This Act relies on a small set of interconnected statutory concepts that determine scope, obligations and enforcement.

Lobbying: Defined as communications with a Government official to represent the interests of others on legislation, planning applications or the exercise of official functions (s 4(1)). Lobbying extends beyond commercial lobbyists to organisational employees representing their organisation or its members (s 4(2)(b)). The definition is deliberately activity-focused: it targets communications made for the purpose of representing others, not communications undertaken for purely private interests of the speaker. It also captures community interest advocacy (s 4(2)(c)).

Government official: A broad class that includes Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, their staff, heads of Public Service agencies, public servants, contractors engaged to provide services to the Public Service, and members of statutory governing bodies (s 3). Important drafting nuance: the definition excludes local government officials except for Parts 5 and 6 (success-fee ban and other restrictions) where local government officials are included (s 3). That affects the reach of the success-fee ban and cooling-off rules.

Third-party lobbyist: A person or body carrying on the business of lobbying Government officials on behalf of others (generally for money) (s 3). The definition is open to extension or carve-out by regulation (s 3).

Lobbyist (general): Includes third-party lobbyists and “any other individual or body that lobbies Government officials”, including individuals engaged by third-party lobbyists (s 3). Not all persons who lobby must register; registration duties in Part 3 apply to third-party lobbyists and individuals engaged by them (s 9).

Lobbyists Code: A code of conduct prescribed by regulation for third-party and other lobbyists (s 5(1)). The Code must set ethical standards to promote transparency, integrity and honesty (s 6(1)). The Code may differentiate between classes of lobbyists and set procedures for contact (s 6(2)). Compliance with the Code is an express duty (s 7).

Registration and public registers: The Electoral Commission must establish and publish a Register of Third-Party Lobbyists and maintain a publicly available Lobbyists Watch List (ss 8, 12). The Register must include defined categories of information (s 10(1)) and the Commission may require updates and sworn verification (s 10(2); s 11(2)). The Commission can exclude information from public disclosure if satisfied there is an overriding public interest against disclosure under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (s 10(3)).

Ban on success fees: The Act defines a success fee as payment contingent on the outcome of lobbying (s 14) and prohibits giving, agreeing to give, receiving or agreeing to receive such fees for lobbying Government officials (s 15). Penalties apply (s 15); courts may order forfeiture of such fees to the Crown (s 16). There is an explicit carve-out where the payment is primarily for technical professional services by lawyers, accountants, financial advisers or other technical specialists rather than for lobbying services (s 17).

Cooling-off: An 18 month prohibition on former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries lobbying Government officials about official matters they handled during the last 18 months of office (s 18(1), (3)). The section lists several exceptions where the prohibition does not apply, including lobbying as a member of Parliament or as a Government or Commonwealth public official (s 18(2)).

Enforcement and administrative powers: The Electoral Commission enforces the Code and this Act and may exercise investigative functions it holds under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 for that purpose (s 19). The Commission must give written notice and reasons for particular adverse decisions (s 19A). Section 20 provides immunity from defamation and breach of confidence suits where the Commission acted in good faith in deciding to include or remove names from registers or lists.

Regulatory delegation: The Governor may make regulations to prescribe the Code and any other matters necessary to give effect to the Act (s 21). The Act therefore sets the skeleton; detailed operational rules are intended to be supplied in regulations and the Code (s 5-6, s 21).

Penalties and judicial process: Offences are dealt with summarily in the Local Court (s 22). Corporations can attract vicarious responsibility for contraventions where directors or managers knowingly authorised or permitted the contravention (s 23). Statutory review is required five years after assent (s 24).

These concepts form the operational logic: identify activity that constitutes lobbying; require third-party lobbyists to register and comply with a Code; prohibit outcome-contingent fees and restrict post-office lobbying by senior figures; give an independent statutory body (Electoral Commission) the power to register, publish, investigate and sanction; and allocate discretion to regulation for detailed implementation.

The Act affects a defined set of private and public actors in different ways, depending on role and activity. The provisions allocate obligations, disclosure duties and prohibitions unevenly across those actors.

Third-party lobbyists (and their engaged agents): Third-party lobbyists carrying on a business of lobbying Government officials on behalf of others are required to be registered on the Lobbyists Register (s 9(1)). Individuals engaged to undertake lobbying for such third-party lobbyists must also be registered in respect of that lobbyist (s 9(2)). Registered third-party lobbyists must provide specified information for the Register (s 10(1)) and update that information in writing as required (s 10(2)). The Electoral Commission has power to cancel or suspend registration for contraventions, ineligibility, failure to update, cessation of business, or as authorised by regulation (s 9(7)). A person who carried on lobbying while unregistered may be made ineligible for registration for a period (s 9(8)). Third-party lobbyists therefore face compliance costs (registration, disclosure, updates) and regulatory risk (cancellation, suspension, ineligibility).

Individuals or bodies who lobby but are not third-party lobbyists: The Act’s definition of “lobbyist” includes any person or body that lobbies Government officials (s 3). However, registration duties in Part 3 are targeted at third-party lobbyists and their engaged individuals (s 9). That means in-house corporate lobbyists, advocacy group staff and other non-commercial lobbyists may be captured by the Code and some parts of the Act but are not automatically subject to the registration regime unless covered by regulation as third-party lobbyists (s 3) or otherwise required by the Code. The Lobbyists Code may make different provision for different classes of lobbyists (s 6(2)), so the practical reach will depend on the Code and regulations.

Clients of lobbyists: The Register requires disclosure of the names of persons who have retained the lobbyist or for whom the lobbyist has provided services (s 10(1)(d)). Clients therefore may be publicly associated with lobbying activity through registration information and face confidentiality and reputational consequences. The Electoral Commission may exclude information if it considers it vexatious, false, or misleading (s 10(4)), and may withhold information from publication where there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (s 10(3)).

Former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries: Section 18 imposes an 18 month cooling-off period on these officeholders, prohibiting them from lobbying Government officials about matters they dealt with in the final 18 months of office (s 18(1) and (3)). The provision applies to lobbying of Government officials (and, because of the government official definition exception, includes local government officials in Parts 5 and 6) (s 3). Exemptions are listed (s 18(2)). Former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries therefore face a direct behavioural constraint on post-office employment or retainer arrangements that would involve lobbying on recent portfolio matters.

Government officials and public servants: The Act defines Government official inclusively (s 3). The Code and Register are aimed at regulating those who approach Government officials; Government officials themselves are excluded from the definition of lobbying when acting in the ordinary course of their duties (s 4(3)(b)). Code procedures may impose special procedures for Government officials when communicating with persons on the Lobbyists Watch List (s 12(2)). Government agencies and officials will therefore have procedural obligations or recommended conduct under the Code and official rules, and may be subject to special interaction protocols vis-a-vis listed lobbyists (s 12(2)).

Electoral Commission: The Act makes the NSW Electoral Commission responsible for establishing and publishing the Lobbyists Register (s 8), maintaining the Lobbyists Watch List (s 12), enforcing the Lobbyists Code and the Act (s 19(1)), exercising investigative functions under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 for enforcement (s 19(2)), and giving notice and reasons for particular decisions (s 19A). The Commission is the decision-maker on registration, suspension, cancellation, and placement on the Watch List (s 9(6)-(7); s 12(1)).

Corporations and directors: Corporations that contravene the Act may attract personal liability for directors or persons concerned in management who knowingly authorised or permitted the contravention (s 23(1)). Corporations also face offences, penalties and possible forfeiture where applicable (s 15-16, s 23(3)).

Lawyers, accountants and technical specialists: The success-fee ban does not apply where the payment is primarily for the provision of professional advice or services (other than lobbying services) by lawyers, accountants, financial advisers or other technical specialists (s 17). Those professions therefore retain an explicit exemption for technical services even if interactions with Government officials occur in the course of their work.

The broader public: The Register and Watch List are public documents (ss 11(1), 13(1)), published on the Electoral Commission’s website (ss 8(2), 12(3)). The Act therefore affects public information flows and enables journalists, researchers and the public to access who is registered and who is on the Watch List, subject to limited public interest exclusions (s 10(3); s 13(2)).

In short, the Act directly regulates third-party lobbyists and their engaged agents via registration and disclosure, restricts former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries, proscribes outcome-contingent payments related to lobbying, places procedural duties on Government officials in dealing with watchlisted lobbyists, and invests enforcement in the NSW Electoral Commission. The precise reach to in-house or non-commercial lobbyists and the operational detail depends on regulation and the Lobbyists Code.

The Act creates specific statutory duties for lobbyists, registration obligations for third-party lobbyists, disclosure duties, prohibitions, and procedural rights tied to administrative decisions. Below are the principal duties and corresponding rights established in the text.

Duties to comply with the Lobbyists Code: It is an express statutory duty of a lobbyist to comply with the Lobbyists Code in connection with lobbying Government officials (s 7). The Code is prescribed by regulation (s 5(1)) and is to set out ethical standards and procedures for meetings or contact with Government officials (s 6(1)-(2)). The Minister must consult the Electoral Commission on any proposed Code or amendments (s 5(2)). Duty-bearers must therefore track the Code and any regulatory amendments.

Registration duties: A third-party lobbyist is required to be registered (s 9(1)). Individuals engaged to undertake lobbying for a third-party lobbyist are required to be registered in respect of that third-party lobbyist (s 9(2)). Applications must be in a form approved by the Electoral Commission and must include names of individuals engaged and any other disclosure required for the Register, including potentially criminal record disclosure (s 9(5)(a)-(d)). The Electoral Commission must register an applicant unless it is satisfied the person is not eligible (s 9(6)). Registered lobbyists must update information in writing as required by regulation (s 10(2)). The Commission may require verification by statutory declaration for information provided (s 11(2)).

Disclosure obligations: The Register must contain the lobbyist’s name and business contact details, names of engaged individuals, names of persons with management, financial or other prescribed interests, names of third parties who have retained the lobbyist, and other prescribed information (s 10(1)(a)-(e)). Information must be retained for the period prescribed by regulation and historical data must indicate the period for which it was current (s 10(6)-(7)). The Commission may decline to include information it believes is vexatious, false or misleading (s 10(4)).

Prohibitions and financial duties: The Act bans success fees for lobbying. It is an offence to give or agree to give a success fee for lobbying a Government official, for a lobbyist to receive or agree to receive such a fee, and for any person other than a lobbyist to receive or agree to receive a success fee (s 15(1)-(3)). Success fees are defined as contingent payments tied to the outcome of lobbying (s 14). Maximum penalties attach: 500 penalty units for corporations and 200 penalty units for individuals for contravention of s 15. Courts can order forfeiture of success fees to the Crown where offences are proved, subject to the court ordering otherwise (s 16).

Cooling-off duty: A former Minister or Parliamentary Secretary must not, during the 18 month cooling-off period, engage in lobbying of a Government official in relation to an official matter that was dealt with by that person in the 18 months immediately before ceasing to hold office (s 18(1), (3)). Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units. Exceptions apply where the person is lobbying as a member of Parliament, as a Government official, or as a Commonwealth public official (s 18(2)).

Procedural rights: Several procedural protections and administrative rights are provided. The Electoral Commission must give written notice and reasons for specified adverse decisions: refusal to register, cancellation or suspension of registration, determinations of ineligibility following unregistered activity, and placement on the Watch List (s 19A(1)). The Commission must also publish notice and reasons on its website unless satisfied there is an overriding public interest against disclosure under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (s 19A(2)). Registered lobbyists may request exclusion of information on grounds of overriding public interest (s 10(3); s 13(2)). The Commission may remove persons from the Watch List if satisfied they should no longer be placed on it (s 12(4)).

Enforcement powers and duties of the Electoral Commission: The Commission has the function of enforcing compliance with the Lobbyists Code and the Act (s 19(1)). For that purpose, it may exercise investigative and other functions it holds under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (s 19(2)). The Act treats references in Part 9 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to “this Act” as applying to the Lobbyists Code and this Act (s 19(3)). The Commission thus has both registration and enforcement duties.

Protections from civil suit for good-faith actions: If the Commission includes or removes a person’s name from the Register or Watch List and believed in good faith the Act permitted or required the decision, no action for defamation or breach of confidence lies against the Crown, the Commission, its members or staff by reason of that decision or any resulting disclosures (s 20). This reduces legal risk to the regulator for publishing its decisions where made in good faith.

Corporate liability: Directors or persons concerned with management are taken to have contravened an offence by the corporation if they knowingly authorised or permitted it (s 23(1)). Persons may be proceeded against whether or not the corporation has been proceeded against (s 23(2)).

Regulatory rights and duties: The Governor’s regulation-making power is broad, permitting regulations not inconsistent with the Act to prescribe the Code and other matters necessary to give effect to the Act (s 21). Transitional regulations may have retrospective effect to the date of assent provided they do not prejudice private rights (Schedule 1, cl 1(1)-(3)).

Together, these duties impose registration, disclosure, compliance and conduct obligations on third-party lobbyists and individuals engaged by them, proscribe contingent success payments and restrict former officeholders, while granting the Electoral Commission enforcement powers and procedural obligations to provide reasons and offer limited protections for those affected.

The Act prescribes criminal and administrative penalties, enforcement functions for the Electoral Commission, court powers over forfeiture, corporate liability rules, and the forum for proceedings. The enforcement regime is primarily regulatory with criminal penalties available for certain contraventions.

Monetary penalties and offence classifications:

• Success-fee offences carry significant monetary maximum penalties: for corporations up to 500 penalty units and for individuals up to 200 penalty units (s 15). The prohibited conduct includes giving, agreeing to give, receiving or agreeing to receive a success fee in connection with lobbying a Government official (s 15(1)-(3)).
• The cooling-off contravention in s 18(1) (former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries lobbying on certain matters during the 18 month cooling-off) attracts a maximum penalty of 200 penalty units.
• The Act does not specify maximum penalties for registration non-compliance or for contravention of the Lobbyists Code generally in the text provided, but s 7 notes the duty to comply and s 9(7) lists administrative measures the Commission may take for contraventions, which include suspension or cancellation of registration.

Forfeiture: If a person is found guilty of an offence under the Part banning success fees, any success fee given to or received by the person is forfeited to the Crown unless the court otherwise orders (s 16(1)). In proceedings or on appeal the court may order that a success fee not be forfeited or be returned to a specified person (s 16(2)). That gives the courts discretion to tailor remedies once guilt is established.

Regulatory enforcement by the Electoral Commission:

• The NSW Electoral Commission is expressly given the function of enforcing compliance with the Lobbyists Code and the Act (s 19(1)). The Commission may exercise any investigative or other functions it possesses under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 for this purpose (s 19(2)). The Act thereby imports operational investigative powers from the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (s 19(2)-(3)).
• The Commission may cancel or suspend registration for a range of reasons, including contravention of the Code or Act, loss of eligibility, failure to update Register information, cessation of business, or as authorised by regulation (s 9(7)).
• The Commission may also determine a third-party lobbyist who carried on lobbying while not registered to be ineligible for registration for a specified period (s 9(8)).

Procedural enforcement obligations and transparency:

• Where the Commission makes a decision to refuse registration, cancel or suspend registration, determine ineligibility following unregistered lobbying, or place a person on the Watch List, it must give the person written notice and reasons (s 19A(1)). The Commission must also publish notice and reasons on its website unless satisfied there is an overriding public interest against disclosure under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (s 19A(2)). That creates administrative law-type disclosure obligations for the regulator.
• The Commission has discretion to exclude information from public publication in the Register or Watch List in cases where it is satisfied there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (ss 10(3), 13(2)). The Commission may also decline to include information it believes is vexatious, false or misleading (s 10(4)). Those discretions shape the public information available and may affect enforcement transparency.

Defamation and confidentiality protection for the regulator:

• Section 20 protects the Crown, the Electoral Commission, Commission members and staff from actions for defamation or breach of confidence that arise from decisions to include or remove names from the Register or Watch List, provided the Commission believed in good faith that the Act permitted or required the decision (s 20(1)-(2)). That reduces legal risk to the regulator for publicising its regulatory decisions taken in good faith.

Criminal liability for false information:

• The Act’s note refers to Part 5A of the Crimes Act 1900, which creates an offence of knowingly providing false or misleading information or producing false or misleading documents in purported compliance with a law of the State (s 10 note). The Registrar may require verification by statutory declaration (s 11(2)), and falsehoods in registration may therefore attract separate criminal exposure under the Crimes Act.

Proceedings and forum:

• Proceedings for offences under the Act may be dealt with summarily in the Local Court (s 22). That sets the prosecution forum and process for criminal enforcement.

Corporate liability:

• A corporation’s contravention also attracts potential personal liability for each director or person in management who knowingly authorised or permitted the contravention (s 23(1)). A person may be proceeded against whether or not the corporation itself is proceeded against (s 23(2)). This is a usual corporate liability provision but bears emphasising given the corporate nature of many lobbying firms.

Administrative remedies:

• Cancellation or suspension of registration and placement on the Watch List are administrative remedies available to the Electoral Commission (s 9(7); s 12(1)). The Commission may later remove persons from the Watch List if satisfied they should no longer be placed on it (s 12(4)). The Commission must provide notice and reasons for these decisions (s 19A(1)) and publish reasons (s 19A(2)) unless an overriding public interest exists against disclosure.

In sum, the Act blends criminal penalties for key offences (success fees, cooling-off breaches), court-ordered forfeiture, administrative sanctions (suspension, cancellation, ineligibility, Watch List placement), investigative powers via the Electoral Funding Act 2018, and procedural obligations (notice and reasons) for the regulator. The Electoral Commission is the central enforcement actor with discretion over publication and verification of information, but protections and statutory obligations attach to its decision-making.

The Act is framed to operate alongside, and in some respects through, other NSW statutes and Commonwealth references. The text makes multiple cross-references that determine operational interaction and procedural application.

Electoral Act 2017: The Act defines “Electoral Commission” by reference to the New South Wales Electoral Commission constituted under the Electoral Act 2017 (s 3). The Commission is therefore the same statutory entity whose constitution and broader powers are governed by the Electoral Act 2017, and the Act relies on that institutional machinery to administer the Register, Watch List and enforcement functions (s 8; s 12; s 19).

Electoral Funding Act 2018: Section 19 expressly permits the Electoral Commission to exercise investigative or other functions that the Commission has under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 for the purpose of enforcing the Lobbyists Code and the Act (s 19(2)). The Act further treats references in Part 9 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to “this Act” as references to the Lobbyists Code and this Act (s 19(3)). That imports procedural, evidentiary and investigative mechanisms from the Electoral Funding Act 2018 into enforcement of this Act.

Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009: The Act uses the public interest concepts and tests from the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 when the Electoral Commission considers excluding information from publication in the Register or Watch List (s 10(3); s 13(2); s 19A(2)). The Commission’s discretion to withhold or publish reasons for decisions is therefore framed against the standard and procedures of the GIPA Act.

Crimes Act 1900: The Act’s note at s 10 draws attention to offences in Part 5A of the Crimes Act 1900 concerning the provision of false or misleading information or documents to comply with a law of the State. That creates a potential criminal overlay for false statements or documents provided in the registration and verification process (s 11(2) on statutory declaration verification).

Subordinate Legislation Act 1989: Schedule 1, clause 4 says that compliance with s 5 of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (regulatory impact statements) in relation to an initial regulation under this Act may be satisfied within six months after the regulation is made (Sch 1 cl 4(1)-(2)). That provides an administrative interaction and a limited procedural easing for the initial regulations implementing the Act.

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979: The Act’s definition of “planning application” (s 3) references that Act when specifying the type of planning matters that constitute part of the scope of “lobbying” under s 4. That ties the lobbying definition to planning processes governed by the EP&A Act.

Electoral Register and Electoral Commission amendments: Schedule 1 provides transitional provisions dealing with existing Registers of Lobbyists kept by the Department of Premier and Cabinet prior to Part 3 commencing (Sch 1 cl 3). Persons registered on that existing Register are taken to be registered under the new Part 3 on commencement (Sch 1 cl 3(2)). That is a transitional interaction rather than a substantive cross-act dependency.

Common law and administrative law: The Act imposes duties on the Electoral Commission to give notice and reasons for certain decisions (s 19A). Administrative decisions by the Commission will therefore be susceptible to review under general administrative law principles, although the Act itself provides immunities for decisions made in good faith (s 20) and it does not establish a private right of appeal within its text. The Act’s protections and obligations will interact with judicial review principles, but the Act does not specify appeal routes beyond the statutory notice-and-reasons and criminal process context.

Regulations and the Lobbyists Code: The Governor, via regulations, is empowered to make rules “not inconsistent with this Act” necessary to carry out the Act’s purpose (s 21). The Minister prescribes the Code by regulation after consultation with the Electoral Commission (s 5(2)). The Code and regulations will thus determine the practical interface with other laws, especially where the Code imposes requirements on Government officials or defines classes of lobbyists and exceptions (s 6(2)).

Overall, the Act is designed to operate as part of the regulatory ecology: enforcement is exercised through the Electoral Commission’s powers under the Electoral Funding Act 2018; disclosure decisions are keyed to GIPA public interest tests; registration and criminal liability interact with the Crimes Act; planning lobbying is defined by reference to the EP&A Act; and the Act relies on regulations under the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 for implementation. Practitioners should review these interlinked statutes and the regulations/the Lobbyists Code once made, because the Act delegates significant detail to subordinate instruments that will determine front-line interaction with other legal regimes.

The text contains a number of amendment and renumbering notes indicating the Act has been substantively amended since enactment. The statutory text itself records those changes; these are the amendments and renumbering steps evident in the source supplied.

Insertion and subsequent amendments: Section 2A (Objects of Act) was inserted by 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 (s 2A: Ins 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 [1]). The objects list (s 2A) articulates transparency, integrity and honesty and specifically includes banning success fees and restricting lobbying by former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.

Renumbering and substitution: Many provisions have been renumbered and substituted across amendment instruments:

• Parts 2-7 and their component sections have notes indicating they were inserted, renumbered or substituted by 2014 No 30, Sch 3. For example, Part 2 (ss 5-7) is listed as Ins 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [3]. Several sections bear the annotation “Renumbered 2014 No 30, Sch 3”.
• Section 3 (Definitions) was substituted by 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [1] and further amended by 2017 No 66 and 2018 No 20 (s 3: Subst 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [1]. Am 2017 No 66, Sch 8.15 [1] [2]; 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 [2]).
• Section 4 (Meaning of “lobbying”) was inserted in 2014 (s 4: Ins 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [2]).
• Part 5 (Ban on success fees) includes historical notes indicating it was previously Part 2 (secs 4-7), and it was renumbered in 2014 (pt 5 (ss 14-17) (previously Part 2 (secs 4-7)): Renumbered 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [4]).
• Section 18 (Cooling-off period) shows a renumbering and amendment: s 18 (previously s 8): Renumbered 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [5]. It was further amended by 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 [5].
• Part 7 miscellaneous sections are annotated as formerly Part 4 and renumbered by 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [6].

Additions giving the Electoral Commission expanded roles: The enforcement function located in s 19 was inserted in 2014 (s 19: Ins 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [7]) and amended by 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 [6] [7]. Section 19A (notice and reasons for certain decisions) was inserted by 2018 No 20, Sch 3.6 [8].

Transitional and savings provisions: Schedule 1 was amended by 2014 No 30, Sch 3 [8]-[10], and contains transitional provisions for existing registration regimes and regulatory commencement matters (Sch 1 cl 3 deals with an existing Register of Lobbyists held by the Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet before commencement of Part 3).

Regulatory instruments and initial regulation: Schedule 1, clause 4 provides an exception for compliance with s 5 of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 for initial regulations under this Act, allowing regulatory impact statements to be completed within six months of the regulation being made (Sch 1 cl 4(1)-(2)). Clause 4 frames the timing for initial implementing regulations.

Notes on substitution and miscellaneous amendments: Multiple sections include annotations indicating insertion, substitution or amendments by specific acts and schedules with bracketed references in the source. Those annotations identify the legislative instruments effecting changes, for example 2014 No 30, 2017 No 66, and 2018 No 20. The source text does not provide the full content of those amending statutes but does indicate where and when changes were recorded in the Act’s amendment history.

Practical consequence: The Act’s operative structure today is the product of these changes. The insertion of s 2A in 2018 foregrounds objects and certain substantive policies such as banning success fees and restricting former Ministers. The 2014 amendments appear to have consolidated and restructured earlier parts and moved enforcement and register functions to the Electoral Commission. The schedule of transitional provisions and the allowing of deferred regulatory impact statement compliance for initial regulations indicate careful staging of implementation on enactment or amendment.

The source does not include a chronological table of amendments beyond the marginal annotations embedded in each section. Practitioners should consult the consolidated statute as published by the NSW legislation portal and the identified amending Acts (2014 No 30; 2017 No 66; 2018 No 20) for verbatim amendment texts and the precise dates of commencement for specific provisions.

The statutory text supplied does not identify any court decisions or judicial consideration arising under this Act. The source records enforcement mechanisms, offence processes and administrative decision-making procedures, but no reported litigation or case law is included in the material provided.

Notwithstanding the absence of named cases in the text, the Act creates several legal pathways by which disputes may be litigated or judicially reviewed, and these set the likely loci of future litigation:

• Summary criminal prosecution in the Local Court: Offences under the Act may be dealt with summarily before the Local Court (s 22). Any prosecution under s 15 (success-fee offences) or s 18 (cooling-off breach) would therefore be prosecuted in that forum, with the Local Court adjudicating guilt and applying the statutory maximum penalties and forfeiture rules (ss 15-16, s 18). The text does not provide particulars about legal defences or evidentiary standards beyond general criminal law principles.

• Judicial discretion on forfeiture: Where a court convicts a person of an offence under the success-fee provisions, the court has discretion in relation to forfeiture of the success fee, including ordering that it not be forfeited or returned to a specified person (s 16(2)). Any dispute about the court’s exercise of this discretion would arise in criminal proceedings and potential appeals, but the text provides no appellate route beyond the ordinary criminal appeal procedures applicable to Local Court decisions.

• Administrative law review: The Electoral Commission is required to give notice and reasons for certain adverse decisions (refusal to register, cancellation or suspension of registration, determinations of ineligibility after unregistered activity, or placement on the Watch List) and to publish reasons unless there is an overriding public interest against publication (s 19A). Decisions of the Commission could therefore be subject to judicial review under general administrative law principles for error of law, jurisdictional error, or failure to follow procedural fairness in administrative decision-making. The Act does not itself prescribe a merits review mechanism or an internal appeal, but the statutory obligation to provide written reasons will be material in any review.

• Corporate liability and director liability: Section 23 provides for vicarious criminal liability for directors or managers who knowingly authorised or permitted a corporation’s contravention. Proceedings against directors could therefore be brought in parallel with corporate prosecutions, leading to contested factual and legal issues about knowledge and authorisation.

• Commission’s investigatory powers: The Electoral Commission may exercise investigative functions it holds under the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to enforce this Act (s 19(2)). Any exercise of coercive investigative powers drawn from the Electoral Funding Act 2018 could be the subject of court proceedings if the legality of those powers or their exercise is challenged, although the source text does not elaborate the specific investigatory powers available.

• Defamation and breach-of-confidence immunity limited by good faith: Section 20 removes civil liability for defamation or breach of confidence against the Crown, the Commission, members and staff where the Commission believed in good faith the Act permitted or required the decision to include or remove names from the Register or Watch List (s 20(1)-(2)). That immunises the Commission against some suits but opens potential litigation questions about the meaning and proof of “good faith” and whether a decision fell within the Act’s scope.

Because the source text does not include reported decisions, practitioners currently must rely on statutory provisions alone. For any litigation history practitioners must consult case law databases and subsequent reported decisions beyond the supplied material. The Act’s mixture of summary criminal procedures, judicial discretion over forfeiture, administrative obligations to give reasons, and the Commission’s investigatory powers sets out clear legal threads likely to be the subject of future litigated disputes, but none are recorded in this source.

This Act contains a number of drafting choices and delegated-authority features that can produce practical surprises for practitioners and clients. These “gotchas” are concrete points where a cursory reading might mislead.

1. Registration is targeted at third-party lobbyists only: The Act requires registration of third-party lobbyists and individuals engaged to undertake lobbying for them (s 9(1)-(2)). The statutory definition of “lobbyist”, however, includes “any other individual or body that lobbies Government officials” (s 3). The practical effect is that in-house lobbyists or organisational representatives may be captured by the Code and certain prohibitions but are not automatically required to register unless they are a third-party lobbyist as defined or the regulations extend the definition (s 3). Do not assume all lobbying actors must be registered; check whether the Code or regulations extend registration obligations.

2. “Government official” excludes local government officials except for Parts 5 and 6: The definition of Government official expressly provides it does not include a local government official except in Parts 5 and 6 (s 3). Parts 5 and 6 include the success-fee ban and the cooling-off rules (Parts 5 and 6). This means success-fee and cooling-off provisions apply to lobbying of local government officials, whereas other parts of the Act that rely on the Government official definition will not capture local government officials. That drafting nuance may be missed and is critical when advising on engagements that involve councils.

3. Success-fee ban is outcome-focused and has a carve-out for technical professional services: The Act defines success fees as contingent payments tied to the outcome of lobbying (s 14) and bans them (s 15). But it excludes fees primarily given for professional advice or services (other than lobbying services) provided by lawyers, accountants, financial advisers or other technical specialists (s 17). Structuring arrangements to circumvent the ban by recasting fees as “professional services” will be a focal point; whether a payment is “primarily” for professional services or for lobbying is a factual inquiry for courts or regulators (ss 14, 17, 15). Expect disputes about characterisation and allocation of fees.

4. The Commission has broad discretion over publication and public interest carve-outs: The Electoral Commission may exclude information from publication in the Register or Watch List if it is satisfied there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (s 10(3); s 13(2)). The Commission also must publish reasons for certain decisions unless satisfied publication would be against the overriding public interest (s 19A(2)). The public interest test is governed by the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and introduces discretionary thresholds that affect public access to information. Do not assume full public visibility; challenge rights may be constrained by these discretionary tests.

5. Verification by statutory declaration and criminal penalty overlay: The Commission may require verification of registration information by statutory declaration (s 11(2)). The Act notes that knowingly providing false or misleading information in purported compliance with a law of the State is an offence under Part 5A of the Crimes Act 1900 (s 10 note). Market participants should not underestimate the criminal law overlay for false registration statements.

6. The Lobbyists Code and regulations supply much of the detail: The Act prescribes high-level duties but delegates operational detail to the Code and regulations (s 5-6, s 21). The Minister prescribes the Code by regulation but must consult the Commission (s 5(2)). The practical requirements for meetings, permitted contacts, classes of lobbyists, reporting periods, retention periods and other operational matters will be determined by those subordinate instruments. Until they are made, obligations are partly open-ended.

7. Watch List placement and consequences are administrative and can trigger special procedures: The Commission may place lobbyists on the Watch List for contraventions of the Code or Act (s 12(1)). Code rules or other official rules may include special procedures for Government officials when communicating with persons on the Watch List (s 12(2)). Placement therefore can have immediate practical consequences beyond reputational harm, but the Act does not list precise operational restrictions; those are left to the Code and official rules.

8. Ineligibility thresholds for fit-and-proper are specified but not exhaustive: A person is taken not to be a fit and proper person if imprisoned for 30 months or more or convicted within prior 10 years of an adult offence involving fraud or dishonesty (s 9(9)). That is a specific, limited threshold but the section also notes “without limiting any other circumstances” (s 9(9)). The Commission therefore retains scope to treat other matters as relevant to fitness. Practitioners advising on eligibility must consider both the hard thresholds and the Commission’s residual discretion.

9. Corporate director liability is strict on knowledge: Directors or management who “knowingly authorised or permitted” contraventions are treated as having contravened (s 23(1)). The knowledge element can be a focus in compliance and internal controls because it permits personal prosecution even where the corporation is the primary offender.

10. Transitional provisions can void post-commencement performance of pre-commencement success-fee agreements: Schedule 1, cl 2 treats existing success-fee agreements entered into prior to commencement as void to the extent they provide for success fees relating to work carried out on or after commencement (Sch 1 cl 2(3)). That can affect contractual arrangements entered before the Act but continuing into the Act’s commencement period.

These items illustrate points where a loose reading of the Act can mislead. The practical reach of the Act depends heavily on the Lobbyists Code and subsequent regulations, the Commission’s exercise of public-interest discretions, and fact-specific characterisations of fees and services. Advisers should review the Code and regulations once made, confirm whether a person is a third-party lobbyist under the regulations, and evaluate the interaction with pre-existing agreements and corporate governance controls.

Compliance requires a mix of organisational policies, contract drafting, registration procedures, recordkeeping, training and careful interaction with the Electoral Commission’s processes. The Act creates discrete, actionable obligations; below are practical steps tied to specific provisions.

1. Determine whether you are a third-party lobbyist: Review the statutory definition of a third-party lobbyist (s 3). If your organisation carries on the business, generally for money or other consideration, of lobbying Government officials on behalf of others, you must register (s 9(1)). If uncertainty remains, consider whether the regulations expand or narrow the definition; the Act allows the regulations to include or exclude classes (s 3). If you are an in-house lobbyist (representing your employer’s own interests), the obligations are different: registration under Part 3 ordinarily targets third-party lobbyists and individuals engaged to undertake lobbying for them (s 9).

2. Prepare to register and maintain accurate Register information: If registration is required, submit an application in the form approved by the Electoral Commission and include the names of individuals engaged to undertake lobbying and any other information required or prescribed (s 9(4)-(5)). The Register must include contact details, engaged individuals’ names, persons with management or financial interests, clients retained (s 10(1)). Put procedures in place to update that information in writing to the Commission at the times or periods required by the regulations (s 10(2)). Anticipate verification requirements; the Commission may demand statutory declaration verification (s 11(2)).

3. Implement internal controls to avoid success-fee arrangements: The Act prohibits success fees for lobbying (ss 14-15). Ensure client contracts and remuneration structures do not include outcome-contingent fees tied to the result of any lobbying. If arrangements involve professional services that include interactions with Government officials, segregate billing and contract language to show that fees are primarily for technical professional services, which the Act excludes (s 17). Keep contemporaneous records evidencing the primary purpose of fees to withstand any enforcement scrutiny.

4. Manage cooling-off obligations for former Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries: If you employ or engage former Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries, ensure engagements do not involve lobbying Government officials on matters the person dealt with in the 18 months prior to leaving office (s 18(1), (3)). Implement a pre-hire compliance clearance that maps portfolio responsibilities and flags potentially restricted matters. Note exceptions where the person is lobbying as a member of Parliament or in specified official capacities (s 18(2)).

5. Train staff on the Act and the Lobbyists Code: All staff who communicate with Government officials should be trained to understand the statutory definition of lobbying (s 4), who qualifies as a Government official (s 3), and the content and procedural rules in the Lobbyists Code once prescribed (s 6). The Code may impose procedures for meetings or other contacts (s 6(2)), and compliance with the Code is a statutory duty (s 7). Maintain an up-to-date compliance manual that references the Code and the regulations.

6. Maintain client and activity records to support disclosure and audit: Keep detailed records of clients who retain the lobbyist, the matters lobbied, dates, attendees at meetings, communication content, and time spent. The Register includes the names of third parties who retained the lobbyist (s 10(1)(d)) and retained information must be current and indicate period of currency (s 10(6)-(7)). Records will support required updates and respond to any investigative use of powers the Commission draws from the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (s 19(2)).

7. Prepare