In the meantime, by report dated 4 December 1989, Hillier Parker (Queensland) Pty Ltd ("Hillier Parker") had reviewed their valuation of Biggera Waters Shopping Centre with the adjacent land and varied such valuation downwards from $7.78 million to $7.6 million. Annexed to that report was a schedule of anticipated capital works requirements for Biggera Waters. The schedule has the following opening paragraph:
"In an effort to retain the current position of the shopping centre in the marketplace, certain capital works will be required to enable [Biggera Waters] to compete with its newer opposition of:-
Runaway Bay
Australia Fair
Labrador Park
Harbour Town (Proposed)
Paradise Point
Helensvale (Proposed)
We comment briefly upon our perception of enhancement works either of a cosmetic or necessary nature. No costings have been sought in the majority of cases at this time."
By letter dated 6 December 1989, the receivers and managers of General Ford had forwarded for Mr Christie's attention a copy of an updated valuation of Biggera Waters prepared by Jones Lang Wootton. The valuation, which was of the shopping centre with the adjacent land, was $8.0 million.
On 8 December 1989, Biggera Waters failed to sell at auction, being passed in at $6.5 million. By letter dated 3 January 1990, forwarded for Mr Christie's attention, the receivers and managers confirmed telephone advice that Westpac as mortgagee had no objection to the receivers and managers entering into a contract for the sale of Biggera Waters (presumably the shopping centre and adjacent vacant land) for the sum of $7.2 million.
A letter, dated 30 March 1990, from the receivers and managers, again forwarded for Mr Christie's attention, indicates that the offer of $7.2 million referred to in the letter of 3 January 1990 was not accepted "pending the resolution of a more favourable offer" in the amount of $7.534 million. It seems that neither offer resulted in a contract of sale and purchase.
By letter dated 24 September 1990 from Hillier Parker to KPMG Peat Marwick, Hillier Parker advised the receivers and managers as follows:
"We have been considering the state of enquiry and the prospect of a revised sale strategy and are confident that real interest can be regenerated in [Biggera Waters] were it offered on alternate terms.
Due to the configuration of the centre and adjacent vacant lands, we are of the opinion that if the vacant land was excised from the sale proposal, the resulting yield would escalate to a level which would encourage reconsideration by prospective purchasers."
The letter goes on to express the view that an aggregate price of $7 million for the shopping centre and the adjacent land would be fair and reasonable in a declining marketplace.
In March 1991, Jones Lang Wootton valued the shopping centre plus the adjacent land at $6.6 million. Their valuation report commented on significant competition in the locality from "better presented centres with superior access and major tenants". In March 1991, Hillier Parker also revised their valuation of Biggera Waters. They commented on Biggera Waters being an "older style shopping centre" and identified "major limitations to the value of the property" being its age and design, including the design of the carpark, the relatively short unexpired lease term of the major tenant and increasing competition from other shopping centres in the area. They placed a value of $5.75 million on the shopping centre and $0.5 million on the adjacent vacant land.
Mr Christie's evidence, which I accept, was that, in about March 1991, he held the view that the valuations of Biggera Waters which he received in March 1991 were a little under the true market value of the shopping centre, which he did not believe had declined to the extent reflected in the valuations. He made handwritten notes at the time on the valuation of Hillier Parker in which he calculated the value of Biggera Waters, at somewhere between $7.0 million and $7.26 million by using lower capitalisation rates than those used by Hillier Parker.
Biggera Waters again failed to sell at auction in March 1991. At this time the reserve was set at $6.6 million and the highest bid received was $4.7 million. On 1 May 1991, Mr Christie recommended to Westpac that Biggera Waters be taken off the market and retained for up to four years before being sold, with the receivers and managers continuing in their management role until further notice. This recommendation received official approval, subject to six-monthly reviews of the position, on 15 May 1991.
Mr Christie was advised by the receivers and managers of each of Mr and Mrs Conroy's offers to purchase Biggera Waters. He took the view that the offers to purchase for a price of $6.3 million, $6.4 million and $6.6 million were too low and he advised Mr Grady that such offers were not acceptable to Westpac. Mr Christie responded negatively to an enquiry made by Mr Nickalls on behalf of Mr Conroy as to whether Westpac would be prepared to offer finance at a concessional rate if Mr Conroy raised his offer for Biggera Waters. Mr Christie told Mr Nickalls that Westpac was not prepared to do any deals with Mr Conroy.
Mr Christie was essentially unresponsive to an enquiry made by one of Mr and Mrs Conroy's branch bankers (on the evidence it is not entirely clear who made the enquiry, or indeed, if it was made twice) at Mr Conroy's request. Mr Christie did not give any indication of a price at which Westpac would be willing to sell Biggera Waters and advised that Mr Conroy should deal with the receiver. Mr Christie took the view that he should remain at arm's length from Mr Conroy in any dealings concerning Biggera Waters. He understood his duty to be to get the best price for the shopping centre for both the mortgagor, General Ford, and Westpac. I note that the undated letter set out above, written by Mr Conroy to the attention of Mr Minihan on or about 9 September 1991, suggests that Mr Conroy was aware of the normal procedures adopted by Westpac when a receiver appointed by it was negotiating a sale of a property to a customer of Westpac, namely that the arm of the bank dealing with the receiver would not ordinarily provide information to the arm of the bank dealing with the customer, or, indeed, to the customer.
After being advised on 7 October 1991 of the offer made by Mr Conroy to purchase Biggera Waters for $7.15 million, Mr Christie submitted a written recommendation to the Westpac General Manager, Group Credit Policy and Control, that the offer be accepted. This document drew attention to the unsuccessful auction of the property, the unsuccessful attempts to sell by private treaty, the need for an estimated $0.5 million to be spent on the shopping centre in the short term and the likelihood of increased competition affecting the operation of the shopping centre. It described the offer of $7.15 million as "more than reasonable in the present economic climate", and noted that it was "within striking distance of the $7.20 we had said we would look to a subsidiary paying had we been able to foreclose on the property".
Mr Christie's recommendation received approval on 17 October 1991.
The applicants allege that Westpac, by the conduct of Mr Carrick and Mr Christie, used the applicants to establish a false market price for Biggera Waters; that is, that Westpac deliberately acted in a manner calculated to induce Mr and Mrs Conroy to make an offer to purchase Biggera Waters at a price which Westpac knew to be financially unrealistic. This allegation is not, in my view, supported by the evidence. I accept the evidence of Mr Christie, which is supported by contemporaneous business records of Westpac, that Westpac was not in late 1991 pressing to sell Biggera Waters. I also accept his evidence that he did not consider that the value of Biggera Waters had dropped to the extent indicated by the formal valuations which he had received in March 1991. Some significance can, I consider, be attached to the fact that Westpac had contemplated selling Biggera Waters to one of its subsidiaries for $7.2 million.
I find that Mr Christie, whilst he regarded the offer of $7.15 million for Biggera Waters as a good offer from Westpac's point of view in October 1991, did not regard it as an unrealistic price. In this regard I note that Gregory Robert Fraser, registered valuer of Southport, Queensland, prepared a written valuation of Biggera Waters for Westpac on the instructions of Mr Conroy in connection with Mr and Mrs Conroy's application for finance. In his valuation report, which is dated 15 January 1992, he stated "[w]e believe the sales evidence supports the purchase price and have valued the property accordingly". Cliff William Allard, also a Queensland based valuer, undertook a valuation of Biggera Waters on behalf of Truebit for Westpac as at 27 October 1992. He valued Biggera Waters at $8.0 million.
As is mentioned above, after failing to receive finance from other sources, on or about 28 November 1991, Mr and Mrs Conroy made a formal application to Westpac for finance to allow the completion of the purchase of Biggera Waters. Westpac confirmed approval of such finance by letter dated 27 December 1991.
Mr and Mrs Conroy accepted Westpac's offer to finance the purchase of Biggera Waters, and the sale and purchase of the centre was completed on 29 January 1991. The purchase has proved disastrous from the applicants' point of view.
CREDIBILITY
It is appropriate for me to record my views as to the respective credibility of the principal witnesses who gave evidence in this proceeding.
As is apparent from my above findings, I entertain reservations as to the credibility of each of Mr and Mrs Conroy. They were both willing, in my view, to tailor their evidence to advance what they saw as their interest in the litigation. Mr Conroy conceded that he had done so by initially refusing to acknowledge that he had retained Mr Jackson to provide him with advice in respect of the proposed purchase of a shopping centre. I do not doubt that each of Mr and Mrs Conroy has been under considerable stress as a result of the events that lie behind this litigation. There may be a real extent to which they have, as a consequence, reconstructed events in their minds to shift responsibility for such events to Westpac. I have found it necessary to treat their evidence cautiously. In a number of instances, as is recorded above, I have rejected their evidence.
By contrast, I have accepted the evidence of the witnesses called on behalf of Westpac. Much of their evidence was able to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. In particular, I found Mr Carrick to be a careful witness and one willing to make concessions.
TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Paragraph 15 of the statement of claim pleads that in reliance upon certain advice, statements, promises and representations of Westpac, Mr and Mrs Conroy:
"15.1 purchased the whole of the issued capital of Truebit and caused themselves to be appointed directors of Truebit;
15.2 caused Truebit to offer to purchase Biggera Waters from Westpac for $7.15 million;
15.3 caused Truebit to exchange contracts for the purchase of Biggera Waters on or about 4 November, 1991;
15.4 made and caused Truebit to make enquires [sic] from other financiers and then to make an application for financial assistance from Westpac;
15.5 agreed and caused Truebit to agree to accept a commercial bill facility for $6.2 million from Westpac upon certain terms and conditions;
Particulars
Westpac Letter of Approval 27 December 1991.
15.6 caused Truebit to complete the purchase of Biggera Waters and to execute Bill of Mortgage Registered No L324877D (the "Biggera Waters Mortgage") and caused and procured Edmund John Conroy to execute Guarantee dated 24 January 1992 (the "Guarantee"); and
15.7 executed Memorandum of Mortgage Registered Number E918388 (the "Mosman Mortgage") over their property at 6 Buena Vista Avenue, Mosman in the State of New South Wales (the "Mosman Property")."
Paragraph 16 of the statement of claim pleads that in reliance upon the same advice, statements, promises and representations of Westpac, Truebit:
"16.1 offered to purchase Biggera Waters from Westpac for $7.15 million;
16.2 exchanged contracts for the purchase of Biggera Waters on or about 4 November, 1991;
16.3 made an application for financial assistance from Westpac;
16.4 agreed to accept a commercial bill facility for $6.2 million from Westpac upon certain terms and conditions (which represented an advance by Westpac of 87% of the purchase price of Biggera Waters) (The "Biggera Waters Bill Facility"); and
Particulars
Westpac Letter of Approval 27 December 1991."
The "advice, statements, promises and representations" of Westpac identified by the statement of claim for the purposes of paragraphs 15 and 16, above are those referred to in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the statement of claim.
Paragraph 11 contains allegations that Westpac "advised, stated and represented" certain matters on 11 July 1991 by its agent Baillieu Knight Frank. As is stated above, I am satisfied that Baillieu Knight Frank was not on 11 July 1991, or at any relevant time, the agent of Westpac in connection with any matter related to this proceeding.
Paragraph 13 of the statement of claim reads as follows:
"In the period between August and October 1991 the Conroys on a number of occasions, consulted Westpac through Carrick at Westpac's King and George Streets Branch, Sydney, in his capacity as Senior Manager, Commercial Business, and requested Westpac's advice as to whether they could and should purchase Biggera Waters. Westpac by Carrick and / or by Mr. J R Christies [sic] ("Christie"), Manager, Loans Management Division of Westpac, advised, stated, warranted, promised and represented to the Conroys:
13.1 That Carrick was personally familiar with Biggera Waters;
13.2 That Biggera Waters was a good sound shopping centre with a strong cash flow;
13.3 That Westpac would advance and continue to advance to the Conroys funds sufficient and adequate to fund the purchase development and commercially viable operation of the Centre by the Conroys;
13.4 That part of the land at Biggera Waters was not required or necessary for the successful operation of Biggera Waters as a shopping centre and could be sold to reduce the level of borrowing to Westpac's preferred lending ratio.
13.5 That Biggera Waters was available for sale at a price which would ensure a reasonable commercial rate of return of approximately 14.4% per annum on the purchase price with a fully let net income of $1,107,000;
13.6 That Westpac was prepared to sell Biggera Waters for $7.15 million which was a reasonable and fair market price; and
13.7 That Biggera Waters was substantially fully let and there were no substantial problems in maintaining the lease and occupancy rates."
Neither Mr or Mrs Conroy gave evidence that they consulted Westpac through Mr Carrick "and requested Westpac's advice as to whether they could and should purchase Biggera Waters". I find that they did not do so. However, I find that Mr Carrick did advise Mr and Mrs Conroy that he was personally familiar with Biggera Waters. There was nothing in this advice which was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. As to the other matters set out in paragraph 13 of the statement of claim, I find that neither Mr Carrick, nor any other officer of Westpac expressly so advised, stated, warranted, provided or represented to Mr and Mrs Conroy.
However, as is mentioned above, the applicants place reliance upon a course of conduct of Westpac in relation to the process by which Westpac prepared and approved Mr and Mrs Conroy's application for finance, and facilitated and effected settlement of the purchase of Biggera Waters.
The preparation, submission and approval by Westpac of the applicants' application for finance took place after contracts naming Truebit as the purchaser of Biggera Waters, and Mr and Mrs Conroy as guarantors of Truebit's performance, were exchanged on 4 November 1991. It was not until approximately 28 November 1991 that Mr and Mrs Conroy submitted a formal application to Westpac for finance to enable the purchase of Biggera Waters to be completed. No evidence was given by Mr or Mrs Conroy to the effect that they would have failed to honour their obligations under the contract, and caused Truebit to fail to honour its obligations under the contract, if Westpac had provided to them in late November or December 1991 the information concerning Biggera Waters which they now assert that it should have provided to them. I find that they would not have done so. I note that the affidavit evidence of Mr Conroy explicitly states that, at the time of a conversation he had on 18 December 1991, he felt that he and Mrs Conroy were committed to the purchase of Biggera Waters. Moreover, even if it be assumed that, by the course of conduct of Westpac in relation to the preparation, submission and approval of Mr and Mrs Conroy's application for finance, Westpac "advised, stated, warranted, promised and represented" to Mr and Mrs Conroy the matters identified in sub-paragraphs 13.1-13.7 of the statement of claim, it would be impossible for me to find that any of the things done by Mr and Mrs Conroy earlier than about 28 November 1991 were done in reliance on such course of conduct, that is, that the applicants suffered any loss or damage by such course of conduct (s 82 of the TP Act).
Important matters which, it is alleged by paragraphs 15 and 16 of the statement of claim, were done by Mr and Mrs Conroy and Truebit in reliance on advice provided by Mr Carrick or representations to be implied from the conduct of Messrs Carrick and Christie include:
(a) the purchase by Mr and Mrs Conroy of the whole of the issued capital of Truebit and their appointment as directors of Truebit;
(b) the offer of Truebit to purchase Biggera Waters for $7.15 million; and
(c) the exchange of contracts on 4 November 1991 for the sale and purchase of Biggera Waters.
Each of these matters was done before 28 November 1991. I find that none of them was done in reliance on any representation or conduct of Westpac.
The additional conduct of Mr and Mrs Conroy and Truebit alleged by paragraphs 15 and 16 of the statement of claim to have been undertaken in reliance on conduct of Westpac is as follows:
(a) the making by Mr and Mrs Conroy and Truebit of inquiries of other financiers and the making of an application to Westpac for financial assistance for the purchase of Biggera Waters;
(b) the acceptance by Mr and Mrs Conroy and Truebit of a commercial bill facility for $6.2 million from Westpac on certain terms and conditions;
(c) the completion of the purchase of Biggera Waters and the execution of the Biggera Waters Mortgage and a guarantee by Mr Conroy dated 24 January 1992; and
(d) the execution of the memorandum of mortgage over the property at 6 Buena Vista Avenue, Mosman.
The above conduct, I find, was not done in reliance on conduct of Westpac, but rather by reason of the fact that Truebit and Mr and Mrs Conroy had caused unconditional contracts for the sale and purchase of Biggera Waters to be exchanged on 4 November 1991. They were unsuccessful in obtaining finance from any financier other than Westpac. Their acceptance of Westpac's offer of finance was, I find, consequential upon their need to meet the legal obligations arising under such contract, and was not undertaken in reliance upon any representation to be implied from the conduct of Westpac as to the financial wisdom of the purchase of Biggera Waters.
The claim of the applicants pursuant to ss 52 and 82 of the TP Act must fail.
FIDUCIARY DUTY
In addition to their claim based upon alleged misrepresentations made by Westpac, the applicants have claimed relief based upon an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Westpac. In their outline of submissions, the claim based on fiduciary duty is put this way:
"... in the circumstances, the Bank assumed a fiduciary duty or responsibility to the Applicants, notwithstanding its own commercial self interest as lender to the Applicants, creating an expectation in the Applicants that it would give favourable consideration to and deal with their application for finance for Biggera Waters in their interests on all the information reasonably available to it and in the interests of the Bank as their financier, but not in the interests of the Bank as outgoing mortgagee/lender to another customer exercising power of sale in a receivership and in the interests of another customer, General Ford (Australia) Pty Ltd (in receivership). Performance of this duty to the Applicants does not involve breach of any duty to the other customer."
It is plain that the categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed (Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 esp per Gibbs CJ at 68, Mason J at 96-97 and Dawson J at 141-142). As Kirby P, as he then was, pointed out, in Breen v Williams (1994) 35 NSWLR 522 at 543:
"As society becomes more complex, it is both necessary and appropriate for courts of equity to recognise new fiduciary obligations and to protect incidents of new or changing relationships... ."
However, the central nature of a fiduciary relationship is well established. It was expressed by Mason J in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation at 96-97 as follows:
"The critical feature of these [ie fiduciary] relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position. The expressions "for", "on behalf of" and "in the interests of" signify that the fiduciary acts in an "representative" character in the exercise of his responsibility, to adopt an expression used by the Court of Appeal."
In Meagher Gummow & Lehane, Equity, Doctrines & Remedies 3rd Ed. at pp 130-131, the position is put as follows:
"The distinguishing characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is that its essence, or purpose, is to serve exclusively the interests of a person or a group of persons; or, to put it negatively, it is a relationship in which the parties are not each free to pursue their separate interests."
There is thus an inconsistency between the notion of Westpac assuming a fiduciary duty to the applicants in respect of its treatment of their application for finance and the maintenance of Westpac's "own commercial self interest as lender". Moreover, there is a commercial, and possibly conceptual, unreality surrounding the contention that Westpac was entitled to consider the applicants' application for finance both in the applicants' interest and in Westpac's own interest as the proposed lender to the applicants, but not in Westpac's interest as the mortgagee/lender exercising through a receiver the power of sale in respect of Biggera Waters.
As Professor Finn, as he then was, pointed out in "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle"(1989) 12 UNSWLJ 76 at 96, Australian case law has favoured an approach to the customer/banker relationship based on unconscionable dealing rather than fiduciary principles: see, for example, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; National Australia Bank Ltd v Nobile (1988) ATPR 40-856.
This is not to say that a bank will never assume fiduciary responsibilities towards a customer. Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith (1991)102 ALR 453 shows that circumstances can arise in which a fiduciary relationship will exist between a bank and its customer. The Full Court of this Court, in that case, at 476-477, said:
"A bank may be expected to act in its own interests in ensuring the security of its position as a lender to its customer but it may have created in the customer the expectation that nonetheless it will advise in the customer's interests as to the vendor of a proposed investment. This may be the case where the customer may fairly take it that to a significant extent his interest is consistent with that of the bank in financing the customer for a prudent business venture. In such a way a bank may become a fiduciary and occupy the position of what Brennan J has called "an investment adviser": Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371 at 384-5.
...
The present case ... is not one where one would properly describe the parties as acting in a commercial transaction at arm's length and each with the assistance of fully independent professional advice. Such considerations would be of significance in tending to show the absence of a fiduciary relationship ... . The starting points for consideration of the present problem are the findings that Mr Dungow [a bank officer] assumed the role of introducing the parties and bringing them together, that he acted as the respondents' financial adviser in the matter, and that they evinced complete faith in him."
In contrast to the circumstances out of which the litigation in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith arose, the negotiations between the applicants and the receiver of General Ford in this case were conducted at arm's length and with the applicants enjoying the benefit of fully independent professional advice. Mr Conroy had retained Mr Jackson of Jackson's Property Consultants, a person recommended to him as a commercial agent with experience in shopping centres in south-east Queensland, to advise him in respect of the proposed purchase of Biggera Waters. Mr Conroy also retained a firm of solicitors to verify, ahead of the exchange of contracts, information provided by the agents for the vendor. Mr Conroy retained a firm of finance brokers to assist him in raising the finance necessary for the purchase of Biggera Waters.
Mr Conroy, as is mentioned above, was aware that it was in Westpac's interest to obtain the highest purchase price possible for Biggera Waters, and he was also aware of Westpac's practice not to disclose to a person in the position of the applicants, information obtained from the receiver of property available for sale where the Bank was the mortgagee of the property.
Neither Mr nor Mrs Conroy, nor any person on behalf of Truebit, explicitly sought financial advice from Westpac in respect of the proposed purchase of Biggera Waters, nor did Westpac do anything to create in the minds of Mr and Mrs Conroy the expectation that it would advise in the applicants' interest as to the wisdom of the purchase of Biggera Waters. Indeed, Mr Conroy was advised that he should deal directly with the receivers.
I find that Westpac neither knew, nor ought reasonably to have known, that the applicants were relying upon it to advise them with respect to the proposed purchase of Biggera Waters. Indeed, I find that the applicants did not rely on Westpac in this regard; nor did they assume that Westpac was acting in their interest. Rather they relied on Mr Conroy's judgment and that of the professional advisers retained by them. Mr Conroy gave evidence that he regarded himself as an astute investor in property; he had provided to Westpac a curriculum vitae which highlighted his formal qualifications and his experience in real estate and as an investor.
The case of the applicants so far as it relies upon an asserted fiduciary relationship between them and Westpac must fail.
UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT
For the same reasons, in my view, the claim based upon alleged unconscionable conduct must also fail. The applicants were under no special disability or disadvantage in their dealings with Westpac. I am not able to conclude in the circumstances of this case that any failure by Westpac to make disclosure of information known to it concerning Biggera Waters, which was, after all, information of the kind which ought to have been available to the applicants' own professional advisers, amounted to misrepresentation or unfair dealing by Westpac (see Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio.)
FAILURE TO MAKE DISCLOSURES
The statement of claim pleads that Westpac had an obligation to make certain disclosures to the applicants, and to advise them against the purchase of Biggera Waters, independently of the asserted fiduciary relationship between them. This pleading was not sought to be supported in final submissions.
BREACH OF CONTRACT/NEGLIGENCE
The statement of claim further pleads that Westpac had agreed to provide to each of the applicants "advice in relation to banking and financial and investment matters, including the sale and purchase and financing of the purchase of Biggera Waters", and that Westpac failed to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in the giving of such advice.
In Lenin v Australian Bank Limited (unreported, Cole J, NSW Supreme Court, 21 June 1991), approval was given to the following propositions:
"1. A loan from a bank to a customer in a commercial context is a transaction in which, generally speaking, the bank is entitled to seek and obtain the best terms it can ... .
2. Generally speaking, the bank is entitled to have regard solely to its own commercial interest. It is not the obligation of the bank to satisfy itself that the borrower has made a correct or wise commercial decision based upon a full understanding of all risks ... .
3. Generally speaking, a customer wanting a loan goes to a bank to ask for it, not to seek advice. There can be no liability for a failure to tender advice unless there be a duty to advise ... .
4. There is no duty on the bank to advise arising simply from the relationship between banker and customer... ."
The evidence in this case does not support a finding that Westpac agreed expressly or impliedly to provide to the applicants advice in respect of investment matters, including the sale, purchase and financing of Biggera Waters. The claim based on an alleged breach of such contract must therefore fail, as must the claim based on Westpac's alleged failure to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in the giving of such advice.
OTHER MATTERS
The statement of claim includes allegations concerning alleged conduct by Westpac later than the date of the completion of the contract for the sale and purchase of Biggera Waters. By the time of final addresses, such contract was apparently relied on by the applicants only as showing a consistency of conduct by Westpac, and not as supporting any independent entitlement of the applicants to relief. That is, it was relied upon as evidence consistent with the applicants' case and thus tending to give credibility to the version of events propounded by them. It is thus not necessary for me to have independent regard to such allegations.
CONCLUSION
The application will be dismissed.