It was submitted on behalf of the respondent, Hoyts, that the jury's answer to question 1 recognised that in what was described as a "but for" sense the respondent's failure to display a sign warning that the floor was wet played a part in the appellant's fall while the answer to question 2 indicated that as a matter of "ordinary common sense" the "whole real cause of the accident" was his lack of care. Nothing in the wording of the two questions suggests that such a distinction should be made. Nothing in the judge's instructions to the jury and, as far as I am able to tell from the limited parts of counsel's addresses to the jury that are available in transcript, nothing in those addresses invited such reasoning on the part of the jury. Indeed, as has been noted earlier, the whole question of causation received scant attention in the judge's charge or, it seems, in counsels' addresses. Those are reasons enough to reject this contention of the respondent but it is as well to say also that the contention is one which does not accord with the Court's decision in March v Stramare (E & M H) Pty Ltd[10]. There the Court recognised that causation is essentially a question of fact to be answered by reference to common sense and experience and that the "but for" test has an important, but not decisive role to play in resolving questions of causation[11]. Indeed, as is pointed out there[12], the introduction of apportionment legislation freed the courts from what had been seen as the desirability, if not necessity, of finding a single or effective cause of the injury of which complaint was made. The respondent's contention about the construction of the jury's answers to questions 1 and 2 appears to assume that the jury were, or should have been, seeking a single or "the effective" cause of the appellant's fall.