Restraint of Debtors Act 1984

The Act defines several key terms in section 3(1). ‘Debt’ means any sum of money, whether liquidated or not and whether pursuant to an order or judgment or otherwise, that is due and legally recoverable in the State or for which a person has a cause of action in the State. ‘Indebted’ has a corresponding meaning. This broad definition ensures that the Act can be invoked even before judgment is obtained - it covers both existing debts and debts that are merely alleged to be due, provided there is a cause of action in the State.

‘Debtor’ is defined differently for Parts II and III. For Part II (absconding debtors), debtor means a natural person whom an applicant alleges is indebted to the applicant. This means only natural persons can be the subject of an absconding debtor warrant or summons - corporations are excluded from Part II. For Part III (restraint on transfer or removal of property), debtor includes both a natural person and a body corporate. This distinction is deliberate: a corporation cannot physically abscond from the State, but it can transfer its property out of the State or dispose of it, so the property restraint regime applies to both natural and corporate debtors.

‘Applicant’ is the person applying for an order or warrant under the Act. There is no requirement that the applicant be the original creditor - it could be an assignee, provided the debt is due and legally recoverable. The term ‘judicial officer’ is defined with reference to the Supreme Court and the District Court, and includes judges, masters, registrars, acting judges and auxiliary judges. For the Magistrates Court, the definition is not directly given but section 6(3) specifies that the court specified in a warrant or summons may be the Supreme Court, District Court or Magistrates Court.

‘Property’ means real or personal property and includes any legal or equitable interest in such property. The definition is deliberately broad to cover all forms of assets that could be removed or transferred. Section 3(2) provides that a reference to transfer of property includes sale or assignment otherwise than for valuable consideration (i.e. gifts or dispositions at undervalue).

The Act introduces the concept of being ‘satisfied as to all material matters’ for both Part II and Part III. For Part II (section 3(3)), the person or court must have reasonable grounds for believing five matters: (a) the debtor is indebted to the applicant; (b) the debtor is about to leave the State; (c) the absence of the debtor would defeat, endanger or materially prejudice prosecution of the claimant’s cause of action or enforcement prospects; (d) the debt is at least $500 (or a prescribed higher amount); and (e) the application has been made within a reasonable time after the circumstances of the debtor’s intention to leave came to the applicant’s knowledge. For Part III (section 3(4)), the court must have reasonable grounds for believing six matters: (a) the debtor is indebted; (b) the debtor has property situated in the State; (c) the property is about to be transferred or removed from the State; (d) the transfer or removal would defeat, endanger or materially prejudice prosecution or enforcement; (e) the debt is at least $500 (or prescribed higher amount); and (f) the application has been made within a reasonable time after the impending transfer or removal came to the applicant’s knowledge.

The definition of ‘debt’ does not include contingent liabilities - it must be due and legally recoverable. However, because the Act allows applications before judgment, the applicant only needs to allege the debt exists; the court does not finally determine the debt at the preliminary stage, except under the consent jurisdiction in Part IV. The Act also does not define ‘reasonable time’, leaving it to the discretion of the judicial officer or court based on the circumstances.

The Act primarily affects creditors (applicants) who hold a debt that is due and legally recoverable in Western Australia and who have reasonable grounds to believe the debtor is about to leave the State or transfer/remove property. Creditors can be natural persons or corporations, and they may apply regardless of whether proceedings for the debt have already been commenced - section 5(1)(b) allows an application to a magistrate or justice even if no proceedings have started, and section 17(2)(b) allows an application to a court in which proceedings might be commenced. The Act also affects debtors, who may be natural persons (for Parts II and III) or bodies corporate (for Part III only). A debtor against whom a warrant or summons is issued must comply with the court’s orders or face arrest. For a corporate debtor, only the property restraint regime applies - a corporation cannot be arrested under Part II.

Other persons affected include third parties who hold property in which the debtor has an interest. Under section 18(3), a person other than the debtor who has an interest in property that is the subject of a restraining order application may take part in proceedings as a party, whether or not they have been served with copies of the application. This could include secured creditors, co-owners, trustees, or persons holding property on behalf of the debtor. Police officers are affected because they are responsible for executing warrants of arrest (section 11) and, in certain circumstances, arresting a debtor without a warrant for breach of conditions under section 16. They also have a duty to hold a debtor in custody and bring them before the court within 24 hours (section 12). The Act provides protection to police and other persons acting in good faith: section 25 says they are not personally liable in civil proceedings, and the Crown is not liable, for any act done in good faith for the purpose of carrying the Act into effect.

Court personnel and judicial officers are affected: registrars, masters, judges and magistrates must process applications, issue warrants or summonses, and conduct hearings. The court may also have to receive deposits of money under sections 10(1)(c) and 13(a)(iii). Regulations may prescribe how such deposits are to be paid out (section 30(a)). The Act also affects the State’s finances indirectly: section 11(3) requires the person on whose application a warrant is issued to pay a prescribed fee for its execution or attempted execution, and that fee may be recovered as a debt due to the Crown.

Lawyers and compliance professionals advising creditors need to be aware of the strict preconditions - particularly the requirement to disclose all previous applications under sections 5 or 17 in relation to the same debtor and same debt (sections 5(2)(b)(ii) and 17(3)(b)(ii)), as well as any other applications concerning the same debtor for any other debt within the past year (sections 5(2)(b)(iii) and 17(3)(b)(iii)). Failure to comply with these disclosure requirements could result in the application being treated as improper under section 26, attracting a penalty and civil liability.

The Act imposes duties on applicants, debtors, police officers and courts, and confers corresponding rights. An applicant’s primary duty is to make a proper application: the application must be in the prescribed form and supported by an affidavit containing the required particulars (sections 5(2) and 17(3)). The affidavit must state whether any previous application has been made under section 5 or 17 in respect of the same debtor and same debt, and whether any other application has been made within the preceding year in respect of the same debtor for any other debt, with details of the debt, outcome and other prescribed particulars. The applicant also has a duty not to make an application if they have reasonable cause to believe they do not have a cause of action recognised by law, or that the amount likely to be recovered is less than $500 (or the prescribed amount), or if they have no reasonable cause to believe the debtor intends to leave the State (for Part II) or that property is about to be transferred or removed (for Part III) - section 26 makes such applications an offence.

A debtor served with a summons under section 6 has the right to avoid appearance by tendering the amount of the alleged debt and costs to the applicant in an acceptable form, giving security to the applicant’s satisfaction, or depositing the amount with the court before the specified appearance time (section 10(1)). If the debtor does any of these things and gives the required notice under regulations, a warrant cannot later be issued under section 7 or 15 in relation to that summons (section 10(2)). A debtor arrested under a warrant has the right to be released from police custody if they pay or give security to the applicant, pay the amount to the police officer for deposit with the court, or if the applicant consents in writing, or if an order for release is made under section 14 or Part V (section 13).

At the preliminary hearing under section 14, the court has broad powers to make orders including releasing the debtor conditionally or unconditionally, requiring an undertaking not to leave the State, requiring security, requiring a deposit of money with the court, requiring surrender of tickets, passports or other documents, and requiring the applicant to take action for recovery of the debt within a specified time. The court may also make orders as to costs. These powers are discretionary, but if the court is not satisfied as to all material matters, it must order the debtor’s release (section 14(2)). The debtor also has the right to apply for review under Part V - section 21 allows an applicant, debtor or other party to apply to the person who issued the warrant or summons, or to the court that made the order, or to the Supreme Court, for orders varying or setting aside a warrant, summons or order, or for release from custody, or for any order that was declined. The reviewing person or court must hear and determine the application and may make such order as they see fit, including costs (section 22(1)).

Under Part III, a person other than the debtor with an interest in property has the right to take part in proceedings as a party (section 18(3)), even if not served with copies. The court hearing an application for a restraining order may order the applicant to take steps to ascertain ownership and to serve copies or notice on the debtor or any other person (section 18(2)). The debtor has the right to challenge the restraining order on review and to seek its variation or quashing.

Under Part IV (Consent Jurisdiction), if the court before which the debtor is brought or appears is not a court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of the alleged debt, the court may, with the consent of both debtor and applicant, hear and determine the claim as if it were proceedings in a competent court (section 20(1)(a)). The court may decline to hear or continue hearing the claim (section 20(1)(b)). The consent jurisdiction provides a streamlined way to resolve the underlying debt dispute without requiring separate proceedings in the proper court, but both parties must agree; neither can be compelled to consent. Any decision made under this Part has effect and may be enforced as a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction (section 20(3)).

The Act creates two main enforcement mechanisms: criminal penalties and civil remedies. The criminal penalty is set out in section 26: a person must not make an application under section 5, 7 or 17 if they have reasonable cause to believe they do not have a recognised cause of action, or the likely recovery is less than $500 (or the prescribed amount), or they have no reasonable belief as to the debtor’s intention to leave or property disposition, or the application is not made within a reasonable time after the facts came to their knowledge. The penalty for contravention is $2,000. This is a criminal penalty enforceable in the ordinary criminal courts. The penalty is relatively modest, but it serves as a deterrent against frivolous or abusive applications that could cause significant disruption to a debtor.

The enforcement of warrants of arrest is carried out by the police. Under section 11, a warrant issued under sections 6, 7 or 15 may be executed by a non-commissioned officer or constable within one month from the date of issue. The executing officer must serve the debtor with a copy of the warrant and, where the warrant was issued under sections 6 or 7, copies of the application and supporting affidavits; endorse the time and place of execution on the warrant; and forthwith take the debtor to the nearest police station. The officer in charge of that station must hold the debtor in custody and, unless the debtor is released under section 13, cause the debtor to be brought before the specified court within 24 hours of receiving the debtor into custody, or as soon as practicable after that period (section 12). Failure to bring the debtor within that time could expose the police to potential civil liability, but section 25 provides protection for acts done in good faith.

Under section 16, a police officer may arrest a debtor without a warrant if they reasonably suspect the debtor has failed, or is about to fail, to comply with a condition of release or has breached or is about to breach an undertaking not to leave the State. The arrested debtor must be brought before the court that ordered the release or required the undertaking within 24 hours (section 16(2)). The court may then revoke the release order if satisfied of the failure or anticipated failure, and may make such order as it thinks fit, including any order that could have been made under section 14(1) (section 16(3)). If the court revokes the release order, the debtor is committed to police custody as if the release order had not been made (section 16(4)).

The civil remedy is provided by section 27: if a person makes an application under the Act without reasonable cause or contrary to any provision of the Act, the debtor is entitled to recover from that person, in a court of competent jurisdiction, (a) any expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the debtor as a result of the application, and (b) any moneys outlaid by the debtor before becoming aware of the application, provided the purpose for which the money was outlaid is defeated by the application and the money is not legally recoverable by the debtor. This remedy is additional to any other remedy the debtor may have (section 27(2)), such as an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. The phrase ‘actual and reasonably incurred’ suggests that the debtor must itemise and prove the expenses - they could include legal fees, travel costs, lost income, or other direct consequences of the application.

Additionally, section 11(3) requires the person on whose application a warrant is issued to pay a fee prescribed by regulation in respect of the execution or attempted execution of the warrant. That fee can be recovered from that person as a debt due to the Crown. This is not a penalty but a cost-recovery mechanism: the Crown bears the cost of police time and resources, and the creditor-applicant must reimburse it.

Section 29 of the Act expressly provides that nothing in the Act restricts, limits or otherwise affects any other jurisdiction or powers of any court or person, or any other remedy a person may have against a debtor. This means the Act is an additional tool for creditors, not a replacement for other procedures. A creditor who obtains a warrant or restraining order under this Act can still pursue ordinary debt recovery proceedings, apply for freezing orders (Mareva injunctions) under the general law, or seek other interlocutory relief. The Act’s procedures are summary and expedited, designed for urgent cases where the debtor is about to leave the State or dispose of assets.

Section 24 provides that where the Act provides for review of a matter, proceedings in the nature of an appeal cannot be instituted under any other Act in respect of that matter. This creates a code for review: the only avenue is within this Act - either by application to the person who issued the warrant or summons, to the court that made or declined to make the order, or to the Supreme Court under Part V. This prevents parties from bringing parallel appeals under the Supreme Court Act 1935 or other legislation. However, section 24 does not prevent judicial review by the Supreme Court under its supervisory jurisdiction (e.g. certiorari for jurisdictional error) because judicial review is not an appeal but a review of the legality of a decision. The wording ‘proceedings in the nature of an appeal’ is narrow - it applies to statutory appeals, not to inherent supervisory jurisdiction.

The Act interacts with the Criminal Code and general criminal law regarding offences such as perjury if an affidavit contains false statements. The Act does not create an offence of making a false affidavit, but the general law applies. Similarly, the Act does not affect the law of contempt - a debtor who breaches an undertaking not to leave the State may be in contempt of court.

The definition of ‘judicial officer’ (section 3(1)) cross-references the Supreme Court Act 1935 for registrars and other officers. The Act also amends the law by omitting references to the repealed Absconding Debtors Act 1877. The consent jurisdiction under Part IV (section 20) allows a court to hear and determine a debt claim that would otherwise be outside its monetary or subject-matter jurisdiction, provided the debtor and applicant consent. This effectively expands the jurisdiction of those courts on an ad hoc basis, but only for claims arising under the Act. The decision is enforceable as if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, so a judgment of the Magistrates Court in a matter that would otherwise be in the District Court will have the same effect as a District Court judgment for enforcement purposes.

The Act also interacts with the Limitation Act 1935 or Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - the debt must be ‘due and legally recoverable’, which implies it is not statute-barred. The Act does not extend limitation periods, so if the debt is time-barred, no application can be made because the debt is not legally recoverable.

The Act was originally enacted as the Restraint of Debtors Act 1984 (No. 73 of 1984). It received royal assent on 29 November 1984 and commenced on 11 July 1986, by proclamation published in the Government Gazette on 11 July 1986 at page 2333 (section 2).

The first amendment was made by the Acts Amendment (Auxiliary Judges) Act 1997 (No. 23 of 1997), Part 8. This amendment inserted references to auxiliary judges in the definition of ‘judicial officer’ in section 3(1). The amendment received assent on 18 September 1997 and commenced on that same day. It expanded the range of judicial officers who could deal with applications under the Act.

The second amendment was made by the Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 (No. 28 of 2003), section 126(2). This amendment deleted the former section 4 of the Act. Section 4 had been a provision dealing with the repeal of the Absconding Debtors Act 1877 - its omission is noted in the compilation table. The Equality of Status Act came into operation on 1 July 2003. Following this amendment, a reprint (Reprint 1) of the Act was produced as at 21 November 2003, incorporating the amendments made up to that date.

The third amendment was made by the Courts Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (No. 59 of 2004), section 141. This amendment affected sections 6 and 22. Section 6 was amended to update references to the Magistrates Court (as part of the broader restructuring of the court system). Section 22 was similarly amended to refer to the Magistrates Court rather than its predecessor. The 2004 Amendment Act received assent on 23 November 2004 and commenced on 1 May 2005.

The Act remains in force as a compilation (the latest compilation is the one set out in the source). No other amendments have been made. The defined terms list at the end of the source is not part of the law but is provided for convenience.

The original section 31 was omitted under the Reprints Act 1984 section 7(4)(f). That section likely dealt with transitional matters or the repeal of the Absconding Debtors Act 1877 (the note at the end of the compilation table indicates that the provision of the Act that repeals that earlier Act has been omitted under the Reprints Act 1984 section 7(4)(f)).

The Act itself contains no reference to any specific cases, and the source text does not provide any litigation history. However, several aspects of the Act invite litigation. The requirement in sections 5(2)(b)(iii) and 17(3)(b)(iii) to disclose any previous application under section 5 or 17 in relation to the same debtor for any other debt within the preceding year, with details of the debt, outcome and other particulars, could be a source of dispute if an applicant fails to disclose or makes an incomplete disclosure. A debtor could argue that the application was improper and seek the civil remedy under section 27 or the criminal penalty under section 26, or apply for a review under Part V on the ground that the warrant, summons or order was obtained in breach of the Act.

The concept of ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ is a fertile ground for litigation. In particular, the requirement under section 3(3)(b) that the debtor is ‘about to leave the State’ and under section 3(3)(c) that the absence would ‘defeat, endanger or materially prejudice’ the applicant’s position - these are fact-specific tests. Disputes may arise over whether the applicant had sufficient evidence of intention to leave, such as booking tickets, selling assets, or making statements. Similarly for Part III, disputes may arise over whether property is ‘about to be transferred or removed from the State’ and whether the transfer or removal would have the required prejudicial effect.

The review provisions in Part V themselves could generate litigation. Section 21 allows any party to apply for variation or setting aside of warrants, summonses or orders. Section 23 imposes a 6-month bar on further applications after a warrant or summons is set aside or an order varied or quashed, unless the applicant introduces further information that was not and could not reasonably have been introduced earlier, or the person or court grants leave. This bar could be challenged if an applicant argues that the new information qualifies or that leave was wrongly refused.

Section 24, which excludes appeals under other Acts, could be litigated on the question of whether a particular review under Part V covers the matter in question. For example, if a party seeks to appeal an interim order made by a single judge under section 22(3) under the Supreme Court Act 1935, the respondent could argue that section 24 prevents that and the only avenue is review under Part V (which may be to a single Judge in chambers, not a full court).

The civil remedy under section 27 could also generate litigation. The debtor must prove that the application was made ‘without reasonable cause’ or ‘contrary to any provision of this Act’. This involves a subjective and objective element. The debtor must also prove actual and reasonable expenses and, for money outlaid before becoming aware of the application, that the purpose was defeated and the money is not legally recoverable. The courts would need to interpret these phrases.

Despite these potential areas, the Act is a relatively specialised and infrequently used piece of legislation. It replaced the Absconding Debtors Act 1877 and was not heavily amended, suggesting it has operated without major controversy. The consent jurisdiction (Part IV) is also likely used rarely because both parties must consent.

Several provisions in the Act can trip up an unwary practitioner or creditor. First, the definition of ‘debtor’ differs between Part II and Part III. In Part II (absconding debtors), the debtor must be a natural person - a body corporate cannot be arrested or summoned under a warrant. If a creditor mistakenly applies for a warrant against a corporation under Part II, the application will be invalid from the outset. Only Part III (property restraint) applies to corporations. The practitioner must check the nature of the debtor before selecting the correct procedure.

Second, the requirement to disclose previous applications is mandatory and detailed. Sections 5(2)(b)(ii) and 17(3)(b)(ii) require the affidavit to state whether any previous application has been made under this section or section 17 (or section 5 as relevant) in respect of the same debtor in relation to the same debt. Sections 5(2)(b)(iii) and 17(3)(b)(iii) require disclosure of any other application made within the preceding year in respect of the same debtor in relation to any other debt, with details of the debt, outcome and other prescribed particulars. Failure to disclose could render the application improper under section 26, even if the non-disclosure was inadvertent. The creditor cannot rely on ignorance of the previous application - the Act places an obligation to state whether any such application has been made, implying a duty to inquire.

Third, the Act imposes a ‘reasonable time’ requirement for making the application after the applicant becomes aware of the circumstances (sections 3(3)(e) and 3(4)(f)). What constitutes a reasonable time is not defined; it depends on the facts. A delay of even a few days could be fatal if the debtor can argue that the applicant had time to pursue other remedies. Courts will likely expect applicants to act promptly in urgent situations.

Fourth, under section 26, an applicant must not make an application if they have reasonable cause to believe they do not have a cause of action recognised by law, or that the amount likely to be recovered is less than $500 (or the prescribed amount). This means a creditor with a small claim cannot use the Act even if the debtor is about to abscond with assets exceeding that amount - the test is the likely recovery, not the total debt. If the debt is $600 but enforcement prospects are poor, the creditor might still meet the threshold, but if the likely recovery is less than $500, the application is improper.

Fifth, the service requirements for a summons are strict: personal service not less than 7 days before the appearance date, accompanied by copies of the application and supporting affidavits (section 9). If service is defective, the debtor may apply for the summons to be set aside, and the court cannot issue a warrant under section 15 for non-appearance if service was not properly effected.

Sixth, the fee for execution of a warrant under section 11(3) is payable by the applicant to the Crown, and can be recovered from the applicant as a debt due to the Crown. The applicant bears this cost even if the warrant is never executed or the debtor is released immediately. Applicants should budget for this.

Seventh, the consent jurisdiction under Part IV can be a trap. While it seems convenient, the debtor may later argue that the consent was not properly obtained or that the court lacked jurisdiction, and then try to set aside the resulting judgment. The Act does not specify how consent must be recorded. Practitioners should obtain written consent signed by both parties and filed with the court.

Eighth, section 23 imposes a 6-month bar on further applications after a warrant or summons is set aside or an order varied or quashed. The bar applies to the same debtor and same debt (or any part thereof). The only exceptions are if the applicant introduces further information that was not and could not reasonably have been introduced earlier, or if the person or court that set aside the warrant gives leave. This bar can trap creditors who try to reapply without new evidence.

Ninth, the special civil remedy under section 27 is not limited to cases where the applicant is convicted under section 26 - it can be pursued even without a criminal conviction. The debtor only needs to prove that the application was made ‘without reasonable cause or contrary to any provision of this Act’ on a civil standard. This remedy includes expenses and certain outlaid moneys, but does not include general damages for anxiety or inconvenience (though those could be sought under other remedies preserved by section 27(2)).

To comply with the Act, a creditor (applicant) must take the following steps. First, determine whether the debtor is a natural person (for both Part II and Part III) or a body corporate (Part III only). If the debtor is a natural person and is about to leave the State, the creditor may apply for a warrant or summons under Part II. If the debtor (whether natural person or corporation) has property in the State that is about to be transferred or removed, the creditor may apply for a restraining order under Part III. The creditor cannot use both regimes simultaneously for the same debt and debtor if it would be inconsistent, but nothing expressly prohibits separate applications if the circumstances differ (e.g. debtor leaving and also transferring property).

Second, ensure the debt is at least $500 (or such greater amount as prescribed). The Act does not define ‘prescribed amount’ but section 30 allows regulations to prescribe a greater amount. As of the compilation date, no such regulation is provided in the source, so the default $500 threshold applies. The creditor must have a cause of action recognised by law - a debt that is due and legally recoverable in Western Australia.

Third, the application must be in the prescribed form (forms are not included in the Act but would be set out in regulations - the Act specifies that the application shall be in the prescribed form, so practitioners must check the current Restraint of Debtors Regulations or equivalent). The application must be supported by an affidavit covering the ‘all material matters’ set out in section 3(3) or 3(4). The affidavit must also disclose whether any previous application has been made under section 5 or 17 in respect of the same debtor and same debt, and whether any other application has been made within the preceding year in respect of the same debtor for any other debt, with details of the debt, outcome and other prescribed particulars. The affidavit must be sworn before an authorised person.

Fourth, the application must be made within a reasonable time after the circumstances of the debtor’s intended departure or property transfer came to the applicant’s knowledge. The applicant should document the date of first knowledge and the steps taken promptly. Delays should be explained in the affidavit.

Fifth, for Part II, the application is made to a judicial officer of the Supreme Court or District Court if proceedings have been commenced in those courts; otherwise, to any magistrate or justice (section 5(1)). The judicial officer may issue a warrant for arrest or a summons (section 6). If a summons is issued, it must be served personally on the debtor at least 7 days before the appearance date, accompanied by a copy of the application and supporting affidavits (section 9). The applicant must arrange service.

Sixth, if a warrant is issued, the applicant must arrange for its execution by the police. The applicant must pay the prescribed fee for execution (section 11(3)). The applicant should also ensure that copies of the warrant, application and affidavits are transmitted to the registry of the court before which the debtor is to be brought (section 8).

Seventh, at the preliminary hearing, the applicant must present evidence to satisfy the court as to all material matters. If the court is not satisfied, it must order the debtor’s release (section 14(2)). The applicant should be prepared to argue why the debtor should be detained or subject to conditions.

Eighth, for Part III, the application for a restraining order is made to a court (Supreme, District or Magistrates) where proceedings have been commenced or could be commenced (section 17(2)). The application is ex parte unless the court orders otherwise (section 18(1)). The court may order the applicant to take steps to ascertain ownership of property and to serve copies or notice on the debtor or others (section 18(2)). The applicant must comply with any such orders.

Ninth, after obtaining a warrant, summons or restraining order, the applicant must comply with any conditions imposed by the court under section 14 or Part V. The applicant must also avoid making a further application within 6 months if the warrant or summons is set aside or the order varied or quashed, unless new information is available or leave is granted (section 23).

Tenth, the applicant must ensure the application is not improper under section 26 - they must have reasonable cause to believe they have a recognised cause of action, that the debt is at least $500, that the debtor intends to leave or property is about to be transferred, and that the application is timely. The applicant should document all steps and keep evidence of the debtor’s intentions (e.g. purchase of tickets, cancellation of lease, statements from witnesses).

Finally, if the debtor seeks review under Part V, the applicant must respond and may need to justify the original application. The applicant should keep all documentation, including the original affidavit and any correspondence.