On 9 March 2022, I delivered judgment in this matter in which I found in favour of the first defendant and ordered that the plaintiffs pay the first defendant's costs (Yisheng Construction Pty Ltd v City Garden Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 221).
By a notice of motion filed on 15 March 2022, the first defendant seeks to vary the order in relation to costs so that its costs are assessed on the ordinary basis up to 19 May 2021 and on an indemnity basis from 20 May 2021. In support of that application, the first defendant relies on an offer of compromise dated 19 May 2021 by which it offered to settle the whole proceedings on the basis that there be judgment for the first defendant with no order as to costs. The offer was expressed to be open for acceptance for 28 days. It was expressed to be made pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) r 20.26, which relevantly provides:
Making of offer
(1) In any proceedings, any party may, by notice in writing, make an offer to any other party to compromise any claim in the proceedings, either in whole or in part, on specified terms.
(2) An offer under this rule -
(a) must identify -
(i) the claim or part of the claim to which it relates, and
(ii) the proposed orders for disposal of the claim or part of the claim, including, if a monetary judgment is proposed, the amount of that monetary judgment, and
(b) if the offer relates only to part of a claim in the proceedings, must include a statement -
(i) in the case of an offer by the plaintiff, as to whether the balance of the proceedings is to be abandoned or pursued, or
(ii) in the case of an offer by a defendant, as to whether the balance of the proceedings will be defended or conceded, and
(c) must not include an amount for costs and must not be expressed to be inclusive of costs, and
(d) must bear a statement to the effect that the offer is made in accordance with these rules, and
(e) if the offeror has made or been ordered to make an interim payment to the offeree, must state whether or not the offer is in addition to that interim payment, and
(f) must specify the period of time within which the offer is open for acceptance.
(3) An offer under this rule may propose -
(a) a judgment in favour of the defendant -
(i) with no order as to costs, or
(ii) despite subrule (2)(c), with a term of the offer that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff a specified sum in respect of the plaintiff's costs, or
(b) that the costs as agreed or assessed up to the time the offer was made will be paid by the offeror, or
(c) that the costs as agreed or assessed on the ordinary basis or on the indemnity basis will be met out of a specified estate, notional estate or fund identified in the offer.
…
UCPR r 42.15A provides:
Where offer not accepted and judgment no less favourable to defendant
(1) This rule applies if the offer is made by the defendant, but not accepted by the plaintiff, and the defendant obtains an order or judgment on the claim no less favourable to the defendant than the terms of the offer.
(2) Unless the court orders otherwise -
(a) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant's costs in respect of the claim, to be assessed on the ordinary basis, up to the time from which the defendant becomes entitled to costs under paragraph (b), and
(b) the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant's costs in respect of the claim, assessed on an indemnity basis -
(i) if the offer was made before the first day of the trial, as from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made, and
(ii) if the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial, as from 11 am on the day following the day on which the offer was made.
It is common ground that in order for UCPR r 42.15A to be engaged, the offer had to be a genuine offer of compromise. Whether it was a genuine offer of compromise is determined objectively according to the circumstances of the particular case at the time the offer was made: Leach v The Nominal Defendant (QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd) (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 391 at [41]-[42] per McColl JA (with whom Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreed); The Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 120; (2006) 67 NSWLR 706 at [8].
In the present case, the offer was made after the first defendant had filed its Technology and Construction List response, served its evidence and attended a mediation. It may be inferred that it had incurred significant costs at the time the offer was made. However, there is no evidence before the Court of what those costs were. The total amount claimed by the plaintiffs was in the order of $900,000.
In some cases, a "walk away" offer may be regarded as a genuine offer of compromise: see Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341 at [30] per Santow JA; Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368 at [29]ff; Fabre v Lui (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 312 at [7]. But in those, the offer is usually made at a time when the offeror has already incurred significant costs or the offeror's case is strong.
In my opinion, the present case is finely balanced. The offer was made at a time when it can be inferred that the first defendant had incurred significant costs. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' claim could not be described as weak. As I explained in my earlier judgment, the essential question in the case was whether the defendant developer (the first defendant) agreed to become responsible for the liabilities of the builder to the plaintiff subcontractors and, if it did, what amount remained owing to the plaintiffs. Contrary to the first defendant's primary case, I concluded that the first defendant did agree to pay amounts owing by the builder in certain circumstances. The case ultimately failed because the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the first defendant had not paid the amounts the plaintiffs claimed. That position emerged during the course of the hearing. It was not an issue raised by the first defendant at the time the offer was made.
Taking these matters into account, I have concluded that the offer was not a genuine offer of compromise. It is true that the first defendant had incurred significant costs at the time the offer was made. However, at that time there was a real issue whether the first defendant was liable to pay amounts owing to the plaintiffs by the builder and there was a question of what those amounts, if any, were.
The first defendant submits, on the basis of the reasoning of Santow JA in Green, that it was in a difficult position. Unlike a plaintiff, a defendant has nothing to gain from the proceedings. Absent a special costs order, it will inevitably suffer a loss (the difference between solicitor/client and party/party costs). Consequently, the Court should more readily accept that an offer to forgo the recovery of costs by a defendant represents a genuine compromise. However, in my opinion, that principle does not alter the outcome in this case. The principle has most force where the outcome is binary (that is, total failure or total success). In those cases, a defendant with a strong case can do little more than offer to bear its own costs. The only alternative is to offer to "buy off" the plaintiff's unmeritorious claim. Such an offer would not serve the policy that the principles relating to offers of compromise are designed to foster.
In this case, however, the plaintiffs had a good case that the first defendant had agreed to pay for work undertaken by them. The real question was whether the first defendant had paid all the amounts owing by it in accordance with that agreement or arrangement and, if not, how much was still owing. On the facts of this case, that was something which was capable of compromise. It is true that the plaintiffs' case failed. But as I have said, it failed because the plaintiffs could not prove that the amounts they claimed were still owing by the first defendant.
Accordingly, the notice of motion filed on 15 March 2022 must be dismissed with costs.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 19 April 2022