WS v R - [2023] NSWCCA 52 - NSWCCA 2022 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCCA

WS v R

[2023] NSWCCA 52

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2022-10-05|Before: Beech-Jones CJ, Davies J, Hamill J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2022-10-05

Before

Beech-Jones CJ, Davies J, Hamill J

Catchwords

[1999] HCA 37 SB v R [2020] NSWCCA 207 R v Bauer (a pseudonym) (2018) 266 CLR 56
[2018] HCA 40 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[1999] HCA 37 SB v R [2020] NSWCCA 207 R v Bauer (a pseudonym) (2018) 266 CLR 56[2018] HCA 40 Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584

Judgment (15 paragraphs)

[1]

Solicitors: Ross Hill & Associate Solicitors (Applicant) Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent) File Number(s): 2017/204223, 2018/387896, 2019/94397 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court Jurisdiction: Criminal Date of Decision: 28 August 2020 Before: Woodburne SC DCJ File Number(s): 2017/204223, 2018/387896, 2019/94397

[2]

HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] Following a trial before a jury, the Applicant (WS) was convicted of 16 sexual offences against three children (BB, EH and SF, collectively the complainants), who were aged between five and 15 years at the time of the offences. The offending against BB, who was the sister of the Applicant's former partner, occurred from 1996-2000; the offending against EH, who was the Applicant's niece, occurred from 2003-2013; and the offending against SF, who was the Applicant's stepdaughter, occurred from 2008-2011. The Applicant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years and six months. At trial, the Crown adduced evidence of complaints made by each of BB, EH and SF to other persons regarding the Applicant's offending. The Crown relied upon the complaint evidence both as "evidence of the truth [of the complaint] and the consistency of the complainants' conduct". In summing-up to the jury, the trial judge gave directions specifically concerning the complaint evidence of BB, EH and SF, in a form prepared by the Crown and approved by the Applicant's counsel. The jury was directed that "you can use [the complaints] as some evidence independent of the evidence given to you of that incident by [the complainant] in the witness box". The trial judge then noted that this direction was "in addition to [a previous] direction … about the Crown relying on the evidence as evidence that makes [the complainants'] account[s] more believable" and was qualified by "the fact that [if] a person says something on more than one occasion [that] does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate. A false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated on more than one occasion". There was no application for a further or revised direction concerning the complaint evidence and, on the following day, the jury returned its guilty verdicts. The Applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. The principal issues on appeal were:

whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury that it could use the complaint evidence as evidence of the truth of the complainants' allegations against the Applicant (the conviction ground); and
whether the Applicant's sentence was manifestly excessive (the sentence ground). The Court held (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, Davies and Hamill JJ agreeing), refusing leave to appeal against conviction, granting leave to appeal against sentence and dismissing the appeal: As to the conviction ground If evidence of complaint is properly admitted without restriction, then it is evidence of the facts asserted. The ground of appeal as formulated was misconceived: [31] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL); [52] (Davies J); [53] (Hamill J). A miscarriage of justice was not occasioned by the trial judge's reference to the complaint evidence as "independent": [34] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL); [52] (Davies J); [53] (Hamill J). SB v R [2020] NSWCCA 207; R v Bauer (a pseudonym) (2018) 266 CLR 56; [2018] HCA 40; Kassab (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 46, considered. The trial judge's directions, referring to the complaint evidence as "independent", appear simply to have been pointing out that evidence of complaint that was broadly similar to oral evidence given by the complainants was also evidence of the facts asserted, which had been given on an occasion independent of or separate to the oral evidence adduced at trial: [35]-[36] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL); [52] (Davies J); [53] (Hamill J). Long (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 212 considered.
Although the hearsay complaint evidence was not "independent", in that its sources were the complainants, in the circumstances of the trial and in light of the formulation of the relevant directions, there was no prospect that the jury misused the complaint evidence: [56]-[57] (Hamill J). As to the sentence ground
The sentence was not manifestly excessive, in that the aggregate sentence properly reflects the total criminality of the Applicant's conduct. Over a period that exceeded 15 years, the applicant used his position in a family to prey upon three vulnerable young girls and use them as sexual objects. His depraved conduct left them devastated. Taking account of the potential for accumulation of the indicative sentences, a more severe aggregate sentence is readily conceivable: [48]-[49] (Beech-Jones CJ at CL); [52] (Davies J); [53], [58] (Hamill J). Lee v R [2020] NSWCCA 244; Aryal v R [2021] NSWCCA 2, approved.

[4]

The Offences

The offences of which the applicant was convicted, the essential facts of the offending, the trial judge's finding of their objective seriousness, the maximum sentences and the sentences indicated by the sentencing judge pursuant to s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the "Sentencing Act") are set out in the following table (which is based on a similar table provided by the Crown): Count Charge Particulars Finding of Objective Serious Maximum penalties Indicative sentence 1 Indecent assault with person BB, then aged under 10 years. Between 1 January 1996 and 1 May 1997 at Glebe. Just below the mid-range of objective seriousness 10 years 2 years 9 s 61M(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) While BB was asleep downstairs on a lounge, the applicant pulled back the sheets and touched her on the breasts in a "swiping motion". No SNPP months 3 Aggravated indecent assault, BB. Between 14 December 1997 and 31 December 1998 at Glebe. Within the mid-range of objective seriousness 7 years 4 years s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant approached BB in bed. He used his thumb to "touch, swipe or graze her vagina" and ran his finger over the top of her underwear. No SNPP 4 Aggravated act of indecency towards BB. Between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2000 at Bidwill committed an act of indecency on BB. Falling within the mid-range of seriousness or slightly above 5 years 2 years s 61O(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) BB was asleep on a futon and the applicant masturbated in front of her while pornography played on television. No SNPP 6 months 5 Aggravated indecent assault, EH. Between 1 January 2003 and 17 February 2005 at Mt Druitt. In or just above the mid-range 7 years 4 years 6 months s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant told EH to go into her bedroom and take off her clothes. While they were both naked, EH sat on the applicant with her vaginal area touching his penis. He used his hands on her hips to move her back and forth on him. 5-year SNPP applied from 1/2/2003 6 Aggravated indecent assault, EH. Between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2005 at Mt Druitt. In the mid-range of objective seriousness 7 years 4 years s 61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) While the applicant and EH watched television, the applicant rubbed her vagina inside and outside of her underpants. 5-year SNPP applied from 1/2/2003 NPP 2 years 8 months 7 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 10 years and over and under 14 years. Between 1 January 2009 and 31 October 2011 at Goulburn. Serious instance of an offence of sexual intercourse: victim taken to remote location; applicant in position of trust and authority 16 years 5 years s 66C(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) In the applicant's blue van in a paddock, the applicant touched EH's vagina and clitoris. No SNPP Indecent assault EH, a person under 16 years of age. Between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2011 at Goulburn. 10 years 4 years 8 S 61M(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) In his room at her home, the applicant grabbed EH's hand and placed it on his penis, moving it back and forth. Within the mid-range or slightly above the mid-range of objective seriousness SNPP 8 years 6 months NPP 3 years 9 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 10 years or over and under 14 years. Between 1 January 2010 and 1 August 2011 at Goulburn. At the mid-range or slightly above the mid-range 16 years 6 years s 66C(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant called EH into his bedroom. There was pornography playing on television and both were naked. The applicant made EH suck his penis. No SNPP 10 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 10 years or over and under 14 years. Between 1 January 2010 and 1 August 2011 at Goulburn. At the mid-range or slightly above the mid-range 16 years 6 years s 66C(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) At the same time as the count 9 incident, the applicant performed cunnilingus on EH. No SNPP 11 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 10 years or over and under 14 years. Between 1 January 2010 and 1 August 2011 at Goulburn. At or slightly above the mid-range 16 years 6 years s 66C(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) In the family home, the applicant made EH suck his penis. He grabbed her head during and moved it back and forth. No SNPP 12 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 14 years or over and under 16 years. Between 1 May 2013 and 23 December 2013 at Airds. At or just above the middle of the range of objective seriousness 10 years 6 years s 66C(3) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant came into EH's bedroom, took off her bed covers and pulled down her shorts and underwear. He digitally penetrated her vagina. No SNPP 3 months 13 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 14 years or over and under 16 years. On or about 24 December 2013 at Airds. At or slightly above the mid-range 10 years 5 years s 66C(3) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant came into her bedroom while she pretended to sleep. He pulled her pants down. At one point the applicant rubbed inside EH's vagina, on the clitoris. No SNPP 14 Have sexual intercourse with EH, a person aged 14 years or over and under 16 years. On or about 24 December 2013 at Airds. At or slightly above the mid-range 10 years 6 years s 66C(3) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) During the same incident as Count 13, the applicant attempted to engage in penile-vaginal intercourse and penetrated her. No SNPP 6 months Indecent assault, SF, a person under 16 years of age. Between 14 March 2008 and 13 March 2009 at Goulburn. 10 years 3 years 15 s 61M(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) While SF was watching a movie, the applicant told her to sit in the corner. The applicant said, "if you let me touch you, you can come out". SF said that the applicant put his hands "all over and down there" on her vagina. Just below the mid-range SNPP 8 years 6 months NPP 2 years 4 months 16 Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse with SF. Between 14 March 2008 and 13 March 2009 at Goulburn. Serious instance of the offence: applicant persisted; breach of trust and associated authority; substantial age difference between the applicant and victim 25 years 5 years 17/Alt s 66B Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) The applicant took SF into bedroom, threw her onto the bed and removed both their pants, with the intention of having sexual intercourse. No SNPP 6 months 18 Commit act of indecency, SF. Between 14 March 2009 and 13 March 2011 at Goulburn. At or slightly above the mid-range 7 years 3 years s 61O(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Masturbated in front of SF to the point of ejaculation in a stall in a toilet block while they attended her brother's soccer game. No SNPP 6 months

[5]

As noted, there were three victims of the applicant's offences, BB, EH and SF. As the above table makes clear, BB was the subject of counts 1−4 on the indictment which were alleged to have been committed between 1996 and 2000. BB was born in July 1988 and was aged between 8 and 12 during the period in which counts 1 to 4 were said to be have been committed. The applicant was born in January 1971. During 1996 BB's elder sister, RB, commenced dating the applicant, who was then 25 years of age. On some occasions the applicant stayed overnight at BB's home. The applicant and RB separated sometime in 2000 or 2001.
The various offences of which the applicant was convicted in relation to BB and the basal facts on which the convictions were based are set out in the above table. The applicant was acquitted of count 2 on the indictment. This count charged the applicant with committing an offence under s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) against BB. The Crown alleged that the applicant placed his hands on BB's inner thigh while he was driving with other members of the family in the car in early 1997.
EH was born in February 1998. EH was the subject of counts 5−14 on the indictment. She was between 5 and 15 years old at the time of those counts. EH's aunty, Belinda, commenced a relationship with the applicant in March 2005. They were married in 2009. EH said that during the time she grew up she and her mother often lived with the applicant and Belinda. In May 2013, EH's mother moved away but EH remained with the applicant and her aunty Belinda to complete Year 10.
EH gave evidence in support of counts 5−14. EH also gave evidence of other (uncharged) acts by the applicant whereby he would come into her bedroom and try and wake her, although she would pretend that she was still asleep. EH said that the applicant pulled the covers down, pulled her pants down, slowly rubbed her vagina and put his finger inside her vagina "but not inside the hole". EH said that the applicant would tell her she was beautiful and say "[f]uck me". EH also said that when she lived in Goulburn the applicant drove her to the "lighthouse" (ie, the war memorial) where he touched and licked her vagina and put her hand on his penis. EH said that occurred "maybe three times a week" and sometimes he ejaculated.
SF was born in March 2002. Her mother is Belinda, i.e. EH's aunty. The applicant is her stepfather. As noted, Belinda commenced a relationship with the applicant in March 2005. SF's evidence was adduced by playing three interviews she had with the police. The first was conducted in March 2012. In that interview SF denied that she had been sexually abused. The second interview was conducted in July 2017 and the third interview was conducted in August 2017. These latter two interviews contain the evidence of SF that formed the basis for counts 15−18. In the third interview, SF disclosed other (uncharged) acts of the applicant towards her, being an occasion when the applicant pulled down her pants and put her on his lap while he was teaching her how to drive and another occasion when the applicant made her watch pornography with him.

[7]

Evidence of BB's Complaint

In her evidence, BB was taken to a police statement she provided in 2018 in which she recounted seeing her sister, RB, in 2008 and telling her, "I don't know how to tell you but I need to tell you as I'm scared for [RB's son] … [because the applicant] used to touch me when I was younger". In the statement, BB said that RB asked her why she did not tell anyone to which she responded, "[b]ecause I didn't think anyone would believe me".
In her evidence at the trial RB said that BB told her, "I have to tell you this because I'm scared [the applicant's] going to do it" to RB's son. BB said to RB, "when I was younger, when we were all living in Glebe he touched me". RB said that she replied, "[w]hat do you mean he touched you?" and BB replied, "[h]e touched me on the breasts, on the outside of my clothing and tried to touch me on the inner thigh".
RB recalled BB saying that she wanted to report it to the police as she was concerned for RB's son. RB said they attended Mount Druitt Police Station and spoke to an officer who took notes. RB recalled that BB told the police that she "wanted them to do something without involving her".
The officer they spoke to was Detective Senior Constable Emma Greig. Detective Greig gave evidence at the trial. She could not recall speaking to them but described the contents of a "COPS" entry she made of their attendance. The entry in the COPS report was, in some respects, inconsistent with the evidence of BB and RB about what the police were told. The COPS report records that the "incidents occurred when [BB] went to stay at the home of the [applicant]", that he would "[c]ome into her room when she was in bed" and "[p]ull her blankets down and would touch her vagina". The entry also records that "[t]he victim stated that there were incidents of penetration", although Detective Greig could not recall whether that was a typing error to the effect that it should have stated "no incidents of penetration". Detective Greig agreed that it was "highly unlikely" that BB would have used the word "penetration".

[10]

The Summing-Up

In opening to the jury and in closing address, the Crown Prosecutor referred to the evidence of complaint both as "evidence of the truth [of the complaint] and the consistency of the complainant's conduct".
The Summing-up commenced on Friday 20 March 2020 and continued the following Monday 23 March 2020 and Tuesday 24 March 2020. On the Friday, the trial judge referred to the evidence of complaints by BB but directed the jury that they could only use it in assessing her credibility. Hence, the instructions to the jury on this topic included the following: "This evidence goes only to consistency of conduct, if you find it to be that, and therefore it may impact upon your assessment of credibility, but you can only use the evidence of the complaint in this way. You cannot use it as any evidence that the assault occurred. The Crown does not lead that evidence as itself being able to prove the charge. You can only find the charge proved on the evidence given in the courtroom and not what someone said at some other place or time. … I should point out to you of course, the fact that a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate. A false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated on one or more occasions." (emphasis added)
Later in the Summing-up on the Friday, her Honour gave a similar direction in relation to the complaint evidence concerning EH including the emphasised portion above. After the jury were sent home for the weekend, the Crown Prosecutor queried the limited scope of these directions. The Crown Prosecutor circulated a draft direction overnight. The next morning, Counsel for the applicant told the trial judge that he had "no problem with [the direction] whatsoever". Her Honour then directed the jury in accordance with the draft prepared by the Crown Prosecutor as follows.
Her Honour reminded the jury that, on the previous day, they had been directed that the complaint evidence given by BB and EH could not be used "as any evidence that the assault occurred" and that the "Crown did not lead evidence as itself being able to prove the charge". Her Honour then corrected that direction as follows in relation to BB: "The situation is the Crown does in fact rely on the complaint evidence as evidence of the truth of the evidence given by S and E. I summarised the evidence yesterday from S and E which was to the effect that S complained to her sister R that she had been touched sexually, and that she was crying when she made that complaint. The direction I give you is as follows. If you find the complaint was made substantially to the effect that S was indecently assaulted or touched by the accused, then you can use evidence of what was said in the complaint as some evidence that such an assault did occur. That is, you can use it as some evidence independent of the evidence given to you of that incident by S in the witness box. The law says because of the circumstances in which the complaint was made, you are entitled to use what was said in that complaint as evidence of the truth of what the complainant alleged against a person. You are entitled to find that the complaint was made at a time and in a manner that would indicate that the allegation was reliable, that is that the allegation is less likely to have been fabricated by the complainant, and more likely to be accurate. The Crown also says that S's distressed state is consistent with the truth of her evidence. It is a matter for you whether you draw that conclusion in this case and so treat the complaint as evidence of the alleged assault by the accused in addition to the evidence that has been given about it during the trial. If you do use it as some evidence of the assault complained of, then what weight you give it is again a matter for you. This is in addition to the direction I gave you yesterday about the Crown relying on the evidence as evidence that makes her account more believable. Again, it is for you to decide whether the complaint was made, but if you are satisfied that it was, then the question you should ask yourself is did the complainant act in a way you would expect her to act if she had been assaulted as she said she was? Is what she did the sort of conduct you would expect of a person who has been assaulted in that way? If you think that the complainant has done what you would expect someone in her position to do, that may support the Crown case because you may find that there is consistency between the complainant's conduct and the allegation that she makes against the accused. On the other hand, if the complainant has not acted in the way you would have expected someone to act after being assaulted as she described, then that may indicate that the allegation is false. But bear in mind when considering this issue that there may be good reasons why the complainant did not raise the allegation immediately following the alleged assault, and that a failure to do so does not mean that the allegation must be false." (emphasis added)
The trial judge then gave the same direction in relation to the evidence that EH complained to Mandi, Cheyenne, SD and Corey as well as the evidence that EH was in a distressed state when she told her friends what happened. As part of that direction, her Honour told the jury that it could use that evidence "as some evidence independent of the evidence given to you by [EH] in the witness box" and that the direction was "in addition" to the direction that had been given the previous day "about the Crown relying on the evidence as evidence that makes her account more believable".
Her Honour then addressed the case concerning the counts on the indictment that concerned SF. On the previous day the trial judge did not reach the point of giving any direction concerning the complaint evidence concerning her. Her Honour identified the complaint evidence concerning SF as the evidence that SF complained to her grandmother, Shenayah, SD and Chenelle. Her Honour then gave a direction to the jury about the evidence which included the following: "It is for you to decide whether the complaint was made and what its contents were. If you find that the complaint was made substantially to the effect, namely that [SF] was sexually molested or touched, indecently assaulted or sexually assaulted by [the applicant], as she described to others, then you can use evidence of what was said in that complaint as some evidence that such an assault did occur. That is, you can use it as some evidence independent of the evidence given to you of that by the complainant [SF] in the witness box. … Secondly, the Crown asserts that the evidence of complaint also has another purpose. The Crown contends that the fact that the complainant [SF] raised the allegation against the accused at the time and in the manner she did would lead to you to accept the evidence she gave in the witness box. In other words, it makes her evidence more believable than if she had not raised the allegation as she did… Of course, the fact that a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate. A false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated on more than one occasion." (emphasis added)
Immediately after the trial judge gave this direction, her Honour asked, "[i]s there anything to be raised [about the complaint directions] before I move on?", to which Counsel for the applicant replied "[n]o". Her Honour completed the balance of the Summing-up on Tuesday 24 March 2020. The jury then retired to consider its verdict. There was no application for any redirection or further direction on behalf of the Crown or the applicant. The jury returned its verdicts the following day.

[11]

Conviction Appeal

As noted, the sole ground of appeal is that the trial judge "erred in directing the jury that they could use the complaint evidence of the complainant as evidence of the truth of the facts" the subject of the complaint.
The applicant's submissions contended that the complaint evidence "should not have been described as evidence of the facts of the allegations with the authority of her Honour's office and her description as it being the prevailing law". The applicant relied on the judgment of Rothman J in SB v R [2020] NSWCCA 207 at [109]−[125] ("SB"). In SB, the trial judge, like the trial judge in this case, had directed the jury that it could use the complaint evidence "as some evidence independent of the evidence given to you of that incident by [the complainant] either in the JIRT interviews or in the pre-recorded evidence" (at [86]). In that part of the judgment relied on by the appellant, his Honour repeatedly (and correctly) noted that, if evidence of complaint is properly admitted without restriction, then it is evidence of the facts asserted (at [110], [111] and [116]; see also Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 60 and 66(2); R v Bauer (a pseudonym) (2018) 266 CLR 56; [2018] HCA 40 at [89] and [92]; Kassab (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 46 at [339]−[340]). It follows that the ground of appeal as formulated is misconceived.
However, in the passages from SB relied on by the applicant, Rothman J also referred to passages from the judgment of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37 ("Papakosmas"), where their Honours addressed the position at common law in relation to complaint evidence. Their Honours observed at [10] that "[e]vidence of complaint cannot constitute corroboration in the technical sense, because it is not independent of the complainant." Based on that statement, Rothman J observed that "evidence of complaint is neither corroborative nor independent of the complainant" and that it followed that in that case the trial judge "erred in directing the jury that the evidence of the complaint was independent evidence" (SB at [127]). However, his Honour added that (SB at [128]−[130]): "However, the establishment of that error only goes part of the way necessary for Ground 2 to be successful. As has been extracted, the trial Judge directed the jury that the fact that a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate. That passage qualifies the reference to the complaint being 'independent' dramatically. It provides the context within which the comment relating to the evidence being 'independent' is contained and through which it must be understood. There is some doubt that the jury would have understood the latter comments as to the effect on truth of the repetition of a statement as related to the description of the complaint as 'independent', albeit it is difficult to relate it to anything else. Moreover, transcript does not always do justice to a judge's Summing-up, which is delivered orally. It seems to me, while the use of the term 'independent' was erroneous and should be avoided in the future, given the latter statements, the use of the term 'independent' did not result, in and of itself, in a miscarriage of justice and the ground of appeal must fail."
In SB Rothman J concluded that, upon a consideration of the Summing-up as a whole, the jury were not misled in that case as to the character or effect of the complaint evidence. In this case, with the complaint evidence concerning SF the trial judge also directed the jury (on Monday 23 March 2020) that just because "a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate". The position is no different in substance with the complaint evidence concerning BB and EH. The complaint directions that her Honour gave on Friday 20 March 2020 in relation to their evidence included that statement. When her Honour returned to "correct" that direction on Monday 23 March 2020, it was made clear that it was in "addition to the direction" given the previous Friday. Thus, in relation to all three complaints, the jury were told that "the fact that a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate" and that a "false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated on more than one occasion".
It follows that SB does not provide any support for the contention that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned in this case by the reference in the Summing-up to the complaint evidence being "independent".
For my part I am doubtful that, even if it is considered in isolation, a direction to the jury that they could treat complaint evidence "as some evidence independent of the evidence given to by [the complainant] in the witness box" is erroneous. Considered in the context of this case, the direction appears to be simply pointing out that evidence of complaint that is broadly similar to oral evidence given by a complainant is also evidence of the events in question and that it has been given on an independent or separate occasion to the oral evidence adduced in the trial.
The position was explained by Basten JA in Long (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 212 at [11]−[13] as follows: "Heard in context, the word 'independent' was used, and would have been understood by the jury, in the sense of 'separate from'. Lawyers might read the term differently. At a time when corroboration was required with respect to particular kinds of evidence, and particular offences, corroborative evidence had to be 'independent' of that which it corroborated: that is, it had to come from a separate source. It was sometimes described as a rule (really a principle) against self-corroboration. The law no longer requires corroboration and no issue arose as to any warning about unreliability in the present case. There is no reason to suppose that the jury would have misunderstood the word 'independent' in the context of the directions. The underlying basis of the challenge was that in SB v R Rothman J stated (with the agreement of Hoeben CJ at CL and Hamill J) that 'the use of the term "independent" was erroneous and should be avoided'. Arguably the term should be avoided, and that view is now reflected in the standard form of direction contained in the Judicial Commission's Criminal Trial Bench Book. However, to describe the term as 'erroneous' did not imply an error of law or a miscarriage of justice in the context in which it was used: the challenge was dismissed in SB. However, the reasoning in SB turned on the proposition taken from the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v The Queen that '[e]vidence of complaint cannot constitute corroboration in the technical sense, because it is not independent of the complainant.' That statement was undoubtedly correct, but it appears, understandably, in a passage (i) dealing with the common law and (ii) referring to the use of evidence of complaint as corroboration. This case is not dealing with the common law and is not concerned with any requirement for, or suggestion of, 'corroboration'." (emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
The sole ground of the conviction appeal is untenable. Rule 4.15 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW) applies. I would refuse leave to raise the ground.

[12]

The Sentencing Judgment

The sentencing judgment was comprehensive. Her Honour set out the maximum penalties and standard non-parole period for each offence as well as the facts of each offence in a manner consistent with the above table at [5]. Her Honour then described the various factors affecting an assessment of the objective seriousness of offences of this character before making the assessments set out in the table. There is no challenge to any of those assessments. Her Honour then confirmed that the applicant was not to be punished for the uncharged acts and that their significance was reduced to "plac[ing] the offences in context and … meet[ing] any suggestion that the offences charged and for which the offender was convicted were isolated acts on the offender's part".
Her Honour addressed the applicant's subjective case. The applicant was 49 years of age at the time of sentence. He was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in 2000, assault in 2006 and assault in 2015. He received various non-custodial punishments. Her Honour noted that count 4 was committed while the applicant was the subject of a bond under former s 9 of the Sentencing Act for one of those assaults. Her Honour found that his prior history meant that he could not "claim a history of good character".
The applicant was described by her Honour as having a "happy family home". He left school after completing Year 8 because he was embarrassed about his appearance after breaking his nose playing football. Commencing when he was 15 years of age the applicant worked for 12 years at a supermarket before suffering a work injury. He re-trained as a bus and truck driver. He worked continuously thereafter. He had two significant relationships, being RB and Belinda. Her Honour noted that he had a number of significant health conditions for a person of his age including asthma, diabetes type 2, coronary artery stenosis, angina, poor blood circulation and impaired hearing. His time in custody involved pandemic restrictions which affected both his contact with family and access to medical care. Her Honour accepted that his medical conditions and the pandemic restrictions would make his incarceration "more onerous than would otherwise be the case".
Her Honour noted the effect of victim impact statements from BB, EH and SF. BB described the "very real long-term effects upon her" including suffering "confusion, shame and fear" as well as the "pain of overcoming a secret", trying to overcome "hate, anger and confusion" as well her "continuous struggle with identity and to feel like a woman". Her Honour noted that EH described a "life marked by drug and alcohol problems, anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts and attempts". EH said that she could not "look at her own body without being reminded of her pain" and felt "degraded and disgusted and angry". SF described self-harming and attempting to take her own life. According to her Honour, SF "suffered from instability which has impacted her education and prospects".
Otherwise, her Honour noted the various sentencing factors. Her Honour found that the applicant did not have "good prospects of rehabilitation" and had "failed to accept and acknowledge the significant harm and damage done by his actions". Her Honour noted that s 25AA of the Sentencing Act required the applicant be sentenced in accordance with the sentencing patterns and practices at the time of sentencing. Her Honour noted the necessity to consider totality. Her Honour rejected the suggestion that the sentences should be wholly concurrent but noted that considerations of totality meant they should not be wholly accumulated. As it was the applicant's first time in custody and given the onerous conditions of his custody, her Honour made a finding of "special circumstances" for the purposes of s 44(2A) of the Sentencing Act.

[13]

The Sentence Appeal

The only ground of appeal against sentence is that the sentence was manifestly excessive in the circumstances and a different sentence is warranted in law.
Appellate intervention on this ground "is not justified simply because the result arrived at below is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases" (Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64 at [58]). Instead, it is only warranted "where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons" (ibid).
In Lee v R [2020] NSWCCA 244 at [32] (Payne JA and Fagan J agreeing), I stated the following in relation to appellate review of an aggregate sentence on the ground of manifest excess: "… with an aggregate sentence, although the indicative sentences specified in accordance with s 53A(2) of the Sentencing Act are not themselves amenable to appeal, they can be a guide to whether error is established in relation to the aggregate sentence (JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [40] per RA Hulme J with whom Hoeben CJ at CJ and Adamson J agreed and cases cited thereat; 'JM'). Even if the indicative sentences are considered excessive, that does not necessarily mean that the aggregate sentence is excessive (PD v R [2012] NSWCCA 242 at [44], [82]; BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [252]-[254]). The corollary of that proposition is that, even if the indicative sentences are not excessive in their own right, then that does not preclude a conclusion that the aggregate sentence is excessive. In that regard, the principles concerning cumulation, concurrency and totality are still applicable to the sentencing exercise when an aggregate sentence is imposed (Beale v R [2015] NSWCCA 120 at [73]; 'Beale'). The 'potentials for accumulation' of the various notional sentences can be examined to determine whether the 'aggregate sentence represents a sound exercise of sentencing discretion' (R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 at [35] per Grove AJ; Beale at [73]), although the absence of any requirement to specify beginning and end dates for each notional sentence may make it more difficult to demonstrate a relevant error in applying those principles (Beale id; Martin v R [2014] NSWCCA 124 at [37]). The 'principle', or even ultimate, 'focus of determination of a ground alleging manifest inadequacy or excess will be whether the aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminality involved' (JM at [40])." (emphasis added)
To an extent this passage allows for a bottom-up analysis of an aggregate sentence, ie, a consideration of the individual indicative sentences as part of the assessment of whether the aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive. However, any such approach is qualified by the last proposition, namely, the necessity to consider whether the aggregate sentencing reflects the total criminality involved. In Aryal v R [2021] NSWCCA 2 (at [50]), R A Hulme J observed that, at least where totality considerations are said to bear upon whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, "[r]ather than making an assumption that the indicative sentences are correct, and then endeavouring to assess the extent by which there has been some notional accumulation, the critical question is … 'whether the aggregate sentence reflects the total criminality involved'".
The applicant's submissions in support of this ground noted the sentencing judge's assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending as mostly in the "mid-range" or "slightly above". The submissions pointed to the strength of the applicant's subjective case, his modest criminal history and his vulnerability in custody. The Crown's submissions noted that the offences committed against BB were either committed in her home or when she was under the applicant's care and involved an egregious breach of trust. The submissions also noted that the offences against EH involved serious forms of sexual abuse and necessitated some "notional accumulation" given the number of serious offences committed and the period of time over which they were committed. The Crown also noted that count 16 carried a long maximum sentence (being 25 years) and was committed against his stepdaughter, SF.
Regardless of whether this ground of appeal is considered by either commencing with the indicative sentences or inquiring whether the aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminality involved, the outcome is the same in that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Over a period that exceeds 15 years, the applicant used his position in a family, or at least his presence in a family home, to prey upon three vulnerable young girls. His depraved conducted left them devastated. The nature and time frame of the offending against EH was the most serious. For around a decade, the applicant exploited his position within her family and used her as a sexual object. He committed seven offences of having sexual intercourse with her which related to five different occasions.
Each of the assessments of the objective seriousness of the offences and indicative sentences were open to the sentencing judge. When regard is had to the "potentials for accumulation" of the indicative sentences, then a total sentence exceeding that which is imposed is readily conceivable. Most significantly, the total aggregate sentence that was imposed very much reflects the total criminality of the applicant's conduct.
I would grant the applicant leave to appeal against his sentence but dismiss the appeal.

[14]

Proposed Orders

Accordingly, I propose the following orders: (1) Refuse leave to raise ground 1 of the appeal against conviction; (2) The appeal against conviction be dismissed; (3) Grant the applicant leave to appeal against the sentence imposed on him by the District Court on 28 August 2020; (4) The appeal against sentence be dismissed.
DAVIES J: I agree with Beech-Jones CJ at CL.
HAMILL J: I have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons of Beech-Jones CJ at CL. I agree with the orders proposed and with his Honour's reasons.
In relation to the conviction appeal I would make the following additional observations.
There can be no criticism of the trial Judge for providing the direction of which complaint is now made. The direction was provided several months before this Court's decision in SB v R [2020] NSWCCA 207, accorded with the draft direction then included in the Bench Book and was provided with the emphatic support of counsel then appearing for the applicant. After a somewhat confusing discussion when the matter was first raised by the Prosecutor, the parties considered the matter overnight. The following day, the Prosecutor provided a draft direction (MFI 26), of which counsel then appearing for the applicant said: "I have no problem with it whatsoever."
The direction was flawed because of the inclusion of the word "independent": see SB v R at [108]-[130] and [179], BS v R [2021] NSWCCA 39 at [36] and Long (a pseudonym) v R [2021] NSWCCA 212 at [12] and [78]. The hearsay evidence of the complaint made by the three children was not "independent" evidence. Its source in each instance was the particular complainant in question. However, in the absence of any order limiting its use under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), it was evidence able to be used in support of the facts alleged by the prosecution. The trial Judge identified the evidence with precision and left it for the jury to determine whether the complaints (that is, hearsay representations) were consistent and supportive of the various allegations made against the applicant. Her Honour reminded the jury more than once, including after she had given the impugned re-direction, that: "[T]he fact that a person says something on more than one occasion does not mean that what is said is necessarily true or accurate. A false or inaccurate statement does not become more reliable just because it is repeated on one or more occasions".
In the circumstances, there was no prospect that the jury misused the evidence because of the use of the word "independent" in the course of the directions.
As to the sentence appeal, I accept that the aggregate sentence imposed on the applicant was a very severe one. However, it was a sentence imposed after trial (which is relevant in making comparisons with sentences imposed after a plea of guilty) and involved the repetitive sexual abuse of three separate children. The description employed by Beech-Jones CJ at CL at [48] is not inapposite. The ground of appeal cannot be upheld because the members of this Court might have come to a different conclusion as to the precise term of the sentence. A severe sentence was to be expected and I agree with the Chief Judge that the aggregate sentence was not "manifestly excessive" in the sense that it was plainly wrong or unjust, or manifestly beyond a legitimate discretionary range.

WS v R

At a glance

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Legislation Cited (6)

Cases Cited (18)

Cited By (2)