The modified universalism issues
26 In HIH Insurance [2008] 1 WLR 852, the House of Lords acceded to a letter of request from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to return to Australia assets of an Australian insurance company. Those assets consisted principally of reinsurance proceeds due to the failed Australian insurer for claims for which it was liable. The consequence was that those assets would be distributed preferentially to insurance creditors here under s 562A of the Corporations Act rather than pari passu to all unsecured creditors who proved in England. The Model Law did not apply in those proceedings. Lord Hoffmann, with whom Lords Phillips of Worth Matravers and Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed, held that the English statutory equivalent of s 581 of the Corporations Act, gave the Court power to direct a liquidator to remit assets and to leave their distribution to the Courts and liquidators of the country whence the letter of request issued: HIH Insurance [2008] 1 WLR at 861 [26]-[27], 864 [43]-[44] and 872 [63].
27 Lord Hoffmann explained that the English courts had power, under the English statute, to decide that there was a foreign jurisdiction more appropriate than the forum for the purpose of dealing with all outstanding questions in the winding-up ([2008] 1 WLR at 861 [28]). He and Lord Walker (but with Lord Phillips reserving his opinion) held that this was also a power that the courts had as a result of the principle of private international law called "(modified) universalism". He described that as a golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century. The principle requires that English courts should co-operate with the courts of the country of the principal liquidation so as to ensure that all the insolvent company's assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system distribution ([2008] 1 WLR at 861-862 [30]).
28 Lord Hoffmann considered that the application of Australian law to the distribution of all of the assets was more likely to give effect to the expectations of the creditors as a whole, rather than the distribution of some of the assets according to English law. He continued ([2008] 1 WLR at 862-863 [33]-[36]):
"Policy holders and other creditors dealing with an Australian insurance company are likely, so far as they think about the matter at all to expect that in the event of insolvency their rights will be determined by Australian law. Indeed, the preference given to insurance creditors may have been seen as an advantage of a policy with an Australian company.
As for UK public policy, I cannot see how it would be prejudiced by the application of Australian law to the distribution of the English assets. There is no question of prejudice to English creditors as such, since it is accepted that although section 116(3) of the Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) gives creditors whose debts are payable in Australia a first call upon Australian assets, this provision will not in practice prejudice the interests of creditors in the English assets. Furthermore, if there were to be a separate liquidation of the English assets in England, all creditors would be entitled to prove. Those Australian (or other foreign) creditors who see an advantage in proving in England after bringing into hotchpot their dividends in Australia would no doubt do so. But UK public policy does not require them to be afforded this facility.
The fact that there are assets in England is principally the result of the companies having placed their reinsurance business in the London market. For the purposes of deciding how the assets should be distributed, that seems to me an entirely adventitious circumstance. Indeed, it may not be to the advantage of London as a reinsurance market if the distribution of the assets of insolvent foreign reinsurance companies is affected by whether they have placed their reinsurance business in London rather than somewhere else.
In my opinion, therefore, this is a case in which it is appropriate to give the principle of universalism full rein. There are no grounds of justice or policy which require this country to insist upon distributing an Australian company's assets according to its own system of priorities only because they happen to have been situated in this country at the time of the appointment of the provisional liquidators." (emphasis added)
29 Here, creditors of Saad Investments would be likely, if they thought about it, to expect that the company would meet its local tax obligations, in accordance with local law, in each jurisdiction in which it had earned income or made taxable gains or profits before its creditors were entitled to receive dividends in the Cayman Islands. It is highly unlikely that they would expect that a local sovereign could not, let alone should not, be able to collect the tax due, or any of it, before funds were remitted from its jurisdiction to the Cayman Islands where the tax would be irrecoverable. If a foreigner trades or makes profits or gains in a local jurisdiction, he, she or it must obey the laws of general application in that forum, including its taxation and criminal laws. The insolvency of the foreigner should not be a reason to exclude him, her or it from an accrued liability to pay tax or a penalty in circumstances where a local person who became insolvent would remain liable to pay the tax or penalty.
30 The purpose lying behind the principle of (modified) universalism is the achievement of a proper and fair distribution to creditors of a cross-border insolvent. Lord Collins of Mapesbury (with whom Lords Walker of Gestingthorpe and Sumption JJSC agreed) explained why insolvency laws may require adjustment of concluded transactions in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 at 269 [94]-[95]. He said (at [94]):
"In order to achieve a proper and fair distribution of assets between creditors, it will often be necessary to adjust prior transactions and to recover previous dispositions of property so as to constitute the estate which is available for distribution. The principle of equality among creditors which underlies the pari passu principle may require the adjustment of concluded transactions which but for the winding up of the company would have remained binding on the company, and the return to the company of payments made or property transferred under the transactions or the reversal of their effect. Systems of insolvency law use avoidance proceedings as mechanisms for adjusting prior transactions by the debtor and for recovering property disposed of by the debtor prior to the insolvency." (emphasis added)
31 The Taxation Debts (Abolition of Crown Priority) Act 1980 (Cth) and its analogues now express the public policy of Australia in relation to debts for taxation (including civil tax penalties and penalty tax imposed pursuant to statute). That Act placed taxation debts into the same position as unsecured debts in insolvencies of both corporations and individuals. The policy reflected in that Act is now also found, relevantly, in s 260-45 of Sch 1 of the TAA. Those statutes removed the Commissioner's advantage of Crown priority over unsecured creditors in domestic insolvencies. The consequence was to enlarge the debtor's estate that was available for distribution to unsecured creditors. Part of the scheme of the legislation included giving the Commissioner the statutory right to be paid the pari passu value of a tax debt on the same basis as unsecured creditors would be entitled to a distribution in respect of their debts that were admitted to proof.
32 The States Party to the Model Law recognised in Art 13(2) that foreign tax and social security claims could be excluded from proof in the forum where the debtor's centre of main interests was located. The version of Art 13 that Australia enacted is set out at [17] above. It excludes foreign tax and social security claims conformably (at least for tax claims) with the ordinary principles of public (or private) international law: see [16] above. The agreement of the States Party to the Model Law that each State had power to adapt Art 13 as it saw fit, recognised that foreign tax and social security claims could be dealt with separately from the Model Law by States in which a foreign cross-border insolvency arose. For example, some States, unlike Australia, would retain a system of sovereign priority for taxation debts that would remove the amount necessary to satisfy those debts from any sum which a foreign representative would be able to remit to the jurisdiction of the debtor's centre of main interests. Such a result would not be contrary to the purpose of the Model Law. This is because the Model Law is silent on how domestic taxation, social security claims and other legislation may operate to diminish the debtor's estate that will become available for remission to the debtor's centre of main interests.
33 In Rubin [2013] 1 AC at 279-280 [141]-[144], Lord Collins observed that the Model Law said nothing about the enforcement of foreign judgments against third parties. He reasoned (at [143]) that it "would be surprising if the Model Law was intended to deal with judgments in insolvency matters by implication". Yet, as he observed (at [142]), Lord Mance JSC had pointed out in argument in the Supreme Court, recognition and enforcement are fundamental in international cases. Thus, the Model Law should be taken not to affect the rules of private or public international law in respect of judgments in insolvency or their enforcement except in respect of the matters for which it makes express provision, such as the recognition of a foreign or foreign main proceeding.
34 The Model Law must be interpreted having regard to its character as an international convention, as required by Art 8. That imports the rules of interpretation in Arts 31 and 32 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 ([1974] ATS 2) which provide:
"SECTION 3: INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. here shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
35 The Vienna Convention is an authoritative statement of customary international law for the purposes of construing the Model Law: Victrawl Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 595 at 622 per Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Chiropedic Bedding Pty Ltd v Radburg Pty Ltd (2008) 170 FCR 560 at 568-569 [34]-[36] per French, Rares and Besanko JJ. Article 8 of the Model Law also imports the provisions of the Vienna Convention. The parties did not argue that any other jurisdiction had considered the issues in this application under the Model Law.
36 Lord Collins' approach to construing the Model Law, and in taking account what implications could, and could not, be made from its terms, reflected the rule in Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was not concerned with the interpretation of Art 22 of the Model Law in Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236. Nonetheless, it is significant that the Model Law is silent about the fundamental subject of how the local forum deals with the treatment of taxes and penalties owed by the insolvent to the local sovereign. In contrast, the Model Law expressly accepts that the local forum can exclude taxation and social security claims by foreign sovereigns from participating in the local distribution of the insolvent's estate.
37 However, there is nothing in the Model Law to suggest that domestic legislation should be construed to deny or diminish the rights of the local sovereign power to collect its taxation and social security (or other monetary) claims from an insolvent debtor's estate before that estate is remitted to the debtor's centre of main interests for distribution to creditors under that jurisdiction's laws.
38 The preamble to the Model Law stated that one of its objectives was "fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor" (objective (c)). This objective is given effect partly by Art 22(1). Importantly, there is nothing in the Model Law that seeks to discriminate against the operation of domestic laws imposing tax and penalties, as laws of general application, on the debtor's estate before it is remitted to the debtor's centre of main interests. It would not be fair to a domestic sovereign, its taxpayers or others doing business in its territory, or to the international body of the debtor's creditors, for a debtor's estate to be freed of any taxation obligation except in the debtor's centre of main interests, merely because the debtor was subject to a cross-border insolvency governed in another jurisdiction wholly or principally by the Model Law where, conformably with the rule of public (or private) international law, foreign taxes and penalties could not be recovered or admitted to proof. Nor is there any reason in principle to exempt a debtor in a cross-border insolvency from all taxation liability in every jurisdiction other than that of its centre of main interests.
39 I am of opinion that the interests of the Commissioner, as an unsecured creditor of Saad Investments, are not adequately protected under the 2010 orders. That is because the 2010 orders would allow the whole amount of Saad Investments remaining Australian assets, of about USD7 million, to be remitted to the Cayman Islands, as its centre of main interests, where the Commissioner could not prove for any distribution from its estate. Even if the Commissioner is entitled to be paid the whole of Saad Investments' assets in Australia, he will receive far less than the estimated 20 to 24 cents in the dollar that all other unsecured creditors will receive in a pari passu distribution based on the total tax debt of AUD83,271,545.70. If the Commissioner's debt were ranked pari passu with other creditors and paid at 20 cents in the dollar, he would receive about AUD16.6 million. Yet, the USD7 million available here is less than half of the lower end of the foreign representatives' estimated distribution to Saad Investments' unsecured creditors of between 20 and 24 cents in the dollar.
40 Moreover, if the Australian assets of Saad Investments were remitted without the Commissioner being allowed to prove for his unsecured debt here or be paid here his pari passu entitlement, the other unsecured creditors will receive a windfall to the extent that his bona fide claim is irrecoverable outside Australia. That result would be contrary to the fair or efficient administration of Saad Investments' insolvency. That is because, effectively, Saad Investments would benefit from its insolvency since it would cease to be subject to the incidents of Australian taxation and insolvency laws in respect of taxable capital gains and penalties imposed in respect of its profit making activities in this country.
41 The foreign representatives' argument that Saad Investments cannot be wound up here reinforces why, for the purposes of Art 22(1), the Commissioner's interests are not adequately protected. The Commissioner cannot, or may not be able to, avail himself of a number of statutory remedies if the 2010 orders are not modified. Those orders are the existing relief operating under Art 21 that currently confer a benefit on all other creditors of Saad Investments. That relief was available to the foreign representatives because Saad Investments, first, operated in Australia and not only had assets but made capital gains here that were taxable, before the Grand Court ordered it to be wound up in the Cayman Islands, and, secondly, it was insolvent both here (given the deficiency in its total assets of USD7 million as against its liabilities of over AUD83 million) and internationally. If the foreign representatives had not been granted relief under the Model Law, such as that in the 2010 orders, then the Commissioner could have used the remedies available to him under the taxation laws to obtain the equivalent of what would have been his pari passu entitlement to a distribution had he been entitled to prove in Saad Investments' liquidation here or in its centre of main interests in the Cayman Islands.
42 For these reasons, I consider that Art 22(1) gives the Court of the forum jurisdiction to make orders enabling the payment of taxation and penalty liabilities to be made from the debtor's assets held by it or a foreign representative appointed under Arts 19 or 21 before those assets are removed from the local forum and sent to the debtor's centre of main interests or elsewhere at the direction of the foreign representative.