This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
156 of 2004
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
3/10 complexity
What the law does
Establishes the National Water Commission (NWC) as an independent statutory body (s3, s6). The NWC’s legal status and its officials are defined for Commonwealth finance law purposes (s6(2)).
Who it affects
Commonwealth ministers and departments that deal with water policy: the NWC gives advice to the Minister and to the parties to the National Water Initiative (NWI) including the Commonwealth (s7(4), s7(4A), s7(5)).
State and Territory governments that are parties to the NWI: they nominate some Commissioners (s8(3)), may be audited or assessed by the NWC at COAG’s request (s7(1)(a)), and receive copies of the NWC’s annual report (s45(4)).
Individuals and organisations that receive Commonwealth financial assistance administered under this Act: the CEO administers such assistance and the recipients must be named in the NWC annual report (s24(1)(a), s45(2)).
NWC officials, staff and contractors: their roles, appointment rules, duties, remuneration and confidentiality obligations are set out (multiple sections, notably s11–s13, s23–s34, s35–s37, s43).
How it works (mechanics)
Functions: the NWC conducts audits and assessments of parties’ implementation of the NWI and, where provided for by other agreements, other Commonwealth–State water agreements; it monitors areas significant to NWI outcomes; it provides advice and recommendations to COAG and the Minister; and it can carry out COAG‑requested studies on matters of national significance relating to water (s7(1)(a)–(i), s7(1)(j)).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Reporting and publication: the CEO must include specified matters in the NWC annual report and provide the report to relevant State/Territory ministers (s45). Audits and assessments done under s7(1)(a)–(c) are to be published on the NWC website unless the Minister objects, and if the Minister objects the Minister’s reasons must be published (s44(1)–(2)). Other advice/recommendations are not to be published without the Minister’s agreement (s44(3)).
Governance and appointments: the NWC comprises a Chair plus at least 2 but no more than 4 Commissioners; the Commonwealth nominates the Chair and up to two Commissioners in consultation with other NWI parties, and the other parties nominate up to two Commissioners (s8(1)–(3)). Commissioners are appointed by the Governor‑General (s11(1)), must have a high level of relevant expertise (s11(3)), and must act in the best interests of the NWC (s10). The CEO is appointed by the Minister (s25) and is the accountable authority for finance law purposes (s6(2)(b)).
Executive functions and staff: the CEO manages day‑to‑day administration and administers financial assistance awarded by the Minister under Commonwealth programs referenced in s7(1)(g) (s24). Staff are APS employees engaged under the Public Service Act 1999 and the CEO is head of the statutory agency for those purposes (s35). The CEO may second staff from Commonwealth agencies or States (s36) and engage consultants/contractors (s37). The CEO may delegate functions in writing to SES employees (s34).
Meetings, remuneration and conditions: the Chair must convene at least five meetings a year (s19(1)); three Commissioners make a quorum (s19(3)). Remuneration and leave entitlements for Commissioners and the CEO are set through the Remuneration Tribunal or regulations (s13, s27, s14, s28). Outside paid employment by full‑time office holders requires the Minister’s consent (s15(1), s29(1)).
Confidentiality and sanctions: disclosing information obtained in connection with NWC duties outside permitted circumstances is a criminal offence with a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment (s43).
Reviews: the NWC’s role and functions must be reviewed periodically — a review before the end of 2017 and then every five years after that (s38), with a written report to be laid before each House of Parliament (s38(2B)–(3)).
Stated purpose and an operational check
The Act states its purpose as creating the NWC as an independent statutory body as required by the NWI (s3). That is the statutory purpose claim. Mechanically, the Act gives the NWC powers to audit, assess, monitor, advise, publish certain audit material, and administer Commonwealth financial assistance (s7, s24, s44). These mechanisms create the following concrete incentives, costs and implementation features:
Who pays and who benefits: Commonwealth programs fund financial assistance that the CEO administers; recipients of that assistance are named in the annual report (s24(1)(a), s45(2)). This concentrates identifiable benefits on grant recipients while reporting costs are borne by the NWC (s45).
Decision authority and discretion: the Minister appoints and may terminate the CEO, can consent to outside employment (s25, s32, s29); the Governor‑General appoints and may terminate Commissioners on specified grounds (s11, s18). The Minister has discretion to withhold agreement to publish audits/assessments (s44(1)) and to set non‑statutory terms for the CEO (s30). Those powers create points of executive control over key personnel and publication of some outputs.
Compliance and administrative burden: the Act imposes governance and reporting obligations on the NWC (minutes, published procedures for conflicts, annual report requirements) and confidentiality duties on officials with criminal penalties (s21, s45, s43). Commissioners and the CEO must comply with PGPA disclosure duties (s18(1)(c) referencing s29 of the PGPA Act). These are measurable administrative costs to the NWC and to staff and appointed officials.
Implementation flexibility and risk: the Act permits secondment of Commonwealth and State staff (s36) and hiring of consultants (s37), which gives the NWC operational flexibility but makes its resourcing dependent on inter‑agency arrangements and procurement choices. Delegations to SES employees (s34) concentrate operational execution beneath the CEO.
Effects on private choice and markets: the NWC’s primary role is monitoring, assessment and advice rather than direct market regulation. The Act does, however, create a grant administration role (s24) that can transfer public funds to projects, and sets public reporting on recipients (s45(2)). The Act does not itself set fees, prices or direct economic regulation.
Trade‑offs and opportunity costs (source‑grounded)
The Act creates a specialised advisory and audit body with powers to publish certain findings (s7, s44). That capability requires staffing, reporting and governance resources (s35, s45). Those resources are paid from Commonwealth appropriations and from administering Commonwealth programs (s6(2), s24(1)(a)). The Act balances public transparency (publication of audits/assessments under s44(1)) with ministerial control over publication in some circumstances (s44(1)–(3)).
In short: the law establishes and details how the NWC is formed, staffed, funded and operated; gives it auditing, assessment and advisory functions focused on the NWI and related agreements; sets appointment, conduct and removal rules for the Chair, Commissioners and CEO; creates reporting and publication obligations (with limited ministerial veto); supplies routes for resourcing via secondment and consultants; and imposes criminal confidentiality restrictions for unauthorised disclosures (see s3, s6, s7, s8, s11, s23–s37, s38, s43–s45).