(The paragraph numbers do not appear in the original publication. They have been added for ease of reference, as they appear in the statement of claim. The headline was given the number "1", the photograph caption the number "2", and the photograph itself the number "3".)
5 It was common ground that the article was published at a time when the state of NSW was being (and had been for some time) ravaged by bushfires. Indeed, the area of factual dispute in the proceedings was remarkably narrow.
6 From time to time the Commissioner for the Rural Fire Service ("the RFS"), Mr Phil Koperberg, acting on powers conferred on him by s99 of the Rural Fires Act, 1997, declared a total fire ban prohibiting, in identified areas, the lighting, maintenance and use of fires in the open air. Such a ban was in force in the Shoalhaven area at relevant times. Mr Zunter was the manager of a caravan park called the Rustic Caravan Park in the Bendalong area in the Shoalhaven area of the south coast of NSW. Photographic and cartographic evidence show that the caravan park is located to the south of Bendalong, on the edge of Berringer Lake, in an area bounded by Bendalong and Berringer Roads and Inyada Drive. Road access appears to be only via a long road through bushland, running off Bendalong Road. The property was, in the early days of January 2002, immediately and seriously threatened by a large bushfire, which was sometimes known as "the Manyana fire". The RFS was working to bring the fire under control. On 2 January officers of the RFS entered the caravan park. This provoked a conflict with Mr Zunter, apparently because the officer in charge, Mr Alan Barter, did not announce his presence or seek Mr Zunter's consent to enter the caravan park. A dispute between Mr Zunter and Mr Barter arose, culminating in Mr Barter saying to Mr Zunter:
"If this place catches on fire we will not be back to assist ... the Rustic Caravan Park can burn to the fucking ground."
7 Later that day police and/or the RFS ordered the evacuation of the caravan park. Not all patrons complied with the order. The following day, 3 January, police and the RFS again ordered the evacuation of the caravan park, and again some individuals refused to leave. RFS officers inspected the caravan park, gave some instructions to Mr Zunter, and left. Mr Zunter made what preparations he could. He had on site a variety of fire fighting equipment which he made ready for use.
8 In mid afternoon he saw that the fire was burning on each side of the access road. He estimated that it would reach the caravan park within an hour.
9 Police established a road block at the intersection of a nearby road, and the access road, or driveway, to the caravan park.
10 By 5.00 pm the fire was about 50 or 60 metres away, approaching the caravan park at an angle and burning to as high as 20 to 40 metres in the tops of the tall trees that form the bushland. At one point Mr Zunter estimated the nearest fire front to be within five metres of the boundary of the caravan park.
11 Six men who had been resident in the caravan park remained to assist Mr Zunter, in defiance of the evacuation orders. One of these was Mr Alan Osborne, who gave evidence in the proceedings.
12 Acting on the advice, and with the assistance, of Mr Osborne, who had RFS training, and also with the assistance of the five others, Mr Zunter ignited a series of fires designed to remove the fuel that the bushfire would otherwise have consumed, and starve it of oxygen. This was the backburn mentioned in the headline and the subject of the article. By the time the men did this, the wind direction was such as to drive the newly lit fires into the main fire. The backburn achieved its purpose and the main fire (the Manyana fire) did not reach the caravan park or cause any damage to it. Indeed, on Mr Zunter's (unchallenged) evidence the backburn self-extinguished within twenty minutes.
13 There was extensive media coverage of the bushfires. Ms Peatling was a reporter then employed by Fairfax on the Sydney Morning Herald, based in Sydney.
14 She had been so engaged since 1999. During the second half of 2001, as part of her employment, she was required to undertake a one-day course conducted by RFS, the purpose of which was to equip her to report on bushfires which were then anticipated, and which included safety and first aid aspects. On New Year's Eve, 2001, she was assigned to cover the fires in the Shoalhaven district and drove to Nowra on the following morning. She attended at the local fire control centre where she met Brian Parry, who was the fire control officer in charge of the entire operation in the region. At times he was known by the title "incident controller".
15 It was Mr Parry's practice to conduct regular briefings, each morning, afternoon and evening. These briefings were intended for the personnel involved in fire fighting and fire control, but they served the dual purpose of informing members of the media, who were permitted to attend and report on what they learned.
16 By the evening of 1 January, Ms Peatling's first day in the area, she was aware of the main fire (the Manyana fire) and that it was threatening several small towns south of Nowra. She attended three briefings on the morning of 2 January, and thereafter, in company with a photographer, travelled to various locations where fire fighting was in progress. The following morning, 3 January, she and another photographer (Mr Paul Harris) visited a number of locations, spoke to local residents, and she began compiling a report. Early in the afternoon Ms Peatling and Mr Harris returned to Nowra and to the main fire control centre, where they attended a briefing. There they learned that the fire situation was considered likely to be severe in the Bendalong area.
17 At 8.00 am the following morning, 4 January, Ms Peatling, with Mr Harris, attended a further briefing which was, again, conducted by Mr Parry. Ms Peatling recorded, in shorthand, much of what was said by him. Her notes, which have been transcribed, indicate that Mr Parry advised that, at that time, the Bendalong fire was behind containment lines but that the weather was such that he anticipated a very awkward day. "The Bendalong fire" appears to be another way of referring to the Manyana fire. Mr Parry said that the fire had worsened during the night and the weather had produced very erratic conditions. Backburning was difficult. It is as well to quote verbatim, from the typescript of Ms Peatling's notes, what follows. The notes read:
"near Bendalong Highway can't control it
spread over the highway and can't control it
caravan park owner refused to evacuate
he did his own backburning and indicated he lost control of backburn he lit
can't put firefighters too close to main front
it tore through and wrecked the main strategy
came into the Manyana fire we were trying to control
that's not to say it would not have done that (but) how we're going to stop it now I can't say."
18 In oral evidence Ms Peatling recounted what Mr Parry had said as follows:
"Mr Parry said that near the Bendalong Highway they couldn't control the fire. It had spread over the highway and they couldn't control it. There was a caravan park owner who refused to evacuate. He had done his own backburning and indicated he lost control of the backburn he lit. They couldn't put fire fighters in because it was too close to the main fire front, that fire had torn through, wrecked their main strategy and had come into the Manyana fire they were trying to control." (t 129)
19 After the briefing Ms Peatling, with Mr Harris, approached Mr Parry to ask for some expansion on what he had said about the caravan park owner. She did not record any answers given by Mr Parry to these questions.
20 After this, and after consultation with the news desk, Ms Peatling and Mr Harris decided to attempt to find the caravan park and the caravan park owner, in Ms Peatling's words:
"...and to see if we could corroborate what we had been told in the briefing with whoever that person was." (t 132)