Background to the extension of time application
3 The background to the current application is set out in ACN 104 635 369 Pty Ltd (formerly known as Total Plant Services Pty Ltd) (in liquidation) v Combined Group Management Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1402.
4 Briefly, in December 2014, pursuant to s 477(2A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("Act"), the Court approved a compromise of the proceeding against the first to sixth defendants.
5 As a result, the current liquidators of the plaintiff received an amount of $600,000.
6 In my reasons, at [40], I noted:
Complaints and criticisms have been made on behalf of Azzopardi Industries and Azbuild about each of the liquidators. In my view, having regard to the history of the relationship between Azzopardi Industries and Azbuild, which includes protracted and contentious correspondence between their solicitor, Ms Thurai Rajah, and the various liquidators, it is appropriate to conclude that the quantum of the liquidators' remuneration is highly unlikely to be resolved between the relevant parties. No party suggested otherwise.
7 At [41], I noted the submission made on behalf of Azzopardi Industries that it expects to be substantially out of pocket as a result of the plaintiff's winding up. At [66], I concluded that Azzopardi Industries would not agree to the remuneration that the liquidators including Mr Hamilton would claim, based on matters including a statement in Ms Thurai Rajah's letter dated 19 November 2014 to Mr Lancaster that her clients "object to the remunerations claimed by Mr Bill Hamilton".
8 For these reasons among others, I made an order pursuant to s 511(1)(a) of the Act referring the proceeding to a Registrar of the Court for determination of the remuneration of each of the liquidators of the plaintiff to the extent that such remuneration had not already been fixed.
9 Rule 16.1 of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) ("Rules") provides relevantly:
(1) For the purposes of paragraph 35A (1) (h) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, if the Court or a Judge so directs, a Registrar may exercise a power of the Court:
(a) under a provision of the Corporations Act mentioned in column 2, or a provision of these Rules mentioned in column 3, of an item in Part 1 of Schedule 2; or
…
(2) A decision, direction or act of a Registrar made, given or done under these Rules, may be reviewed by the Court or a Judge.
(3) An application for the review of a decision, direction or act of a Registrar made, given or done under these Rules, must be made within:
(a) 21 days after the decision, direction or act complained of; or
(b) any further time allowed by the Court.
10 Section 511(1)(a) is mentioned at item 81 in column 2 in Part 1 of Schedule 2.
11 Section 35A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the following powers of the Court may, if the Court or a Judge so directs, be exercised by a Registrar:
…
(g) the power to make an order exempting a party to proceedings in the Court from compliance with a provision of the Rules of Court;
(h) a power of the Court prescribed by Rules of Court.
(3) The provisions of this Act and the Rules of Court that relate to the exercise by the Court of a power that is, by virtue of subsection (1), exercisable by a Registrar apply in relation to an exercise of the power by a Registrar under this section as if references in those provisions to the Court were references to the Registrar.
…
(5) A party to proceedings in which a Registrar has exercised any of the powers of the Court under subsection (1) may, within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court, apply to the Court to review that exercise of power.
(6) The Court may, on application under subsection (5) or of its own motion, review an exercise of power by a Registrar pursuant to this section and may make such order or orders as it thinks fit with respect to the matter with respect to which the power was exercised.
…
(8) In this section, Registrar means the Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy District Registrar of the Court.
12 The decision that Azzopardi Industries seeks to have reviewed was made on 13 February 2015. The Registrar's precise order was:
The remuneration of the Seventh Defendant is approved in the sum of $46,009.10 excluding GST for the period 25 December 2013 to 3 June 2014, inclusive.
13 Accordingly, by s 35A(5) and rule 16.1(3), any application for review of the Registrar's decision was required to be made by 6 March 2015.
14 By interlocutory application dated 12 March 2015, Azzopardi Industries sought the following interlocutory orders:
(1) The order made by Registrar Tesoriero on 13 February 2015 be set aside;
(2) The application for remuneration made by Mr Hamilton be joined with the substantive proceedings;
(3) The application for remuneration be stood over to 31 March 2015 before Justice Gleeson for management within the substantive proceedings;
(4) Costs of this interlocutory application to be met by Mr Hamilton;
(5) Any further or other order that the Court deems fit.
15 The interlocutory application was not accompanied by a supporting affidavit, as required by rule 17.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). An affidavit of Adam Azzopardi sworn 31 March 2015 was subsequently filed in Court on 31 March 2015.
Legal principles concerning applications for extension of time
16 The relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant an extension of time are:
(1) the reasons for the delay. The Court must be satisfied that it is proper to grant an extension of time, noting that the prescribed period is not to be ignored;
(2) any prejudice to Mr Hamilton, noting that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension;
(3) the merits of the application: cf. Lemmen v Porcu [2013] FCA 1056 at [2]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-9; Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 417.
17 In Diab v McDonald (No 2) [2007] FCA 616, an application for an extension of time was refused where the Court was not satisfied that the application was brought with reasonable diligence or that there was a sufficient explanation for the delay during a certain period.