' relationship. In our view, the evidence, such as it was, does not establish that in fact the existence of a relationship of principal and agent between the joint venturers on the one hand and the party acting as manager on the other or, put simply, between Alliance and Heathgate or Quasar, existed contrary to the stated provision of cl 13.6 of the JVA. The mere fact that Heathgate (or Quasar) undertook work at the JV's request and for its benefit is insufficient to establish agency: cf. Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41 at 48-49 (Dixon J). Not every independent contractor doing work for or for the benefit of someone else will be that person's agent "and so identified as it, or as representing it, and its interests": see Tonto at [177] (Allsop P, Bathurst CJ agreeing at [1] and Campbell JA at [303]). Neither is it enough that some invoices from Heathgate were addressed to the JV or included in monthly accounting packs provided to Alliance. Those invoices sought payment of the management fee only, or of expenses Heathgate (or Quasar) had incurred. That circumstance, in our opinion, is entirely neutral. It may signify no more than an understanding on Heathgate and Quasar's part that the JV would ultimately bear certain costs. It says nothing about whether the parties intended that Heathgate (or Quasar) should be able to legally bind the joint venturers when contracting with third parties or whether Heathgate (or Quasar) ever represented to third parties that it was acting on behalf of the JV when it did so. Indeed, the fact that all the invoices in evidence from the third parties were directed to Heathgate (and in the odd case to Quasar), and made no mention of the JV or the joint venturers, suggests otherwise.
73 The "central notion" of agency is the agent acting or having actual or apparent authority to act as representative of, or for, or on behalf of, the principal (NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (2000) 107 FCR 270 at [522] per Lindgren J) of which there is no evidence here save in the limited respects referred to in the contract. Nor is there any evidence that Heathgate or Quasar ever represented to the third parties with which they contracted that they were acting on behalf of the joint venturers.
74 The element of control is relevant, though not decisive, in determining whether agency exists: see South Sydney DRLFC at [137]; ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) 91 SASR 570 at [110] (Besanko J). The evidence, and the JVA, in particular, demonstrates that Heathgate and later Quasar, as manager, were virtually given carte blanche to decide how the mine was to be managed. This militates against a conclusion that Heathgate or Quasar were at any point acting as agent for the joint venturers.