Circular definition: 'contributor's component' is defined as a portion of a 'transfer value', while 'transfer value' is defined as a lump sum consisting of a 'contributor's component' and a 'subsidy component'. Each definition relies on the other to be meaningful.
The 'subsidy component' is defined purely mathematically as the difference between a 'transfer value' and the 'contributor's component'. Since 'transfer value' is itself defined as consisting of these two components, this definition is tautological — subsidy component = transfer value minus contributor's component, where transfer value = contributor's component + subsidy component. It adds no independent information.
Temporal circularity in the definition of 'elector': an 'elector' is defined as a person who has made an election under s.6(1), but the right to make an election under s.6(1)(a) requires the person to 'again become an eligible officer' within 3 months — a condition that must be satisfied before the election is made, meaning the person cannot be an 'elector' until after they have already satisfied the qualifying conditions. The definition thus presupposes the outcome it is meant to describe.
A person under 20 years of age is ineligible to make an election to protect their superannuation portability rights, yet there is no corresponding bar on persons under 20 being contributors or eligible officers. This creates a class of eligible officers who have portability entitlements in principle but are legally barred from exercising them during the same period they are accruing benefits, with no apparent mechanism for retrospective exercise once they turn 20.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Funds that received financial assistance in the same financial year as another assisted fund are exempt from the levy, meaning if many funds suffer fraud simultaneously, the levy base shrinks precisely when the funding need is greatest.
Regulations may lawfully fix levy rates exceeding the statutory maximum, and such regulations are explicitly stated to be valid despite breaching the rate ceiling prescribed by subsections (1) and (2).
All substantive definitions are entirely outsourced to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, leaving this Act definitionally hollow. The Act imposes a tax without independently defining its own tax base.
The tax rate calculation mechanism depends entirely on a table in a separate Act (Income Tax Rates Act 1986, Schedule 7, Part I). If that table is repealed, amended, or the relevant column structure changes, section 5 becomes inoperable without any fallback or savings provision.
The cap in subsection 6(3) references 'excess concessional contributions' but section 6 is about excess NON-concessional contributions tax. The 95% cap is applied to the wrong category of contributions entirely.
The 95% cap references both 'income tax' and 'excess non-concessional contributions tax' as the two components of the sum, but excess non-concessional contributions tax is levied on a different base (non-concessional contributions) than income tax on excess concessional contributions. Summing these two amounts as a percentage of excess concessional contributions is mathematically incoherent.
Setting tax on excess untaxed roll-over amounts to nil while simultaneously acknowledging they are taxed under a separate Act creates a structural absurdity in the context of this Act's purpose
A person may only drive a motorbike on motorbike control land if they have a motorbike access authority. However, motorbike control land is land 'prescribed under this regulation' — yet the regulation contains no schedule or provision actually prescribing any specific area as motorbike control land. The entire permission framework is contingent on land being prescribed, but no land is ever prescribed, rendering the lawful pathway under s.4(1)(a) practically inoperative.
Section 6(3) directs that a person may apply to 'the responsible chief executive' for reconsideration of a refusal or condition. Section 6(4) then states that if the original decision was made by someone other than the responsible chief executive, the reconsideration must be conducted by someone in a more senior office. However, s.5 vests the decision-making power in 'the chief executive,' suggesting the responsible chief executive is the primary decision-maker. If the responsible chief executive personally made the original decision, there is no mechanism or instruction for who conducts the reconsideration — a gap that leaves applicants with a nominal right of reconsideration but no...
The historical version dated 08/12/2000 is listed as 'Current from 08/12/2000 to 30/06/2000' — the end date precedes the start date by approximately five months, making the version temporally impossible.
The status information asserts that all displayed provisions have commenced and the timeline is authoritative, yet the timeline itself contains a version with an end date preceding its start date. An authoritative, certified timeline cannot simultaneously be correct and contain a chronologically impossible entry.
A Repeal Act that has been amended and continues to have an active version 'current from 1 January 2017 to date' suggests an Act whose sole purpose is to repeal another Act has itself required ongoing legislative maintenance, raising questions about what substantive content remains to amend in a pure repeal instrument.
The Act is described as 'current from 1 January 2017 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 13:18)' yet the file was 'last modified 14 May 2024'. If the version is current to the access date of 5 April 2026, it logically cannot have been last substantively modified in May 2024 while simultaneously being presented as current and up-to-date in April 2026, unless no changes have occurred — in which case the version currency statement is misleadingly dynamic.
Section 27 contains its own expiry date, referencing itself for that date ('exp 31 December 2005 (see s 27)'). The provision that causes sections 7–27 to expire is itself subject to expiry under the very provision it creates — a self-referential expiry clause.
Section 283A similarly expires by reference to itself ('exp 30 September 2009 (see s 283A)'), repeating the same self-referential expiry flaw as section 27.
Disqualification from succession is defined entirely by reference to a foreign statute 'as in force at the commencement of this section', meaning the disqualification criteria are permanently frozen at the moment of commencement and cannot be updated if the UK law changes, yet the stated object of the Act is to keep the Australian and UK successions aligned.
Section 5 declares it is not the intention of this Act to affect the relationship between the Sovereign and the State, yet the entire Act substantively alters the rules determining who the Sovereign is, which necessarily and inevitably affects that relationship.
The Act purports to be a Tasmanian state law requesting the Commonwealth Parliament to alter the law relating to succession to the Crown, but a state 'request' has no binding legal force on the Commonwealth Parliament and creates no enforceable legal obligation whatsoever.
Succession to the Crown is a matter governed by Imperial/UK legislation and the preamble to the Commonwealth Constitution. A Tasmanian state Act cannot itself alter succession rules, meaning the Act's entire purpose is legally inoperative at the state level.
Non-sequential paragraph lettering in the definition of 'qualified employee'
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 8(2) caps the applicable rate at 0.0005 (i.e. 0.05%) at the individual fund level, which is consistent with section 7(2), but section 7(3) allows regulations fixing rates above the maximum to remain valid, creating a hard cap in section 8 that cannot be overridden by the same regulation whose invalidity section 7(3) purports to prevent.
Subsection (1B) requires that regulations made under (1A) imposing a levy in respect of more than one determination must specify all funds in respect of which determinations are made and the proportion each represents, but this information is about the assisted (exempt) funds — not the funds being levied — creating a potentially purposeless disclosure requirement.
5 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 6 imposes a 2 percentage point increase for 'temporary budget repair levy years', but the temporal scope of the levy is entirely defined by reference to a transitional provisions Act (Income Tax (Transitional Provisions) Act 1997, section 4-11). If that definition has expired or been repealed, section 6 either applies to no years at all or creates ambiguity about its ongoing operation.
Section 4 imposes tax but contains no quantum whatsoever. Section 5 sets the amount but only by reference to an external Act's table plus an arbitrary 2% addition. The combination means this Act, read in isolation, imposes a tax of an entirely indeterminate amount.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The flat 47% rate on excess non-concessional contributions is effectively a penalty rate designed to equal or exceed the top marginal income tax rate, but since non-concessional contributions are made from after-tax income, this creates a scenario of potential double taxation without any offset mechanism within this Act.
Section 5 imposes tax on excess non-concessional contributions, but section 6(3) limits the levy increase by reference to excess concessional contributions, creating a direct contradiction between the subject matter of the tax being imposed and the subject matter of the limiting provision.
1 more generated issue for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 5(3) overrides subsections 5(1) and 5(2) with a flat 65% rate, but section 6(2) purports to increase the percentages specified in those same overridden subsections, creating an irreconcilable conflict as to the applicable rate for working holiday makers during a temporary budget repair levy year
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When conducting the mandatory 3-yearly review of motorbike control land, the responsible government entity must consult 'each person who holds a motorbike access authority for the area.' If no motorbike access authorities have been issued (e.g., all were refused or the area has never had uptake), this consultation requirement is trivially satisfied by the absence of any authority holders, potentially allowing a review to be completed without any community input from actual users — defeating the purpose of the consultation.
Section 16(1)(b) requires the spray paint prohibition sign to display 'only the following words,' yet s.16(3) then expressly permits the sign to also display 'a reference to the State, the department or the Act.' The word 'only' in s.16(1)(b) is directly contradicted by the express permission in s.16(3), creating an internal contradiction within the same section.
5 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
A pure repeal Act is logically spent upon commencement — it performs its sole operative function (repealing the parent Act) at a single point in time. Yet the instrument is maintained as a living, versioned document with an ongoing currency date and a Table of Amending Instruments, implying it has ongoing operative effect inconsistent with its character as a repeal instrument.
(65% confidence)
Section 33A(2) deems the parties to have made a 'referral agreement' to arbitrate, while section 33A(3) separately provides that the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 applies 'if the grower or mill owner refers a dispute to arbitration'. The two subsections establish overlapping and potentially redundant pathways to the same arbitration, creating ambiguity about which triggers the process and whether both can operate simultaneously.
The cascading conditional structure of section 33B(2) creates a chain of obligations each dependent on the prior term being included, but then gives parties the right to 'otherwise agree' at each level. This means parties can agree out of virtually every mandatory term, rendering the provision's mandatory language ('must include') functionally illusory for all terms except the basic cane payment in (a).
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Section 10 validates previously void marriages 'for all purposes except those relating to succession to the Crown', yet one of the key conditions triggering validation (s.10(1)(a)) is that 'neither party was one of the 6 persons next in line to the Crown'. The validation thus hinges on succession-related facts but explicitly excludes succession consequences, creating a logical asymmetry where the same matrimonial event is treated as valid for some legal purposes but its succession context is used to determine validity.
The condition that 'no person acted, before the commencement of this subsection, on the basis that the marriage was void' is practically impossible to verify or enforce, and may be impossible to satisfy in most real cases, since third parties (e.g. solicitors, registrars, other family members) may have acted on the void status without the parties' knowledge.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The status information states the version is 'current from 26 March 2015 to date (accessed 1 April 2026 at 23:11)' while also stating 'File last modified 22 October 2025', creating an internal inconsistency about whether any amendments occurred after 26 March 2015.
The version currency statement implies no legislative change has occurred since 26 March 2015, yet the file modification date of 22 October 2025 suggests the document was altered approximately ten years later, contradicting the currency statement.
1 more generated issue for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.