A member is not required to give a superannuation provider information relevant to the calculation of the member's adjusted taxable income, yet the provider is nonetheless obliged under s 15B(2)(b) to calculate that very figure. The provider is mandated to perform a calculation it is simultaneously barred from obtaining the inputs for.

The advance instalment mechanism requires payment of half the surcharge 'on account of surcharge payable for the member for the following financial year,' but the instalment is payable on 15 June in the current financial year — before the following financial year even begins and long before the surcharge for that year can possibly be assessed. The instalment is therefore a payment of a liability that is definitionally speculative and may never crystallise.

Section 33 declares that nothing in the Act makes the Commonwealth liable to pay any amount. However, ss 17(2)(b)(ii), 17(3)(b), 19(5)(b), 20(6)(c) and 15B(4)(b)(ii) all expressly require the Commissioner (acting on behalf of the Commonwealth) to pay amounts — refunds and overpayment returns — to providers and members. Section 33 thus contradicts the operative provisions of the very Act it appears in.

Section 15(7) provides that if a member dies, any assessment made after the death for the financial year of death or a later financial year 'is taken not to have been made.' This means the Commissioner is obligated by s 15(1) to make an assessment (it says 'must'), but that assessment is simultaneously deemed never to have existed. The Commissioner is compelled to perform an act that is instantaneously void.

Circular/incomplete definition mechanism — the Act defines no terms itself but instead wholesale imports definitions from a separate Act, meaning the interpretive scope of this Act is entirely hostage to amendments made to that external Act without any parliamentary scrutiny of the effect on this Act.

Constitutional carve-out renders the primary power in s4(1) potentially nugatory and of indeterminate scope — the trustee cannot know ex ante whether exercise of the power 'would or might' contravene the Constitution, making compliance effectively impossible to confirm.

The trustee is simultaneously a Commonwealth officer/authority/agent (as required by section 4 to trigger the Act) and deemed NOT to be a Commonwealth officer/authority/agent (as declared by section 5). The Act can only apply when the trustee IS a Commonwealth officer, yet immediately upon application declares them NOT to be one.

Subsection 3(2) expands the definition of 'superannuation contributions surcharge' in the Assessment Act to include surcharge 'payable because of the operation of section 5', but section 5 creates liability by deeming the trustee NOT to be a Commonwealth officer. The surcharge liability is thus defined partly by reference to a legal fiction that is itself defined by the section being interpreted, creating a circular definitional dependency.

Section 5(1) appears to be missing paragraph (a). The subsection begins with paragraph (b), creating a gap in the logical structure and potentially leaving an entire category of permitted provision unaddressed.

Section 5(2) is also missing paragraph (b). The subsection lists exceptions as (a) and (c), skipping (b) entirely, creating a structural gap analogous to the missing paragraph (a) in section 5(1).

The $3,000 cap applies identically to both a prescribed flat amount AND a calculated amount, but a calculation method cannot inherently guarantee it will never exceed $3,000 unless the calculation itself is constrained — the Act does not specify how compliance with the cap is enforced when a method rather than a fixed amount is used.

Section 3 imposes fees 'payable in accordance with section 128L' of the SIS Act, but the imposition Act itself does not set any fee — it delegates that entirely to regulations under section 5. Until regulations are made, there is nothing imposed in practice, rendering the imposition potentially nominal and circular.

The status information states that 'Some, but not all, of the provisions displayed in this version of the legislation have commenced' in the version current from 1 July 2021 to date, yet no actual legislative text, sections, or provisions are included in the document provided.

There exists a distinct historical version described as 'Current from 19/05/2016 to 19/05/2016', meaning the version was current for a single day only — or possibly zero duration if boundaries are exclusive.

The Minister is required to execute the Trust Deed 'Before 1 July 2005', but sections 3 to 46 (which include section 10 itself) only commence on or after 29 June 2005 (Royal Assent). This creates a legal impossibility: the obligation in s10(1) only legally exists from 29 June 2005, yet the deed must be executed before 1 July 2005, leaving a window of potentially only one day (29-30 June 2005) for compliance. More critically, if the Superannuation (Consequential Amendments) Act 2005 had received Royal Assent after 1 July 2005, sections 3-46 would never have commenced, yet the Minister would have already been obligated (and presumably acted) under a provision that never legally existed.

The simplified outline states membership 'continues until the occasion, or the last of the occasions, on which a benefit is paid to or in respect of the member.' However, s15(1)(c) provides a fallback that membership continues until death 'in any other case' — meaning if no benefit is ever paid, membership never ends until death. A person could theoretically be a member of PSSAP for their entire life without ever receiving a benefit, making the outline's description misleading and potentially incorrect for a significant class of members.

Section 4(b) requires the Minister to establish a fund and vest it in 'the Board', but the definition of 'Board' in section 3 defines it as the board established by section 20 'as in force before its repeal'. The Board has been repealed, yet s 4 still mandates vesting the fund in a repealed entity.

Section 4(c) requires the deed to set out the functions and powers of 'the Board', which has been abolished. Any future exercise of this obligation is impossible, and the existing deed provisions referencing the Board are now moot.

The definition of 'salary' includes 'any payments made when on paid leave' as a positive component of salary, but the exclusions in (a) only carve out termination payments. This means parental leave and ancillary leave payments (listed in (c)) are included in salary, yet sec.13B treats non-full pay periods during parental leave as periods where contributions must be calculated 'as if' on full pay — implying the actual salary during those periods is insufficient. This creates a tension where parental leave payments are definitionally part of salary but operationally treated as inadequate for contribution purposes.

Section 13B(2) requires a 'relevant public sector unit' to pay contributions during non-full pay periods, but the defined term in sec.13A is 'relevant unit', not 'relevant public sector unit'. The section uses an undefined term.

Eligibility for standard defined benefit category is circular and functionally impossible for new members

Retroactive eligibility start day predating the amendment creates impossible compliance obligations

Election under repealed Act is impossible to make prospectively

Bootstrapping condition: The Minister may declare an entity a unit of the State public sector only in relation to particular employees only if the entity employs persons whose membership in the scheme is continued under part 3, division 2. But membership can only be continued under part 3, division 2 (sec.11-12) if the relevant event has already happened - i.e., the entity has already ceased to be a unit or the person has already left the sector. The condition for the declaration presupposes the prior existence of continued membership, which itself depends on prior membership in the scheme, which may depend on the entity already being recognised for scheme purposes.

The former board provisions are stated to continue to apply to QSuper Board 'as if they had not been repealed'. This is a legal fiction that requires applying provisions that have been removed from the statute book. The provisions are simultaneously repealed (and thus legally non-existent) and in force. While transitional provisions commonly work this way, the mechanism of declaring repealed provisions to apply 'as if not repealed' creates a legal limbo where it is unclear whether the provisions can be amended, how they interact with other current legislation, or what happens if there is a conflict with current unrepealed provisions.

Retroactive or contingent commencement tied to another Act's commencement, with ambiguous 'or is taken to have commenced' language suggesting potential retroactive application without specifying what triggers the alternative 'taken to have commenced' scenario.

Section 3 purports to apply provisions of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act), a statute enacted in 1993, to an Act that commenced in 1991. This creates a temporal impossibility where a 1991 Act is governed by interpretive and definitional provisions of a statute that did not yet exist at the time of commencement.