The legislation states it is 'current from 1 July 2025 to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 13:40)' while also stating 'File last modified 17 July 2025'. If the file was last modified on 17 July 2025 but the currency begins 1 July 2025, there is a two-week gap where the legislation was nominally in force but the published version did not yet reflect its current state.
The status page states the legislation is current 'to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 13:40)' but also notes that 'legislation on this site is usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation.' The phrase 'current to date' is therefore self-undermining: the publication cannot simultaneously guarantee currency and disclaim a potential 3-working-day lag.
The header asserts the version is definitively current as of the access date (3 April 2026), while the body concedes updates may not yet be reflected for up to 3 working days. These two statements cannot both be true simultaneously if any amendment occurred in the 3 days prior to access.
The definition of 'computer' is self-referential and circular: it means 'all or part of one or more computers'. The term being defined appears within its own definition without any base-level anchor.
The definition of 'asset' includes 'any other thing' as its final catch-all, meaning literally every object or thing in existence is potentially an 'asset' for the purposes of the Act. Combined with downstream definitions of critical infrastructure assets, this creates an almost unlimited theoretical scope.
The legislation states it was 'Version current from 23 December 2025 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 11:41)' while simultaneously stating the 'File last modified 10 December 2025' — the file was last modified before the version even came into effect.
The regulations purport to be accessed on 5 April 2026, yet the substantive regulatory content provided is entirely absent — no operative provisions, licensing requirements, fees, definitions, or schedules are present in the text.
The legislation states it is 'current from 1 July 2025 to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 13:42)' while simultaneously stating the 'File last modified 2 July 2025'. If the file was last modified on 2 July 2025, the claim that it is current 'to date' (3 April 2026) is unverifiable and potentially misleading, as no modifications have occurred in approximately 9 months despite the legislation purportedly remaining current.
The legislation claims to be 'accessed 3 April 2026 at 13:42' as a fixed timestamp embedded in the document header, yet this timestamp is presented as static text rather than a dynamic access record. This creates the logical impossibility that every person accessing the document at any time sees it stamped as accessed at a single fixed moment (3 April 2026 at 13:42), making the access timestamp meaningless and potentially misleading as to the actual time of access.
Circular definition of 'recent certified photograph': the term is defined as a 'recent passport-size photograph' — the word 'recent' is used in the definiendum and left undefined, creating a circular definition that fails to clarify what 'recent' means in either the defined term or the definition body.
Obligation to notify of a 'charge' within 7 days is potentially impossible to comply with in practice, since a person may not learn of a charge against themselves (e.g., a summons not yet served) within 7 days, yet the obligation runs from the moment the 'change' occurs — i.e., from when the charge is laid, not when the licensee becomes aware of it.
A 'department of the Commonwealth or a State' is listed as a person who is not a security provider. Departments are not persons and cannot carry out the functions of a security provider in any case. Listing a department alongside natural persons (police officers, ministers, etc.) as something that is 'not a security provider in carrying out the functions of the person's employment' is logically incoherent — departments have no employment and perform no personal functions.
Investigating the disappearance of a missing person is listed as a qualifying activity for being a private investigator without the requirement that it be done 'without the other person's express consent.' Unlike paragraphs (a) and (b), paragraph (c) has no consent qualifier, meaning anyone who for reward investigates a missing person is a private investigator — including, potentially, the missing person's own family member who pays a professional genealogist, a journalist, or a welfare worker.
The Act is described as 'current from 15 July 2001 to date' yet the file was last modified on 2 March 2026, suggesting substantive amendments have occurred while the currency date remains static. This creates an ambiguity about whether the version displayed is actually current.
The site states legislation is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change' but provides no mechanism or obligation to verify this claim, and the static currency date of 15 July 2001 alongside a 2026 modification date suggests the commitment may not have been consistently honoured for this instrument.
The chief executive is explicitly prohibited from having regard to criminal intelligence when deciding suitability, yet the entire suitability framework exists to protect the public from criminals. Criminal intelligence is arguably the most relevant information for assessing whether a person poses a risk in the second-hand property market.
The definition of 'criminal history' in s.9 is expanded to include charges not yet dismissed, but s.9A(3) then prohibits the chief executive from relying on charge information when making suitability decisions. Information that triggers the commissioner's notification obligation cannot then be used for any purpose by the recipient of that notification.
The legislation states it is 'current from 1 April 2017 to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 13:54)' while also stating 'File last modified 8 May 2024'. If the file was modified in May 2024, the version currency start date of April 2017 is misleading or internally inconsistent with respect to what 'current' means.
The metadata claims the site is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation', yet the file was last modified 8 May 2024 while the version currency date remains 1 April 2017. This implies either the update policy was not followed, or the modification on 8 May 2024 was non-substantive but is indistinguishable from a substantive amendment to a reader.
The legislation is described as 'Current version for 20 February 1915 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 12:24)' yet the file is noted as 'last modified 8 May 1995'. This means a 1915 Act surrendering land to the Commonwealth has been unmodified for over 30 years yet is still described as current, raising questions about whether the administrative metadata is accurate or meaningful.
The Responsible Minister for a 1915 Act surrendering NSW territory to the Commonwealth is listed as 'Premier' with reference to the 'Administrative Arrangements (Minns Ministry—Administration of Acts) Order 2023'. The Act's substantive purpose — the surrender of land — was completed and exhausted in 1915. Assigning ongoing ministerial responsibility to a functus officio instrument is an administrative absurdity, as there is nothing left for the Premier to administer.
The Minister is required to announce by notifiable instrument the day that the Greater Sunrise Special Regime ceases to be in force, but section 13AC(1) provides that Division 2AA ceases to have effect at the start of the day AFTER that regime ceases. This creates a practical impossibility: the obligation to make the announcement is itself contained within Division 2AA, which ceases to have effect contemporaneously with or immediately after the triggering event. The Minister's obligation to announce may itself have ceased to exist by the time the announcement is required or able to be made.
Section 13AB(1) provides that a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory does not apply in the Greater Sunrise special regime area in relation to exploration or exploitation of natural resources. Section 13AB(2) states that subsection (1) is 'subject to a contrary intention.' This means that any law of a State, Territory or the Commonwealth can override the exclusion simply by expressing a contrary intention, rendering the exclusion effectively illusory and providing no meaningful legal protection or certainty.
Circular commencement dependency: This Act commences when section 2 of the Compensation Act commences, but if the Compensation Act has a similar commencement provision referencing another Act, a circular dependency could arise. More practically, if the Compensation Act never commences, this Act can never commence, creating a permanent state of legislative limbo with no fallback mechanism.
The definition of the first 'quarter' is potentially a period of less than one day. If this Act commences on the last day of March, June, September or December, the first quarter begins and ends on the same day, creating a zero-duration or near-zero-duration quarter. This would make compliance with the 14-day return requirement in section 6 paradoxical — the return would be due 14 days after the beginning of the quarter, yet the quarter itself may have already ended.
Both paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of 'access to computer data' are introduced with the same condition: 'in a case where the computer data is held in a computer'. This means paragraph (a) (display/output) and paragraph (b) (copying/moving) cover the same factual predicate with no apparent distinction, resulting in redundancy and potential interpretive confusion about which applies when both conditions are met.
Assets owned by the Commonwealth or Commonwealth bodies (other than government business enterprises) are excluded from being critical infrastructure assets unless declared or prescribed. This means Commonwealth-owned infrastructure — arguably the most securely controlled infrastructure — receives less regulatory scrutiny under the Act than privately owned equivalents, inverting the apparent purpose of the legislation.
15 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The document title and section headings are duplicated verbatim multiple times (e.g., 'Security and Investigations Ag Security and Investigations Agents Regulations 2025', 'Status Information Status Information', 'Currency of version Currency of version') suggesting a rendering or consolidation defect that may mean the authoritative text of the instrument is uncertain.
The file modification date (10 December 2025) directly contradicts the stated version commencement date (23 December 2025). A file cannot have been last modified prior to the existence of the version it is said to record.
1 more generated issue for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The document asserts currency 'to date' (implying ongoing and up-to-date status as of 3 April 2026), while also disclosing the file was last modified on 2 July 2025. These two statements are in tension: if no modification has occurred since 2 July 2025, the assurance that the document is current 'to date' nearly nine months later cannot be independently verified from the metadata provided, and potentially contradicts the implication that the document reflects all changes up to the access date.
The register must be 'written in ink' but also acknowledges that 'writing includes any mode of representing or reproducing words in a visible form' under the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The ink requirement and the expansive statutory definition of 'writing' are irreconcilable — the regulation imposes a specific medium (ink) that the Acts Interpretation Act's definition explicitly renders unnecessary.
Same ink/writing contradiction as sec.18(ssec.3) — the security firm's crowd controller register must be 'written in ink' while simultaneously acknowledging the Acts Interpretation Act definition that writing includes any visible form of reproduction.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
An employee of a person who, for reward, installs security equipment is excluded from being a 'security equipment installer' when they install their employer's own security equipment — regardless of whether the employee is doing this as part of their job in the security installation business. This means a fully-trained installer employed by a security firm who fixes the firm's own office alarm is not a security equipment installer, yet the same person fixing a client's alarm is. The practical effect is negligible but the classification creates an artificial and potentially confusing toggle.
Section 7(4) states a person is 'not a security officer merely because' they are an employee guarding their employer's property, but section 7(5) then re-captures those same persons as security officers if they are employed principally for guarding or guarding licensed premises. The word 'merely' in sec.7(4) does no logical work — the exception in sec.7(5) swallows the rule so completely that sec.7(4) adds no meaningful protection from classification.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The version is stated to be current 'from 15 July 2001 to date', implying no substantive change since that date, yet the file was last modified on 2 March 2026. These two statements are in direct tension: either the file was modified in a way that changed the legislation (contradicting the static currency start date) or the file was modified in a way that did not change the legislation (making the modification date misleading).
The provision allows the chief executive to 'refuse to renew or restore the license for a period', which is conceptually incoherent. A refusal to renew or restore is a binary outcome — the licence either continues or it does not. Refusing to renew 'for a period' has no intelligible legal meaning because a refusal does not have a duration; the licence simply lapses.
Section 42 prohibits employing persons under 17 to acquire second-hand property, while s.45 prohibits acquiring property from persons under 17. The age thresholds are inconsistent: employees must be at least 17, but sellers must also be at least 17. A 17-year-old employee is therefore legally old enough to work but legally prohibited from selling property to their own employer.
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The version currency date (1 April 2017) and the file modification date (8 May 2024) are irreconcilable if the modification reflected a substantive legal change. A substantive amendment on 8 May 2024 should have produced a new version currency start date, yet none is shown.
The Act is certified as correct under section 45C of the Interpretation Act 1987, a provision that did not exist until 1987 — some 72 years after the Act was made in 1915. The certification process retrospectively applies a 1987 statutory mechanism to authenticate a 1915 document, creating a temporal absurdity where the authenticating authority derives its power from legislation that postdates the instrument being authenticated by seven decades.
The status information asserts the version is current and maintained up to the access date of 5 April 2026, yet the file metadata records the last modification as 8 May 1995. These two claims are in direct tension: a file unmaintained since 1995 cannot simultaneously satisfy the representation that the NSW PCO 'compiled and maintains' it in a current database.
Key terms including 'territorial sea,' 'continental shelf,' 'exclusive economic zone,' and 'contiguous zone' are all defined by reference to UNCLOS, which was concluded in 1982. However, this Act was enacted in 1973 — nine years before the Convention existed. The Act as originally enacted therefore contained definitions that incorporated a non-existent treaty, meaning the definitional framework was inoperative at the time of enactment and the Act retrospectively incorporated an external instrument.
Section 16(2)(a) contains a typographical and grammatical error, referring to sea-bed 'within the sovereign of the Crown' rather than 'within the sovereignty of the Crown.' While minor, this is a defect in a provisions dealing with the scope of Commonwealth sovereignty and could theoretically create interpretive uncertainty about what legal concept is being invoked.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 5 defines the due date for levy payment as 'at the end of the period within which an employer is required by this Act to give a return under section 6.' Section 6 requires returns within 14 days after the beginning of each quarter. This means levy is due at the end of 14 days after the quarter begins — i.e., before the quarter has concluded — yet the levy is calculated on the number of berths on the first day of the quarter (section 4). While technically calculable, payment is required mid-quarter for a full quarter's levy, which is logically awkward and potentially burdensome.
The self-incrimination protection in s.7(3) is internally contradictory. It compels persons to give returns (overriding the privilege against self-incrimination) but then makes the return inadmissible in criminal proceedings — except in proceedings for an offence under s.7(2) (giving an incomplete or false return). This means the compelled return CAN be used against the person in proceedings for the very offence of giving a defective return. A person is thus compelled to produce a document that can be used to prosecute them for producing that document incorrectly.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.