GROUNDS OF APPEAL
16 In the notice of appeal filed in this Court on 26 March 2009 in which the appellant appeals against the decision of the Federal Magistrate, the appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal:
1. The Tribunal made its decision relied on information, which is incorrect.
2. The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to explain, in the form of a document, the reason why the Tribunal considered some particulars of information relevant to the matter.
3. The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to assess the possibility of the risk the applicant face if he return to China.
17 It will be noticed that the three grounds of appeal in this Court are, on the face of it, different from the three grounds of appeal before the Federal Magistrate. None asserts error by the Federal Magistrate but appear to raise fresh grounds for judicial review of the decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal, or at least variation of the grounds argued before the Federal Magistrate.
18 Counsel for the first respondent, taking a generous approach to the Notice of Appeal in circumstances where the applicant is self‑represented, accepts that the grounds in substance impugne the Federal Magistrate's decision for error of law and otherwise raise a general unreasonableness argument that the Federal Magistrate by inference was bound to deal with. Accordingly, counsel submits:
(1) The Federal Magistrate's decision was not attended with any error, let alone appealable error.
(2) The Tribunal did not commit any error, let alone jurisdictional error.
(3) There is accordingly no basis for the appellant to obtain any relief from this Court on further appeal from the Federal Magistrate.
(4) There is, in any event no demonstrated unreasonableness in the Tribunal's decision that the Federal Magistrate should have detected.
19 It is well established that a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal is only available to be set aside upon judicial review if it involves "jurisdictional error". Absent that, a decision refusing an applicant a protection visa will be "privative clause decision" for the purpose of s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 from which no appeal or relief on judicial review is available: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76].
20 It is now well established by Plaintiff S157/2002 that an error by an administrative tribunal such as the Refugee Review Tribunal will only constitute jurisdictional error if the Tribunal:
● identifies a wrong issue;
● asks the wrong question;
● ignores relevant material; or
● relies on irrelevant material;
in such a way that the Tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the relevant statute.
21 It is also accepted (see Plaintiff S157/2002 211 CLR 476 at [76]) that there may also be jurisdictional error if a tribunal fails to discharge "imperative duties" or to observe "inviolable limitations or restraints" upon which its exercise of administrative powers is conditioned. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82]; Lobo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 200 ALR 359 at [45].
22 However, where a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal refusing an applicant a protection visa turns entirely on an assessment of that applicant's credibility, a challenge to the Tribunal's findings and conclusions can only amount to an impermissible attempt to undertake further merits review. This proposition has been affirmed in a number of cases. Recent examples include SZKMV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 157 at [18] per Stone J; SZMFH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 105 at [14] - [15] per Graham J; SZMLR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1853 at [11] per Spender J.
23 Accordingly, a finding by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which is not capable of being set aside on the basis of jurisdictional error, is a factual one which is not open to challenge by way of judicial review or on subsequent appellant proceedings: see NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10].
24 The first ground of appeal as stated before me is that "The Tribunal made its decision relied on information, which is incorrect". It is not open on this appeal to seek a further review of the merits of the appellant's case in this Court. In any event, the Federal Magistrate has pointed out that the Refugee Review Tribunal had before it a variety of information and that appellant had the opportunity to make written and oral representations to it, which he did. The Tribunal ultimately rejected the appellant's accounts of his practice of Falun Gong for reasons tied to its assessment of his credibility, not by reference to other information concerning the philosophy of Falun Gong itself. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal must necessarily fail. No error of law on the part of the Federal Magistrate is discernible. Nor is any relevant jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
25 The second ground of appeal as stated before me is that "The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to explain, in the form of a document, the reason why the Tribunal considered some particulars of information relevant to the matter". No further particularisation of this ground is provided and none was provided at the hearing by the appellant. It purports to raise the ground of jurisdictional error, occurred because the Tribunal took into account irrelevant matters. On the face of the Tribunal's decision and the decision of the Federal Magistrate, the Court finds difficulty in understanding what irrelevant information was taken into account. The applicant does not point to any. He simply says the Tribunal should have accepted his testimony. It certainly cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to explain the basis for its rejection of the appellant's claim for a protection visa. To the contrary, it set out in detail and with clarity its reasons for the findings of fact it made and its ultimate lack of the requisite "satisfaction" for the purposes of s 36 and s 65 of the Migration Act 1958. Ground two must necessarily fail. No appealable error on the part of the Federal Magistrate is discernable. Furthermore, there is no discernable jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
26 Ground three before me is that "The Refugee Review Tribunal failed to assess the possibility of the risk the applicant face if he return to China (sic)". A relevant consideration before the Tribunal was whether a genuine Falun Gong practitioner would face risk of harm if he or she were required to return to China. In that regard, the Tribunal clearly held that a genuine practitioner of Falun Gong would face such risk. The reason why the appellant's claim before the Tribunal failed was that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was a genuine Falun Gong practitioner. In those circumstances, there was no other relevant Convention reason raised by the applicant or arguably raised for consideration by the evidence before the Tribunal, for the Tribunal to consider the protection visa should be granted to the appellant. The factual assessment made by the Tribunal concerning the appellant's claimed status as a genuine Falun Gong practitioner was open to it. Accordingly, the third ground of appeal must fail. There is no discernable error on the part of the Federal Magistrate in his decision. Nor is there any discernable jurisdictional error on the part of the Refugee Review Tribunal.
27 This is a case that throughout has revolved around the credibility of the appellant's claim that he is a genuine Falun Gong practitioner. The Tribunal found against him in that regard. The appellant simply says the Tribunal made a wrong decision. Nonetheless, the basis upon which the credibility of the appellant was rejected were entirely open to the Tribunal. Where the Tribunal is not affirmatively satisfied that the prerequisites for the grant of a protection visa exists, the Migration Act 1958 requires that the application be dismissed: see SZGZQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 62 at [13] - [14] per Greenwood J.
28 As noted above, counsel for the first respondent also accepted that on a generous view it may be said that the appellant has also challenged the "reasonableness" of the decision of the Tribunal that he was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner, and the (implied) decision of the Federal Magistrate rejecting his claim of jurisdictional error in that regard. There is an issue whether what is referred as "Wednesbury unreasonableness" (a reference to the principles stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesdbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229 - 231) are applicable in relation to the decision of the Minister (or delegate) under s 36 and s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 where the Minister must be "satisfied" about certain facts: see generally Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshutu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [121] - [145] per Gummow J. Whether or not one were in fact to ask whether a reasonable person on the basis of the materials before them could have made the decision that the Tribunal made in this case, or whether one seeks to ascertain whether the facts existed to enable the decision‑maker to be satisfied of the relevant matters, I do not consider that the Tribunal committed any jurisdictional error or that the Federal Magistrate failed to detect such error. Having regard to the information before the Tribunal, the way the Tribunal considered all the material before it and the factors the Tribunal took into account in not accepting the evidence of the appellant, it was entitled to be satisfied on review of the delegate's decision that the appellant was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner and consequently that there was no Convention based reason to grant the protection visa.