Section 88(2)(a) - Section 41
42 The primary contest between the parties has been on the operation of s 41. The result of this contest will be determinative of the primary issue in this proceeding for the reasons I am about to give.
43 Lemnos contends that the trade mark PERSIAN FETTA was not capable of distinguishing Yarra Valley's goods from the goods of other persons, contending that the trade mark was not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish at the filing date.
44 The relevant question posed by s 41(2) is whether "the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods … in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered … from the goods … of other persons". Section 41 requires that a trade mark must possess the requisite capability to distinguish in order to be registrable. That is, the mark must distinguish (or be capable of distinguishing) Yarra Valley's goods from those of other persons.
45 This question must be considered in the context of the TMA as a whole, including s 17 of the TMA.
46 In determining whether a mark is capable of distinguishing the relevant goods the Registrar, and thus this Court, is obliged by s 41(3) to undertake an initial inquiry as to the extent to which Yarra Valley's mark is "inherently adapted" to distinguish Yarra Valley's goods from the goods of other persons.
47 The relevant date for assessing a trade mark's capability to distinguish is the priority date of the trade mark application.
48 An issue arose as to whether the claim under s 88(2)(a) of the TMA giving rise to the application of s 41 of the TMA should be decided under the terms of s 41 as it stood prior to the amendments affected by the Trade Marks Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). The aim of the relevant amendment to s 41 was merely to clarify the existing provision. Whatever form of that provision is adopted the same conclusion would be reached in this proceeding. This has been accepted by the parties.
49 In these reasons, I rely upon the existing provisions of s 41. In so doing, I do not necessarily endorse the view that the existing provisions are applicable. I see a strong basis for applying s 41 of TMA in the terms that stood at the time when Yarra Valley's trade mark "could have been opposed". However, I need not dwell on this issue any further.
50 Unlike the other grounds of examination, s 41 sets out, in effect, a decision tree to follow in the assessment of a trade mark's capability to distinguish.
51 I adopt the analysis of Branson J in Blount at [56]-[57]:
Subsections (3)-(6) of s 41 of the Act are designed to control the process by which the registrar is to reach a conclusion as to whether the trade mark for which registration is sought is capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services). If the trade mark is not so capable, the application for its registration must be rejected: s 41(2). Subsection (3) requires the registrar first to ``take into account the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons''. Having taken such matter into account, it is theoretically open to the registrar to conclude:
(a) that the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons and capable, on that basis alone, of so distinguishing the designated goods or services; or
(b) that the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; or
(c) that the trade mark is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, but there is uncertainty, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is actually capable of so distinguishing the designated goods or services.
52 If conclusion (a) is reached, the application will be accepted unless there are other reasons to reject the application. If conclusion (b) is reached, the application can proceed, if at all, only if s 41(6) is satisfied. Where the examiner comes to conclusion (c), and is satisfied of the matters referred to in s 41(5)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii), the application will be accepted because the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing. If not so satisfied, the examiner will reject the application.
53 The test for determining a trade mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish was formulated by Kitto J in Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (Michigan case) (1964) 111 CLR 511, at p 514, where his Honour described the test as follows:
…the question whether a mark is adapted to distinguish [is to] be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives - in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess - will think of the word and want to use it in connection with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it.
54 Justice Kitto, in Clark Equipment at p 513, also referred to Lord Parker of Waddington in Registrar of Trade Marks v W & G du Cros Ltd [1913] AC 624 at 634-635, where his Lordship said:
The applicant's chance of success in this respect [ie in distinguishing his goods by means of the mark, apart from the effects of registration] must, I think, largely depend upon whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their own goods.
55 In Clark Equipment at 517, Kitto J identified an improper motive as a "desire to get for themselves a benefit from the appellant's reputation".
56 The 'Clark Equipment test' has been applied on numerous occasions by the courts in determining a trade mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish pursuant to s 41 of the TMA: see eg Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273 at [18] [85] [146]; Blount at [506]-[507]; Philmac at [42]; Ocean Spray Cranberries at [26] and MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 561 at [572].
57 I do not consider that any party before me sought to reformulate this test. Each party accepted it as the current and correct statement of the law. To the extent it was suggested otherwise, I do not consider that Foster J in Alcon Inc v Bausch & Lomb (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1299 was suggesting any reformulation.
58 The test to be applied in assessing the extent to which a geographical term is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods is the same test that is applied to all trade marks. There is no separate test applicable to marks which may contain a geographical reference.
59 I do not accept that general laudatory epithets or geographical terms are inherently incapable of ever being used as trade marks: see Aldi Stores Ltd Partnership v Frito-Lay Trading Co GmbH (2001) 190 ALR 185, at [62].
60 The categories of descriptive words on the one hand and those that are capable of distinguishing goods and services on the other are not mutually exclusive. As Lockhart J said in Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326 at [335]-[336]:
The mere fact that a word is descriptive or has a descriptive flavour does not necessarily prevent it being distinctive of somebody's goods: see Re application of H N Brock & Co Ltd, for a trade mark ("Osowoolo") and trade marks ("Orlwoola") (1909) 26 RPC 683, 850, 854 (the Orlwoola case) and Re application of Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd to register a trade mark ("Perfection") (1909) 26 RPC 837 (the Perfection case).
If a word is prima facie descriptive the difficulty of establishing that it is distinctive of the plaintiff's goods is considerably increased. Also, if the plaintiff has not used the word simply for the purpose of distinguishing his own goods from those of others but primarily for the purpose of describing the particular kind of article to which he has applied it and only secondarily, if at all, for the purpose of distinguishing his own goods, it will be more difficult for him to establish that it is distinctive of them.
A word may be so totally descriptive of the goods concerned as to be unregistrable, for example, ELECTRICS for electrical apparatus: see Electrix Ltd's application for the registration of trade marks [1959] RPC 283 at 288. In less extreme cases the question is one of degree. There must be a sufficient degree of distinctiveness to counterbalance the descriptive character of the word: see Re application by J & P Coates Ltd for registration of a trade mark (1936) 53 RPC 355 at 368 and Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [1954] 1 WLR 554; [1954] 1 All ER 570. A word which is prima facie descriptive may become distinctive in connection with particular goods and yet retain its descriptive meaning: see Burberrys v J C Cording & Co Ltd (1909) 26 RPC 693 at 704, per Parker J and the Perfection case (supra) (at 857-858). But the word must, in order to become distinctive, have a new and secondary meaning different from its primary descriptive one and thus cease to be purely descriptive: see Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199 at 213, per Lord Herschell.
Distinctive means distinctive in the sense that the mark distinguishes the registered proprietor's goods from others of the same type in that market, though it does not mean that the goods must specifically identify the plaintiff as the source of those goods. Often the identity of the supplier will be unknown, but what is important is that a significant number of consumers in the relevant market identify the plaintiff's goods as coming from one trade source: see S Ricketson, par 25.8."
61 Nevertheless, geographical names do require specific attention.
62 In Clark Equipment, Kitto J said at [514]-[516]:
The fact that this is the test is the basic reason for the frequent refusal, exemplified in this Court by the case of Thomson v B Seppelt & Sons Ltd (1925) 37 CLR 305, to register as a trade mark a word of prima facie geographical signification. It is well settled that a geographical name, when used as a trade mark for a particular category of goods, may be saved by the nature of the goods or by some other circumstance from carrying its prima facie geographical signification, and that for that reason it may be held to be adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods. Where that is so it is because to an honest competitor the idea of using that name in relation to such goods or in such circumstances would simply not occur: see per Lord Simonds in the Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (1954) 71 RPC 150, at p 154. This is the case, for example, where the word as applied to the relevant goods is in effect a fancy name, such as "North Pole" in connexion with bananas: A Bailey & Co Ltd v Clark, Son & Morland Ltd (the Glastonbury Case) (1938) AC 557, at p 562; (1938) 55 RPC 253, at p 257 (see also the Livron Case (1937) 54 RPC 327, at p 339), or where by reason of user or other circumstances it has come to possess, when used in respect of the relevant goods, a distinctiveness in fact which eclipses its primary signification. Compare the case of a descriptive word: Dunlop Rubber Co's Application (1942) 59 RPC 134. But the probability that some competitor, without impropriety, may want to use the name of a place on his goods must ordinarily increase in proportion to the likelihood that goods of the relevant kind will in fact emanate from that place. A descriptive word is in like case: the more apt a word is to describe the goods, the less inherently apt it is to distinguish them as the goods of a particular manufacturer. This may seem at first blush a paradox, as Lord Simonds and Lord Asquith suggested in the Yorkshire Copper Works Case (1954) 71 RPC 150, at pp 154, 156, but surely not when Lord Parker's exposition of the subject is borne in mind.
The consequence is that the name of a place or of an area, whether it be a district or a county, a state or a country, can hardly ever be adapted to distinguish one person's goods from the goods of others when used simpliciter or with no addition save a description or designation of the goods, if goods of the kind are produced at the place or in the area or if it is reasonable to suppose that such goods may in the future be produced there. In such a case, the name is plainly not inherently, ie in its own nature, adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods; there is necessarily great difficulty in proving that by reason of use or other circumstances it does in fact distinguish his goods; and even where that difficulty is overcome there remains the virtual if not complete impossibility of satisfying the Registrar or the Court that the effect of granting registration will not be to deny the word to a person who is likely to want to use it, legitimately, in connexion with his goods for the sake of the geographical reference which it is inherently adapted to make. The leading authorities on the subject include the Yorkshire Copper Works Case (1954) 71 RPC 150 (the judgment of Lord Evershed in that case when it was in the Court of Appeal (1953) 70 RPC 1 contains a valuable discussion of the topic), the Glastonbury Case (1938) AC 557; (1938) 55 RPC 253 and the Liverpool Electric Cable Co Ltd's Application (1929) 46 RPC 99. These cases show, as the Registrar said in "Dan River" Trade Mark (1962) RPC 157, at p 160, in a decision which was endorsed by Lloyd-Jacob J, that there is a category of words which are so adapted for descriptive purposes that no amount of acquired distinctiveness can justify their registration, and that among such words are the names of large and important industrial towns or districts, and also of smaller towns or districts if they are a seat of manufacture of the goods for which registration is sought.
63 After referring to Kitto J's judgment in Clark Equipment, Bennett J in Bavaria NV v Bayerischer Brauerbund eV [2009] FCA 428 made the following comments:
This has led to the rejection of a word of prima facie geographical signification, particularly when it is used simpliciter and where goods of the kind for which it is sought to be registered are produced at the place or in the area (Clark Equipment at 515-516), or if it is reasonable to suppose that such goods in the future would be produced there (Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford (Trading as Oxford University Press) v Registrar of Trade Marks (1990) 24 FCR 1 at 23 per Gummow J). This is because other traders have a legitimate interest in using the geographical name to identify their goods and it is this interest which is not to be supplanted by permitting any one trader to effect trade mark registration (Clark Equipment at 514-515). Justice Gummow in University of Oxford came to the view that, if a court is in doubt as to the likelihood of another trader legitimately wishing to use a mark, the application should be refused (at 25). In Clark Equipment, Kitto J held that the word MICHIGAN was not adapted and was not capable of becoming adapted to distinguish earth-moving and other equipment. Similarly, OXFORD was refused for printed publications (University of Oxford) and COLORADO refused for bags (Colorado Group Ltd v Strandbags Group Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 506). In each case, the registration sought was of a word mark that connoted a geographical location.
64 I accept the contention of Yarra Valley that a number of English cases (including Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd to Register a Trade Mark ("Perfection") (1909) 26 RPC 837; the Liverpool Electric Cable Co Ltd's Application (1928) 46 RPC 99; A Bailey & Co Ltd v Clark, Son & Morland; Re Glastonbury's Trade Mark (1928) 55 RPC 253 and Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd's Application for a Trade Mark (1954) 71 RPC 150) indicate that the question of whether a mark referring to a geographical location is inherently adapted to distinguish is to be looked at on a sliding scale, with examples given of, at one end, "British", and at the other end, "Monte Rosa Cigarettes", "Teneriffe Boiler Plates" and "North Pole Bananas". The cases in which it was held that the marks referring to geographical locations were not registrable (Yorkshire, Liverpool and Glastonbury) were cases in which the geographical location was associated or could be associated with the goods in respect of which registration was sought.
65 It was submitted by Yarra Valley that the vice consistently identified by the courts in these cases and in Clark Equipment was the difficulty registration of the trade mark would present to honest traders wishing to refer to their products or potential products as originating in that geographical centre. For instance, a trader in copper tubes made in Yorkshire has a legitimate right to refer to its goods as Yorkshire copper tubes. Similarly, in the case of Glastonbury slippers, Liverpool cables and Michigan Cranes. Of course, context is important. Therefore, the term "North Pole Bananas" may be considered fanciful, because clearly bananas are not grown at the North Pole and therefore no honest trader would want to describe its bananas as coming from the North Pole.
66 Undoubtedly, then, the degree of association of the place with the goods may assist in determining where along the scale of inherent adaptability to distinguish a given mark lies. Even well known places such as "Sahara", "Atlantic" or "North Pole" could be capable of distinguishing a variety of products if no reputation or association for the designated goods or services exists in relation to the relevant geographical area. Again, it will all depend upon context.
67 In this respect, I should indicate that the context must be viewed in light of the product the subject of the trade mark registration. In the case of this proceeding, much mention was made of various products 'described' as Persian other than dairy (including cheese) products. I think there is a danger in relying upon such use of the word "Persian" in a context other than that of dairy products. However, as observed later, I do rely upon the use of the word "Persian" in other contexts to demonstrate the common usage or common heritage of the word, and in the context of considering the legitimate actions of honest traders in dairy products who may wish to adopt such a word. The honest traders are those who do or may wish to trade in Australia.