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Judgment

1. HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff challenges the validity of a decision made by the defendant on 8 October 2014 to suspend the plaintiff's membership of the defendant. The present application is for a mandatory interlocutory injunction and associated relief to restore the plaintiff to the rights and privileges of membership until the final determination of these proceedings or earlier further order.
2. The defendant is a company limited by guarantee. Its principal objects are to promote and raise the standards of the breeding of purebred dogs, to promote such breeding and to promote and encourage the holding of canine exhibits, shows, dog trials and dog sports.
3. The plaintiff deposed that the defendant is the governing body for dog activities and events, including dog shows, in New South Wales and is a member of the Australian National Kennel Council Limited ("ANKC") which is, in turn, an associate member of the Fédération Cynologique Internationale ("FCI"). She deposes that it is through these associations that members of the defendant who hold judges' licences and whose names appear on the defendant's lists of judges and judges' lists of ANKC and FCI are able to judge dog shows in Australia and worldwide. It is only if a judge's name is on such lists that organisers of dog shows are able to contact the judge to appoint and contract him or her for a dog show.
4. The plaintiff became a member of the defendant or its predecessor in about 1988. She has obtained a judge's licence for six of seven categories into which dogs are classified for the purposes of shows.
5. On 11 June 2014, the board of the defendant heard and dealt with a complaint against the plaintiff that at the 2014 Sydney Royal Show she had assaulted an international judge, a Mr Frank Kane. The board found that the charge against the plaintiff was proven and resolved to impose a penalty of five years suspension effective immediately.
6. On 10 September 2014, after correspondence from the plaintiff's solicitor, the board revoked that decision and purportedly lifted the suspension of the plaintiff's membership, although the plaintiff contends that the defendant did not take the steps that should have been taken in consequence of the revocation of that decision to restore her rights and privileges of membership including by giving necessary advice to ANKC that her suspension had been lifted.
7. On the same day that the board made that decision, that is 10 September 2014, it also resolved to make a new investigation of Mr Kane's complaints. It again resolved that the inquiry into that complaint be conducted by the board.
8. The second inquiry was conducted on 8 October 2014. Twelve members of the board participated. It was unanimously found that the complaints for breaches of articles 18(a) and (b)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) were established. Those articles in substance provide that a member must strictly observe and act in accordance with the articles and regulations of the defendant and not engage in conduct discreditable to the member concerned or any other member, or prejudicial to any person interested in canine affairs, or prejudicial to the interests, image or standing of the defendant, or contrary to the spirit and intent of the articles, regulations, the policy or the direction of the defendant or any committee.
9. The board determined that the plaintiff's membership be suspended for two years and eight months effective from 8 October 2014. It is that decision which is challenged by the summons in these proceedings. The summons was filed on 23 February 2015. The plaintiff gave evidence that she was informed by a director of the defendant that the decision on penalty was seven to five in favour of the penalty imposed. The relief sought by the plaintiff on the present application is as follows: "1 An order that the plaintiff is immediately reinstated as a member of the defendant until final orders are made in these proceedings. 2 An order that the defendant do everything necessary to give effect to order 1 above, including: a. Process any relevant membership renewal and/or judge's licence renewal; b. Reinstate the plaintiff to all Dogs NSW Judge's Lists on which the plaintiff's name had appeared or on which the plaintiff's name was eligible to be placed, on 10 June 2014; c. Notify the Australian National Kennel Council Ltd ("ANKC") regarding the reinstatement of the plaintiff in accordance with order 1 above; d. Request that the ANKC immediately reinstate the plaintiff to all ANKC Judges Lists and Federation Cynologique Internationale ("FCI") Judges Lists, respectively, on which the plaintiff's name had appeared or on which the plaintiff's name was eligible to be placed, on 10 June 2014; and e. When it contacts the ANKC in accordance with orders 2(c) and 2(d) above, it requests the ANKC to: i. advise ANKC Member Bodies; and ii. request the FCI to issue a circular to all FCI Members, regarding the lifting of suspension and reinstatement of the plaintiff's membership of the defendant. 3. An order restraining the defendant from suspending the plaintiff as a member of the defendant until final orders are made in these proceedings."
10. Prayers 1 and 2 of the relief sought seek to restore the plaintiff to the position in which she was in or should have been in prior to the making of the impugned decision on 8 October 2014. Paragraph 3 appears to go further and I will return to that in due course.
11. To obtain the mandatory interlocutory relief sought, the plaintiff must establish that there is a serious question to be tried that the defendant's decision is invalid, and that the balance of convenience favours granting the relief sought, or, to put it another way, that the risk of injustice to the plaintiff if the present application is refused but she succeeds at a final hearing exceeds the risk of injustice to the defendant and others if the present application is granted but the plaintiff fails in her claim for final relief (see generally Businessworld Computer Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 ALR 499).
12. There is a further question as to whether relief should in any event be refused on account of delay. No question arises in the present case as to the adequacy of damages.
13. The plaintiff attacked the validity of the decision of 8 October 2014 on two grounds. First, she said that under the rules governing the defendant all the members of the board were required to participate in the hearing of the inquiry and in the decision on it. Secondly, she submitted that there is a serious question to be tried that two board members who did participate should have disqualified themselves on the ground of bias.
14. The defendant denies that these grounds raise a serious issue. It also says in any event that the present dispute is not justiciable, and if even it is, and the claim were otherwise made good, that it is precluded by article 23 of the defendant's articles of the association.
15. I will deal first with the grounds of challenge raised by the plaintiff.
16. I do not accept the first ground. It appears from the minutes of a meeting of the defendant held later on the day of 8 October that there were at least 15 board members. Twelve participated in the inquiry into the plaintiff's conduct. Under the articles, 10 directors constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at a meeting of the directors.
17. It appears that the defendant's board has adopted regulations. The plaintiff argued that under the regulations for the conduct of inquiries, investigations and appeals all board members were required to participate in the inquiry.
18. Counsel for the plaintiff relied on regulations 9.2 and 5.3(d) in Part IX of the regulations. Regulation 9 provides as follows: "9. INQUIRIES BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 9.1 Notwithstanding the forgoing provisions of this part of the regulations, the Board of Directors may: (a) give directions as to the conduct of any Inquiry that may be under way, including a direction that the Inquiry shall terminate; (b) remove any matter, the subject of an inquiry, from the jurisdiction of the Committee and the Judicial Panel and, if considered appropriate, complete the Inquiry itself; (c) itself conduct any Inquiry (d) itself determine that an Inquiry be initiated in regard to any matter it considers appropriate. (09/13) 9.2 Any inquiry by the Board of Directors as contemplated by regulation 9.1 (b) and (c) shall be conducted as closely as possible in accordance with regulations 5 and 6, mutatis mutandis. 9.3 Upon completion of the inquiry, the Board of Directors shall take such action as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 9.4 There shall be no appeal from a decision of the Board of Directors following an inquiry completed or conducted pursuant to this regulation."
19. Regulation 5.3(d) provides: "5. CONDUCT OF INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING MISCONDUCT OR BREACHES OF THE RULES OR THE REGULATIONS BY MEMBERS … 5.3 … (d) All persons who constitute the Committee for the purpose of an inquiry must be present at any hearing conducted by the Committee."
20. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that applying regulation 5.3(d) mutatis mutandis to the board all members of the board were required to be present at the hearing conducted by the board. That is because regulation 5.3(d) provides that all persons who constitute a committee for the purposes of an inquiry must be present at any hearing conducted by the committee.
21. Section 2 of Part IX of the regulations provides for the establishment of a Judicial Panel comprising no fewer than 14 persons. Three members of the judicial panel are to be appointed by the board as a Disputes Assessment Panel. That panel can select members of a Judicial Panel to constitute a committee to conduct an inquiry. The Disputes Assessment Panel can also give directions to the committee for the efficient disposition of an inquiry (see regulations 2.1-2.4).
22. Section 5 of Part IX of the regulations deals with the conduct of an inquiry by a committee whose members would have been selected by the Disputes Assessment Panel.
23. Section 5.3 in whole provides: "5.3 (a) The Committee shall conduct a hearing at such time and place as it considers appropriate, provided that at least 21 days' written notice thereof is given to the person or persons against whom the complaint is made and to the person or persons (if any) who lodged the complaint upon which the inquiry is based and to any witnesses to the events in question and all such persons shall be entitled to appear and be heard at the inquiry and to give such evidence as shall be relevant in the circumstances.6/97 (b) Where a witness in relation to a matter the subject of an inquiry is more than 100 kilometres by road from the place at which the inquiry hearing is to be conducted, and that witness has presented a written statement to the inquiry, the Committee may permit the witness to give evidence and be cross examined by means of a telephonic conference facility.9/97 (c) In respect of written submissions made following the notification of an Inquiry, such written submissions must be made no less than 5 working days prior to the Hearing date and any written submissions received after that time will not be accepted.(11/14) (d) All persons who constitute the Committee for the purpose of an inquiry must be present at any hearing conducted by the Committee."
24. In the context in which regulation 5.3(d) appears it is evident that the paragraph applies to those persons who form the committee that is to undertake the inquiry by requiring them all to be present at any hearing. That regulation is not directed to establishing the identity of the members of the committee. The identity of the committee members would have been determined by the Disputes Assessment Panel. Where the board decides to conduct an inquiry itself, the Disputes Assessment Panel has no role to play in determining who should sit on the inquiry. Once the board has resolved to conduct the inquiry itself the inquiry is part of the transactions of the board. All board members would be entitled to attend but would not be bound to do so. In the present case, a quorum was present. I do not consider that the issue raised by the first ground of challenge raises a serious question to be tried.
25. The second ground of challenge relates to alleged actual bias on the part of one or two board members.
26. The facts relevant to this ground can be summarised as follows.
27. By e-mail dated 29 April 2014 Mr Kane made a complaint to the defendant. He said that after the Royal Show he was chatting to a group winner of a particular breed of dog and was approached by a woman whom he later learned was plaintiff who, he said, punched him heavily on the left shoulder. Mr Kane said that when he told the woman he was awaiting surgery on that shoulder she punched him on the other shoulder. A director of the defendant, Mr Wayne Burton, reported in substance that Mr Kane had made an oral complaint in much the same terms to him shortly afterwards.
28. The plaintiff was advised on 21 May 2014 that the defendant was convening an inquiry to investigate the complaint. On that day, she sent an e-mail of apology to Mr Kane. Included in papers for the board on the second inquiry was an e-mail from Mr Kane dated 14 August 2014 in which he repeated his complaints and commented in adverse terms on statements made by the plaintiff and another person. In that e-mail Mr Kane asked rhetorically why the plaintiff had not apologised.
29. On 1 October 2014, a week before the second hearing, the plaintiff sent a further e-mail to Mr Kane stating that she hoped he would find it his heart to forgive her. She said that she did not know why he had not received the earlier apology.
30. In response Mr Kane wrote to the plaintiff and said among other things: "First of all I did receive your apology and forwarded it to Wayne and Deborah Harkin as soon as I received it. I did not reply to you as I was told not to enter into correspondence."
31. The plaintiff submits that it should be inferred that the "Wayne" referred to was Mr Wayne Burton. Mr Burton was one of the directors who participated in the board's inquiry. It was submitted for the plaintiff that for a board member to advise the complainant not to enter into correspondence denoted bias against the plaintiff.
32. The other complaint of bias concerns a Ms Gunther who is described in the minutes as the president of the defendant.
33. Before the meeting on 8 October 2014, the plaintiff provided a number of written references. These included a reference from a Ms Robyn Knox. Ms Knox wrote a letter dated 2 October 2014 in which she protested that the board had not followed what she said was the usual practice of holding a "Judiciary hearing" but had itself conducted a disciplinary hearing. She submitted that the suspension handed down at the first hearing was unfair and she testified that the plaintiff was a woman who had devoted her life to what she loves, namely, dogs, her stewardship, judging and helping out when she could. Ms Knox's letter was, in substance, a character reference.
34. The plaintiff gave evidence that in November 2014, that is after the second hearing, Ms Knox told her that Ms Gunther had telephoned Ms Knox about the letter Ms Knox had written in support of the plaintiff. The plaintiff deposed that Ms Knox had said that Ms Gunther had suggested that she withdraw the letter of support.
35. In response to an allegation made by the plaintiff's solicitor in a letter dated 24 November 2014 that Ms Gunther had sought to influence one or more of those who had written to the board in support of the plaintiff, the defendant's solicitor advised that Ms Gunther denied the allegation.
36. The plaintiff's solicitor had also asserted that Ms Gunther had a conflict of interest because she and her husband were friends of the plaintiff's ex-husband. The defendant's solicitor advised that Ms Gunther denied any conflict of interest. The defendant solicitors also stated that Ms Gunther did not vote in regards to penalty at either inquiry.
37. There was no explanation as to why Ms Gunther did not vote on penalty when she had voted on the question of whether the plaintiff was guilty of the charge alleged, or for that matter, why she voted on that question when she apparently recused herself on the question of penalty. In this respect it is relevant that whilst the plaintiff had admitted that she touched Mr Kane, she denied that her actions constituted an assault which was the subject of the charge. She asserted that she made a merely boisterous gesture which, in hindsight, she recognised was inappropriate, and it was this for which she apologised.
38. It is not possible to determine on this application whether there will be evidence at the final hearing that is likely to be accepted that Ms Gunther did seek to persuade Ms Knox to withdraw her support for the plaintiff. The hearsay evidence given by the plaintiff is nonetheless evidence that there may be evidence at the final hearing that Ms Gunther did attempt to persuade a person who had expressed support for the plaintiff to withdraw that support. If evidence to that effect were given at the trial and that evidence were accepted, it could provide a basis for a finding that Ms Gunther was actuated by actual bias against the plaintiff. I doubt it would be an answer that Ms Knox's letter was relevant only to the question of the penalty and Ms Gunther did not participate in the decision on penalty. If Ms Gunther were actually biased she should not have taken part in either decision. If she was not biased it is unclear why she should have recused herself on the decision on penalty.
39. I conclude that there is a serious question to be tried that Ms Gunther might have been actuated by actual bias against the plaintiff. I have proceeded on the basis (that I think was common ground) that a finding of actual bias on the part of one or more members of the board would be necessary to invalidate the board's decision of 8 October 2014 (see Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161 at 170-171 per Glass JA; and Sturt v Farran, Bishop of Newcastle [2012] NSWSC 400 at [399]).
40. On the present materials I would not conclude that such a serious question arises as a result of the correspondence from Mr Kane in response to the plaintiff's e-mail of 1 October 2014 referred to earlier, but for present purposes, I doubt that it is material whether a charge of actual bias, if made out, was established against only one or against more than one member of the board.
41. It would be seriously arguable that if one member of the board were biased the board's decision was invalid even though the decision was a unanimous decision of 12 members of the board (Australian Workers' Union v Bowen No 2 (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 631 per Dixon J and IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 50 per Gummow J).
42. In the latter case, Gummow J said (at 50) that: "… in bias cases the court does not enter into difficult evidentiary questions as to the extent to which that person [viz. the one actuated by bias] may have influenced the majority ".
43. I conclude that there is a serious question to be tried as to the validity of the decision of 8 October 2014.
44. The defendant submits that the plaintiff's claim is not justiciable citing Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 at 370, 372 and 376 per Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, and 384 per Starke J.
45. Counsel for the plaintiff did not submit that the plaintiff was seeking to enforce contractual rights as a member of the company limited by guarantee. The defendant's constitution operates as a contract between the defendant and its members (Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140). But the regulations which are in question here do not appear to be part of the defendant's constitution. In any event, the plaintiff did not suggest that she was seeking to enforce contractual rights such as an implied term of procedural fairness. Nor does the suspension of the plaintiff's membership affect her livelihood, although working with dogs comprises a large part of her life, or would do so but for her suspension. Her work in this respect is voluntary. In Rush v WA Amateur Football League (Inc) [2007] WASCA 190; (2007) 35 WAR 101 at [30] the Court of Appeal of Western Australia said: "[30] In Skelton's case, Chesterman J noted that there were many cases in which courts have intervened where exclusion or suspension from membership of a club or association had occurred in breach of the organisation's rules or of natural justice. However, as his Honour noted, all of those cases were predicated upon the person involved suffering some diminution of rights of property, livelihood or trade. To that category of case may be added cases where a person's reputation is damaged: see Starke J in Cameron v Hogan (at 383), Plenty v Seventh-Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 SASR 121 at 124 and Carter v New South Wales Netball Association [2004] NSWSC 737 at [107])." (See also Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211 at [31].)
46. Here it is clearly arguable that the defendant's decision in finding the complaint proven and imposing the suspension would have damaged the plaintiff's reputation in the circles in which she moves. Accordingly, I think it is arguable that the claim is justiciable.
47. The defendant also argued that article 23 would be complete defence. It provides: "23. No member or affiliate shall have any claim against RNSWCC or against any member, any Director or against any member of a committee or against any employee or agent of RNSWCC in respect of any act, matter or thing done in good faith and purporting to be done in accordance with the Articles and regulations during an inquiry or investigation conducted pursuant to Article 22 and the Regulations. (11/12)"
48. The defendant submitted that even if an individual member were actuated by actual bias so as to invalidate the board's decision, that would not mean that the board considered as a whole was not acting in good faith in purported discharge of its functions under the regulations. The defendant argued that unless the board was not acting in good faith article 23 precluded the plaintiff from bringing any claim against the company or its directors, including a claim to challenge the validity of the board's decision.
49. Notwithstanding the use of the wide words "any claim" it is arguable that article 23 does not protect every act or omission of the company or its directors, or others, from challenge where the acts or omissions are done in good faith. One might ask rhetorically would a member or a director who challenged the purported election of a person as a director where the person was ineligible, and hence the decision to elect the person was invalid, be precluded from challenging the validity of the election unless he or she could establish bad faith? Would a notice convening a general meeting be immune from challenge unless it were shown that the notice was issued in bad faith?
50. In the area of public law privative clauses are read strictly. It is not self-evident that the clause would be read so widely as to apply to every challenge to the validity of the company's or the board's actions.
51. Moreover, if actual bias of a director were established, the question of whether the decision of the board was taken in good faith would be a matter requiring factual investigation.
52. I do not conclude that if the decision were otherwise invalid the plaintiff's challenge would necessarily be bound to fail because of article 23.
53. For these reasons I conclude that there is a serious question to be tried as to whether the decision of 8 October 2014 was valid. Clearly damages would not be an adequate remedy. They would probably not be available and are not sought.
54. As to the balance of convenience, the plaintiff gave evidence of the time and commitment required to obtain a judge's licence for each of the seven groups of breed that are entered for shows. She obtained her first licence in 2004 and since then has acquired a licence to judge five other groups.
55. There is only one licence she has not obtained, being for Group 3 (gundogs). The process to obtain such a licence takes about two years and the next intake for the course to obtain a Group 3 licence is in May this year. If the plaintiff cannot participate, which she will not be able to do if suspended, she will not be able to enter that course until 2017.
56. Since 2004 the plaintiff has judged dog shows all over the world. She may have judged as many as 100 in that time. Until she gets her last licence she will not be eligible for an all breeds license and hence not eligible to award the title of best in show. Dogs are one of the most important things in her life. As a result of her suspension in June, the plaintiff has lost all her judging appointments. She had secured appointments not only for 2014 but for 2015. These included appointments for shows to take place between April and November 2015 in New South Wales, South Australia, Scotland and Ireland.
57. The plaintiff deposes that as she is no longer on the lists of the defendant, ANKC and FCI, no club will contact her for future appointments. Suspending her membership until June 2017 effectively means that it is unlikely she will have the chance to judge any dog show before 20 June 2018.
58. She deposes that as soon as she is reinstated to membership of the defendant and is reinstated to the relevant judge's lists the sooner she will be able to receive judging appointments and there is a chance she may still be able to judge dog shows in 2015.
59. A Mr Garry Dryburgh gave evidence as to what he considers to be the adverse effects on the reputation of the defendant if the interlocutory relief sought were granted. Mr Dryburgh has been a member of the defendant or its predecessor since 1976. He has been involved in dog breeding for more than 30 years and has judged dog shows for 20 years. He is a director of the defendant.
60. He deposes that in his belief the reputation and authority of the defendant will be significantly diminished if the plaintiff were permitted to be temporarily relieved from the board's decision to suspend her membership. He says that people involved in dog shows and dog judging are members of a relatively large but well-connected group. Most of those participating in judging dog shows would be aware of the charges against the plaintiff and the fact that she has been suspended, as would those attending the course for acquiring a judge's credentials.
61. Mr Dryburgh deposes that Mr Kane is a well-known and well respected judge of dog shows in the United Kingdom and internationally and it is very likely that participants in international dog shows would also be aware of the plaintiff's conduct and the fact of her suspension.
62. He deposes that the defendant's reputation would be significantly damaged if the plaintiff were to engage in further misconduct whilst relieved from the suspension. He also expressed the belief that the board's decision serves as a deterrent to others against engaging in misconduct and that that deterrent effect would be undermined if the interlocutory relief sought were granted.
63. There is no evidence to suggest the likelihood of repetition of the incident that led to the present complaint and inquiry.
64. In my view, the asserted adverse effects on the reputation of the defendant may well be overstated. If those in the closely connected community who are involved in dog shows have the knowledge of this case, as Mr Dryburgh thinks likely, then they would also learn that if the plaintiff is relieved of the effect of her suspension pending a final hearing, that would not be the result of any decision taken by the defendant and would not be any endorsement of the plaintiff as an appropriate judge or course participant. Rather it would be the result of the Court's decision to restore the position to what it was before the board made the decision that is subject to the plaintiff's challenge, until that challenge is finally determined.
65. If the plaintiff's challenge at a final hearing is successful the prejudice to her from her suspension up to the hearing is likely to be irremediable. It may well be that if the plaintiff is successful at the final hearing that there may be yet a third hearing and it is possible that at the third hearing the same decision would be made and a further suspension imposed. But that cannot be assumed. If the plaintiff is successful at a final hearing it may well be that there is no further inquiry, or if there is, it may well be that she succeeds on a further hearing.
66. Considering the matter from the converse point of view, if the plaintiff obtains the interlocutory relief she seeks but fails at final hearing, then unless a condition is imposed upon the relief, she might obtain an advantage to which she is not entitled. That is to say, for the period that would elapse between now and the final hearing she would be relieved from the effect of the suspension, when a final hearing might demonstrate she should not have been so relieved. That, however, is a matter which can be dealt with by the imposition of a condition on the relief which I will indicate I would be minded to give later in these reasons.
67. The delay in commencing these proceedings is quite significant. The decision was made on 8 October 2014 and the summons was not filed until 23 February 2015. About one month of that period was taken up whilst the defendant's solicitors responded to correspondence from the plaintiff's solicitors challenging the validity of the decision. The balance of the delay is not particularly satisfactorily explained.
68. There was about six weeks between the plaintiff's receiving the defendant's response to her solicitor's letter and her giving instructions for the commencement of proceedings. She said that it was her intention only to commence proceedings as a last resort and she hoped to avoid the need for litigation.
69. Delay, particularly in a case where mandatory interlocutory relief is sought, can be fatal. In the present case there is no evidence that the delay has or is likely to cause prejudice to anyone except perhaps to the plaintiff herself.
70. When assessing where the lower risk of injustice lies and taking into account such delay as there has been in bringing this application, the hardship to the plaintiff if the suspension is continued but she succeeds in obtaining final relief substantially outweighs any prejudice to the defendant's reputation if interlocutory relief is granted and the plaintiff's claim fails at final hearing.
71. Subject to conditions to which I will turn, I am therefore prepared to grant substantially the interlocutory relief sought. The qualification to that is that I will not make order 3 sought in the notice of motion. The effect of that order, as sought, would be to preclude the defendant from suspending the plaintiff as a member of the defendant on any ground including if there were a fresh incident that warranted a fresh complaint, inquiry and suspension.
72. Moreover, it may be that the defendant would convene a third inquiry before the present case comes on for final hearing. If there were such a third inquiry and a third result adverse to the plaintiff, there is nothing which has been advanced on the present application which would justify restraining, in advance, as it were, the defendant from acting upon such adverse decision.
73. However, subject to conditions, the plaintiff is entitled to interlocutory relief restraining the defendant from suspending her as a member on the basis of the decision of 8 October 2014.
74. The conditions of relief will require not only the giving of the usual undertaking as to damages which is proffered, but should address the extension of the plaintiff's period of suspension if she obtains relief from that suspension for the period the injunction is in force but fails at final hearing. As a condition of the grant of interlocutory relief I would require an undertaking from the plaintiff that if her claim for final relief is dismissed, or if the proceedings are discontinued, or are otherwise finally determined adversely to her, then, subject to any agreement with the defendant or order of the Court to the contrary, she acknowledge and undertake to act on the basis that her membership of the defendant would be suspended, or further suspended, for the same period as that for which she obtains relief against the suspension of her membership pursuant to the orders to be made.
75. If that undertaking is given, and if the undertaking as to damages is given, then I will make orders 1 and 2 as sought in the notice of motion filed on 23 February 2015 and would also order until final determination of the proceedings or further order, that the defendant by itself, its servants or agents be restrained from suspending the plaintiff as a member of the defendant on the basis of the defendant's decision on 8 October 2014.
76. I am told the plaintiff is presently in hospital and I think the plaintiff should have a proper opportunity to consider whether she will give the undertaking that I have indicated. If the plaintiff fails at a final hearing and her current suspension is extended pursuant to that condition of relief, then she may be worse off than she would presently be because she may then find herself in the position that she cannot attend even the 2017 judges' course for which she thinks she could enrol if the present suspension continued.