CONSIDERATION
20 The first representation said to give rise to the expectation pleaded in paragraph 21D came out of the conversation between Mr Burrowes of the bank and Mr Sukkar. Mr Burrowes said that it would be the quickest and best way to proceed, they would be the best rates that he would be able to give and that the application then being discussed would be the quickest way to procure finance.
21 The second representation on which the expectation in paragraph 21D was said to have been raised arose out of a conversation with Mr Bingham. The evidence before me is that he is no longer an officer of the bank, his whereabouts are not known and he was not previously considered to be a person who would be a witness in the proceedings. Mr Sukkar says that Mr Bingham told him over the telephone that the issue of interest rates was raised and Mr Bingham said that the rates then discussed would be the best that Mr Sukkar would be able to achieve. And, at a later time, he said that he wanted ASS, in effect, to proceed quickly in order for Mr Nicolau or Akyman to be satisfied that ASS could raise the funds and proceed with a letter of credit. Mr Bingham was also claimed to have said that they were the best interest rates he would be able to give to the applicants.
22 I am of opinion that the circumstances described in Mr Sukkar's evidence do not suggest any situation in which an expectation could reasonably be seen to have arisen that the bank was taking on a role of financial adviser. The statements appear to me to be typical of the kind one would expect to have been made during the course of any negotiations with a financial institution in discussing the terms on which finance might be granted.
23 There is a slightly different complexion in the context here because in the third conversation, according to Mr Sukkar, Mr Bingham was saying that the bank wanted the transaction to proceed quickly so that Mr Nicolau (of Akyman) could be satisfied that the bank would provide ASS with finance facilities. However, none of these matters seems to me to be anything other than the normal sorts of to-ing and fro-ing one would expect between bankers and potential or actual customers discussing rates and terms and whether the bank would be able to give them better rates or terms or not and how quickly things should proceed. The statements by the bank officers display elements of commercial puffery. But I am of opinion that they are not capable of creating a situation in which it could be said that the bank had assumed, would assume, or could be put into a position where it owed, fiduciary duties to disclose matters to ASS.
24 In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith (1991) 42 FCR 390 at 391 Davies, Sheppard and Gummow JJ looked at a situation in which a bank was held to have entered into a fiduciary relationship with its customer. Their Honours noted that it was not a novel proposition, where a bank gave a customer advice upon financial affairs, that in addition to any contractual rights the customer may have, the relationship between the parties may be such as to found either a breach of a common law duty of care or a breach of a fiduciary duty. And they said that in many cases the bank as financier would have a manifest personal interest of its own in the matter.
25 They said that the question then became one of ascertaining whether, given the apparent commercial self-interest of the bank, it also could be taken to have assumed a fiduciary responsibility towards the customer in question, and emphasised that the context and factual settings were critical in that regard. Their Honours said that a bank could be expected to act in its own interests in ensuring the security of its position as a lender to its customer (Smith 42 FCR at 391):
'… but it may have created in the customer the expectation that nevertheless it will advise in the customer's interests as to the wisdom of a proposed investment. This may be the case where the customer may fairly take it that to a significant extent his interest is consistent with that of the bank in financing the customer for a prudent business venture. In such a way the bank may become fiduciary and occupy the position of what Brennan J has called "an investment adviser"; Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371 at 384-385.'
26 Their Honours went on to emphasise that the case before them was not one where one would properly describe the parties as acting in a commercial transaction at arm's length and each with the assistance of fully independent professional advice (Smith 42 FCR at 392).
27 I am of opinion that the evidence before me on this application has every characteristic of a transaction of the latter description. This involved a business proposition that was being considered by ASS and its principals over a period. They had the assistance of fully independent professional advice from their solicitors, Bruce & Stewart. In his affidavits, Mr Sukkar noted disclosures that the bank and also Akyman had made, to some degree, at the times when Bruce & Stewart were advising first him and Mr Barrow and, later, ASS. There was also some further disclosure to ASS because its consent had to be given to the relationship agreement between the bank and Akyman.
28 The matters alleged to have been relevant for the bank to disclose, again, have features which suggest that much of this material could be taken to have been known to ASS or its principals during the course of the relationship. Of course, the mere fact that ASS had some knowledge is not an answer to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In order to discharge his or her duty the fiduciary must disclose fully and frankly the nature and extent of any conflict between his or her duty and or interest and the interest of the person to whom the fiduciary owes the duty. As Lord Radcliffe said in giving the advice of the Judicial Committee in Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14 of a director's duty to disclose to the company's board:
'The amount of detail required must depend in each case upon the nature of the contract or arrangement proposed and the context in which it arises. It can rarely be enough for a director to say "I must remind you that I am interested" and to leave it at that, unless there is some special provision in a company's articles that makes such a general warning sufficient. His declaration must make his colleagues "fully informed of the real state of things" (see Imperial Mercantile Credit Ass'n v Coleman (1873), LR 6 HL 189 at p 201, per Lord Chelmsford). If it is material to their judgment that they should know not merely that he has an interest, but what it is and how far it goes, then he must see to it that they are informed (see Lord Cairns in the same case at p 205).'
29 And, Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said in Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 466 (footnote omitted) (which was approved by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22 at [107]):
'What is required for a fully informed consent is a question of fact in all the circumstances of each case and there is no precise formula which will determine in all cases if fully informed consent has been given.'
30 Likewise it would not have been enough for the bank simply to rely on the fact, had a fiduciary relationship come into existence, that Mr Sukkar or Mr Barrow or anyone else acting on behalf of ASS knew the bank had some relationship with Akyman. In those circumstances it would have been necessary, as the proposed amendment alleged, for the bank to make a full and frank disclosure, and to receive a fully informed consent, before any discharge from the obligations of a fiduciary could be relied on by the bank (see too Furs Limited v Tomkies (1936) 54 CLR 583 at 592-593 per Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ).
31 However, the matters which were actually disclosed during the negotiations, and the active role of Bruce & Stewart in giving independent legal advice to ASS in the relevant period, bear on the question of whether the bank had become a fiduciary of ASS.
32 The salient feature of this application to amend, it seems to me, is that the conversations relied on to create the fiduciary duty between Mr Sukkar and the two bank officers are of such an inconsequential nature. They included two conversations made over the telephone on the subject of interest rates and the promptitude of when something might be done. I do not consider that this amendment could be said to be fairly arguable or that it should be allowed to proceed to trial.
33 Because of the transitional provisions introducing s 31A into the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the test in that section for summary dismissal of causes of action cannot be applied on the present application. For the purposes of determining fair arguability, rather, I must have regard to the line of authority exemplified in Sir Garfield Barwick CJ's judgment in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125, particularly at 129-130. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 576 [57]:
'The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were to be allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.'
34 I am satisfied on the material before me that there is a high degree of certainty this amendment would not be able to succeed as pleaded and ought not to be allowed to go to trial. Other factors which have induced me to come to this conclusion are as follow. The discussions that Mr Sukkar said occurred with the bank officers did not take place in circumstances where it might be expected, ordinarily, that reasonable persons in the position of the parties or Mr Sukkar himself would regard the bank as giving him financial advice, as opposed to simply putting forward the bank's position, even if that position were being put perhaps forcefully or determinedly.
35 After all, this was a situation in which the bank had no pre-existing relationship with ASS upon which any reliance has been placed in this hearing. There is no evidence that the bank offered any financial advice other than what is said to have come out of the three snippets of conversation that have been put forward. Even in those conversations the bank officers did not express, in direct terms, any obligation which the bank was assuming or discharging to provide advice about its services or banking products, as opposed to it making assertions of the kind which one sees every day in advertising in the ordinary course of life (see too In re Coomber; Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728-729 per Fletcher Moulton LJ).
36 On a number of occasions the courts have considered claims in which bankers have been sought to be made into fiduciaries of their customers. Recently, in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finding [2001] 1 Qd R 168 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland considered a case in which a bank was in the position of being a mortgagee exercising power of sale as well as being financier of the purchaser. The Court held that no fiduciary duty to the incoming purchaser arose in the bank on the facts in that case. In coming to that conclusion they referred to a number of authorities in this Court, the High Court and elsewhere. They pointed out that in other cases where a relationship of a fiduciary nature between banker and customer arose, the bank had assumed the role of financial adviser, or perhaps had brought parties together, and the customer had placed complete faith and confidence in the adviser, as one would expect in a fiduciary relationship. In a passage quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in Finding [2001] 1 Qd R at 172, Hill J had said in Golby v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 72 FCR 134 at 136:
'It is not a critical feature of a banker/customer relationship that the banker undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of its customer in the exercise of some power or discretion affecting the interests of the customer in a legal or practical sense. Absent therefore some special feature, such as the giving of advice in Smith [42 FCR 390], there is no reason to erect a fiduciary relationship between bank and customer when that relationship is essentially one founded in contract.'
37 The Queensland Court of Appeal also quoted with approval what Branson J had said in Truebit Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1997] FCA 1290 at p 28. Her Honour set out the following passage from Meagher RP, Gummow WMC and Lehane JRF, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (3rd ed, Butterworths, 1992) at pp 130-131, which read:
'The distinguishing characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is that its essence, or purpose, is to serve exclusively the interests of a person or group of persons; or, to put it negatively, it is a relationship in which the parties are not each free to pursue their separate interests.'
Her Honour then continued:
'There is thus an inconsistency between the notion of Westpac assuming a fiduciary duty to the applicants in respect of its treatment of their application for finance and the maintenance of Westpac's "own commercial self interest as lender". Moreover, there is a commercial, and possibly conceptual, unreality surrounding the contention that Westpac was entitled to consider the applicants' application for finance both in the applicants' interest and in Westpac's own interest as the proposed lender to the applicants, but not in Westpac's interest as the mortgagee/lender exercising through a receiver the power of sale in respect of [the property].'
38 And as Davies and Pincus JJA with Derrington J pointed out in Finding [2001] 1 Qd R at 173-174 [13], there was no evidence in that case of reliance upon the advice of the bank in relation to the transaction, nor was there evidence of the customers holding any expectation that the bank would disclose the relevant information or that it had assumed the role of adviser to the customers. Here the proposed amendment does not make any allegation of reliance by ASS upon the advice given by either Messrs Burrowes or Bingham in relation to interest rates, timing of finance or the quality of the terms proposed by the bank. In those circumstances, the proposed pleading does not reveal a cause of action that I regard as fairly arguable.
39 I would also observe in passing that, unlike what had happened in the cases to which I have referred, much of what was pleaded as material which the bank ought to have disclosed suggested that, had disclosure been made, the proposition of dealing with Akyman would have appeared even better from ASS's point of view than it had on what ASS already knew. Although the bank had made its own internal estimates as to how profitable the business was likely to be, based on the sales projections which it had been given by Akyman, it is likely that much of that material had been already provided to ASS by the same source (Akyman) in one form or another, albeit it is possible that it may not have provided all of it. In any event, these observations do not affect the matter because, if there were a duty to disclose, the bank would have had to discharge its obligation to give a proper disclosure.
40 The sufficiency of disclosure by a fiduciary can depend on the sophistication and intelligence of the person to whom it is made, so that it can truly be said that his or her consent is fully informed. That is a question of fact in all cases (Farah Constructions [2007] HCA 22 at [107] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Because I am of opinion that no fiduciary obligation arose, it is irrelevant for me to consider the question of sufficiency of disclosure in the context of whether the proposed amendment is fairly arguable (cf: Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 at 198-199 [77]-[79] per McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
41 For the reasons that I have given that there is no fairly arguable cause of action that the bank owed any fiduciary obligations to ASS as alleged in the proposed amendment, it follows that the claims made under the Act, in respect of ss 52, 51AA and 51AB, also fail to meet the threshold of disclosing a case that is fairly arguable. The bank's conduct is alleged to be misleading and deceptive because of its failure to disclose. This is, in effect, an attempt to plead fiduciary duties as ones which arise under the Act(cf: Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 452 at 465D-467B). I am of opinion that fiduciary duties or duties of the kind pleaded here do not arise under the Actindependently of a fiduciary relationship. The Act prohibits corporations from engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. There is nothing in the material before me that suggests that, in the ordinary situation of trade or commerce, a bank would be expected to disclose matters of the kind set out to its customer. Indeed, a customer would be expected to know the bank may well have had personal interests in the transaction. It is the business of banks to engage in transactions of lending money to customers in order to make profit from interest rates and the terms of their arrangements. Likewise, banks engage in commercial transactions of the kind which the parties were discussing between themselves for the exploitation of the Akyman technology, in order to make money.
42 I do not think that it would be expected, in the ordinary course of trade or commerce, for one person interested in exploiting technology to their advantage to have to disclose everything about its plans to another with whom it was negotiating. Particularly is this so where there is no suggestion in the material before me that ASS perceived itself to have a similar fiduciary obligation in relation to the bank in respect of the very transactions in which it was engaged. However, ASS has not sought to plead that it owed any fiduciary duties to the bank. It is not relevant to the question whether the proposed amendment is fairly arguable that ASS has made no pleaded allegation that it also owed fiduciary duties to the bank, as it may well have been thought to, if as it alleged the bank owed such duties to it arising out of their relationship. I have not placed any reliance on the absence of any allegation by ASS of this kind.