The published version of the Plan expressly states it does NOT include the amendment made by cl 7.28(3) of the same Plan, which repeals cl 7.28 on 31 July 2030. This means a currently-in-force provision of the Plan is simultaneously excluded from the published, certified version of that same Plan — creating a situation where the certified 'correct' version is knowingly incomplete as to its own future operation.
A version is listed as 'Current from 16/06/2022 to 16/06/2022' — meaning the version was in force for zero days (a single calendar date only). While technically possible if two amendments commenced on successive days, this creates a practically absurd legislative state where a distinct version of the Plan existed for less than 24 hours, rendering any compliance assessment against that version almost impossible in practice.
A second version is listed as 'Current from 01/12/2022 to 01/12/2022', again lasting only a single calendar day. This repeats the same absurdity as the 16/06/2022 version, compounding the pattern of sub-day or single-day legislative states in a planning instrument.
The Plan is certified as the 'correct' form of the legislation under s 45C of the Interpretation Act 1987, yet simultaneously and expressly acknowledges it does not include a provision (cl 7.28(3)) that forms part of the same instrument. A document cannot be simultaneously complete and correct while also admitting to a known omission of one of its own operative provisions.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The 9-month exclusion period creates a potential impossibility: an entity applying for its first-ever certificate for a vessel cannot have days recognised for the first 9 months of the certificate year unless it has a notice under section 14. However, section 15 requires the notice application to be made at least 3 months before the end of the income year, meaning the notice can only be obtained in the final quarter of the year. For a standard July-June income year, this means the notice window (April-June) precisely aligns with the only period eligible for recognition under subsection 8(4)(a), leaving a first-time applicant with at most approximately 3 months of eligible days — even if the...
The 10-year lockout in s9(1) is triggered when an entity does NOT have a shipping exempt income certificate for the previous year but HAS had one issued in an earlier year. However, the Minister may revoke a certificate under s13. Per Note 3 to s13(2), revocation causes the entity to not be eligible for the exempt income incentive for up to another 10 income years under s9. This creates a circular penalty loop: an entity that loses a certificate due to non-compliance is locked out, but if it then somehow receives a certificate (which the Minister 'must' issue under s8(1) if requirements are met), s9 would prohibit issuing a shipping exempt income certificate version of it, which is the only...
A 'club' is defined as requiring at least 30 persons AND must sell or supply liquor on its premises. This means a teetotal association of 10,000 members does not qualify as a 'club' for anti-discrimination purposes, while a liquor-selling association of exactly 30 people does. Organisations that choose not to serve alcohol are effectively excluded from the definition, creating a perverse incentive structure and leaving their members without protection in club-related discrimination contexts.
The objects clause simultaneously seeks to 'promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle of the equality of men and women' (s3(d)) while also seeking to 'achieve, so far as practicable, substantive equality between men and women' (s3(e)). The Act's own protected attributes now extend well beyond men and women (sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, etc.) throughout the substantive provisions, yet the objects clauses in (d) and (e) remain confined to the binary 'men and women' framing — creating an internal inconsistency between the stated objects and the actual scope of the Act.
Section 8(2) refers to 'Moneys borrowed under section 5 of the Sewerage Agreements Act 1973', but section 5 of that Act is expressly ceased (in part) by section 5 of this Act. While section 5 of the 1973 Act may be a borrowing authority provision distinct from what is ceased here, the juxtaposition creates confusion: this Act simultaneously extinguishes provisions of the 1973 Act while redirecting funds borrowed under that same Act.
Section 7 authorises borrowing under the 'Commonwealth Inscribed Stock Act 1911-1973', a citation referencing a consolidation up to 1973. By the time this 1974 Act was operative, this citation style may have already been superseded, creating a potentially inapplicable reference to borrowing authority.
Section heading references 'Consolidated Revenue Fund or Loan Fund' but the body of section 4 only authorises payments from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, omitting any reference to a Loan Fund.
Section 5 authorises borrowing under the Commonwealth Inscribed Stock Act 1911-1966, a repealed and superseded Act, rendering the borrowing mechanism potentially inoperable as a matter of law.
Section 3 approves execution of agreements 'substantially in accordance with' the Schedule, but the Act does not define 'substantially', creating an undefined and potentially unlimited tolerance for deviation from the Schedule's terms.
The submitted text is not legislation at all. It is a 404-style error page from the Western Australian Parliamentary Counsel's Office website, indicating that the actual Settlement Agents Code of Conduct 2016 is no longer available at the provided URL.
Every heading in the document is duplicated verbatim immediately after itself (e.g. 'Settlement Agents Code of Conduct 2016' appears twice consecutively, 'Unknown URL' appears twice, 'Acknowledgement of Country' appears twice), suggesting a rendering or markup error that has produced nonsensical structural repetition.
Circular definition: 'dependant' is defined by reference to trustees' opinion that a person's relationship justifies 'receipt by that person of benefit from that fund', but whether a person is a dependant determines their eligibility for that very benefit.
Circular definition: 'fund' means any fund established under this Act, but the Act never provides a mechanism to establish funds in Parts II or VII — funds only come into existence by being named in Parts IV, V and VI. The general definition bootstraps on the specific provisions rather than providing independent meaning.
The definition of 'court' includes 'an authority exercising the powers of such a court', while 'authority' is separately defined as 'a judge, magistrate, coroner or officer of a court appointed or holding office under a law of a State.' This creates a partially circular structure: a court includes an authority, and an authority is defined by reference to officers of a court.
The definition of 'person under restraint' expressly includes a person 'serving a period of home detention or a term of imprisonment by way of periodic detention' but expressly excludes 'a person who is in prison.' Section 3(6) then clarifies that a person serving imprisonment by periodic detention is NOT considered 'in prison' for Act purposes. However, the definition of 'prison' in s 3(1) includes 'a gaol, lock-up or other place of detention' — which could arguably encompass a periodic detention centre, creating tension with s 3(6).
The Act's commencement depends on a Proclamation made under subsection 2(4) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, but the 1992 principal Act itself commences by the same or related Proclamation mechanism. If the Proclamation is never made, this transitional Act — including the repeal provision in section 3 — never commences, meaning the 1901 Act it is meant to repeal remains in force indefinitely alongside the 1992 principal Act.
The transitional provisions preserve Parts II, III, IIIA, IV, and IVA of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901 'as if that Act had not been repealed', but section 3 of this same Act repeals that Act absolutely and unconditionally. The Act therefore simultaneously repeals the 1901 Act (section 3) and treats it as unrepealed for specified purposes (section 4).
The Act is titled 'Phasing Out Of Suspended Sentences' but the full text provided contains no operative provisions, transitional schedules, or phasing timeline whatsoever. An Act purporting to 'phase out' a sentencing mechanism with no operative clauses defining phases, timelines, or offence categories is logically incoherent on its face.
The document states it is 'Version current from 14 December 2018 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 13:17)' while also stating 'File last modified 17 October 2025'. If the file was last modified in October 2025, the claim that it reflects the version 'current from 14 December 2018 to date' is internally inconsistent — a modification would typically signal a new version currency date.
The legislation states it is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation,' yet the file was last modified on 17 October 2025 while the version is stated as 'current from 28 April 2000 to date.' This implies either no amendments have occurred in over 25 years (rendering the update frequency statement meaningless in practice), or amendments have occurred but the substantive content provided is incomplete.
The substantive operative provisions of the Senate Elections Act 1935 are entirely absent from the text provided. A piece of legislation containing no operative sections, definitions, obligations, rights, or penalties cannot logically fulfil its stated legislative purpose of regulating Senate elections.
The file is stated to have been last modified on 29 October 2025, yet the version is described as current from 4 November 2025. This means the authorised file predates the version it purports to authorise.
The currency statement claims the version is current 'to date' (accessed 5 April 2026), yet the site disclaimer states legislation is 'usually' updated within 3 working days. The word 'usually' introduces an indeterminate gap that means the 'current' version may in fact not be current at the moment of access.
The associate extension provision deems associates to be 'part of the applicant rather than a separate entity' for the purposes of the lockout. This could mean that an entity acquiring a new associate that previously held and lost a shipping exempt income certificate for a vessel immediately becomes subject to a lockout for that vessel, even if the acquiring entity had no prior connection to the vessel. This creates an impossible compliance situation where a corporation cannot conduct ordinary commercial transactions (acquisitions) without inadvertently triggering a decade-long tax penalty for vessels it did not previously operate.
The Minister must be satisfied that a 200-499 gross tonnage vessel 'has been, or will be, used wholly or mainly for carrying shipping cargo to, from or within regional or remote Australia' during the income year. The application is made after the end of the income year (s11(1)(c)), yet this subsection still refers to future use ('will be'). By the time the application is assessed, the income year is over and 'will be' is factually inapplicable. The Minister would be required to assess a future-tense condition that has necessarily already been resolved.
9 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 7D(4) prohibits the taking of special measures 'for a purpose referred to in subsection (1) that is achieved.' This creates an impossible compliance problem: there is no defined mechanism, standard, or process by which it can be determined that substantive equality has been 'achieved.' A person taking a special measure cannot know with certainty whether equality has been achieved, and could therefore unknowingly act unlawfully by continuing a previously lawful program.
The Act defines 'State' (except in ss9(15)-(18)) to include the ACT and Northern Territory, while simultaneously defining 'Territory' (except in ss9(17) and (18)) to NOT include the ACT and Northern Territory. This means the ACT and Northern Territory are simultaneously States-but-not-Territories for most of the Act's operation. The definitional gymnastics, while legally functional, create a conceptually absurd position where the Australian Capital Territory is legally a 'State' but not a 'Territory' for the same purposes.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The definition of 'Principal Agreement' is defined by reference to agreements 'executed in pursuance of the Sewerage Agreements Act 1973', but no mechanism in this Act verifies or attaches copies of those Principal Agreements. Unlike Supplemental Agreements (which are set out in the Schedule), the Principal Agreements are entirely extrinsic, making the core operative provisions of section 6 dependent on documents that cannot be identified on the face of the Act.
The Act jumps from section 8 to section 10 with no section 9. There is no note, repeal reference, or explanatory memorandum visible in the text to account for the missing section.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 5 caps borrowing at $30,000,000 in aggregate, but section 6 also requires borrowed moneys to cover 'expenses of borrowing' from within that same cap, meaning the full $30,000,000 is never actually available for State payments as Parliament may have intended.
3 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The document identifies itself as the Settlement Agents Code of Conduct 2016 in its title and metadata, but its own body text explicitly states that this legislation is not available at this location. The document simultaneously claims to be and disclaims being the instrument in question.
Section 5(3) disapplies s.30 of the PGPA Act 2013 (which deals with termination for contravening general duties) 'despite subsection 30(6)' of that Act. This creates an absurdity: s.5(2) already grants the Minister unfettered power to terminate at any time, making the carve-out in s.5(3) simultaneously redundant and potentially harmful — trustees can be terminated for no reason at all, yet the specific accountability-based termination ground is expressly excluded.
Section 11(1) states trustees are not entitled to 'remuneration for any work done', but s.11(2) allows payment of 'travelling and other expenses'. The phrase 'other expenses' is broad enough to potentially encompass what would ordinarily be characterised as remuneration, undermining the honorary nature of the office purportedly established by s.11(1).
9 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The Coral Sea Islands Territory is deemed to be part of Norfolk Island for the purposes of this Act. However, s 5(1) provides that each Territory (other than those taken to be part of a State or another Territory under s 7(2)) is to be regarded as a State. Norfolk Island is itself a Territory, not a State. The Act therefore deems one Territory to be part of another Territory which is itself only treated as a State by virtue of s 5(1), creating a two-step fictional chain: Coral Sea Islands → Norfolk Island (Territory) → State.
Section 11(2) states that subsection (1) — the general proof of service requirements — 'does not apply to service by post.' Subsections (3) and (4) then impose separate proof requirements for postal service. However, subsection (1)(b) requires proof of 'the time at which and the day on which' service was effected, while the postal service provisions (ss 11(3)-(4)) only require proof of 'the day on which it was posted' — not the day of actual service. Combined with the s 11(11) presumption of service on the fourth day after posting, there is an internal inconsistency: the Act simultaneously deems a service date (day 4 after posting) yet does not require that deemed date to be proved, while...
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The definitions of 'regulations' and 'rules' in subsection 4(6) refer to instruments 'in force immediately before this Act commenced', but since commencement depends on a Proclamation that may be made at any indeterminate future time, there is a temporal ambiguity: if regulations or rules under the 1901 Act were amended or revoked between the 1901 Act's effective supersession by the 1992 Act and the date this Act actually commences, it is unclear which version of those instruments is preserved.
Section 3 provides an absolute, unqualified repeal of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901. Sections 4(1) through 4(5) then direct that specified Parts of that same Act continue to apply 'as if the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901 had not been repealed'. The Act simultaneously asserts the 1901 Act is repealed and that it has not been repealed.
1 more generated issue for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Multiple headings and subheadings are duplicated verbatim throughout the document (e.g., 'Status Information Status Information', 'Currency of version Currency of version', 'Authorisation Authorisation'). While likely a rendering artefact, if taken as the legislative text itself, a statute containing doubled provisions with identical text would create ambiguity as to whether each instance constitutes a separate operative or merely one provision — a classic interpretive absurdity.
The version currency date of 14 December 2018 conflicts with a file modification date of 17 October 2025. A legislative file modified in 2025 should ordinarily reflect an updated version currency date post-2018, yet no such updated currency is acknowledged. This creates a contradiction between the stated currency of the version and the actual modification history.
The Act is titled 'Senate Elections Act 1935' and is presented under Tasmanian legislation, yet the Senate is a federal institution established under the Commonwealth Constitution. A state Act purporting to govern Senate elections raises a fundamental constitutional absurdity, as Senate elections are primarily regulated by Commonwealth law (Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918), and state legislative competence in this area is constitutionally constrained and subordinate.
Every heading and section title in the document is duplicated verbatim (e.g., 'Status Information Status Information', 'Authorisation Authorisation', 'Currency of version Currency of version'). While likely a rendering or markup error, if taken as the authoritative text of the legislation, it creates a document that is structurally self-referential and redundant, making authoritative interpretation of any heading impossible.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The instrument's authorisation records a modification date of 29 October 2025, which is six days before the stated commencement date of 4 November 2025. These two dates are mutually contradictory: a file cannot be in its final authorised form prior to the date on which that form is said to have taken legal effect, unless intervening modifications occurred without updating the authorisation record.