Costs
3 The matter in dispute is whether or not costs should be awarded in favour of the respondents against the applicants on an indemnity basis or on a party-party basis, the applicants accepting that costs should follow the event and that they should pay the respondents' costs on a party-party basis.
4 Although the applicants failed and, in particular, failed in relation to the claim that the bankruptcy notices should be set aside for fraud on the Supreme Court of New South Wales and bad faith in relation to the application brought in that Court, the factual basis of the claim of fraud was wider and fraud on the Supreme Court was not the only basis on which the applicants sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to go behind the judgment of that Court on which the bankruptcy notices were founded.
5 I therefore do not accept the submission that the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices were in the circumstances "a frivolous and thoroughly unjustified proceeding" in their entirety. I also do not accept the submission that the applicants, properly advised, should have known that they had no chance of success in relation to the entirety of their applications so as to found a presumption that the proceedings were commenced or continued for an ulterior motive or because of a wilful disregard of the known facts or the clearly established law: see generally Dal Pont, Law of Costs (3rd ed, 2013) at paragraph 16.51, referring to Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 401. In my opinion it is not one of those cases where it is appropriate to order costs on an indemnity basis in relation to the entirety of the proceedings in this Court.
6 I do, however, agree, in light of the history of the litigation in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in relation to the allegations of fraud and bad faith, culminating in the judgment of that Court on 13 March 2013, In the matter of Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2013] NSWSC 189, and the insubstantial evidentiary basis on which the claims of fraud and bad faith were put on the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices, that the respondents should have their costs of those claims paid by the applicants on an indemnity basis. I take into account in this respect the correspondence between the solicitors annexed to the affidavit of Irene Szikla affirmed 5 June 2014. I also note the practical difficulties which may be inherent in such an order, pointed to by counsel for the respondents.
7 Otherwise, in my opinion the appropriate order is that the applicants, and each of them, pay the costs of the respondents on a party-party basis, as agreed or assessed.
8 I do not accept the submission by counsel for the applicants that the making of costs orders against the applicants should be postponed until the outcome of any application for costs orders against the applicants' former legal representatives is known.
9 I now turn to that question. The first respondent seeks orders that leave be granted to issue subpoenas to the applicants' former solicitors and barrister with respect to legal advice provided to the applicants and that leave be granted to the first respondent to make an application for costs orders, presumably against those persons, within a month of the determination of the appeal proceedings in the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Similarly, the second and third respondents state that they intend to file an application for a personal costs order against the former solicitors for the applicants and that that may lead to an application for a personal costs order against the applicants' then counsel.
10 I say no more about either of those applications other than to note that they are not presently before me and the appropriate course is to await the filing of any such applications, supported by appropriate affidavits, including, in relation to the second and third respondents, a short explanation for why it was not possible to comply with order 6 made by me on 12 May 2014. Any question of subpoenas, in my view, should await the filing of any such application. Before leaving that topic I note that, as it seems to me at present, nothing out of the ordinary appears in relation to the position of the legal representatives, in that it seems their clients sought advice, they gave advice to their clients and the clients apparently acted on that advice.
11 For these reasons, in my view it is not appropriate to grant the leave sought by the respondents in relation to the issue of subpoenas. The first step, if the respondents be so advised, is to file and serve appropriate applications.