This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Collection
legislative instrument
Plain English Summary
7/10 complexity
What this regulation does, in plain language
It sets out detailed administrative rules for three main areas: (1) who can access and how certain Electoral Rolls and voter information may be shared (Part 2 and Schedule 1); (2) enrolment and identity evidence rules (Part 3); and (3) how electronically assisted voting works for certain voters, plus related ballot handling, offences and court procedures (Part 4). Key practical effects follow.
Who is affected
Sight‑impaired persons and Antarctic electors: they may register to vote by telephone using an "electronically assisted vote" and, if registered, to vote by that method (definitions and registration / voting process: sections 5, 15–19, 22–24).
The Electoral Commissioner / Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and AEC officers: the Commissioner must set up call centres, determine days/times and written procedures, keep registers, make records of electronically assisted votes, and handle ballot boxes and scrutiny (sections 15–16, 17(1), 19(1), 22–24).
Call centre operators and other election officers: they perform identity checks, assist voters to indicate their choices, initial and pack ballot papers, and must follow Commissioner‑determined procedures (sections 15–16, 17–19, 22–24).
Prescribed Commonwealth agencies, specified private organisations and named commercial entities listed in Schedule 1 and section 8: they may be provided with Roll information for the limited, prescribed purposes set out in the regulation and Schedule 1 (section 6, section 8, section 9, Schedule 1).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Candidates and scrutineers: the regulation permits a candidate (or authorised appointer in a referendum) to nominate one scrutineer per authorised call centre, but sets limits and offences governing scrutineer conduct (section 21).
Any person handling electronic voting hardware, software or related data: the regulation creates offences for destroying or interfering with such items (section 26).
How it works mechanically
Definitions set who qualifies as a "registered electronically assisted voter": a sight‑impaired person or an Antarctic elector registered with the Electoral Commissioner for that purpose (section 5).
The Electoral Commissioner must establish one or more authorised call centres to receive calls from those voters for registration and voting (section 15).
The Commissioner must issue written determinations for: (a) when registration and electronically assisted voting are available; and (b) procedures to assess registration status and to enable voting (sections 16(1), 17(1), 19(1)). These written determinations give the Commissioner broad operational discretion over timing and procedures.
To register, a person must contact an authorised call centre at the days/times set by the Commissioner and comply with the assessment procedures; the Commissioner must keep a register and assign identification numbers (section 16(2)–(3)).
To vote, the caller must be satisfied to be the registered electronically assisted voter and the voter’s name must appear on an approved list, certified list or reference Roll; call centre operators ask simple questions about prior voting and may ask questions based on list information to confirm identity (sections 17–18).
If the voter instructs how to mark the ballot, the call centre operator must initial and mark the ballot(s), read choices back, place the ballot(s) in a Division‑marked envelope and deposit them in a ballot box used at the call centre; record keeping and forwarding of records to Divisional Returning Officers follows (sections 19, 22–24).
The regulation adapts ballot‑box and scrutiny rules in the Act and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act to treat electronically assisted votes as pre‑poll ordinary votes for handling and counting (sections 20, 24).
It prescribes a specific form of the Roll to indicate a person is not enrolled (a circle before the name) (section 7).
It lists Commonwealth agencies and named organisations that may receive Roll information and prescribes the permitted purposes for which each may use that data (section 6, section 8, section 9 and Schedule 1). Examples include law enforcement, statistical use, fraud detection, and specific health and research uses (sections 9–11, Schedule 1).
The regulation prescribes additional forms of identity evidence that may be used in enrolment procedures (e.g. the evidence number on a citizenship notice or a person’s Medicare number) (section 11A).
It prescribes classes of people who may act as authorised witnesses or certifiers for provisional enrolment of persons about to become citizens (Schedule 2 / section 12).
It creates statutory offences (many carrying a penalty of 5 penalty units) covering improper scrutineer conduct, interference with electronically assisted voters, attempts to discover how such a voter voted, unauthorised handling of ballot packages, and destruction or interference with electronic voting programs/files/devices; the regulation also imposes strict liability for some unauthorised acts (sections 21(6–7), 23(3), 24(4), 25, 26).
Court procedure rules for prosecutions for failure to vote are set: Divisional Returning Officers must send an elector’s response to the court and the court must treat that response as evidence; in certain prosecutions, certified documents and statutory declarations may be lodged so prosecuting officers need not attend the hearing (sections 27–28).
Stated purpose claims and a practical test of their mechanical implications
The instrument is explicitly made for the purposes of enabling parts of the Commonwealth Electoral Act and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act that authorise electronically assisted voting and related administration (section 14). That states the aim: to provide an administrative framework for telephone‑assisted voting for defined classes of voters.
Practical implications, trade‑offs and implementation points (source‑grounded):
Who decides and where discretion sits: the Electoral Commissioner is given repeated, explicit discretion to determine days/times and written procedures for registration, identity assessment and voting (sections 16(1), 17(1), 19(1)). That places operational decision‑making, and therefore costs and implementation risk, with the Commissioner/AEC.
Who pays / bears operational cost: the regulation requires the Commissioner/AEC to establish call centre(s), maintain registers, produce records and handle additional ballot processing and forwarding (sections 15–16, 22–24). Those are administrative activities implemented by the Commissioner and therefore funded and run through the AEC’s existing election operations budget (implementation tasks are specified in the cited sections).
Compliance burden on officials and voters: AEC officers and call centre operators must apply the Commissioner’s procedures, make identity checks, keep records and follow packing/forwarding rules (sections 15–16, 17–19, 22–24). Voters who wish to use electronically assisted voting must call during specified times, be on approved/certified/reference Rolls and satisfy the operator’s identification checks (section 17(2)–(3)).
Gatekeeping and the effect on individuals: the call centre operator acts as the gatekeeper of entitlement to vote by this method; the operator may refuse a vote if not satisfied of the voter’s identity or if the voter’s name is not on an approved list or reference Roll (section 17(2)–(3), section 18). That alters the process for those voters compared with ordinary in‑person voting.
Security and integrity measures: the regulation treats electronically assisted votes as pre‑poll ordinary votes for ballot‑box handling and scrutiny and imposes offences to protect ballot handling, scrutineers, and electronic hardware/software (sections 20, 21, 23–26). The requirement to keep records and forward them to Divisional Returning Officers creates an audit trail (section 22).
Information sharing and private organisations: Schedule 1 and section 8 name specified private and commercial organisations that may receive certain Roll information and sets out permitted purposes (section 8; Schedule 1). The regulation therefore creates authorized data flows to an enumerated set of recipients for specified uses (sections 8–11, Schedule 1). The permitted purposes are itemised and differ by recipient (Schedule 1 and sections 9–11).
Timing and transitional detail: one temporary provision is time‑limited (section 10A repealed at the end of 31 December 2026). The regulation also includes an application clause about a later set of amendment regulations applying to elections with writs issued on or after their commencement (section 29).
Concise statement of incentives and substitution effects (source‑grounded)
The Commissioner’s discretion to set availability times and procedures (sections 16(1), 17(1), 19(1)) creates an operational incentive to design processes that fit AEC capacity and security requirements. Those operational choices mechanically affect which voters can practically use the service (section 17(3)(a) on calling during availability times).
The regulation substitutes telephone/assisted voting procedures for in‑person marking of ballots for registered sight‑impaired and Antarctic electors, with an explicit rule that it is irrelevant the voter did not personally complete the ballot (section 24(2)(c), 24(3)(c)). The substitution is limited to registered classes and subject to the procedural gates the Commissioner sets.
Primary implementation risks reported from the text
Capacity and timing risk: if availability windows are narrow, eligible voters who cannot call in those times will be excluded from this method (section 17(3)(a)).
Identity verification risk: the operator’s satisfaction is a discretionary threshold for entitlement to vote by this method (sections 17(1)(b), 17(2)(c), 18(1)).
Electronic security risk: the regulation criminalises interference with voting‑related software, data files and devices (section 26), which implies a need for secure IT and physical controls to avoid those offences and to protect ballots.
Bottom line (mechanical):
This instrument creates a telephone‑based, assisted voting pathway limited to sight‑impaired persons and Antarctic electors; it assigns the Electoral Commissioner the operational task of establishing call centres, writing procedures, maintaining registers and records, and ensuring ballot handling and scrutiny treat these votes as pre‑poll ordinary votes (sections 5, 15–19, 20, 22–24). Separately, it prescribes which Commonwealth agencies and specified organisations may be given Roll information and for what purposes (sections 6, 8–11; Schedule 1), prescribes extra permitted identity evidence for enrolment (section 11A), lists classes of authorised witnesses for provisional enrolment by new citizens (Schedule 2), and sets procedural rules and offences about compulsory voting prosecutions (sections 27–28).