Aktar v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2015-05-01|Before: Hoeben CJ, Hulme J, Wilson J, Dunford J, Smart J, Handley JA

Judgment

HOEBEN CJ at CL: I agree with Wilson J. I reserve my position in relation to the correct interpretation of s 21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1995 until an occasion when the matter has been fully argued by both sides. In saying that, I do not in any way wish to deprecate the interpretation of Wilson J. I also agree with Wilson J's comment concerning the applicant's submission that the sentence imposed on him was a "crushing" one. Hyperbole of this kind, apart from being inaccurate, is quite unhelpful.

The Facts of the Offences

The facts of the offences were before her Honour as a statement of agreed facts. The following summary is taken from that document, which was part of the Crown's case on sentence.
The offences all arose from a single incident on 22 January 2013, and involved the same complainant. The complainant has some family connection to the applicant and was regarded by him, and regarded herself, as his cousin. The two had grown up together.
On 22 January 2013 the applicant drove to the complainant's home, arriving there at about 9pm. The asserted purpose of his visit was to see other family members who had been staying with the complainant until earlier that day. The applicant and the complainant chatted for a time, with the applicant eventually introducing the subject of his marriage into the conversation, telling the complainant that he had been unfaithful.
It soon became clear to the complainant that the applicant's interest in her was sexual, and she became frightened. She told him that he was "barking up the wrong tree". The applicant responded that he was "picking the right girl". He refused to leave when the complainant asked him to do so and, instead, approached her as she sat on a chair, and picked her up. He carried the complainant to a sofa. After laying the complainant on the sofa, the applicant lay on top of her, pinning her down with the weight of his body. Despite her repeated requests that he leave, the applicant began kissing and licking the complainant, and touching her breasts.
When the applicant stood up the complainant tried to run away, but he took hold of her forcefully, and carried her upstairs towards her bedroom. The complainant was struggling and demanding to be released, but the applicant continued towards the bedroom. In the process the applicant struck the complainant's leg against a door, causing bruising. This injury, occasioned during the struggle, is reflected by the charge of AOABH, which was before the court on the Form 1 document.
On reaching the complainant's bedroom, the applicant threw the complainant onto her bed and got on top of her. After removing the complainant's upper clothing, he began to kiss and fondle her exposed breasts. This act was reflected by the offence of indecent assault that was also before the Court on the Form 1.
After forcing the victim's hand onto his exposed erect penis the applicant moved his penis towards the complainant's mouth. The applicant caused his penis to move against the complainant's exposed chest area. This act is reflected by the first s.61L offence, count 1a.
The applicant began pulling at the leggings the complainant was wearing, but she begged him not to, telling him that she was menstruating. The applicant desisted and stood up. When the complainant tried to get up from the bed the applicant pushed her back onto the bed and began to again kiss and lick her upper body. This assault was charged as the second s.61L offence, count 2.
Soon after, the applicant got up and left the bedroom, telling the complainant that he would return the following evening.
After he left the complainant sat in her bedroom crying. She told her mother and brother what had happened the following day. The applicant was confronted by the complainant's family when he arrived at the house that next evening. He denied any wrongdoing.
The matter was reported to police that same night. Observations were made by investigating police of bruising to the complainant's throat, and lower left leg.
The applicant was charged on 24 January 2013. He refused to be interviewed by police.

The Proposed Appeal

If granted leave, the applicant seeks to plead five grounds of appeal, expressed as follows. 1. "Her Honour erred by imposing sentence was manifestly excessive including the total effective sentence imposed (in relation to all counts). 2. Her Honour erred in accumulating the sentence. 3. Her Honour erred in taking in the exercise of her discretion in assessing the allowances to be made for special circumstances conceded by parties in relation to the Applicant. 4. Her Honour erred by imposing sentence as aggravating feature (p7) that the offence was committed in the victim's home. 5. Her Honour fell into error in concluding that the objective seriousness of the offence was "at higher end" (remarks, tp7.6) category in relation to count 1a, 2 and Form 1 count 1." [sic]
Rather curiously, the statement of the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal contains a statement of particulars following each ground. It is not intended to set out here the particulars advanced against each proposed ground; the matters raised will be dealt with when considering the individual grounds.
Adopting the approach of the Crown, I propose to deal with grounds 2 to 5 before considering ground 1.

Ground 2: "Her Honour erred in accumulating the sentence"

As can be seen from the details of the sentence set out at [5] above, the sentence imposed for count 1a (taking into account the Form 1 offences) was to commence on 4 March 2015, six months after the commencement of the sentence imposed for count 2.
The applicant complains that her Honour's discretion in this regard miscarried, and that she failed to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case when determining the level of concurrency / accumulation of sentence. Referring to the principle of totality the applicant contends that the sentencing judge should have regarded the discrete offences as part of a single course of events, and considered imposing a wholly concurrent sentence for both counts.
In an ex tempore judgment given immediately following the tender of evidence and submissions on sentence made by the parties, her Honour specifically referred to the fact that there was a need for some level of accumulation of sentence. It is by no means apparent that she overlooked this aspect of the sentencing exercise.
The degree of accumulation is, as the applicant noted, a discretionary matter and, subject to the application of principle, how the discretion is exercised is a matter for the sentencing judge: LG v R [2012] NSWCCA 249 at [24]; Panchal v R; R v Panchal [2014] NSWCCA 275 at [81].
There is no rule that determines whether sentences are to be imposed concurrently, with a degree of accumulation, or wholly consecutively. In Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 at [27], Howie J said, "The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is so regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality."
Whilst the fact that two offences occurred in the course of the same conduct can indicate that concurrency of sentence is appropriate, that is very much a matter for judgment, having regard to the circumstances of the individual matter. The ultimate consideration is whether the degree of concurrency or accumulation provides for sentences that properly reflect the offending conduct.
In the applicant's case the offences all occurred during a single course of conduct, but that does not of itself dictate that the sentences for the two offences, taking into account the Form 1 offences, should have been ordered to be served concurrently. There are other relevant considerations.
The offences occurred over a relatively protracted period of time, in the face of the complainant's repeated protests, and against her struggles to be free. The acts were quite discrete, and there was some temporal break between each. The second offence was committed after the complainant had attempted to flee, and after the applicant had forcefully pushed her back onto her bed. Each offence contributed to a significant level of criminality, with the whole being somewhat greater in my view than the sum of its parts.
It was necessary for the overall sentence to reflect the totality of the criminality involved. Whilst minds can reasonably differ on the level of concurrency appropriate in any particular case, wholly concurrent sentences in this matter would not, in my view, have served that purpose.
The approach taken by her Honour was within her discretion and in accordance with principle. The applicant has failed to establish error.

Ground 3: "Her Honour erred in taking in the exercise of her discretion in assessing the allowances to be made for special circumstances conceded by parties in relation to the Applicant."

By this ground, the applicant appears to complain that her Honour did not make a sufficient adjustment to the structure of the sentence to reflect her finding of special circumstances, in circumstances where, in the proceedings before her Honour, the Crown did not dispute that such a finding could be made.
If that interpretation of this ground as pleaded is correct, it is difficult to see how any argument in support of it could be sustained.
Ordinarily, s.44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1995 creates a restriction upon the structure of a sentence to be imposed, such that the non-parole period may not fall below seventy-five per cent of the total term of the sentence. The exception is where a finding of special circumstances is made.
Where a finding of special circumstances is made, the Court must record its reasons for making that finding. In making a finding in the applicant's favour, her Honour referred to the fact that the applicant had not previously been incarcerated, that he would require assistance to reintegrate with the community, and that he would need treatment and assistance to address his offending behaviour, services which were better provided in a community setting.
Having made that finding, her Honour varied the usual statutory ratio of sentence very favourably to the applicant. The non-parole period ("NPP") specified for count 1a is 42.8% of the overall term; for count 2 it is 46.1%. Expressed as a percentage of the total sentence, the NPP is 55.5%. This represents a significant variation in the structure of sentence, and one which imports a considerable measure of leniency.
The degree or extent of any adjustment of the statutory ratio is very much a matter within the discretion of the sentencing judge: Caristo v R [2011] NSWCCA 7 at [31]. Having found that the applicant would require a longer than usual period on parole to facilitate his reintegration to and treatment in the community, the sentencing judge fixed the NPP so as to allow the applicant a longer than usual period for that to occur.
In his written submissions, the applicant asserts that "the applicant's need to access services from Community Services and be free for these purposes was an important consideration that needed to be given weight and the discretion properly exercised", and "her Honour having recognised that there was a requirement for the treatment then gone ahead and put a barrier for the applicant to engage the services". Nothing is advanced in support of these assertions, and there is nothing in the evidence that was before the sentencing judge that is capable of sustaining them.
A period of one year in which to have the benefit of supervision and support in the community represents a generous period for the applicant to achieve rehabilitation and reintegration in the circumstances of this matter. There is no basis upon which to conclude that a relatively lengthy period of parole such as this is in fact inadequate to those purposes.
It must be remembered that rehabilitation is only one of the purposes of sentencing referred to in s.3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1995. The others are punishment of the offender, deterrence (general and specific), ensuring the protection of the community, making the offender accountable for his or her actions, denunciation, and recognition of harm. The NPP is the minimum period for which an offender must be imprisoned to properly reflect the gravity of the crime and the manifold purposes of sentencing: R v Simpson [2001] 53 NSWLR 704 at [59]; R v Cramp [2004] NSWCCA 264 at [34]; MD v R [2015] NSWCCA 37 at [39].
The variation to the ordinary ratio of sentence was here markedly generous, and cannot evidence a failure by the sentencing judge to give proper consideration to this aspect of the sentencing exercise. There was no miscarriage of her Honour's discretion.
This ground is incapable of being made good.

Ground 4: "Her Honour erred by imposing sentence as aggravating feature (p7) that the offence was committed in the victim's home."

This ground complains of error in the application by the sentencing judge of s.21A(2)(eb) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1995.
In her remarks on sentence, her Honour said this: "The complainant considered the offender to be her cousin as he was related to her blood cousin. She was home alone. He said he had come to visit relatives but the facts clearly state that the offender was aware those persons had been taken back by the complainant's mother, the three girls had been taken back to the offender's mother's house earlier that day. It is a feature of aggravation pursuant to s21A(2)(eb) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act that the offence was committed in the home of the victim. The victim was clearly entitled to feel safe in her own home and it was because of the relationship between the two of them that she allowed him to come into the home."
Recent decisions of this Court have given some consideration to the proper interpretation of s.21A(2)(eb).
In both Melbom v R [2013] NSWCCA 210 and Montero v R [2013] NSWCCA 214; (2013) 234 A Crim R 532, the Court considered the meaning of s.21A(2)(eb) and how it should be applied, although no concluded view was taken in the absence of full argument from the parties.
In Melbom, the Crown in its written submissions challenged the narrow interpretation that this Court had placed upon s.21A(2)(eb). At the hearing of the appeal, it abandoned that challenge. Referring to that abandonment, RA Hulme J said (at [41]), "The Crown abandoned its proposed alternative argument in relation to this ground and conceded the correctness of those decisions. This is despite the fact that the plain words of s 21A(2)(eb) do not support the limitation that this Court has placed on their application. It is also despite the fact that it was never intended by Parliament that there should be the constraint upon their application that this Court has imposed: see the second reading speech of the Attorney-General, New South Wales Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 17 October 2007 (p 2667ff) where it was said that it would be "an aggravating circumstance when victims are assaulted in their own homes ... even if it is also the home of the accused". However, given the concession by the Crown, now is not the occasion for reconsideration of what has been said previously in this Court on the subject."
Both Simpson J and Price J agreed with his Honour's comment.
In Montero, RA Hulme J referred to Melbom, and noted again the inconsistency between the words of the statute and the narrow interpretation of the words by the Court. Leeming JA agreed with his Honour.
In Pasoski v R [2014] NSWCCA 309 at [54] Meagher JA (with whom Hidden J and RS Hulme AJ agreed) found that the sentencing judge was in error in concluding that sexual assault offences were aggravated by the fact that each occurred in the complainant's home, in circumstances where the offender was the complainant's de facto partner, and lived at the premises. Meagher JA referred to EK [2010] NSWCCA 199; (2010) 208 A Crim R 157 as authority for his conclusion. (EK is referred to below, at [54].)
There is clearly some tension between decisions of this Court as to the proper interpretation of s.21A(2)(eb).
Section 21A(2)(eb) is as follows. "(1) In determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, the court is to take into account the following matters: (a) the aggravating factors referred to in subsection (2) that are relevant and known to the court, [(b) - (c)] (2) The aggravating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows: [(a) - (ea)] (eb) the offence was committed in the home of the victim or any other person, [(f) - (p)]"
In Ingham v R [2011] NSWCCA 88, a decision that has hitherto represented the interpretation of this Court of s.21A(2)(eb), the provision was said to apply only in circumstances where the offender was an intruder.
That interpretation was consistent with the position at common law which, prior to the insertion into the Act of s.21A(2)(eb) on 1 January 2008, was that an offence was only aggravated by the fact that it was committed in the victim's home if the offender was an intruder unlawfully within the premises: R v Preston (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), Dunford J, Smart J and Handley JA, 9 April 1997, unrep); R v Gazi Comert [2004] NSWCCA 125 per Hidden and Hislop JJ at [29]; EK v R supra, at [79] per RA Hulme J.
Although Ingham has been followed in a number of decisions (such as NLR v R [2011] NSWCCA 246; BIP v R [2011] NSWCCA 224; and DS v R [2012] NSWCCA 159), there is considerable force in the proposition that the interpretation and application of s.21A(2)(eb) as noted in Ingham is too narrow, and fails to give effect to the express intention of the Legislature to broaden the common law rule upon which the section is (lightly) based. Proper construction of the provision should, in my opinion, include its application to offences committed within residential premises by an offender lawfully present.
There is nothing in the wording of s.21A(2)(eb) to suggest that it must be narrowly construed to identically reflect the common law; indeed, its broad language ("in the home of the victim or any other person") suggests the contrary.
If the language used by the Legislature suggests that the provision could or should be more broadly construed than has hitherto been the case, arguably, the ordinary rules of statutory construction should apply to a more thorough consideration of the provision and its interpretation.
Statutory interpretation in New South Wales is guided by the Interpretation Act 1987. Section 33 of that Act provides: "In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object."
Applying s.33 in Project Blue Sky Inc. & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said at [78], "However, the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision a meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have [...]."
The intention of the Legislature in introducing s.21A(2)(eb) can be gleaned from the Second Reading Speech of the Crimes (Sentencing Amendment) Bill 2007 delivered in the Legislative Council of the Parliament by the then Attorney-General on 17 October 2007 (and recorded at p.2667 of the Hansard). "Item [3] [of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Bill 2007] also enacts section 21A (2)(eb). It will aggravate an offence that was committed within a victim's home or another person's home. This aggravating factor preserves the notion of sanctity of the home, whereby individuals are entitled to feel safe from harm of any kind. This protection should apply in any home. The courts have long recognised that it is an aggravating circumstance when victims are assaulted in their own homes. The Government takes the position that any offence committed in the home of the victim, even if it is also the home of the accused, or in the home of another person, violates that person's reasonable expectation of safety and security. However, when a crime is committed in and from the accused's own home - for example, if the offender is committing computer or fraud offences - and no other person is present, the aggravation will not apply."
It is significant that, after referring to the common law recognition of an assault upon a victim in his or her home as an aggravating factor, the Attorney then set out the Government's "position" on the issue, thereby appearing to clearly distinguish it from that which previously applied at common law. The distinction is preserved by the following sentence, in which the Attorney specifically noted that a victim was entitled to the safety of his or her home, "even if it is also the home of the accused, or [in] the home of another person".
Implicit in the Attorney's comments in the extracted passage is recognition of the common law as it was at that point, distinguished by the expression of a clear intention to broaden the application of the principle to include by statute the commission of offences occurring "even in" an offender's home. Ordinarily an offender in his or her own home could be presumed to be there lawfully. Accordingly, the Parliament must have intended that, by introducing s.21A(2)(eb), the feature of aggravation as it had operated at common law would be broadened to include offences which occurred in a residence where an offender was lawfully present.
It seems clear that the legislature intended to recognise the additional distress occasioned to a victim (and consequently the additional criminality of the offence) when the home - a place of safety and refuge - is sullied by the commission within it of a crime. The destruction of a victim's sense of security and repose at home is the same whether the offender was lawfully present or not. The right of all citizens to be free from attack or other crime in their own home, regardless of the basis upon which the offender was present, must be recognised and protected.
In the present case, the applicant did not direct any submissions to the proper interpretation of s.21A(2)(eb), or refer to the tension in the authorities regarding its proper construction. Whilst the Crown did consider the issue in its submissions, in the absence of submissions from both parties this is not an appropriate occasion on which to make further comment; however, I respectfully agree with the comments of RA Hulme J in Melbom, and the interpretation there suggested.
Even setting aside the question of the proper construction of s.21A(2)(eb), I am not persuaded that there was any error in the way that the sentencing judge approached this matter. Although the applicant contended in his written submissions that he had the right to be at the complainant's home, he in fact had no such lawful right.
Although there was evidence before the sentencing judge that the applicant attended the complainant's home for a spurious purpose - that is, to call upon family members whom he knew to have already left the house, it may be accepted for present purposes that the applicant was initially a guest in the complainant's home, and lawfully inside the premises. His status changed however, from the moment the complainant told him to leave the premises, that being prior to the commission of the offences.
In the circumstances of this case it was entirely open on the evidence for her Honour to conclude that the applicant exploited his position as a trusted family member permitted to enter the complainant's home, and subsequently abused the complainant in what should have been the safety of her home. The evidence before the Court by way of an agreed statement of facts clearly established the aggravating feature referred to by her Honour.
The applicant has failed to establish error, and this ground cannot be made out.

Ground 5: Her Honour fell into error in concluding that the objective seriousness of the offence was "at higher end" (remarks, tp7.6) category in relation to count 1a, 2 and Form 1 count 1."

Assessing the objective gravity of count 1a the sentencing judge concluded that the offence was "at the higher end". Contrary to the applicant's assertion, count 2 was found to be "at the lower end".
In his very brief written submissions, which were not expanded upon at the hearing before this Court, the applicant complains that, as the offences were not "the most serious" offences, her Honour fell into error. He additionally complains that he had no notice that her Honour might reach such a conclusion, and he was thereby denied procedural fairness. Finally, the applicant asserts error by reference to her Honour's discussion of his criminal history. Each of these arguments appears to be misconceived.
Whilst concluding that the offences were serious, her Honour did not find them to be in the worst category for offences of that nature, as the applicant contends. A conclusion that the gravity of the first of the offences was at the higher end was open to her Honour, who took into account: 1. that the offence occurred after the applicant had physically carried the complainant upstairs, thereafter pinning her down on her bed; 2. that a degree of force and coercion was used against the complainant; 3. that the applicant had removed the complainant's upper clothing; and 4. that the offence involved the applicant forcing his exposed and erect penis against the complainant's exposed chest.
The lack of foundation for the applicant's second complaint, that he was denied procedural fairness in relation to her Honour's conclusions as to objective seriousness, is readily demonstrated by the record of the proceedings. In submissions on sentence, the Crown submitted to the sentencing judge that the first of the offences was a very serious offence at the higher end of any notional spectrum of gravity. This raised the issue and the applicant had an opportunity to address it in his submissions to her Honour which, in the usual way, followed those of the Crown. There was no denial of procedural fairness.
The third complaint refers to the applicant's criminal record, but the complaint is misplaced: an offender's antecedents are of no relevance to an assessment of objective seriousness, and her Honour did not refer to the criminal history in this regard. The evidence concerning the applicant's former history was referred to by her Honour in a different and entirely appropriate context, that of whether leniency could be afforded to him in light of his record of prior offences. This complaint is without substance.
As has been repeatedly emphasised in this Court, the assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence is a matter for the sentencing judge. In Mulato v R [2006] NSWCCA 282 Spigelman CJ said (at [37]), "Characterisation of the degree of objective seriousness of an offence is classically within the role of the sentencing judge in performing the task of finding facts and drawing inferences from those facts. This Court is very slow to determine such matters for itself or to set aside the judgment made by a first instance judge exercising a broadly based discretion."
Mulato has been consistently applied and followed, most recently in Sabongi v R [2015] NSWCCA 2015 25 at [65] - [69], and Gall v R; Gall v R [2015] NSWCCA 69 at [125] - [127].
For this Court to set aside the judgment of her Honour, exercising as she was the broad discretion referred to in Mulato, the applicant would have to identify error in the sense set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. That is, that the judge acted on a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect her, mistook the facts, or did not take into account some material consideration.
No error of that nature has been identified. This ground cannot be made out.

Ground 1: "Her Honour erred by imposing sentence was manifestly excessive including the total effective sentence imposed (in relation to all counts)"

Much of what is advanced by the applicant in his written submissions is also relied upon in support of grounds 2 and 3, and has already been addressed.
Otherwise, the applicant contends that the sentence imposed upon him was a "crushing sentence", particularly having regard to his youth.
For my part, I find it difficult to see how an overall sentence of 2 years and 3 months, with a NPP of 1 year and 3 months, could possibly be characterised as a "crushing sentence", and nothing about the applicant's age makes such a characterisation more readily acceptable.
At the time of the commission of the offences the applicant was aged 28 years and 3 months. He was almost 30 years old when sentence was imposed upon him. Her Honour specifically referred to the applicant's age in her remarks. Even if she had not, the applicant could hardly claim the ameliorating benefit of youth at a time when he was close to his fourth decade.
Her Honour had regard to the applicant's (relatively mature) age, to his antecedents, and to his future prospects of rehabilitation, which she considered to be reasonable. She took into account his need for treatment, that being part of the basis upon which special circumstances were found to exist, and gave him the benefit of a conclusion that he had expressed some remorse. She also gave some weight to the fact that all of the offences before the court were capable of summary disposition, even after noting that the applicant did not enter or offer pleas of guilty to the charges prior to committal (and potentially avail himself of summary jurisdiction in that way). The sentences, in any event, were sufficiently low as to fall beneath the jurisdictional limit individually.
The conclusions she reached were all open to her Honour, and the sentences imposed might well be regarded as generous, having regard to the serious nature of the offending.
A complaint of manifest excess is essentially a contention that the sentence imposed was unjust. To establish such a complaint the applicant must demonstrate that the sentence was "unreasonable or plainly unjust": R v Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 at [325]. This has to be established, as this Court has repeatedly said, in a context where there is no single "correct" sentence, and judges at first instance are to be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with the application of proper principle and consistency of approach: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357.
The question for this Court is whether the length of the sentence is demonstrated to be outside the range of a sound sentencing discretion. In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive it is necessary to examine the result from the perspective of the maximum prescribed penalty, which in this case is five years imprisonment for the offences on indictment, with the same maximum penalty applicable to the offences before the Court on the Form 1 document. The Court must also consider the place which the criminal conduct occupies on the scale of seriousness of offences of the kind in question, and the personal circumstances of the offender.
Having considered the evidence that was before the sentencing court, and her Honour's remarks, I can detect no error in the approach taken, and no departure from the application of relevant principles.
The applicant has failed to establish that the sentences imposed upon him were unfair or unjust.

Conclusion

The order I propose is: 1. Leave to appeal is refused.

Amendments 03 June 2015 - Typographical error in paragraph 64 corrected DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 03 June 2015

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (10 paragraphs)

Parties

Cases Cited (28)

Cited By (9)