19Item 8 in the table above was addressed in the supplementary report of Ms Lindsay dated 29 August 2012. Items 9 to 11 were addressed by Ms Lindsay in oral evidence.
20As previously stated, the plaintiff's claim that the net asset position of the defendant is $11,128,843.
21Counsel for the defendant made an overall general submission that separate question 1 is quite specific; it asks for the defendant's asset and liability position as at 30 June 2012 and there is insufficient evidence permitting the Court to answer that question because the most recent balance sheets relied on by Ms Lindsay are those for 30 June 2011.
22While the defendant also pointed out the four property valuations (Ex A, Tabs 10, 11, 12 & 13) relied on by the plaintiff all pre-date 30 June 2011, on 15 May 2012, the parties agreed that the valuations of the St George Bank with respect to the Wiley Park Hotel, the Guildford Hotel and Norton's on Norton Hotel be accepted as admissible and relevant valuations of the identified properties at any hearing of any separate question or questions. As there is to evidence to the contrary, I accept these valuations as being correct despite being dated prior to 30 June 2011. However, events have overtaken the valuation of Norton's on Norton Hotel as it has since been sold and that has been dealt with at Item 8 above.
23If the defendant wanted to challenge any of these valuations he should have obtained an independent forensic valuation of the identified hotels and served such a report by 19 June 2012 - see Order 3 made on 15 May 2012. He chose not to do so.
24The defendant submitted that apart from the evidence about the sale of the Norton Hotel (Ex A, Tab 7 [15]), there is no evidence of the assets purchased and sold by the defendant or his entities in 2011-2012; the values of any such purchases and sales; or the liabilities, actual or contingent, of the defendant on 30 June 2012. That proposition is not entirely correct as the defendant has set out his assets and liabilities, as at 30 December 2011 - that is six months prior to 30 June 2012. It is noted that Ms Lindsay has updated her report to take into account the calculations in Mr Young's Statement of Financial Circumstances.
25In any event, these matters are within the defendant's knowledge (not the plaintiff's) yet he has elected not to put on any evidence, other than his Financial Statement. The defendant has from time to time not complied with court directions - see 15 December 2011 Order 1; 21 June 2012 Order 1 and 12 July 2012 Order 1. The effect of this is that the determination of the defendant's financial position, be it under s 79 or in accordance with the separate question, has been delayed. The plaintiff is impecunious and has incurred additional expense in attempting to ascertain the defendant's up-to-date to financial position. If the defendant wanted to put any of these matters in issue he could have. He did not.
26The plaintiff submitted that the Court should draw an inference that nothing of substance changed in the year after 30 June 2011. The defendant submitted that there is no factual basis upon which the Court can draw that inference.
27The parties referred to a "presumption of continuity". As Dixon J explained in Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 at 404-405:
"When it is proved that a human being exists at a specified time, the proof will support the inference that he was alive at a later time to which, having regard to the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that in the ordinary course of affairs he would survive. It is not a rigid presumption of law. The greater the length of time the weaker the support for the inference. If it appears that there were circumstances of danger to the life in question, such as illness, enlistment for active service or participation in a perilous enterprise, the presumption will be overturned, at all events when reasonable inquiries have been made into the man's fate or whereabouts and without result. The presumption of life is but a deduction from probabilities, and must always depend on the accompanying facts."
28The presumption of continuance, it is said, is no more that a convenient way of describing a process of logic by reasoning involving the inferences from established facts: see R v Noonan [2002] NSWCA 46; (2002) 127 A Crim R 599 at [18].
29According to the defendant, any presumption of continuity is but a deduction from probabilities. The "accompanying fact" in this instance, is the sale of the Norton's on Norton Hotel. That fact shows that it cannot be presumed that any of the other 2011 assets remained unsold a year later; and the valuations relied on by the plaintiff are likely to be overstated by 6 or 7%. Overall, the defendant submitted that there is insufficient evidence to permit the Court to presume that the facts and figures, which prevailed in 2011, were the same in 2012, let alone prevail upon a realisation of a net position. According to the defendant, it follows that there is insufficient evidence to make findings about the position in 2012. I disagree. The plaintiff's accountant has updated the defendant's assets and liabilities to 30 December 2011. I am prepared to infer that the significant assets and liabilities have not materially changed in the six month period between 30 December 2011 and 30 June 2012.
30According to the defendant, the plaintiff's case appears to have proceeded as if separate question 1 asked simply for the net asset or liability position of the parties. But counsel for the defendant says that it does not. I agree. The separate questions ask for the values of each of the assets and liabilities of the parties. In relation to Mr Young, the assets and liabilities of each item are set out in the accountant's report. The separate question 1 does ask for the assets and liabilities and the respective values as at 30 June 2012 and I will adopt the other figures in the adjusted Financial Statement subject to what I say about Item 4.
31I now turn to consider the financial position of the defendant as at 30 June 2012.
32The defendant makes no submissions on the plaintiff's items 1 to 11 except for item 4. I shall refer to each item in turn.