EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
24 Objection was taken to a number of paragraphs in Ms Whiting's first affidavit. Because of those objections the following paragraphs were not read: 6-17 inclusive, 19, 22-27 inclusive, 29, 33, 34 (save that exhibit JMVW-7 referred to therein went into evidence), 35-42 inclusive, 54 and 58.
25 Zomojo also sought to rely on a second affidavit which was sworn by Ms Whiting on 8 May 2013 ("Ms Whiting's second affidavit"). This affidavit referred to certain procedural matters including the form in which Gordon J's orders were provided to Zomojo's solicitors, communications between Zomojo's solicitors and Middleton J's Chambers and the extension of the period of operation of Mr Matthew Hurd's undertaking.
26 The respondents submitted that this affidavit should not be received or considered by the Court.
27 The respondents contended that an interlocutory application for punishment for contempt must be accompanied by a statement of charge and the affidavits on which the person making the charge intends to rely to prove the charge: see Rule 42.12(b). I rejected the submission and admitted the affidavit into evidence.
28 Rule 42.12 does not, in terms, or, in my view, implicitly preclude a prosecutor from relying on additional affidavit evidence which has been filed after the interlocutory application. The rule plainly contemplates, as a matter of fairness, that as much evidence as possible to support the charges should be provided to the accused person with the statement of charges. The extent to which a prosecutor may rely on additional affidavit material, served before trial, must be a matter within the discretion of the Court. It is also to be borne in mind that a prosecutor may wish to call evidence from persons who are not willing to swear affidavits but who are prepared to give oral evidence at trial.
29 Rule 1.34 confers a wide discretion on the Court to dispense with compliance with any other rule "either before or after the occasion for compliance arises." In Lazar v Taito (Aust) Pty Ltd (1985) 5 FCR 395 McGregor J (at 403-4) said that the power conferred by the predecessor of Rule 1.34 may be exercised in contempt proceedings, particularly "where there is no apparent injustice and the alleged error can only be one of procedure." Neaves J (at 414) accepted that, in contempt proceedings, there will be limited circumstances in which the discretion conferred by the Rule should be exercised. Fox J agreed (at 396) with McGregor and Neaves JJ on this point. In Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (No 2) (1985) 9 FCR 194 at 199 Smithers and Northrop JJ held that the affidavits referred to in the then O 40, r 8, which dealt with personal service are the affidavits filed in support of the motion and that O 40, r 8, did not apply to other affidavits which may be used at the hearing of the motion. Toohey J said (at 226) that:
"In my view r 8 does not impose an absolute prohibition on the use of material that has not been served personally on an accused person. The intention of the rule is to ensure that no injustice is done to an accused person by reason of a failure to provide him with the material filed in support of the charge against him. Rule 7(2) contemplates that evidence may be given orally in support of the charge. Again the question is one of fairness to the accused. Evidence, whether orally or by some later affidavit, may represent such a departure from the material served on the accused person or may introduce such new matter that the applicant ought not to be permitted to adduce that material without service of the affidavit or notification of the proposed oral evidence to the accused person. But where, as in the present case, an accused person or someone with authority to speak on his behalf makes some comments at the time of service of material, the reception of that additional material is one for the discretion of the judge before whom the contempt motion comes." (Emphasis added).
30 Ms Whiting's second affidavit did no more than amplify material which had appeared in paragraph 47 of her first affidavit. She exhibited material, much of which appeared on the Court file. That material related to procedural matters of which the respondents were aware. The admission of the affidavit did not cause any injustice to the respondents. In these circumstances I considered it appropriate to exercise, to the extent necessary, the dispensation power conferred by Rule 1.34.
31 Zomojo also sought to tender and rely at trial on affidavits which had been filed by Mr Matthew Hurd and Mr John Hurd. Zomojo contended that the affidavits contained admissions against interest and were admissible under the Evidence Act 1985 (Cth) ("the Evidence Act").
32 The respondents submitted that the affidavits were inadmissible for a variety of reasons. These included a denial that they contained any admissions, that real prejudice was caused to the respondents by what was said to be a late tender of the affidavits and, in the case of Mr John Hurd's first affidavit, that, if the affidavit contained admissions, he should be protected by the rule against self-incrimination.
33 Mr John Hurd's first affidavit was described by him in it as an "[a]ffidavit of John Barrie Hurd in support of Federal Court Orders dated the 5th February 2013 for compliance with clauses 16 to 21 inclusive …". As already noted the affidavit was sworn by Mr John Hurd on behalf of some of the corporate respondents, namely, Zeptonics, Crosswise, Zepto Markets, Zepto Fabrics, Zeptoip and Trademach. He deposed that each of Zeptonics, Crosswise and Zepto Markets had no profits to disclose and he exhibited financial statements for each company "in verification" of those claims. He deposed that the other three companies had never commenced business, had made no profits and had no financial accounts.
34 The affidavit was filed in purported compliance with orders made by Gordon J. No objection had been taken by Mr Hurd to complying with her Honour's orders on the ground that, to do so, might incriminate him.
35 Mr John Hurd swore a second affidavit on 18 March 2013 ("Mr John Hurd's second affidavit"). He said that the affidavit had been filed "in support of compliance with Federal Court Orders of the 5th February 2013…". It was sworn on behalf of Zeptonics, Crosswise, MD Hammer, Zepto Markets, Zepto Fabrics and Zeptoip. In the affidavit he stipulated the dates on which he said that compliance with paragraphs 12-21 inclusive and 23 of Gordon J's orders had occurred either in part or in full. Mr John Hurd raised no objection to being required to file this affidavit on the ground of self-incrimination or otherwise.
36 Zomojo also sought to rely on certain passages in an affidavit sworn by Mr Matthew Hurd on 5 April 2013. He said, in the affidavit, that it was made "in response to the Statement of charge dated 7 March 2013". The affidavit contained a series of explanations and apologies for his failure to comply with various orders made by Gordon J.
37 In respect of paragraphs 12 and 13 of her Honour's orders, Mr Matthew Hurd deposed that:
"I believe that by 14 March 2013 the companies and I were in compliance. I believe the Products (including any parts thereof) within the Respondents (sic) control were delivered on time. An assignment agreement for all rights was not delivered on time. When I engaged legal representation it was pointed out to me that a formal document should be provided for the assignment. I had wrongly assumed that because the court had ordered the assignment and we delivered the Products, the relevant rights were assigned. … I apologise for the fact that the assignment agreement was not prepared on time."
38 In respect of paragraph 14 of her Honour's orders, Mr Matthew Hurd deposed that:
"I believe the Respondents were in full compliance by 14 March 2013. I know that my staff provided many documents by 26 February 2013. A substantial number of documents were not delivered. Over twenty five thousand further documents were provided after 26 February 2013 that were hand delivered … to Zomojo's … Office … I apologise to the court that the delivery of these documents was not timely and the majority of the documents were delivered after the [statement of charge had been filed and served]."
39 In dealing with the alleged contravention of paragraph 15 of Gordon J's orders Mr Matthew Hurd deposed that:
"Two Korean brokers, NewEdge Korea and Leading Investment and Securities, were running the ZeptoAccess KRX system in Korea on 5 February 2013. One Korean broker, Hyundai Futures, was having the ZeptoAccess KRX system installed prior to 5 February 2013. My staff and I stopped work on any support and any installation activity related to ZeptoAccess KRX from 5 February 2013. … I believe there was no legal action we could take to force a return or to disable the systems in foreign jurisdictions. It would have been an illegal action for my staff or me to reach into a Korean broker's production financial system and interfere with their system."
40 The first question is whether the material in these affidavits upon which Zomojo wishes to rely is, in each case, properly to be regarded as an admission. If it is, the material is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 81(1) of the Evidence Act provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of an admission. The term "admission" is defined in the dictionary to the Act as:
"Admission means a previous representation that is:
(a) made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding (including a defendant in a criminal proceeding); and
(b) adverse to the person's interests in the outcome of the proceeding."
A "previous representation" is defined in the dictionary to mean "a representation made otherwise than in the course of giving evidence in the proceeding in which the evidence of the representation is sought to be adduced." By s 82(b) of the Evidence Act it is provided that s 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of an admission unless it is in a document in which the admission is made. Section 83(1) prevents evidence of an admission by one respondent from being used against another respondent. It provides that "[s]ection 81 does not prevent the application of the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission in respect of the case of a third party."
41 An affidavit sworn at an interlocutory stage of a proceeding may be treated as a "previous representation" and contain admissions for the purposes of ss 81, 82 and 83 of the Evidence Act if it is sought to rely on such material at a later trial: see Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 at 322 (per Rares J).
42 The respondents submitted that some, at least, of the material appearing in the affidavits on which Zomojo sought to rely did not constitute "admissions". This was because, so it was contended, exculpatory statements could not constitute an admission and because omissions could not constitute admissions.
43 The contentions that exculpatory statements cannot be treated as admissions for the purposes of the Evidence Act was founded on a judgment of Spender J, sitting as a member of a Full Court of this Court, in R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419. His Honour held that a false account of events given to police did not constitute an admission because a "statement which is exculpatory on its face is not a representation which is adverse to the interests of the accused: it is the addition of other circumstances which may import that quality. It is not the representation, but the proof of its untruth, which is or may be adverse": see at 422. The other members of the Court (Miles and Madgwick JJ) were prepared to accept that a false denial could constitute an implied admission. On either analysis the false statement did not constitute an admission because the prosecution did not seek to rely on it as revealing a consciousness of guilt but as an act constituting an element of the charge of conspiracy to give false information to the police.
44 It was not suggested that any of the statements contained in the affidavits on which Zomojo sought to rely were false. Some were exculpatory in a different sense: they sought to explain and excuse non-compliance with Gordon J's orders. Whether those statements can be regarded as being adverse to the maker's interests or those on whose behalf the statements were made, will need to be examined on a case by case basis.
45 The contention that an omission to say something cannot amount to an admission within the dictionary meaning was said to be supported by some observations of Bryson J in Re A (a Child) (2000) 115 A Crim R 1. The issue before his Honour was whether the word "no" spoken by a person which indicated a lack of consent to taking part in an identification parade could be treated as an admission. His Honour held that it could not: rather it was "a direct statement on the subject of the plaintiff's wishes about taking part in [the parade], and was not in any sense an admission … about whether some state of facts existed": at 9 [28]. Re A does not, therefore, support the broad proposition which is advanced by the respondents. It establishes the necessity of focussing attention on the terms of any alleged admission, the purpose served by the words and the circumstances in which they were spoken or written. In an appropriate case it may be that a statement of facts which omits to mention some material fact may amount to a tacit admission. Again, attention will need to be given separately to each alleged representation appearing in the affidavits to determine whether or not any of them constituted admissions.
46 The respondents contended that any admissions contained in the affidavits of Mr John Hurd and Mr Matthew Hurd could not be used in evidence against the other: see s 83 of the Evidence Act. This may be accepted. Mr John Hurd's affidavits were sworn on behalf of various corporate respondents of which he was, at relevant times, a director. Any admissions contained in those affidavits may be treated as admissions by each of the corporate respondents to which they relate.
47 It was submitted that, if Mr John Hurd's affidavits contained any admissions against his personal interests, those affidavits, to that extent, were not admissible because they were self-incriminatory. This submission cannot be accepted. The privilege against self-incrimination enables a natural person to refuse to answer questions or produce documents, if to do so would have a tendency to expose the person to a civil penalty or conviction for a crime. Once, however, the words have been spoken or the written representation has been published any potential claim to the privilege is destroyed: see O Limited v Z [2005] EWHC 238 at [64]. The material may be relied on in subsequent criminal proceedings: see R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 33-4, including contempt proceedings: see Memory Corporation v Sidhu [2000] Ch 645 at 661.
48 When he swore and filed his two affidavits Mr John Hurd made no claim to privilege against self-incrimination. Those affidavits were sworn in purported compliance with Gordon J's orders. Whether or not the privilege would have been available to him at that time need not be decided. The issue in the present proceeding is whether the affidavits are inadmissible because some of their contents might expose Mr John Hurd to a criminal penalty. The privilege against self-incrimination was lost when the affidavits were filed and may not be relied on to exclude them from evidence.