Consideration
24Mr UMT, as supported by Mr NET, contended that the Tribunal did not comply with subs (1) and (3) of section 45 of the CAT Act by allowing Mr JCN to represent Ms DCN and by not giving them the opportunity to be legally represented. This failure was said to be an "irregularity" within the meaning of s 53(4) and the Tribunal is thereby empowered to set aside the decision.
25There are a number of difficulties with this contention.
26First, a review of the reasons for decision and the recording of the hearing reveal that Mr JCN did not represent Ms DCN at the hearing on 29 July 2014. Ms DCN represented herself and Mr JCN gave evidence to the Tribunal as a witness when called upon to do so. Accordingly, the factual assertion made by Mr UMT is not established.
27Secondly, while s 45(3) provides that the Tribunal may grant leave for representation, there must be an application for leave made by a person to enliven the obligation of the Tribunal to exercise its discretion. There was no such application nor did Mr UMT or Mr NET seek representation or an adjournment to obtain representation. This claim is therefore not made out.
28Thirdly, but more fundamentally, I do not accept that s 53 applies to the circumstances as contended by Mr UMT. Section 53 focuses on non-compliance with provisions and procedural rules that create any irregularity. There is no definition of "irregularity" in the CAT Act but the plain English meaning, as set out in the Oxford English Dictionary, connotes "not in conformity with [a] rule or principle." Section 53(3) refers to "the provisions of the Act and procedural rules." While on its face this section may encompass a wide range of provisions and rules, including those provisions directed to procedural fairness, to interpret the effect of s 53(4) so broadly would unnecessarily trespass on the rights of appeal established in Part 6 of the CAT Act. Section 53 is a beneficial but practical provision intended to give effect to documents and decisions affected by technical procedural defects and to give the Tribunal discretion to correct such defects. This is clear from the language, heading and context of s 53 when read as a whole. Furthermore, s 53 is directed to the conduct and actions of the parties, not the Tribunal.
29Even if I am wrong on this and my interpretation of the provision is unduly restrictive, s 53(4) gives the Tribunal discretion to set aside, wholly or partly, proceedings or a decision in the proceedings. Having regard to the remedies available to parties under Part 6 and regulation 9, in my view it would not be appropriate for the discretion under s 53(4) to be exercised in circumstances where these alternative remedies could be more properly utilised. To exercise the discretion such circumstances would defeat the provisions of Part 6 and regulation 9 and undermine the objects of the CAT Act. Parties are entitled to finality in the determination of their disputes. Where there has been a hearing conducted and a decision is made by Tribunal, the decision should stand unless challenged on appeal in accordance with the provisions of the CAT Act or under the terms of regulation 9.
30I therefore reject Mr UMT's application to set aside the decision of the Tribunal pursuant to s 53(4) of the CAT Act.
31I also reject Mr UMT's application pursuant to s 63 of the CAT Act. It is clear from the terms of the section that this section is directed to the obvious errors in the text of the decision, not errors of law or errors of fact. This is reinforced by s 63(3) which provides specific examples of when there will be an error. Those errors include typographical errors and an accidental slip or omission.
32It is clear from Mr UMT's letter of 29 August 2014 that the matters he particularises as errors for the purposes of s 63 are in fact matters he disputes about the Tribunal's findings of fact. He does not agree with the conclusions made by the Tribunal on the evidence nor does he agree with the way the Tribunal exercised its discretion to make a financial management order. This is not an error contemplated by s 63. It is also relevant to note that only the President or the member who made the decision can correct the error and there is no power to set aside or vary the decision but merely to "correct." Section 63 therefore has limited scope and effect.
33Mr UMT further contended that the decision "failed to protect his mother's human rights." This could not be described as an irregularity or an obvious error. Mr UMT explains this ground in his written submissions as follows:
The application for a financial manager for my mother is unnecessary and has no ground, substance and no adequate supporting evidence, because:
My mother granted her Power of Attorney to my brother and me on 22 October 2010. The Power of Attorney was duly executed in accordance with the Power of Attorney Act 2003 with the intention that it will continue to be effective even if she lacks capacity through loss of mental capacity after its execution.
My brother and I, as Attorneys, have acted in the best interests of the Principal. The Power of Attorney has operated and been in effect in accordance with the Power of Attorney Act 2003.
34This ground seeks to challenge the factual findings of the Tribunal and the exercise of its discretion to make an order under s 25E of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW). It is clear from the reasons for decision that the Tribunal considered the existence of the Power of Attorney dated 22 October 2010 when making its decision. Mr UMT and Mr NET do not agree with that decision. As parties they had the right to appeal the decision, either on a question of law, or with leave, to Appeal Panel of the Tribunal. They did not do so.
35I therefore find that the application made by Mr UMT and Mr NET must fail and is therefore dismissed.