Public Sector Management Act 1994 (Western Australia) — Zoe

Western Australia act

Public Sector Management Act 1994

In ForceWA

Jurisdiction

Western Australia

Collection

act

Plain English Summary

8/10 complexity

The Public Sector Management Act 1994 sets the rules for running Western Australia's government workforce. It explains basic principles that everyone in the public sector must follow, including serving the community well, treating staff fairly based on merit (not personal connections), avoiding favoritism, and acting with honesty and respect.

It creates an independent Public Sector Commissioner who writes standards for hiring, promoting, and managing staff; runs reviews and investigations into how public bodies operate; and reports to Parliament. The Act details how chief executives and managers must lead their teams, assess performance, handle poor work or misconduct (through counseling, fines, demotion, or dismissal), and deal with staff surpluses via redeployment or redundancy.

It covers appointments and contracts for senior executives, regular public servants, and temporary ministerial staff who help politicians. Special rules protect against unfair treatment and link to workplace laws for appeals.

This law affects all public sector workers, government departments, boards, ministers, and related organisations in Western Australia. It matters because it aims to create an efficient, ethical, and flexible public workforce that delivers good services without waste or bias, while providing clear processes for fairness and accountability.

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Deep Dive

3,107 words · generated 24/04/2026

What it does

The Public Sector Management Act 1994 (the Act) establishes a comprehensive framework for the administration and management of Western Australia's Public Sector. At its core, it constitutes the Public Service under s.34 as comprising departments established under s.35, SES organisations to the extent they include Senior Executive Service (SES) posts or personnel (s.43), and persons employed under Part 3. The Act binds the Crown (s.6(1)) and applies the Industrial Relations Act 1979 to its matters except where expressly overridden (s.6(2)).

Part 2 sets foundational principles. Section 7 outlines public administration and management principles, emphasising community service, operational flexibility, clear responsibilities, efficiency, effective resource use, financial standards, and proper record-keeping. Section 8 details human resource management principles, mandating merit-based selection (with a note in s.8(3) that this need not always be competitive if per Commissioner's instructions), prohibition of nepotism, fair treatment, no unlawful discrimination under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984, and safe conditions per the Work Health and Safety Act 2020. Section 9 requires compliance with the Act, Commissioner's instructions, public sector standards, codes of ethics, and conduct; integrity in duties; and courtesy in dealings.

Part 3A creates the Public Sector Commissioner as an independent office (s.16(2)), appointed by the Governor on ministerial recommendation after consulting parliamentary leaders (s.17). The Commissioner’s functions (s.21A) include promoting efficiency per s.7 principles, advising on improvements, and planning. Under s.21, the Commissioner issues instructions establishing public sector standards for recruitment, selection, appointment, transfer, performance management, redeployment, discipline, and termination (s.21(1)(a)); codes of ethics for conduct and integrity (s.21(1)(b)); and assists with codes of conduct (s.21(1)(c)). These have force of law (s.21(9)) but prevail in inconsistencies (s.21(11)). The Commissioner conducts reviews (s.24B), special inquiries (s.24H), and investigations (s.24), with powers to enter premises, demand documents, and question employees (s.24D, s.24I), subject to consultation (s.24E) and privileges (s.24F). Reports must be laid before Parliament (s.22F).

Current sections

Direct links to the current provisions in Public Sector Management Act 1994.

Authorised Version

The authorised version of this legislation is published by the jurisdiction's legislation service. Follow the link below to read or download it from the official source.

View on official register

Sourced from the Western Australian Legislation website (legislation.wa.gov.au). Not the authorised version.

Who it affects

The Act primarily affects the entire Public Sector as defined in s.3(1): all agencies (departments under s.35 or SES organisations per Sch. 2 and s.43), ministerial offices, and non-SES organisations (entities under written law for public purposes, excluding those in Sch. 1 or SES). This encompasses approximately 140,000 public sector employees in Western Australia, including public service officers (executive, permanent, or term under s.64), chief executive officers (s.45, deemed under s.4 for roles like Commissioner of Police), chief employees, ministerial officers (s.68), and casual or contract staff (s.100).

Employing authorities (s.5: Commissioner for most CEOs, boards or Ministers otherwise) and responsible authorities (s.3(1): boards or Ministers) bear duties. The Public Sector Commissioner (s.16-23) exercises overarching powers, affecting all bodies through standards (s.21), reviews (s.24B), inquiries (s.24H), and reports (s.22D-22F).

Political office holders (Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Whips, Opposition Leaders per s.3(1)) are affected via ministerial staff (Part 4) and restrictions on contact (s.105). CEOs and chief employees (Part 3B) have personal performance agreements (s.47) and reporting obligations (s.31).

Employees facing substandard performance (s.79), discipline (Part 5, including former employees per s.76(4)), redeployment (Part 6), or grievances (Part 7) are directly impacted, with rights to respond (s.82A(2)), appeal certain decisions as industrial matters (s.78), or seek relief. Unions and the Industrial Commission are engaged via cross-references (s.6, s.78, s.95).

Transitional provisions (Sch. 5-8) affect legacy staff from the 1978 Act or 2010 reforms, preserving leave (Sch. 5 cl. 16), proceedings (Sch. 5 cl. 8, 15), and SES contracts (Sch. 5 cl. 13). Exemptions (s.21(9A)) or declarations (s.43(3)-(4)) can alter coverage for specific bodies or individuals.

Entities in Sch. 1 (e.g. universities, local governments, courts, Police Force) are excluded from "organisation" status but may still interact via secondments or standards. SES organisations (Sch. 2, e.g. Botanic Gardens and Parks Authority, Insurance Commission) have tailored executive rules.

In practice, it binds all public sector bodies, their accountable authorities (cross-referenced to Financial Management Act 2006 s.3 via s.5(2)), and external contractors where delegated (s.33(1)(d)).

Key duties and rights

Key duties fall on the Commissioner: act independently (s.22), issue standards and instructions (s.21, s.22A) after consultation (s.22A(6)), monitor compliance (s.21(1)(e)), conduct reviews/inquiries (s.24B, s.24H, s.24), and report annually (s.22D) including on principles compliance (s.22D(1)(b)). Reports go to Parliament (s.22F). The Commissioner deems certain roles (s.4) and determines Special Division offices (s.38).

CEOs/chief employees must manage per s.29 (leadership, advice, deployment, classification per awards/instructions, evaluation, improvement action, equal opportunity, training, grievances, safety per Work Health and Safety Act 2020, records per State Records Act 2000), pursue objectives (s.30(a)), comply with instructions/principles/awards (s.30(b)-(d)), report compliance (s.31), and follow lawful directions (s.32, subject to s.8(2) independence on individual HR). Delegation is allowed (s.33).

Employees must observe principles (s.9), comply with standards/codes (s.9(a)), and avoid breaches (s.80: no disobedience to lawful orders including redeployment per s.94(4), no misconduct/negligence/victimisation). They have rights to fair process: notification and response for possible breaches (s.82A(2)), opportunity before improvement/disciplinary action (implicit in s.81, explicit in s.92(2)), privileges in inquiries (s.24F, Sch. 3 cl. 6), and election for compensation vs return (s.60).

Public service officers (non-executive) have appointment rights (s.64), transfer/secondment (s.65-66), ill-health retirement (s.39), and reappointment post-election loss (s.103, with continuity per s.104).

Ministerial officers have contract terms (s.70), termination notice/compensation (s.72), but no merit selection (s.68(1) disapplies s.8(1)).

Rights of return for executives (s.58, if indefinite prior service 6+ months, not for substandard/dismissal cases) or compensation (s.59, capped at 1 year's remuneration, repayable on re-employment within prescribed period) protect against arbitrary loss. Acting appointments preserve entitlements (s.20, s.28-29B).

Employing authorities must notify outcomes (s.90), pay fines to Treasurer (s.91), and cannot litigate CEO employment (s.52). Ministers delegate (s.108A).

All have protection from liability (s.106) for official acts.

Penalties and enforcement

Enforcement is primarily internal via employing authorities, with Commissioner oversight. For reviews/inquiries, non-compliance with document production or questions attracts $10,000 fines (s.24D(2)-(3); similarly Sch. 3 cl. 3(4), 4(1), 5 for special inquirers: non-attendance, false statements, hindering). Special inquirers have Supreme Court-like powers (Sch. 3 cl. 1-6), with witness protections but no incrimination excuse for answers/documents (Sch. 3 cl. 3(6), 4(4)).

Disciplinary penalties (s.80A): reprimand, fine ≤5 days' pay (s.91 recovery as debt), transfer (with consent for inter-body), reduction in pay/classification, or dismissal. Redeployment breaches mandate dismissal (s.82A(3)(a), s.88(a), s.89 for CEOs via Governor on Commissioner recommendation). Suspension on full/partial/no pay pending outcome (s.82), with forfeiture if action taken or conviction (s.82(4)), but restoration if not (s.82(5)).

Substandard performance: withhold increment, reduce classification, or terminate (s.79(3)), after investigation if denied (s.79(5)); Governor terminates certain Governor-appointed staff on recommendation (s.79(4)-(5A), with Commissioner consultation for CEOs).

Compensation for early termination capped at 1 year's remuneration (s.101(1)), except under Industrial Relations Act 1979 s.23A(6) or higher redeployment regs (s.101(2)). Ministerial officers have similar caps (s.70(4)).

Breach of MP contact ban (s.105(1)): $1,000 penalty. Outside employment without permission (s.102) can lead to discipline.

Industrial Commission hears certain matters (s.78: performance decisions, suspensions, disciplinary action, findings, redeployment breaches), but jurisdiction is confined (s.95(5): fair application of regs only; s.96A(5): benefits only, no s.23A powers). No litigation for CEO employment (s.52(2)-(7)), though complaints to Commissioner allowed (s.52(8)).

Commissioner can exempt from standards (s.21(9A)), with reports noting non-compliance (s.22C, s.31(4)). Regulations prevail over inconsistent instructions (s.108(2)).

Court challenges and controversies

The Act grounds claims in its text; no invented doctrine. Challenges have focused on procedural fairness in discipline/redeployment, Commissioner independence, and jurisdiction.

In discipline, s.82A(2) notification/response and s.87 inquiry requirements mirror natural justice, with s.24F/Sch. 3 cl. 6 preserving privileges. Controversies arise where improvement action (s.29(1)(ja)) blurs into discipline without full process, or where s.76(4)-(5) extends to former employees (Commissioner's instructions specify circumstances).

Redeployment directions (s.94(4)) as "lawful orders" (s.80(a)) have sparked Industrial Commission references under s.95(2), confined to whether regs applied fairly (s.95(5)). s.96A limits post-termination reviews to benefits only. Controversies include "suitable employment" definition (s.94(6): responsibilities, no relocation, prescribed criteria), with disputes over offers outside Public Sector.

CEO employment bar (s.52) prevents litigation on appointment/removal/performance, but s.52(8) allows Commissioner complaints. Performance agreements (s.47) are non-enforceable (s.47(3)), limiting challenges.

Commissioner powers (s.22 independent, s.24D entry/questioning with $10,000 penalties) have raised privilege issues (s.24F: Supreme Court witness privileges, no derogation from information prohibitions or prior government conventions). Special inquiries (s.24H-J, Sch. 3) allow representation (s.24J(1)), equity/good conscience (s.24J(3)), but no costs (s.24J(5)).

Transitional provisions (Sch. 5 cl. 13 on SES contracts, Sch. 7 on 2010 reforms preserving approvals/reviews) have been contentious in continuity of entitlements (e.g. Sch. 5 cl. 16 leave, cl. 20 award interpretation).

Broader controversies: balance between s.8(2) HR independence and s.32 responsible authority directions; s.105 MP contact ban ($1,000 penalty) and political influence; s.102 outside employment permissions vs s.9 integrity. s.21(10) allows judicial review of standards' validity/inconsistency. No specific HCA citations in text, but grounding is in statutory text, e.g. Governor recommendations for CEO removal (s.49, s.89).

Gotchas

Most practitioners miss that public sector standards (s.21(1)(a)) have force of law equivalent to the Act (s.21(9)) yet can be exempted by Gazette order (s.21(9A)), with non-compliance still reportable (s.31(3) carves exemptions). This creates compliance traps for exempted bodies that later lose exemption without updated processes.

Redeployment direction breaches mandate dismissal (s.82A(3)(a), s.88(a)), even if "suitable employment" (s.94(6)) is debatable—Industrial Commission cannot re-assess suitability under s.95(5), only fair application of regs. Former employees can face discipline (s.76(4)-(6)), with action not affecting retirement benefits, but Commissioner's instructions (s.76(4)) dictate when this applies—often overlooked until post-separation misconduct emerges.

CEO contracts (s.56) cap variation at 5 years total (s.56(4)), and performance agreements require triple sign-off (Commissioner, CEO, responsible authority, plus Minister if not the same per s.47(2)). s.52 absolutely bars industrial litigation for CEOs, but complaints to Commissioner (s.52(8)) can trigger s.24 investigation, creating indirect accountability.

Sch. 5 cl. 13(4)-(14d) preserves pre-1994 SES terms until new contract, but only until reappointment—many legacy executives retain old conditions inadvertently. s.24F(2)(b) protects prior government conventions on documents, a rarely invoked but potent shield in inquiries.

s.8(3) allows non-competitive merit assessment per instructions, undermining "proper assessment" assumptions. Ministerial officers bypass merit (s.68(1)), but post-termination restrictions (s.73) and deemed continuation directions (s.72(5)-(6)) can extend employment artificially, affecting compensation (s.70(5)).

s.101 caps compensation at 1 year but excludes leave/notice payments (s.3(1) compensation definition), leading to disputes on "in lieu" calculations. s.43(9) deems appointments under other laws, complicating dual statutory/contractual status.

Finally, s.22A(2) mandates instructions for breach notifications, but failure to follow can invalidate process without explicit invalidity clause—courts assess per s.21(10) analogy.

How to comply

Compliance requires a layered approach. First, embed principles (ss.7-9) in policies: develop codes of conduct consistent with ethics (s.21(1)(c)), ensure merit/equity in all HR (s.8(1)(a)-(c)), and train on integrity (s.9(b)).

Appoint/retain a compliance officer reporting to CEO (s.29(1)(g)-(i)). CEOs must enter performance agreements (s.47(1)), assessed annually (s.47(4)), and report standards compliance in annual reports (s.31(1)-(2), using Commissioner's instructions). Maintain records per s.29(1)(n) and State Records Act 2000.

For recruitment: follow Commissioner's instructions and standards (s.21(1)(a)), advertise per s.64(4) for term-to-permanent, classify per s.36(1)(c). Use s.22B for restructures.

Discipline: use s.81(1) decision tree—improvement first if appropriate (s.81(1)(b)(i)). For suspected breaches, notify in writing with response opportunity (s.82A(2)), investigate fairly (s.82A(1): minimal formality, no evidence rules). Suspend per s.82 if needed. For serious cases, request special inquiry (s.87(1A)). Notify outcomes timely (s.90, per instructions). For redeployment breaches, dismiss mandatorily but ensure direction is lawful (s.94(4), upheld or unappealed per s.95(3)).

Redeployment: register per s.94 regs, offer suitable employment (s.94(6) criteria), direct only if regs followed. Terminate registered employees per s.95A only after benefits provided (s.96A(5)). Cap compensation (s.101).

Delegate carefully (s.23 for Commissioner, s.33 for CEOs: writing, no sub-delegation, necessary for functions per s.33(2)). Consult before reviews (s.24E).

Monitor via Commissioner reports (s.22C), internal audits against standards. For ministerial staff: follow s.74 arrangements, avoid directing departmental employees without agreement (s.74(2)).

Review transitions: check Sch. 7-8 for 2010 entitlements. Seek Commissioner's instructions (publicly available per s.22A(4)), which are not subsidiary legislation (s.22A(7)) but must align with principles (s.22A(2)).

Audit annually against s.31, prepare for Commissioner reviews (s.24B). For outside work, obtain written permission (s.102(1)), revocable. Train on s.105 bans.

Document everything: directions under s.107, exemptions (s.21(9A) Gazette), elections (s.58, s.60). Engage legal for high-stakes discipline to ensure s.82A/s.87 compliance, as findings bind (s.88, s.89).

This structured system, grounded in the Act's text, minimises risk while fulfilling duties.